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A b s t r a c t
The present thesis is concerned w ith the character of kinds in hum an somatic pathology and the 
relation th a t these kinds and their m em bers have w ith function-based explanations. More 
precisely, in the first part of the thesis I investigate w hether diseased organisms, grouped together 
on grounds o f their shared pathological features, could form natural kinds, taking into account 
th a t the paradigm atic natural kinds are the kinds of the exact sciences. The second part of the 
thesis has as a backdrop the H um ean/anti-H um ean debate over causation (and the specific 
construal o f explanations according to which to explain is to pinpoint causes). In this backdrop, I 
enquire into what sort of function-based explanations we could provide for the symptoms and 
pathological behaviours exhibited by diseased organisms, if we construe such organisms as 
m em bers of natural kinds.
I argue in the first part of the thesis that from a metaphysical point o f view, the organisms dealt 
w ith in somatic m edicine form natural kinds in the same sense in which we take the kinds dealt 
w ith in the exact sciences as natural. By com paring a ‘classical’, exact science kind w ith a kind of 
disease, I show th a t whatever features are associated w ith natural kind m em bership (e.g. 
involvem ent in laws or inductions, explanatory relevance, possession o f ‘essential’ properties, 
instantiation o f substantive universals, etc.) there is no ‘ontological gap’ between disease kinds 
and the kinds in the exact sciences.
The conclusion th a t diseases are natural kinds has a certain proviso regarding the question of 
w hether the identity  o f the individual m em bers of natural kinds is dependent upon their kind 
m em bership. Should diseases no t be natural kinds, the proviso says, it would be because the 
properties characteristic of natural kinds m ust have an identity-influence over the kind members. 
I present in addition serious problem s posed by outlining such identity bearing properties.
In the second part o f the thesis, I argue that function based explanations concerned w ith diseased 
organisms - if we construe such organisms as being m em bers of natural kinds - should illum inate 
positive causes for the symptoms and pathological behaviours they exhibit. W e could obtain such 
function-based explanations, I suggest, if we in terpret the functioning of biological item s as the 
m anifesting of causal powers. Against the background of the H um ean vs. anti-H um ean debate on 
causation, I show th a t Nancy Cartwright’s capacities are a plausible variant for the powers at work 
in ‘pathological’ functioning.
I argue th a t one could track down these capacities if one viewed healthy organisms as nomological 
machines, in the sense in which Cartwright understands this notion. I also suggest th a t capacities 
are necessary in order to vindicate general and, m ore im portantly, singular causal claims involved 
in medical diagnosis and  hence to found satisfactory functional explanations.
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In t r o d u c t io n
In science as in  everyday life, we operate w ith  classifications th a t organise objects 
according to  various sim ilarities. O n a m etaphysical level, the  classified objects are 
candidates for being m em bers o f natural kinds. The no tion  o f natu ral kind is thus  
in tended  to  delineate a m etaphysical category th a t reflects the  fact th a t objects resem ble 
one ano th er in different degrees and th a t some of these resem blances seem  m ore 
’p ro found’ th an  others. Banknotes, galaxies, w eeds and shopping bags, for instance, 
certainly appear less sim ilar than, say, m etals. T hat som e of our classifications seem  to be 
m ore im portan t th an  o thers stands in need o f a m etaphysical explanation and natural 
kinds rep resen t (the beginning of) an  answer.
By appealing to  a m inim al construal of properties, we could say th a t m em bers o f natural 
kinds are individual objects th a t share certain  p roperties and  th a t to look for the  
im portan t resem blances betw een individuals is to search for certain  pa tte rn s  of properties 
th a t should be p a rt o f an  ‘ideal classification’.1 Different au tho rs have proposed different 
requ irem ents for exactly w hat sim ilarities are required  for natural kind m em bership. 
These requ irem ents refer to  inductions, laws, identity, universals, causation etc., and 
connect the  natu ra l kinds them e to various o ther controversial problem s in m etaphysics 
(the m ost im portan t o f w hich being the problem s of essences, hierarchies, substantive 
universals and processes, to w hich I will re tu rn  shortly).
The idea th a t th ings in the  w orld can fit into an ‘ideal classification’ has a definite 
in tuitive appeal. It is im portan t to note th a t natural kinds have been, in fact, associated 
w ith  an  entire  luggage o f intu itions. Theorists have often affirm ed th a t to reveal the 
resem blances shared by natural kind m em bers is to  ‘carve natu re  a t its jo in ts’, ‘classify 
objects independen tly  o f our thoughts, values, conventions and language’, ‘provide a basic 
ontology’, ‘divide the  w orld in a non-arb itrary  way’, ‘illum inate w hat th ings a re ’, ‘delineate
1 Bird and Tobin note that if there were a single property to characterise kind members, some of our 
intuitions concerning the nature of ‘profound’ classifications would be violated; intuitively, the charged 
bodies for instance do not constitute a natural kind; see Bird and Tobin (2008: section 1.1). That is, kind 
members should share several properties. That is why I shall often speak about patterns of properties (or of 
similarities) and not just about properties simpliciter.
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th e  fundam ental divisions o f natu re ', etc.2 O f course, these in tu itions have played their 
role in  the  debates abou t w hat lands are natu ral and  w hat criteria  and  requ irem ents for 
na tu ra l k ind m em bership  we should accept.
In m edicine we also deal w ith  classifications; diseases and  diseased organism s are 
classified. In the  p resen t thesis, I focus on the  life th rea ten ing  conditions in som atic 
m edicine and  ask - could diseases be natu ral kinds? The abovem entioned  in tu itions tell 
us ‘n o ’, by all m eans. Surely, classifications in physics or chem istry  intuitively delineate 
the  ‘basic divisions o f n a tu re ’ and  the  fundam ental particles or the  chem ical elem ents do 
seem  to fit in to  a ‘basic ontology’. Diseased organism s, in  contrast, appear as second-hand 
relata  o f m edical classifications, which, even though they  m ight be non-arbitrary , do no t 
seem  to ‘carve n a tu re ’ deep enough, dow n to its ‘joints'. In short, an  ‘ontological gap’ 
seem s to separate the natu ral kinds o f the exact sciences and the  disease kinds, as it were. 
M oreover, the  fact th a t the  very objectivity o f m edical classifications has been under 
d ispu te3 - in line w ith  m ore or less recent allegations th a t a value com ponent is involved 
in the  disease concept -  seem s to m ake the case for diseases as na tu ra l kinds even worse.
The m ain  claim  I will try  to defend in the  first part of th is thesis is th a t no tw ithstand ing  
these in tu itions (and the  problem s concerning the exact d isease/non-disease d istinction), 
the  ontological gap putatively  separating lands in the  exact sciences from m edical lands is 
un-w arran ted . I will try  to show  th a t instead o f an  ontological gap, we only have a 
difference o f degree. Hence, we can justifiably view diseases as na tu ra l kinds.
This conclusion will have a certain  proviso, related to  the  question  o f w hether 
m em bership  o f a kind is necessary for the  iden tity  o f na tu ra l kind m em bers. Only if their 
identity  depends on the  instan tia tion  o f land  properties, the  caveat says, diseases could 
no t be natural kinds. T hat is sim ply because the  iden tity  o f organism s could n o t possibly 
depend  on their diseased traits. O n the o ther hand, a lthough in principle the  kind 
m em bership  in physics or chem istry could influence the  iden tity  o f the  respective kind 
m em bers, I will indicate a sum  o f epistem ological reasons for w hy such a possibility is 
very im plausible and  difficult to assess.
2 See for example Hirsch (1997: 52)
3 See for instance Szasz (1987) Fulford (2001)
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M ethodologically, I will undertake  my discussion by way of com paring a kind o f disease 
(nam ely Graves’ disease) w ith an exact science kind (nam ely Gold). I will show th a t no 
m atte r w hat putative criterion o f natu ral kind m em bership  we take into account, a 
w arran ted  ontological gap does no t show up betw een them . Three possible scenarios will 
appear in m y com parison. For som e criteria, bo th  Gold and  the  Graves’ disease k ind will 
tu rn  o u t to satisfy them . For o ther criteria, ne ither Gold nor the  Graves’ disease land  
appears to  be suitable. For a th ird  group of criteria, only one o f the  two kinds seem s to  
satisfy them  b u t th en  we can seriously question  the justification these criteria; the  
iden tity  caveat m entioned  above will play a crucial role in th is question ing  task.
The second p a rt o f the  thesis continues the w ork o f the  first in the  d irection  of scientific 
explanations. Obviously, the  pragm atic reason why classifications abound  in sciences is 
th a t they  sm ooth  ou t the  way tow ards explaining the  behaviour o f classified particulars. 
In general, natu ral k inds are associated w ith  causal explanations. T hat is, the  behaviour of 
a particu lar is explained by poin ting  out th a t the properties characteristic o f its na tu ra l 
land  cause it to behave as it does, in a positive way. In m edicine, however, a large part of 
the  explanations in  use do no t take an overt causal form  b u t appeal to biological dys­
functions (or failures to  function). In o ther words, in such explanations the absence of 
certain  functional effects is responsible for the  state of d isordered organism s. The issue I 
am  concerned w ith in the  second part o f the  thesis is how  to reconcile this (dys-)function 
based register of m edical explanations w ith  the  assum ption  th a t diseases are natural 
kinds and  th a t the  behaviour o f ill organism s should be dealt w ith, on an  explanatory 
level, by indicating the  positive causes characteristic o f (or identifiable through) the ir 
kind.
The suggestion I will advance is th a t instead of (or com plem entary  to) identifying the 
dys-functioning of biological items, we should (also) seek to identify in pathological 
contexts the ir functioning, per se. Further, we can provide kind-specific explanations if we 
in te rp re t the  function ing  as the  m anifesting o f causal powers. Against the  background of 
the  H um ean / an ti-H um ean  debate, I will show  th a t Nancy C artw right’s capacities 
represen t a plausible varian t for the  powers a t w ork in  ‘pathological’ functioning.4
4 Cartwright (1999)
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I should  say th a t m y enquiry into m edical kinds and  explanations is set ou t in a particu lar 
research context. Just as all the  o ther special sciences, m edicine has received in the  last 
few decades a great deal o f a tten tio n  from  philosophy. The philosophers discussing 
m edical issues, however, have n o t prim arily sought to explore the  particu lar relevance for 
m edicine of classical no tions em ployed in the  philosophy of science (notions like natural 
kinds, induction , laws, causation, explanation, etc.), b u t have ra ther concen tra ted  on 
ethical aspects - for instance, the  values th a t m ight be involved in identifying diseases. 
This focus o f research has left little room  for w ork on the  m etaphysics o f m edicine, as 
such. The la tte r has rem ained a relatively uncharted  territo ry  and  the  few au thors who 
have ven tured  to discuss it were ham pered  by the absence o f a background of system atic, 
concerted  enquiry. Thus, for the  m ost part, they  could only im port ready-m ade 
conclusions draw n elsewhere in the  philosophy of science.
In th is respect, the  issue o f function-based explanations is a good example. Theorists have 
appealed to functions as a possible m eans to draw  the border betw een the pathological 
and  the  non-pathological, the  claim being th a t one can identify diseased organism s via 
biological dysfunctions or failures to function of their biological item s. A part from  this, 
however, the  litera tu re  hardly offers any discussion o f the explanatory relevance of 
biological functions in m edicine. The related issue o f natural k inds is also illustrative. 
There have been  a num ber of papers and book chapters enquiring into the  natural kinds 
o f diseases, som etim es w ith in teresting  and provocative resu lts.5 N onetheless, they  have 
no t really engaged w ith  the  cu rren t w ork on the  m etaphysics o f natu ral kinds.
In a sense then , the  central question of my thesis can be form ulated  as follows: if one sets 
aside the  issue o f the  d isease/non-disease d istinction  (and all the  related discussions in 
w hich various ethical aspects are involved), w hat can be said, strictly vis-^-vis the  
m etaphysics o f m edicine, abou t the  lands and  explanations th a t the  organism s suffering
5 See Cooper (2005), Reznek (1987)
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from  life-threaten ing  conditions are subject of?6 O f course, in order to  avoid the  tem pting  
range o f ready-m ade conclusions, my answ er will require a separate discussion o f some 
general argum en ts from  the  philosophy of science abou t the  na tu re  o f natu ral kinds. 
These argum ents concern  the problem s of essences, h ierarchies, substantive universals 
and  processes. M ore deeply, they concern  the  sum  o f in tu itions I have m en tioned  above, 
w hich influence kind theorists  in backing up a particu lar set o f criteria  for natu ral kind 
m em bersh ip .7 My approach  will be to offer two possible substan tia tions o f the  in tu ition(s) 
a t hand  and  to question  th a t particular set of requ irem ents vis-^-vis their (m ade) explicit, 
in tuitive grounds.
It is precisely th a t set of requirem ents that, it will tu rn  out, poses the  greatest problem s in 
m y m ethodological com parison. However, the  problem s of essences, hierarchies, 
substantive universals and  processes, I will show, are quite  innocuous w hen it com es to 
viewing diseases as natu ral kinds. If carving nature  a t its jo in ts does not m ean th a t the 
d iachronic iden tity  o f natural kind m em bers depends upon  their m em bership, th en  it 
does no t m atte r w hether m edical kinds satisfy or n o t th a t set of requirem ents. If carving 
natu re  a t its jo in ts does m ean th a t the  diachronic identity  of na tu ra l kind m em bers 
depends upon  the ir m em bership , th en  an  ontological gap could be in place betw een 
m edical kinds and  exact science kinds (as m y caveat says, indeed). N onetheless, we face 
huge epistem ological problem s w hen a ttem pting  to determ ine w hich properties have an 
identity-influence over the  m em bers o f exact science kinds.
6 I should underlie that I consider these ethical aspects extremely important and my decision to leave them  
aside is simply an issue of focusing on a particular path o f enquiry. It is extremely important for instance, to 
come to terms with the problem o f borderline cases in medicine -  those conditions about which there is 
disagreement over their status as diseases. By focusing on life-threatening conditions, my enquiry does not 
demand (or attempt) a solution to the problem of how to draw the distinction between disease and non­
disease in borderline cases (the interested reader should consult Margolis (1976) and Boorse (1977) for two 
representative defences of the value-ladeness and value-free positions, respectively). My views on this issue, 
vis-^-vis natural kinds, closely follow Cooper’s approach from her (2005). Cooper maintains that a value 
component is involved in the disease concept but points out that this should not deter us from considering 
that at least some of the cases that medics treat, research, etc., qualify as natural kinds. A useful analogy 
drawn by Cooper is with the case of weeds and the weed concept -  it might be that considering any plant a 
weed is a value judgment, but that being said, the plants put under this heading (e.g. daisies, buttercups) 
could be investigated as natural kinds; see Cooper (2005: 76). My account of diseases as natural kinds 
should be readily applicable to those conditions (among the borderline ones) that would conclusively be 
found to be diseases.
7 In chapter 1, I will call these criteria the ‘N&S requirement’, ‘non-overlapping requirement’ and ‘non-phase 
requirement’.
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In  outline, the  s truc tu re  o f m y thesis is as follows. In c h a p te r  1, I p resen t the  various 
criteria  and requ irem ents for natural kind m em bersh ip  advanced in the  literature  and 
outline certain  accounts of natural kinds adop ted  by particu lar philosophers th a t will play 
an  im portan t role in my argum ents (Ellis, Lowe, Bird, Dupr£, Boyd). I th en  set ou t the  
state  o f the  a rt in the  debates over the  existence o f natu ral kinds in m edicine. In the  final 
p a rt o f the  chapter, I discuss the  issue o f nom inalism  vs. realism  for natural kinds vis-^-vis 
the  p resen ted  requ irem ents for m em bership  and  th en  in troduce the two substan tia tions 
o f the  carving na tu re  a t its jo in ts in tu ition .
The problem s o f essences, substantive universals and processes are approached in 
c h a p te r  2, w here m ost o f my discussion abou t the  general m etaphysics o f natural kinds is 
located. I show  th a t if carving natu re  a t its jo ints does not m ean th a t the  diachronic 
iden tity  o f natu ral kind m em bers depends upon their m em bership , th en  som e o f the 
m ore dem anding  criteria for natural kind m em bership  th a t theorists  have p u t forw ard in 
the  litera tu re  cannot be justified.
In c h a p te r  3 I in troduce the  m ethodological com parison betw een gold and the  Graves’ 
Disease k ind and  take into account, in tu rn , all the  criteria o f m em bership  presen ted  in 
chap ter 1. I th en  argue, in conjunction w ith the analysis undertaken  in  chapter 2, th a t 
there  is no ‘ontological gap’ betw een kinds of diseased organism s and  kinds in the  exact 
science, m ain tain ing  however, the  proviso th a t if the  identity  o f natu ral kind m em bers 
depends on their instan tia ting  natural kind properties, th en  diseases could no t possibly 
be natural kinds.
In c h a p te r  4 I tu rn  to  the  o ther aspect o f m y enquiry and  look a t how  we could explain 
the  behaviour of diseased organism s, taken as m em bers o f natural kinds, from  the  poin t 
o f view of biological functions. I argue th a t w hat we should expect from  function-based 
explanations o f diseased organisms, w hen viewed as m em bers o f natural kinds, is to 
illum inate positive causes o f the  sym ptom s and pathological behaviours they  exhibit. I 
show  th a t one can construe function-based explanations as fully-fledged explanations 
th a t refer to  positive causes, if we in te rp re t the  functioning o f biological item s as the  
m anifesting o f causal powers. I also provide as a background for th is discussion a 
p resen tation  o f the  H um ean /an ti-H um ean  debate  on causation and  show  next th a t Nancy
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C artw right’s capacities rep resen t a plausible variant for the  pow ers th a t are a t w ork in 
pathological’ function ing .8
I argue th a t these capacities can be tracked dow n if healthy organism s are viewed as 
‘nom ological m ach ines’, in the  sense in w hich Cartw right understands th is notion. I also 
suggest th a t capacities are necessary in order to vindicate general and, m ore im portantly , 
singular causal claims involved in m edical diagnosis and  hence to  found satisfactory 
functional explanations.
The thesis ends w ith  som e ‘Final Rem arks’ in w hich I take stock o f the  argum ents about 
m edical kinds and  explanations espoused in the  previous chapters, situate  ten tatively  the 
position  o f m y thesis in  the  evolution th a t certain  concepts have had in the  history of 
philosophy and  explain some of the  argum entative strategies I have em ployed.
I should  m en tion  one final aspect in th is In troduction . I will have to  m ake a num ber of 
assum ptions in  m y enquiry, having no space or scope to discuss the ir justification. I will 
specify each o f these assum ptions in the  thesis, w here the ir use is relevant for the  
discussion. For the  purpose of clarity it is evidently useful to  list th em  from  the  beginning 
as well. First, I assum e non-reductionism  of biological properties to physical and  chem ical 
properties. Second, I assum e th a t the problem  o f (causal) induction  is a m etaphysical 
issue th a t has to do prim arily  w ith  the  existence or the  non-existence o f causal powers. 
Finally, I assum e th a t m etaphysical d isputes can a t m ost be clarified, b u t n o t solved by 
sem antic and  linguistic considerations.9
8 Cartwright (1999)
9 See especially Salmon (1982), Mumford (2005) and Lowe (2008) who discuss the issue of essentialism and 
the Kripke/Putnam semantic approach to it.
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C h a p t e r  i . N a t u r a l  Kin d s
In t r o d u c t io n
W h at are na tu ra l kinds? In  scholastic philosophy, w hat we now  call ‘na tu ra l k inds’ were 
supposed to  be Ideas in  God’s m ind, paradigm atic ‘en tities’ th a t pre-existed  and (thus) 
shaped the  God’s creation o f the  world of particu lars.10 In contem porary  philosophy, the 
defin ition  o f na tu ra l k inds is less straightforw ard, if n o t slightly elusive. At base, natural 
kinds are m ean t to  be m etaphysical categories reflecting the  fact th a t objects resem ble 
one ano ther in d ifferent degrees and  som e of these resem blances seem  m ore ’profound’ 
th an  others. The m em bers o f natural kinds, accordingly, should be individual objects th a t 
share (a) certain  (p attern  of)11 ‘im portan t’ properties, w hich we should consider in an 
‘ideal’ classification. However, w hat are the  ‘profound’ resem blances, w hat is an  ‘ideal’ 
classification and  w hat (patterns of) properties should count as ‘im portan t’? W e have in 
the  literatu re  a great variety of answers to these questions, bo th  on an  explicit and 
in tuitive level.
O n an  explicit level, we have a series o f requirem ents for natu ral k ind m em bership  th a t 
aim  to specify w hat na tu re  the (patterns of) ‘im p o rtan t’ p roperties have. These 
requ irem ents refer to  inductions, laws, identity, universals, causation etc., and  connect 
the  natu ral kinds them e to various o ther controversial problem s in m etaphysics (such as 
the  problem s of essences, hierarchies, substantive universals and  processes). O n an 
in tuitive level, we have a series of appealing renditions for w hat a ‘perfect’ classification 
should realize, e.g. ‘carve natu re  a t its jo in ts’, ‘provide a basic ontology’, ‘divide the  world 
in a non-arb itrary  way’, ‘illum inate w hat th ings are’, ‘classify objects independen tly  o f our 
thoughts, values, conventions, language, etc .’ ‘delineate the  fundam ental divisions of
10 See Funkenstein (1989)
11 Again, as Bird and Tobin note, if  there were a single property to characterise kind members, som e o f our 
intuitions concerning the nature of ‘profound’ classifications would be violated; intuitively, the charged 
bodies, for instance, do not constitute a natural kind; see Bird and Tobin (2008: section 1.1). That is, kind 
members should share several properties. That is why I shall often speak about patterns of properties (or of 
similarities) and not just about properties simpliciter.
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n a tu re ’, e tc .12
Notably, there  is a basic d isagreem ent in  the  literature  as to w hich criteria  are ‘correct’ 
and  the  precise, in tu itive con ten t suggested by phrases like ‘carving natu re  a t its jo in ts’ is 
also unse ttled  (and often  unquestioned). The two m atters  m ight well be connected . To 
disagree over the  criteria  o f natural kind m em bership  is in the  end to  disagree over 
na tu ra l kind Realism and the  elusiveness of the  ‘carving na tu re  a t its jo in ts’ in tu ition  
m ight well reflect the  tension  faced by contem porary  m etaphysics w hen em ploying age- 
old conceptual schem es (in which ‘natural k ind ' Realism was, as I said, a m uch  m ore 
straightforw ard m atte r).13
My purpose in the  p resen t thesis is no t to analyse th is conceptual tension  (if any) from 
the  perspective o f the  history of philosophy and  even less to try  to settle w hat natural 
k inds are. However, I will have to undertake a discussion, w ith  analytic, contem porary  
m eans, o f the  relationship  betw een kind Realism and  criteria o f natu ral kind m em bership 
on the  one hand, and  the  intuitive baggage o f the  contem porary  natu ral kind discourse, 
on the  o ther. T hat is because, as I have m entioned  in the  In troduction  to th is thesis, a 
crucial reason for dism issing diseases as natural kinds is th a t they  seem ingly could no t 
form  a ‘basic ontology’, ‘show w hat things are’, etc. and som e requirem ents fulfilled by 
exact science kinds and  failed by m edical kinds have an in tricate grounding in  th is 
intuitive luggage. I will undertake in chapter 2 the bulk o f this discussion, which will 
revolve a round  the (possible) role played by natural kind m em bership for the  diachronic 
identity  o f kind m em bers. In the  p resen t chapter, I will in troduce some key concepts and 
lay dow n both  the  background for the  general, m etaphysical discussion from  chapter 2 
and  the  m ore applied enquiry from  chapter 3 in w hich the particu lar context o f m edical 
kind is investigated.
T hus, I w ill p re se n t in  th is  c h a p te r th e  various c rite ria  an d  re q u ire m e n ts  for n a tu ra l k ind  
m em b ersh ip  ad v an ced  in  th e  lite ra tu re  (§1.1) an d  will o u tlin e  ce rta in  acco u n ts  o f  n a tu ra l
12 See for example Hirsch (1997: 52)
13 As it is well known, 'carving nature at its joints’ is originally a platonic phrase (Phaedrus—though 
Socrates’s words are somewhat different) that was taken up and exploited to the maximum by medieval 
philosophers. For some general analyses of the abovementioned kind o f tension see Funkenstein (1989) who 
looks at the heritage o f our notions o f space, will and knowledge, Koyre (1957) who looks at the heritage of  
our cosmological concepts and Hacking (1984) who traces back the origin of the modern concept of 
probability.
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kinds adop ted  by particu lar philosophers th a t will play an  im portan t role in my 
argum ents (§1.2). T hen  I will set ou t the  state o f the  a rt in the  debates over the  existence 
o f na tu ra l lands in m edicine (§1.3) and  will portray  the  d ilem m as posed for natu ral kind 
Realism by the  p resen ted  requirem ents for m em bership, as well as m y own m ethodology 
vis-a-vis na tu ra l k ind Realism (§1.4). In the  final part o f th is chap ter I will in troduce w hat 
I see as two possible substan tia tions of the  ‘carving natu re  a t its jo in ts’ in tu ition , in 
relation to the  d iachronic iden tity  o f natural kind m em bers (§1.5).
§  1.1 C r it e r ia  f o r  n a t u r a l  k in d  m e m b e r s h ip
All accounts o f kinds claim  th a t m em bers o f a kind are sim ilar. However, questions 
rem ain  w ith  respect to  w hat sort o f properties kind m em bers should  share and  o f w hat 
types o f sim ilarity patterns they should exhibit. I will try  in  the  p resen t section to 
system atise a num ber o f requirem ents advanced in the  literatu re  regarding the  natural 
k ind m em bership . The criteria a t hand  provide various answ ers to  the  questions above.
I -  natural properties requirement
The first criterion  tells us th a t properties delineating kinds should be natural. The reason 
w hy our classifications are arbitrary  in som e cases is sim ply th a t the  sim ilarities 
grounding  these classifications am oun t to gerrym andered properties. The salient contrast 
a t w ork here is betw een natural properties and so-called Cam bridge properties -  
arbitrary, relational properties envisioned by m anoeuvring predicates e.g. being 3 km 
away from  the  Eiffel tower. Evidently, the objects th a t are 5 km  away from  the  Eiffel tow er 
are less likely to  be candidates for natural kind m em bership  than , say, the  objects m ade 
o u t o f alum inium . Philosophers who deny th is requ irem en t affirm  in tu rn  th a t any 
classification is just as good as any other. G oodm an m akes an adequate  example here 
since his paradox o f induction  unveiled using grue-predicates (a kind o f Cam bridge
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properties) questions the  sta tus o f natu ral p roperties.14
Som etim es theo rist con trast natu ral p roperties w ith  relational p roperties in general.15 It is 
debatab le  though  w hether all relational properties should be p u t in to  the  sam e category 
as the  Cam bridge ones. There are salient relational properties, m ost rem arkably the  ones 
found in biology (e.g., lineage), th a t are far from being gerrym andered and  arguably 
should  n o t be ruled ou t in the  first instance as candidates for being instan tia ted  by 
natu ra l kind m em bers.16
Insofar as p roperties are natural, one could rule out a source o f arb itrariness for our 
classifications. Indeed, th is requ irem ent concerning natu ral properties is often 
form ulated  by saying th a t our classifications should be non-arbitrary in the  sense th a t 
they  should  no t depend  on our language, values, conventions, though ts, etc .17 Som etim es, 
non-arb itrariness is also cited in connection w ith  the  rest o f the  m em bership  criteria, to 
be listed below.
II - causal induction requirement
Besides being characterised  by natural properties, w hat is also required  from  kinds is to  
participate in consequential, causal inductions.18 For instance, it m ight well be th a t the  
kind w ater -  characterised  as liquid, transparen t, dissolving sugar, etc. - is delineated by 
natural properties. N onetheless, this k ind does no t participate in causal inductions in the  
sam e sense as does the  kind delineated by m ore profound’ p roperties (like covalent and 
hydrogen bonding  betw een atom s of oxygen and  hydrogen, w hich dissociate under th is or
14 See Goodman (1946) and Goodman (1965) in which not only natural properties but also all our 
metaphysical categories are relativized upon the holding of certain conceptual schemes.
15 Ellis (2001) and Wilkerson (1995) among others, require the properties in question to be intrinsic. Ellis 
notes and discusses the problems with the exact distinction between intrinsic and relational (Ellis, 2001: 26- 
30); see also Bigelow (1999: 52, 53)
16 See Dupr6 (1993) who advocates the use o f relational properties (in biology)
17 See Hirsch (1997: 53-60), Bird and Tobin’s discussion o f naturalism in their (2008) and also Hacking’s 
review of Mill’s kinds in Hacking (2006)
18 A criterion put forward by, for instance, Wilkerson (1995: 32), Ellis (2001: 4-7 passim), Mackery (2005: 
446), and Boyd (1995: 368). As I have stated in the Introduction, I assume that the problem of (causal) 
induction is a metaphysical one, which has to do primarily with the existence or the non-existence of causal 
powers.
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th a t ionic product, w ith  the  corresponding V shaped structu re  having a high density  
electron  d istribu tion  around  the  oxygen atom s, etc).19 O f course, bo th  sets o f p roperties 
uniquely  pick out the  kind w ater (in the  actual w orld a t least). N onetheless, the  la tte r sort 
o f properties, unlike the  form er, is causally efficient - they  act as causes for o ther 
‘superficial’ p roperties we seek to explain. The reason th a t inductive conditionals o f the  
form  “if som eth ing  is a sam ple o f w ater, th en  it will, or it probably will, boil a t ioo°C, 
under norm al a tm ospheric pressure” are successful is because the  w ater kind being is 
characterised  precisely by such explanatory powerful properties: the  sort o f properties 
th a t science m akes reference to in scientific explanations.
Hence, a kind supports consequential causal inductions w hen  the  properties th a t 
characterise it are ‘p ro found’ from  a causal po in t o f view - properties a ttended  by causal 
powers, w ith  roles in scientific explanation, prediction, etc. For simplicity, I will 
henceforth  call these properties determining p roperties.20 Evidently, m ost often these 
determ in ing  properties th a t science m akes use o f are m icrostructural properties and  the 
p roperties they  explain are observable ones. However, it is w orth  stressing that, insofar as 
the  criterion  o f (causal) induction  is concerned, the  d istinction betw een the  ‘p rofound’, 
determ in ing  p roperties and  the ‘superficial’ p roperties has strictly causal grounds and is 
thus  d ifferent from  the  d istinction  betw een m icrostructural and  observable properties. 
T hat is because, for one th ing, the  ‘superficial’ properties we should explain m ight be 
m icrostructural p roperties as well, and for ano ther observable properties and  behaviours 
m ay have causal pow ers as well.
Ill - law involvement requirement
A bolder developm ent of the  previous criterion says th a t natu ral kinds should be involved
19 See Chaplin (2008)
201 follow here Cooper’s (2005) terminology. Note that certain authors (especially those following the 
Lockean discussion o f ‘essences’) call these explanatory powerful properties as ‘essential’; see for instance 
Harre (2005:10,11). I shall return to different senses o f the essential shortly.
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in (causal) laws o f n a tu re .21 It m ight be for instance th a t electrons are involved in 
induction  inferences o f the  type ‘if all electrons observed so far exhibited th is or th a t 
behaviour tow ards pro tons, th en  the  next observed electron will, or will probably exhibit 
the  sam e behaviour', or ‘if som eth ing  is an electron, then  it will a ttrac t p ro tons w ith  th is 
force’. However, one could po in t ou t th a t w hat is a t w ork here is a law in w hich the  kind 
o f electrons is involved, because charge is one o f its characterising properties.
In o ther words, th is criterion  says th a t the properties shared by kind m em bers should be 
n o t only na tu ra l and  explanatory powerful b u t also ‘nom ic’ -  the sort o f properties th a t 
w ould be found in the  an teceden ts of law statem ents, were such sta tem en ts form ulated 
by appealing to property-predicates.
N ote th a t th is is a correct rend ition  of the requ irem en t th a t kinds should  be involved in 
laws only if kinds do no t found  laws, i.e. only if the  casual m ention ing  o f k inds in law-like 
sentences is n o t in te rp re ted  m etaphysically in the sense th a t kinds are construed as tru th -  
m akers o f law -sta tem ents.22 The m ainstream  view, however, is th a t the  relata  of laws are 
properties. N ote also th a t th is criterion is different from  criterion II, insofar as kinds 
could participate  in causal inductions w ithou t being involved in laws, and there  are 
serious reasons to  th in k  th is is the  case. For instance, special sciences represen t for m any 
scientific law theorists  dom ains in which we do n o t have laws, a t least in the  sense in 
w hich canonically, laws characterize the  exact sciences.23 Yet, insofar as one does not 
advocate reductionism  (for instance of the  biological or psychological to the  physical 
level), special sciences cannot be understood  as lacking causation, i.e. as being 
characterized by arbitrary, accidental processes. Hence, in such dom ains it should be 
m eaningful to discuss abou t explanatory powerful properties and causal inductions, even 
if the  existence o f nom ic properties, in the full-blooded sense, is an  undecided  issue.241 
will re tu rn  to the  topic o f kinds and  laws a t various o ther points in th is chapter, especially
21 Criterion put forth by Bird (1998), Collier (1996), Ellis (2001) among others. One should distinguish 
between causal and non-causal laws -  what Hempel for example called ‘laws of succession’ and ‘laws of 
coexistence’ (Hempel, 1966). At work in the above criterion, which strengthens the causal induction 
criterion, are the causal laws. The co-instantiation laws are involved in what I shall call the N&S 
requirement (criterion VIb -  which I will describe below).
22 See Lowe (1989) who adopts this view of natural laws.
23 See Ellis (2001) and Carnap (1995).
24 See for instance Boyd (1991), who discusses persuasively about causal induction and causation in biology 
while accepting that the type of laws found in physics have no correspondent in the biological realm.
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in §1.2, and  in chap ter 3.
IV - identity requirement
A final condition  set upon  the  properties characterising a na tu ra l k ind is for them  to be 
involved in the  iden tity  o f the  kind m em bers, in the  sense that, should a kind m em ber 
lose its m em bership , it w ould cease to exist. The underly ing view here is th a t the  
(num erical) iden tity  o f a particu lar depends n o t only on spatio-tem porally  continuity  or a 
certain  causal history, b u t also on its continuing  to instan tia te  the  natural kind 
properties. For example, in spite o f the  fact th a t the  m icrostructural properties of lead are 
natural, explanatory powerful, nom ic, etc., in order for lead to be a natural kind it should 
be the  case that, w ere a particu lar sam ple o f lead tran sm u ted  in to  gold, the  end-resu lt 
w ould be num erically different from  the  sam ple before the  transubstan tia tion .25
Now, the  previous four criteria spell ou t w hat sort o f properties should be instan tia ted  by 
kind m em bers. W e have, however, a fu rther set of requ irem ents concerned w ith  the  co­
instan tia tion  o f properties by kind m em bers and  the  natu re  o f the  patterns  o f properties 
they  share. These additional criteria com plem ent the  first four in  the  sense th a t the  
properties considered as parts o f the  respective pa tte rn s should be a t least explanatory 
powerful, determ in ing  properties.
V - co-instantiation induction requirement
O ne such criterion is th a t natural kinds should be involved in co-instan tia tion  inductions, 
w hich we should distinguish from  causal inductions (just as we should distinguish causal 
laws from  co-instan tia tion  laws). For example, if som ething is a m etal, th en  it will (or it
Z5 The proponents of this criterion are Brody (1974), Denkel (1996), Wiggins (1980), Elder (2005, 2007) These 
identity-bearing properties are also at times called essential; evidently, in a different sense than the one 
associated with the explanatory powerful, determining properties. Parenthetically, if  we reckon with the 
distinction between countable and non-countable (or mass) kinds, in the case o f the latter this criterion 
entails that their members' diachronic identity has changed after losing their kind membership. See Lowe 
(2001: 73, 74) and Lowe (1998: 199-201) for his related distinction between individuals and pseudo- 
individuals.
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will probably) have the  valence shell electrons delocalised, and  have available a far larger 
num ber o f delocalized energy states th an  o f delocalized electrons, and  possess a lattice o f 
positive ions, etc.
I have said th a t the  p roperties involved in  th is additional set o f criteria  concerning the 
natu re  o f the  patterns o f sim ilarities exhibited by kind m em bers (and accordingly, 
involved in the  co-instan tia tion  induction  criterion as well) should be a t least 
determ in ing  properties. This observation is particularly  relevant here because it helps us 
to  d ifferentiate betw een the co-instan tia tion  induction  involved in the  p resen t criterion 
and  the  causal induction  involved in criterion II.
M ost if  n o t all co -instan tia tion  inferences th a t can be fram ed using (causally) ‘superficial’ 
p roperties -  e.g. if som eth ing  is a duck, th en  it has w ebbed feet, a long neck, serrated  
lam ellae of the  bill, etc. -  are m asked causal inductions th a t appeal to the  presence of 
certain  determ in ing  properties (in th is case, the  genetic properties o f ducks). Such 
m asked causal inductions are in fact dependen t upon  prior co-instan tia tion  inferences 
concerning determ in ing  properties, the  la tte r inferences being m uch m ore genuine 
candidates for co-instan tia tion  inductions.26
Via - cluster requirement
Relative to requ irem en t V, we have two separate criteria concerned w ith  the  lim its o f the 
p roperties’ pa tte rn s  shared by kind m em bers (or, differently put, concerned w ith the 
degree o f sim ilarity required  for kind m em bership).
O ne criterion says th a t we should identify the lim its of these pa tte rns as the  regions of 
high density  in the  logical space o f properties, corresponding to individuals th a t share a 
certain  cluster of properties. In order for an individual to  qualify as a natural kind 
m em ber, it should instan tia te  (all or) some of the  properties of the  cluster. D ifferent parts 
of the  cluster could be instan tia ted  and  no part should be necessary and  sufficient for
26 O f course, in theory, a causal story could be brought into discussion for the case o f co-instantiated 
determining properties as well (and not only for the co-instantiation of ‘superficial’ properties), as we shall 
see in the following.
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kind m em bership . The rationale th a t a ttends th is requ irem en t is that, due to  the  causal 
s truc tu re  o f the  world, properties tend  to agglutinate; by citing e ither (external) 
m echanism s or (external) laws, we could vindicate the  co-instan tia tion  inductions.27
Boyd (1991), w ho focuses m ostly on biology, advocates mechanisms as the  m eans th rough  
w hich the  ‘causal s truc tu re  o f the  w orld’ produces the clustering o f properties. Bird (2007) 
focuses on the  exact sciences and  proposes laws instead. O n Bird’s proposal, the  kinds in 
physics and  chem istry  w ould end up being non-fuzzy, b u t sim ply in the  sense th a t laws 
w ould produce a perfect agglu tination  o f properties, resulting  in  ‘perfect’, w ell-cut 
patterns.
It is worth noting that th is criterion allows kinds th a t m ight be fuzzy or overlap each other, 
in the  sense th a t na tu ra l kind m em bers m ight instan tia te  different properties and  two 
different natu ral kinds m ight share m em bers, even if they  were n o t in  a species-genus 
h ierarchy.28
VIb -  N&S requirement
The o ther criterion  (standing  som ehow  in opposition  w ith  Via) concerned w ith  the 
degree o f sim ilarity betw een kind m em bers, says th a t every natu ral kind should have a set 
o f properties th a t are necessary and jointly sufficient for kind m em bersh ip .29 Notably, 
theorists  avoid som etim es the ‘necessary and  sufficient’ idiom  w hen discussing th is 
requirem ent. The reason is th a t the  necessary and sufficient conditions o f m em bership 
have long been  associated w ith a set of ‘superficial’, ‘observable’ properties considered
27 See Boyd (1991:129), Bird (2007: 208-211) Kornblith (1995: 35, 43). Dupre, in his (1993), sticks to the cluster 
requirement but does not mention the underlying, causal justification for it. This diminishes much of the 
coherence of Dupre’s argumentation, or at least of its explanatory scope. On a different note, I have called 
mechanisms and laws (ensuing the co-instantiation unity of the patterns of properties) ‘external’ from a 
metaphysical point o f view, in contrast with the ‘internal’ sense in which substantive universals (or 
‘essences’ simpliciter) are supposed to ensure such co-instantiation (see criterion VIb above). In biological 
cases, from a physical point o f view, mechanisms could be both internal and external (i.e. within a certain 
organism or outside o f it) but they would still be metaphysically external to the pattern o f properties they 
agglutinate (because of latter as the truth-makers o f the former. Otherwise, I believe, laws (irrespective of 
whether they are causal or co-instantiation laws) are external to kinds, pace Tobin (2008:9)
28 See Dupr£ (1993: 18 et passim  efficient causation). Similarly, laws could be metaphysically ‘internal’ to 
kinds only if we construe the.,)
29 See Wilkerson (1995:109) and Harre (2005: 9,10)
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potentially  useful for recognising  natural kinds bu t no t fundam ental for the ir very nature; 
the  preferred  form ulation  of th is criterion, a negative one, is th a t natu ral k inds should no t 
be fuzzy. There should  no t be any gradual transition  betw een one kind and  another, 
certain  au tho rs claim, for instance - w here th is form ulation, we could easily infer, simply 
precludes the  interw eaving of clusters th a t m ight show up w hen no necessary and 
sufficient conditions are in place.30
This criterion  (which, nevertheless, I will call ‘N&S requ irem en t’ henceforth) has an 
evident connection  w ith  the  co-instan tia tion  induction  criterion, even though  som etim es 
au tho rs m ay advance it for independen t reasons.31 The necessary and  sufficient conditions 
are supposed to delineate ‘essences’ which, inform ally put, should constitu te  an ‘in te rnal’ 
glue and  thus account ‘in ternally’ for the  co-instan tiation  of properties by kind m em bers. 
As to  w hat m etaphysical category the essences should belong to, one direct answ er is th a t 
we have essences sim p lic ite r ,32 or, in a m ore precise in terp re ta tion , th a t we have 
substantive universals w hich are instan tia ted  by kind m em bers.33
30 The formulation belongs to Ellis, who advocates accordingly the ‘categorical distinctness’ that should be 
in place between natural kinds. At other times, Ellis speaks about the exact resemblance, or the ‘identity’ 
between different natural kind structures (Cf. Ellis, 2006: 67-68). In this context, Ellis says that the 
properties of the clear-cut patterns are necessary and sufficient for the identity o f the kind (Ellis, 2001:19, 52, 
75, 246). This is a third sense in which the kind properties are sometimes called essential - besides the sense 
in which properties should be explanatory powerful and the one in which they should have an identity 
bearing on kind members.
31 Ellis thinks that if there were a gradual transition between kinds, the limits between them would have to 
depend on us, on our decision to draw a dividing line. Kinds would then turn out to be arbitrary. (Cf. Ellis 
2001:19)
32 Many authors mention Lockean Real Essence at this point. Parenthetically, the invoking of Lockean real 
essence constitutes a great source o f equivocation between three senses of ‘essential’ properties, to wit, as 
explanatory powerful, as essential-for-kinds (or necessary and sufficient for the identity of kinds) and as 
essential-for-kind members (necessary for the identity o f kind members; see Wilkerson (1995: 30,55) for 
instance, or Brigandt (2009), Harre (2005). Ellis notes the distinction between the two senses by observing 
that kinds with Lockean essences might be fuzzy (Ellis, 2001: 31) but in his arguments as such the 
distinction is often overlooked (see Ellis, 2001: 19-38). I shall return to this aspect in chapter 2. Note that 
there is also a fourth important sense of the essential, recently (re-)introduced in the natural kind 
discussion, namely that essential properties could be necessary for kind membership (Bird, 2009). I will not 
discuss it in the present thesis though, because, inter alia, this fourth sense o f the essential is consistent 
with accepting requirement Via and denying requirement VIb.
33 Both Ellis (2001) and Lowe (1989), (2001) view kinds as substantive universals. There is an important 
difference between their views: for Ellis the members o f natural kinds should instantiate all the properties 
that are necessary and sufficient for membership (kind identity, in his idiom). For Lowe, these properties 
(at the level o f their corresponding non-substantive universals), characterise the natural kind substantive 
universals, but do not have to be instantiated by all kind members. Cf Lowe (2006: 26)
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VII - non-overlapping requirement
Closely connected  w ith  the  above VIb criterion is the  non-overlapping requirem ent, 
w hich sta tes th a t na tu ra l kinds m ay no t overlap each other. T hat is, if  two natu ral kinds 
share m em bers th en  the  kinds are e ither identical or are part o f a species-genus 
h ierarchy.34 I should stress th a t in principle, we could have non-overlapping kinds th a t 
p resen t fuzziness and  non-fuzzy kinds th a t are overlapping; th a t is, we could have kinds 
th a t respect criterion  VII and  violate criterion VIb and  vice-versa. However, kind theorists  
discuss so closely the  two criteria35 th a t I will no t insist in general upon  exceptional cases. 
In §2.1.2, however, w hen discussing a certain  approach  to the  ‘essences’ o f natu ral kinds, I 
shall take into account the  fact th a t there  is no relation o f logical en ta ilm ent betw een 
criterion VIb and  VII.
VIII - non-phase requirement
Finally, w hat is required  from  the patterns characterising kinds is th a t th e ir  instan tia tion  
should n o t constitu te  a phase in a process th a t is parasitic upon  a (m ore stable) 
fundam ental pa ttern . In the  following, I will call th is the  non-phase requ irem ent.36 The 
requ irem ent in question  rules out for instance th a t tadpoles (in con trast w ith  frogs) or ice 
(in con trast w ith w ater) could form a natural kind and  it is in tricately involved in the 
debates over the  sta tus o f natural kinds in biology, from the po in t o f view of evolution. It 
also has a d irect relevance for our topic insofar as diseases could be construed  as 
processes (tha t com e to be) suffered by ‘healthy ' organism s. I will address th is po in t in 
chapters 2 and 3.
To sum  up, I have p resen ted  in the p resent section various m em bership  criteria advanced 
in the  literature. I have split them  into criteria concerning the  natu re  of properties (the 
first four o f them ) and, com plem entary, criteria concerning the natu re  o f the  patterns o f 
properties natu ral kind m em bers should possess. Figure iQ lists all these requirem ents.
34 See Ellis (2001), Thomson (1969), Wilkerson (1995), Hacking (1993) who endorse this requirement.
35 The most salient example being Ellis (2001); see Khalidi (1998: 40,41,50) for a (critical) discussion
36 See Lowe (2001:174-178), Wiggins (2001: 33 et passim). Often, this criterion is not stated as such, but is 
alluded to in the claim that biology could not have natural kinds, because o f the evolution process.
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They are  also ten ta tive ly  organised in  if, accord ing  to  th e ir  increasing  degree  o f  
com plexity  a n d /o r  in te r-dependence  -  nam ely, top  to  b o tto m  in th e  o rder o f com plexity  
for th e  low er p a rt o f th e  figure (concerned w ith  th e  property  c riteria) an d  b o tto m  to  top  
for th e  u p p e r p a rt  (concerned  w ith  the  pattern  criteria).
FIGURE 1 CRITERIA FOR NATURAL KIND MEMBERSHIP, SPECIFYING WHAT NATURE THE PROPERTIES AND THE 
PATTERNS THEY FORM SHOULD HAVE (the d o tted  lines ind icate  th e  increasingly com plex d em an d s placed by these  
crite ria  over th e  n a tu re  o f th e  n a tu ra l kind properties and  th e  n a tu re  o f th e  p a tte rn s  they  form )
a. Criteria for natural land m em bership
I. Instantiation o f natural properties (the non­
arbitrariness criterion)
II* Instantiation o f  explanatory powerful, 
determ ining properties (causal induction 
criterion)
III. Instantiation o f  nomic properties (law 
involvement criterion)
IV* Instantiation o f identity-bearing properties for 
the kind members (identity criterion)
V. Co-instantiation induction requirement 
Via. Cluster requirement 
Vib.*N&S requirement
VII. N on-overlapping requirement
VIII. N on-phase requirement
* The marked criteria are associated with a 
construal o f properties as essentia,/  in different 
senses though — explanatory essential (criterion II), 
identity bearing for kind members (criterion IV), 
identity bearing for kinds (criterion VIb)
b. Tentative organisation o f  the natural kind criteria
The hierarchy requirement (VII)
I
*The cluster requirement (Via) The N&S requirement (Vib)**
Involvement in the co-instantiation induction (V)
f5lCs c  patterns





(causal) induction-related properties (II)
ii
nomic properties (involvement of kinds in laws) (III) 
identity-bearing properties for kind members (TV)
*What ensures that properties cluster are either laws or mechanisms 
(which are metaphysically ‘external to the kinds
** The properties considered as necessary and sufficient are described 
as delineating‘'essences'' (which ensure ‘internally’ that a stable co­
instantiation ts in place). The category of essences is either unspecified 
(we have essences srmpliciter) oris identified with that of substantive 
universals.
I d id  n o t m ean  to  provide in figure if, a definitive o rgan isa tion  o f k ind  m em bersh ip  
criteria , such  th a t  any  o th e r possibility  o f ontological d ependencies be tw een  th em  exists. 
For in stance , even if  th e  in duction -re la ted  p roperties  need  to  be a t least n a tu ra l a n d  th e
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nom ic p roperties need  to be a t least induction-rela ted , one could see the  N&S 
requ irem en t n o t (only) as going a step forw ard from  the criterion o f involvem ent in co­
instan tia tion  induction , as my 1 f, suggests, b u t (also) as a condition  for our classifications 
being non-arb itrary . However, even though the  in terdependencies betw een these criteria 
could be differently put, I th ink  th a t the  organisation in if, reveals an  im portan t sense tha t 
m akes all these requ irem en ts part o f a un itary  picture.
In figure 2a below, I have in troduced  a sim ple no tation  for the  co n ten t o f the  m em bership  
criteria; I will frequently  appeal to  it in the  chapters 2 and 3. In figure 2b the  difference 
betw een the  criterion  VTa and  VIb is draw n vis-a-vis th e  sta tus o f co-instan tia ted  
properties.
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FIGURE 2 The criteria of membership in a natural kind NK for an individual a instantiation a pattern [p„ p2, pn] of
‘profound’ properties and a [q„ q2,......... q„] pattern o f ‘superficial’ properties
2a
I. [pj, p2, p j  should be natural properties
II. |pls p2,......... p j  should be responsible for [qh q2, q j
(as well as for the causal interactions with other individuals). 
Were a to be NK, a would, or probably would, instantiate
i% cb  <y
III. [p1? p2, pn] should be involved in laws (either
governing/describing the causal interactions whose effects 
are [qh q2,........ q j  or the interactions with other individuals
IV. lPi, p2, p j  should be involved in the (absolute)
identity of a. Were a to stop instantiating any of the [p1,
p2, p j  properties, it would not be the same numerically
identical individual (or it would not have the same 
diachronic identity conditions, if a was a sample of a non- 
countable kind)
V. The co-instantiation induction criterion -  were a to be 
NK, it would instantiate [p,. p2, pa]
Via. |pb p2,........ p j  form a cluster due to the causal
structure of the world; neither all of fpt, p2, pn] nor
any part of them are both necessary and sufficient for 
membership
Vib. [pj, p2,....... p j  are necessary and sufficient for
membersliip
VII Was a to be a member of a different natural kind NK’, 
then either NK’ would be identical with NK or the two 
kinds would be in a species-genus hierarchy
VIII. The instantiation of the pattern fp,, p2, p j
should not represent a phase in a process whose end result 




mechanisms, \  
laws
[ P l ,  P2r •PnJ
ton  qj
* Between the  individual a and the  substantive universal NK there is a relation of
instantiation, due to  which a possesses the pattern [pt, p2, p j
‘ ‘ Alternatively, the  possession by a of [pt, p „  p j  might be viewed as the
result of the (efficient) causal structure of the world (mechanisms, causal laws) 
*** Between the 'profound' and the  'superficial' properties there is a causally 
efficient relation. The arrow should indicate both this relation betw een the  two 
patterns instantiated by a as well as the  causal interactions with other individuals
in which a engages. For these interactions, a subset of [qv  q2, q j  could be
taken to  designate 'observable' behaviours or dispositions, irrespective of 
whether the latter are considered intrinsic or relational properties.
A dm itted ly , th e  causal re la tio n s  involving m ech an ism s/law s a n d  d e te rm in in g  p ro p erties , 
ju s t as th e  causal re la tio n s  h o ld in g  b e tw een  th e  d e te rm in in g  a n d  superficially  p ro p e rtie s  
a re  very  m u ch  sim plified  in  2/, - see for in s tan ce  Boyd’s re n d itio n  o f th e  ro le o f 
m ech an ism s, to  be p re sen ted  in  th e  follow ing section . H ow ever, th e  respective figure is 
h eu ris tic  for th e  d is tin c tio n  b e tw een  th e  causal an d  th e  c o -in s tan tia tio n  in d u c tio n , w hich  
will p lay  a cen tra l ro le in  ch a p te r 3.
T he n ex t sec tio n  will p re sen t a few o f th e  m o st im p o rta n t acco u n ts  o f  n a tu ra l kinds,
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w hich em ploy som e or all of these requ irem ents and  w hich will have a bearing on my 
discussion o f the m edical kinds in the  following chapters.
I should  finally add  a po in t o f clarification to th is section. In p resenting  these 
requ irem ents for natu ral kind m em bership, I have tried  to avoid as m uch as possible the  
use o f sem antically loaded term s and  locutions like ‘essences’, ‘essential p roperties’, 
‘species’, ‘being w hat one is’, etc., even if they  w ould have eased the  exposition. The 
sem antic  load o f the  term  ‘essence’, for instance, w hich has in the  m odern, post-Locke 
context a t least four different senses,37 m akes its use in exposition only apparently  helpful.
In his discussion o f the  case o f apparen t sem antic incom m ensurability  from  the 
n ineteen th  century  debate  on Darwinism , Laporte rem arks th a t the  m ain  source o f 
strained  com m unication  was simply the fact th a t the  anti-D arw inian, trad itionalist side 
associated the  concept o f species w ith ‘being created by God'. This side simply could no t 
accept the  rival theory  couched in the  term s o f changeable ‘species’.38 Yet, Laporte doubts 
th a t there  was a case o f genuine sem antic incom m ensurability  in th a t debate and th inks 
th a t a com m unication  could have been established if simply the term  species had been 
dropped  or if  the  parties had agreed to distinguish betw een the  different parts o f the  
m anifold sem antics each o f them  associated to the  respective term .
To be sure, there  is no case of sem antic incom m ensurability  in the  natural kinds 
discussion, b u t nevertheless, I th ink  th a t the  scope of argum ents w ould greatly benefit 
from  an  econom ical use o f sem antically loaded term s (as well as from  a precise definition 
o f their senses, w henever they are used). It is for related reasons th a t I chose to  assign 
num bers to  each criterion o f m em bership earlier in th is chapter, nam ed (a bit 
ponderously) the  sim ilarities betw een kind m em bers patterns o f properties', and so forth. 
These choices m ight m ake the exposition slightly m ore difficult in the  following chapters, 
b u t in return , I hope th a t the  argum ents will gain in clarity.
This is n o t to  say th a t term s like 'species’, ‘essences’ and  phrases like ‘carving natu re  a t its
37And a few others, I suppose. For instance Murphy (2006) discusses the simple essences and refined 
essences; Brigandt (2009) speaks about origin essences, qualitative essences, epistemologically fundamental 
essences and essences as ‘the feature determining an entity’s identity’ where the entities in question are 
species.
3 Cf. Laporte (2004:122)
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jo in ts ’ sh o u ld  n o t be used . N evertheless, th e ir  senses sh o u ld  be clearly  d is tin g u ish ed . A 
g re a t dea l o f  th e  d iscu ssio n  in  c h a p te r  2 o f c rite rio n  V ib (N&S re q u irem en t)  for in s tan ce , 
w ill revolve a ro u n d  d is tin g u ish in g  d iffe ren t senses o f th e  essen tia l an d  a ro u n d  
d isen tan g lin g  th ese  senses, as em ployed  in th e  w orks o f ce rta in  k ind  th eo ris ts . T he case o f  
‘carv ing  n a tu re  a t  its  jo in ts ’, as w e shall see in  § 1.5, is a n o th e r  on e  in  w h ich  w h a t w e m ean  
sh o u ld  be p la in ly  d e lin ea ted .
§ 1 .2  M a i n  a c c o u n t s  o f  n a t u r a l  k in d s
W ith  th e  possib le  c rite ria  for k ind  m em b ersh ip  d iscussed , w e now  have a fram ew ork  for 
co n sid erin g  th e  ac co u n ts  o f som e key th eo ris ts . T h eir view s are  very  d iffe ren t an d  diverse, 
as it can  be seen  p re lim in arily  in  Fig. 3 below , in  w h ich  th e ir  a lleg iance to  som e specific 
se t o f  c rite ria  is re p resen te d . T heir ap p ro ach es th u s  cover a lm o st th e  w hole  sp ec tru m  o f 
view s ad v an ced  in  favour o f  one p a rticu la r a c co u n t o r an o th e r .
FIGURE 3 KEY ACCOUNTS OF NATURAL KINDS
Criteria I II III IV V Via VIIb VII
Natural Causal Law Identity Co­ Cluster N&S N on­
property in d u ction in volvem ent criterion in stantiation criterion criterion overlapping
criterion criterion criterion in du ction criterion
criterion
B. Ellis V V V V V V
J. Lowe V V V V
A. Bird V V V V V
R. Boyd V V V V V






Brian Ellis takes the  no tion  o f natural kind as a cornerstone of his argum enta tion  
designed to  refute H um eanism  and show th a t laws o f na tu re  are m etaphysically 
necessary. Ellis argues th a t the  properties characterising natu ral kinds should be natural, 
explanatory pow erful (determ ining) and should participate in the  (causal) laws o f nature, 
rejecting however the  condition th a t the  identity  o f kind m em bers depends on the  kind 
properties they  in stan tia te .39 In o ther words, Ellis adopts criteria I-III described in the  
previous section and  rejects criterion IV.4°
N atural p roperties are con trasted  w ith Cam bridge properties and  the  form er are defined 
as being intrinsic; th is is one o f the  reasons w hy Ellis rejects the  view th a t natural kinds 
exist in  the  biological realm . The explanatory powerful properties are m ostly in troduced  
by contrasting  the  m icrostructural properties o f chem ical elem ents and  com pounds w ith 
the ir observable features. The form er are to be preferred to the  latter, says Ellis, n o t only 
because the  form er are intrinsic w hereas the  la tte r are relational (the m ost often cited 
exam ple such observable properties th a t are supposedly relational being colours), b u t also 
because the  form er are a ttended  by causal powers, etc. and  produce the  la tte r.41
Ellis som etim es calls the  ‘properties a ttended  by pow ers’ (in the  term inology I have used 
so far) sim ply ‘pow ers’ and  divides the  m icrostructural properties into two sorts: powers 
and  so called structu ral properties, nam ely the properties underlying sim ilarities in shape, 
spatio-tem poral a rrangem en t of various com ponents, etc. The contrast betw een powers 
and structu ral p roperties is set out by using a certain  construal o f the  fam ous 
dispositional/categorical d istinction  -  powers should confer to their bearers the  
possibility o f engaging in certain  causal in teractions w hereas structural properties, as
39 Cf. Ellis (1999: 67,68) I shall restrict my presentation of Ellis’s views to the theme of natural kinds of 
objects, ignoring for the most part the other veins o f his (extremely rich and impressive in its scope) 
metaphysical picture.
40 Ellis specifies that natural kinds should be inductively rich but, as most authors, does not make the 
distinction between co-instantiation and causal inductions. His examples o f laws include, however, co­
instantiation laws and laws in turn are said to justify inductions.
41 See Ellis (2001: 31). The background of the discussion is Locke's distinction between real and nominal 
essences.
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categorical, should be neu tral to  such in teractions.42
Kinds are involved in causal laws precisely because laws describe the  m anifestation o f 
these pow ers (intrinsic properties possessed by kind m em bers). These ‘nom ic’ properties 
do n o t have to be involved, however, in the  iden tity  o f kind m em bers and  therefore it is 
possible for objects to swap kinds while retain ing their identity . O ne cannot see any 
d istinction, says Ellis, betw een an atom  losing an electron and  its losing a p ro ton , insofar 
as the  im plication o f these changes on the  identity  of the  individual a tom  in question is 
concerned.
As regards the  criteria  concerning the  p roperties’ patterns, Ellis adheres bo th  to the  N&S 
requ irem en t and  to the  non-overlapping requ irem ent (tha t is, to criteria Vib and VII). 
N atural kinds should n o t be fuzzy and there  should be a genus-species hierarchy for any 
overlapping kinds. O ne reason for th is is to avoid arbitrariness in classification. If l<inds 
were fuzzy and  hence there  were transitions betw een them , th en  the line betw een one 
kind and  the  o ther w ould depend on us. If on the o ther hand  kinds overlapped w ithout 
being in a hierarchy, a llo tting  an  individual to  one kind or ano ther w ould hinge on our 
decision as well and  w ould no t reflect the  ‘divisions of n a tu re ’. These requirem ents also 
have a m ore elaborate m etaphysical underpinning. In order to explain the  ‘identical’ 
structu res exhibited by natural kind m em bers and  the exact sim ilarities betw een the 
powers they  possess (i.e. in order to m etaphysically justify the  N&S requirem ent), Ellis 
in troduces a class o f substantive universals whose tropes should be instan tia ted  by kind 
m em bers. The powers th a t the  kind m em bers possess are also taken  to  represent tropes of 
universals, o f a non-substan tia l type and to form ‘essences’.43
Jonathan Lowe takes natural kinds as a crucial part of his four-category ontology th a t 
should reconcile diverse m etaphysical positions abou t the  nature  of individual substances
42 As Ellis frequently states -  due to their powers, objects are disposed to behave in certain ways; see Ellis 
(2008:140) Note that the categorical/dispositional distinction does not have a direct connection with our 
discussion. This distinction is mentioned in this section only insofar as it underlines the different 
approaches that the two most important proponents of kinds as substantive universals (Lowe and Ellis) 
have with respect to the way in which kind members come to instantiate (patterns of) properties.
43 Ellis (2001:70, 73-75, 92) For the justification of the non-overlapping requirement, see Ellis (2001: 67,68), 
where the species-genus relation between substantive universals is introduced. I will discuss in more detail 
in chapter 2 how precisely the substantive and non-substantive universals should metaphysically justify the 
N&S requirement.
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and  the ir properties, following A risto tle’s footsteps. Just like Ellis, Lowe construes kinds 
as substantive universals, and the  pa tte rns o f properties possessed by kind m em bers are 
sim ilarly taken  to  correspond to non-substantive universals. There are im portan t 
differences betw een their approaches though. Lowe in troduces a relation o f 
characterisation betw een the  non-substantive universals and the  substantive ones. This 
relation should  explain the phenom enon  of co-instantiation, in th a t the  possession of 
certain  p roperties (tropes o f non-substan tive universals) by individuals th a t are kind 
m em bers (i.e. th a t are bearers of substantive universals) should reflect, a t the  level of 
particulars, the  fact th a t the  non-substan tive universals characterise substantive 
universals.
Lowe accepts criteria I and II by stating th a t the  properties possessed by kind m em bers 
should be natu ral and  explanatory powerful b u t does no t em ploy Ellis’s d ichotom y 
betw een structu ral (geom etrical) and non-structu ral properties. Lowe uses substantive 
universals to  w ork ou t a different d istinction  betw een the categorical and  the 
dispositional and  thus to define the  powers possessed by kind m em bers. Lowe states that, 
from  the  po in t of view of universals, the  pred ication  of properties to  land  m em bers is 
dispositional, and  indicates to the  fact th a t non-substan tive universals characterise 
substantive universals. Insofar as we strictly keep up w ith  the  level o f particulars, the  
pred ication  o f properties to kind m em bers is categorical (or occurent), and  indicates th a t 
a trope is in stan tia ted  by a kind m em ber.
In o ther words, in the  occuren t (or categorical) register kind m em bers actually instan tia te  
certain  properties. In the  dispositional register, kind m em bers can instan tia te  certain  
properties. The difference betw een the dispositional and the categorical register is no t 
(just) a difference in  the  m ode o f predication. It m arks the m etaphysical difference 
betw een a non-substan tive universal th a t is in a certain  relation w ith  the  land  universal 
and  the  trope o f such a non-substantive universal instan tia ted  by a kind m em ber.44
W hereas for Ellis, pow ers are those properties whose in stan tia tion  can produce the  
subsequent in stan tia tion  o f ano ther property  (the m anifestation) in the  sam e or in
44 Cf. Lowe (2006:17)
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ano ther individual,45 for Lowe, powers are those properties th a t can be instan tia ted  by 
kind m em bers in v irtue o f their m em bership. These could be properties simpliciter (and 
Lowe cites as an  exam ple the  case o f the  properties in stan tia ted  by the m em bers o f the  
kind electron) or properties involved in causal in teractions (and Lowe’s exam ples include 
the  dissolving o f salt in to  w ater, the  ro ta tion  o f planets in to  circular orb its).46
This construal o f the  d ispositional/categorical distinction has also a bearing on the  way in 
w hich Lowe accepts criterion III referring to the  involvem ent o f k inds in  laws. For Lowe, 
laws sim ply describe the  relation o f characterisation from  the  level of universals. Hence, 
even if the  properties th a t kind m em bers possess are in a sense ‘nom ic’, on a m ore 
fundam ental level kinds are involved in laws directly (and th a t is w hy the la tte r are 
expressed in second order quantified statem ents). Finally, the  special approach to  the  
categorical/d ispositional d istinction  m otivates Lowe’s rejection o f the  requ irem ent Vib 
concerning the  pa tte rn s  o f properties instan tia ted  by kind m em bers. These pa tte rns from 
the  level o f particu lars do no t have to be clear-cut, simply because the respective 
characterisation rela tion  from  the  level o f the  universals ju st entails th a t land  m em bers 
(instan tia ting  substantive universals) can instan tia te  tropes corresponding to  certain  n o n ­
substantive universals. The m anifestation o f laws a t the  level o f particulars adm its 
exceptions and  th is is in  fact considered an  explanatory advantage. Lowe’s expository 
example is th a t o f the  law ‘ravens are black’ which, he argues, is no t disconfirm ed by the
45...and whose instantiation actually produces, 'in such and such circumstances Eij’, the instantiation o f the 
manifestation/effect properties. See Ellis’s preferred notation of the consequent of causal laws in his 
(1999:68-69)
46 The sort o f properties instantiated by kind members in the case o f causal interactions (the properties that 
are commonly regarded as manifestations o f dispositions, e.g. being dissolved, or being stretched) could be 
taken as intrinsic properties simpliciter; Cfi Lowe (2006: 40) where this reading seems to be allowed. These 
properties could also be taken as relational properties; they underlie processes and exemplify certain 
relations between substantive universals (Cf. Lowe 2006:17,161-163). F°r instance, the power to dissolve in 
water possessed by the members o f the natural kind salt should be due to a relation between the water kind 
and the salt kind. This relation gets exemplified at the level of particulars when a particular sample of salt 
dissolves into a particular sample o f water, so that the occurent predications involving the ‘is dissolving’ 
predicate become appropriate. Note that at this point Ellis introduces processes-universals that are 
connected with his power universals and not with his substantive universals; see Ellis (2001:4, 19-22) and 
also Clapp (2002: 592)
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presence o f albino ravens.47
Lowe rejects requ irem en t IV as well - kind m em bership  is no t taken  to  have any bearing 
on the  iden tity  o f kind m em bers. Individuals could swap lands (this m igh t be a physical 
possibility or ju st a m etaphysical possibility) while rem aining the  sam e individuals. 
However, the  num erical iden tity  o f individuals is d ependen t on them  rem aining w ith in  
the  sam e (w hat Lowe calls) ontological categories. O ntological categories are divisions o f 
individuals, above the  level o f kinds, which m ake it m etaphysically im possible for an 
organism  (e.g. a horse) to tu rn  into an  artefact (e.g. a statue) and for an im m aterial, 
inorganic object (e.g. a bronze piece) to  transform  into a living thing.
These th ree  categories o f individuals (the categories o f living organism s, m aterial objects 
and  artefacts) are m ore general th an  kinds and  yet they  have a d irect connection w ith 
kind m em bership  because they are used by Lowe to w ork ou t criterion VIII (regarding the 
phase/non-phase  d istinction).48 For each category, Lowe circum scribes a certain  set of 
processes th a t m ark  the  transform ation  o f a phase kind into a non-phase land, or on the 
contrary, th a t qualify a transform ation  undertaken  by a natu ral kind as ju st a phase one .49
Alexander Bird invokes natural kinds, like Ellis, in the  context o f an an ti-H um ean  
argum en ta tion  (which should prove th a t the  laws o f nature  are m etaphysically necessary). 
Bird argues (contra Ellis and  Lowe) th a t substantive universals are no t requisite for an 
account o f scientific laws. Causal laws can be founded on the ontology o f non-substan tive 
universals only, according to w hich the causal in teractions described/governed by laws 
reflect relations betw een non-substantive universals th a t are ingrained in universals’
47For such cases of exception-ridden generalisations, ceteris paribus clauses, attached to first order 
statements (and said to refer to cp laws) are often invoked in the literature. However, Lowe argues that 
without introducing substantive universals, such cp clauses cannot escape the charge of triviality (Cf. Lowe 
1989:153-154). Lowe also extends his critique o f cp conditions to the first order quantified statements meant 
to indicate counterfactually in which conditions powers (dispositions) produce (are followed by) 
manifestations (Cf. Lowe 2006:13-17)
48 Lowe is the only author from the five presented in this section who discusses explicitly criterion VIII 
regarding the phase/non-phase distinction
49 See Lowe, 1998:176 for instance, for the phase-processes that can be undertaken by material objects.
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iden tity .50 As for the  com m only regarded ‘laws of co-instan tia tion ’, for Bird these are no t 
laws a t all -  the  fact th a t certain  properties are non-accidentally  co-instan tia ted  does no t 
require the  positing  o f substantive universals (and o ther a ttend ing  laws), b u t can simply 
be seen as the  resu lt o f the  causal in teractions governed by causal law s.51 Thus Bird says 
th a t ‘W ater is H20’, for instance, is no t a law a t all. The co-instan tia tion  of the  properties 
o f the  H20 m olecules (just like, presum ably, the  co-instan tia tion  o f w ater’s superficial 
properties) is the  result o f o ther causal laws.
In fact, th is view o f the  unity  o f the  co-instan tia ted  properties is the  basis for Bird’s 
proposal regarding the  m etaphysics of natu ral kinds. Kind m em bers do no t instan tia te  
substantive universals b u t possess (directly) clusters o f properties whose un ity  is the 
resu lt o f the  operation  o f causal powers. Bird thus adheres to  criterion VIa regarding the 
pa tte rn s  o f properties. Kinds could be represented  as points in the  logical space of 
p roperties (w hen the laws produce a perfect agglutination o f properties, possessed by all 
kind m em bers) or as regions o f density  in th is space (when the  laws produce an  im perfect 
agglu tination  so th a t the  kind m em bers possess m ost o f the  properties of the patterns 
characterising the  respective kinds). Obviously, criteria I-III, concerning the  natu re  of 
properties th a t are part o f the  respective patterns, are adop ted  by Bird as well.
Richard Boyd is the  philosopher who firstly proposed th a t we should see the co­
instan tia tion  of properties by kind m em bers as the  result of som ething o ther than  
essences/substantive universals. In fact, Boyd’s m ain concern is w ith the N&S 
requ irem ent (criterion Via) and the fact th a t in biology organism s subject to 
classifications do n o t p resen t clear-cut pa tterns of properties (i.e. do n o t seem  to fulfil any 
necessary and sufficient conditions). His solution is to drop requ irem ent Vib and stick to 
VIa (kind m em bers in  biology should instan tia te  clusters of properties) as well as to 
appeal to mechanisms as the  external m eans through which the ‘causal s tructu re  o f the
50 Bird construes powers in Ellis’s (rather than Lowe’s) style. For an individual, to instantiate such a non­
substantive universal is to instantiate powers that produce, following causal interactions in the same or 
other individuals, the instantiation of other properties (the non-substantive universals that are in an 
identity-bearing relation with the initially mentioned universal), provided that certain conditions (e.g. the 
absence of antidotes) are in place. Powers are taken then to be intrinsic properties that, just like in Ellis, can 
produce the instantiation o f other properties, where this modal level is worked out in counterfactual terms 
involving particulars and their properties (Bird, 2005:437-428).
51 Cf. Bird (2007: 208-211)
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w orld’ produces the  agglutination o f the  properties characterising these (biological) 
kinds.
These m echanism s, w hich can be 'in trinsic ' to  organism s (e.g. developm ental 
m echanism s) or ‘extrinsic’ to organism s (e.g. m echanism s involved in  ecological 
adap tation , gene flow and  interbreeding, evolutionary pressures), m ain tain  the 
hom eostasis o f organism s. They are shared by the  m em bers o f a population  and  are 
responsible for the  resulting  (clusters of) phenotypic and genetic sim ilarities. M em bers o f 
a biological kind need to possess m ost of these clustered properties and even if no ‘laws of 
co-instan tia tion  are p resen t’,52 m echanism s and  the a ttend ing  causal in teractions are 
sufficient to m ake such kinds ‘inductively rich'.
In o ther words, Boyd adheres also to criteria I, II and  V. Notably, m echanism s are 
supposed to agglutinate the  determ ining properties (e.g. genetic ones) in connection w ith 
criterion VIa, as well as to intercede the causal in teractions betw een the  determ ining  
properties and  the  ‘superficial’ ones (e.g. m orphological features), in connection  w ith  
criterion  II.53
Just like Boyd, John Dupre focuses on biology and offers a very liberal account of kinds, in 
line w ith  his general view th a t the  world, in spite o f scientists’ unifying efforts, is 
disordered and messy. W e could no t discover any necessary and sufficient properties 
shared by categories of organisms, says Dupre (no m atter how hard  we looked a t intrinsic 
sim ilarities like the genetic or phenotypic ones, or relational properties like ecological
52 ...even if no essences of biological kinds are in place, says Boyd (see Boyd, 1991:129). In addition, for Boyd, 
mechanisms make kinds inductively rich, in spite o f the fact that in biology we do not have ‘causal’ 
universal generalisations. Boyd writes that ‘[W]hat the [HPC] theory of natural kinds helps to explain, is 
how we are able to identify causally sustained regularities that go beyond actually available data and how  
we are able to offer accurate causal explanations of particular phenomena and of such causally sustained 
regularities (italics original, Boyd (1999: 152), apud Tsou, (2008: 72)). Boyd continues ‘[S]cientific (and 
historical and everyday) knowledge often depends on our being able to identify causally sustained 
generalizations that are neither eternal, nor a-historical, nor without exceptions, and our ability to do so 
depends on our coordination between language and classificatory categories and causal phenomena 
involving and defined by imperfect property homeostasis’ (ibid, p. 164).
53 In addition, the homeostatic nature of those mechanisms makes it that the prima facie  ‘profound’ 
properties might also depend on the ‘superficial’. This may happen due to the feedback interactions during 
organisms’ lives and to the selection pressures, which make the instantiation o f genetic properties depend 
on the phenotypic traits, across generations. See Boyd (1999:165) on the involvement of his homeostatic 
kinds in evolution and also Griffiths (1997) who develops Boyd’s account and stresses the importance of 
extrinsic mechanisms for the homeostatic kinds to be found in the special sciences.
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niche sharing) and  our biological classifications do criss-cross each o ther.54 Dupr£ thus 
denies criteria Vib and VII and draw s radical conclusions from  th is biological lesson. He 
advocates p luralistic classifications th a t are fuzzy, nested  and depend  on ou r ‘epistem ic’ 
in terests dow n to the  po in t w here sim ilarities th a t are ‘o f in terest for theoretical reasons’ 
are no m ore fundam ental th an  ‘econom ically useful or strikingly noticeable’ ones. 
G astronom ic classifications, for example, are considered ju st as good as, say, the  ones 
fram ed in evolutionary biology.55
Notably, while m ain tain ing  th a t classification depends on our in terests, Dupr£ does not 
allow classification based on m ind-dependent, Cam bridge p roperties.56 Dupr£ therefore 
adheres to criterion  I and  feels en titled  to call his position  ‘(prom iscuous) realism ’. In his 
m ore recen t work, D upre even seem s to accept criterion II by suggesting th a t the  
properties in question  should after all provide a basis for scientific theorising .57
In th is section I have presen ted  the views of some of the m ost im portan t theorists of 
kinds, w ho weigh differently the im portance of the  general criteria o f kind m em bership 
(see fig. 3 above). They look at different scientific dom ains and  explore various ways in 
w hich the  kinds discussion is related to o ther debates in  m etaphysics and  the  philosophy 
o f science. Their accounts will play a central role in my enquiry. Even if I lean tow ards 
considering som e of these views as m ore robust th an  other, I will try  to rem ain neutral in 
m y own enquiry, in a m ethodological sense which will be discussed in the  final section of 
th is chapter.
In the  next section I will outline some of the  approaches to m edical kinds th a t have been 
sketched in the  literature, either by choosing som e subset o f the  criteria for kind 
m em bership  described in §1.1, or by adopting one particular account o f natural kinds or 
another.
54 Dupr£ (1993:18), Thalos (1995: 252)
55 Dupr£ (1981: 82-83) Dupr£ mentions as well the mapping of kinds in the multi-dimensional property 
space, leaving indeterminate what sort o f properties should be reckoned with in this mapping.
56 See Dupr£ (1993:105) and also his response to Cooper’s charge o f arbitrariness in Cooper (2005: 50)
57 Cf. Dupr£ (2002) apud Cooper (2005). At any rate, Cooper does develop a variant of his account in which 
the properties used in classifications are determining, explanatory powerful properties. See Cooper (2005: 
50-52)
§1.3 K in d s  in  m e d ic in e
A num ber o f philosophers and  social science theorists  have approached  the  them e of 
na tu ra l kinds in m edicine (especially psychiatry) by appealing directly to  various 
m em bersh ip  criteria or by adopting  particular accounts o f kinds. In the  following, I will 
p resen t the  views o f som e o f them  th a t reflect the  state  o f the  a rt in  the  cu rren t d isputes 
over m edical k inds.58
Lawrie Reznek  discusses m edical kinds in a few chapters o f his (1987) book dedicated  to 
the  natu re  o f disease. The criteria Reznek adheres to are I, II, III and Via. Objects are said 
to  belong to natu ral kinds if ‘(1) they have the  sam e cluster properties (2) the  possession 
of the  cluster is explained in the  same way (by the sam e laws o f nature) and (3) natural 
boundaries exist betw een them  and m em bers o f neighbouring k inds’.59
Reznek argues th a t disease, as such, does no t represent a (genus) natural kind because 
different pathological conditions have different explanatory natu res and the appeal to 
such explanatory natu res does n o t help us in d istinguishing diseases from  non-diseases.6° 
The border betw een the  healthy and the pathological depends on our values. As Reznek 
pu ts  it, th is border ‘is invented by us’.
However, particu lar pathological conditions could be natural lands, since the  organism s 
suffering from  one disease or ano ther exhibit a cluster of sym ptom s th a t m ight have the 
sam e explanatory nature . For Reznek, such explanatory natures should delineate the 
identities of diseases, or the  identities of diseases as entities. M ore precisely, the  identities 
o f diseases should depend on the  identities of the  explanatory natures, w here these 
explanatory natu res are also clusters of properties th a t are d istinct ‘if and  only if there  is a 
relative rarity  o f in term edia te  form s’ betw een them .61 W e m ight have troubles w ith those
58 On inspection, some of their views are interesting and challenging. In general, I should point out from 
the start that their approaches reflect broad conceptual confusions and a very superficial level o f the 
discussion. That is why in this section I shall extensively use quotations, for illustrative reasons.
39 Reznek (1987:42) That this is what being a natural kind consists in is argued in chapter 2, in pp. 33-47. 
Reznek’s most serious worry is that we might not be able to distinguish between the universal 
generalisations that are accidental and those that are not accidental (p. 41).
Reznek (1987: 68). Reznek thinks that considering diseases as a natural kind is committing an ‘essentialist 
fallacy’ -  attributing the same essential, explanatory natures to all disease cases, (ibid., p. 78)
61 Reznek (1987:41)
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pathological 'en tities ' th a t vary continuously  from  the  'invented ' healthy  state. W e m ight 
also have problem s in deciding w hether diseases w hich share only ‘a p a rt’ o f their 
explanatory natu res are d istinct ‘en tities’ or are just form s o f a m ore general, ‘syndrom e’ 
entity. But overall, there  is some ‘grain o f tru th ’, says Reznek, in the  assum ption  th a t 
natu ral kinds are to be found in the  m edical realm .62
Rachel Cooper dedicates a chapter to natural kinds in her (2005) book concerned w ith 
classification in psychiatry. Cooper m akes the d istinction  betw een two im portan t senses 
o f essential p roperties -  explanatory powerful and part o f necessary and sufficient 
conditions o f m em bersh ip ,63 and notes in addition  on the  involvem ent o f natural kinds in 
laws, explanations and inductions. The N&S requ irem ent is d ropped  after espousing 
D upre’s convincing critique of its application on the biological realm  and is substitu ted  
w ith  the  cluster requirem ent.
Cooper takes up criteria  I, II, III and Vib and investigates w hether psychiatric disorders 
are na tu ra l kinds by using the  m apping of kinds into the m ulti-d im ensional space whose 
coordinates are represen ted  by determ ining properties (apud D upre). Cooper argues th a t 
in th is space, psychiatric d isorders as natural kinds could be identified w ith  the  regions of 
density  corresponding to the  psychiatric cases th a t a t any stage o f their illnesses p resent 
the  sym ptom atic characteristics outlined by the conventional psychiatric categories. Not 
all diseases will qualify as natural kinds. There will be some psychiatric categories we can 
clearly m ap in th is space (e.g. H un ting ton’s chorea, whose genetic basis we know). But 
there  will also be in term ediate, doubtful cases (e.g. schizophrenia, whose sym ptom s, 
researchers suggest, do no t share a sufficiently sim ilar de term ining  basis) and ‘rag bag’ 
cases th a t could n o t be natural kinds (like the category o f Sexual D isorder N ot O therw ise 
Specified).64
Just like Reznek, Cooper points ou t th a t the  value involvem ent o f the  disease concept
62 Reznek, (1987:188, 9)
63 Cooper (2005: 47, 58, 59). For clarity, Cooper calls the explanatory powerful properties determining 
properties, and as I have already noted, I adopt this use as well.
64 Cf. Cooper (2005: 71-74) and Cooper (2004:130). Cooper allows that the determining properties could be 
relational in the case o f the diseases whose environment-dependence is decisive (Cooper 2005: 51). Other 
criticisms advanced against psychiatric diseases as natural kinds (e.g., Hacking’s looping kinds argument, 
McGinn’s argument from multiple realisation) are also discussed and rejected.
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should no t de te r us from  considering diseases as (candidate) natu ral kinds. It m ay be th a t 
a value judgem en t is involved in grouping together all the cases th a t m edicine deals w ith 
u nder the  heading disease (and indeed, Cooper argues th a t a value com ponent is involved 
in the  disease concept), b u t a t least some of the  cases th a t are trea ted , researched, etc. 
could qualify as natu ral kinds. A useful analogy draw n by Cooper is w ith  the  concept of 
w eed -  it m ight be th a t considering a p lan t a weed is a value judgm ent, b u t th a t being 
said, the  p lan ts p u t u nder this heading (e.g. daisies, bu ttercups) could be investigated as 
natu ral kinds.
Peter Zachar does no t th ink  th a t psychiatric disorders are natural kinds. N atural kinds, 
argues Zachar, are ‘exclusively defined w ith reference to inheren t p roperties’. They could 
be found in psychiatry only if diseases were ‘bounded entities in n a tu re ’ whose 
characteristics could be exhaustively circum scribed by statistical m eans (at the  level of 
sym ptom s) a n d /o r by the  study of ‘biopathological processes’ (on the  m icrostructural 
level).65 This view of diseases is characterised as ‘essentialist’ and  is taken  by Zachar to be 
inconsisten t w ith  the  em phasis on relational properties and  the environm ent dependency 
th a t is p resen t in psychiatric practice and  the contem porary  construal of biological 
species. Zachar thus  argues th a t ‘th inking  in an an ti-essentialist fashion and 
conceptualising psychiatric disorders as practical kinds [i.e. as relatively stable pa tte rns of 
sym ptom s] is m ore consisten t w ith a scientific view o f the  w orld’.66
Nick Haslam  disagrees w ith Zacher. H aslam ’s objection is th a t Zachar is too narrow  in his 
approach and that, by th inking  in an anti-essentialist fashion, he ignores the  possibility of 
property  clusters th a t possess coherence and crisp boundaries:
‘One problem with Zachar's analysis is that he identifies natural kinds with essentialist categories. Although 
there is ample precedent for this equation (e.g., Kripke), it is arguably possible to separate essentialism  
from the natural kind concept (Haslam, 1998). Boyd (1984), for instance, has proposed an understanding of 
natural kinds as homeostatic property clusters that possess coherence and crisp boundaries but lack 
necessary features. Most biological kinds are probably well understood in this fashion. It is well known that 
species cannot, after Darwin, be seen in an essentialist manner, as they lack necessary features, maintain 
their boundaries dynamically and relationally, change over time, and occasionally show gradations between
65 Cf. Zachar (2000:167)
66 See Zachar (2000:167) and also Benjamins (2003) who comments on Zachar's work.
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species. However, they rem ain natural kinds in any meaningful sense o f the  term . (Haslam, 2003:3)
H aving portrayed  his alternative account o f natural kinds -  nam ely Boyd’s, Haslam  is 
quick to  po in t o u t w here Zachar’s analysis fails -  even if no essences o f psychiatric 
disorders exist, it is n o t im possible th a t we could cu t na tu re  a t its jo in ts and  a ttribu te  a 
respectable ontological sta tus to  m ental diseases. In his own approach, H aslam  suggests 
th a t psychiatric diseases could be natural kinds insofar as ‘discrete categories, based on 
objective d iscontinuities ra ther th an  pragm atic decisions, exist in the  psychopathological 
dom ain ’.67
When we ask whether a mental disorder is well understood as a natural kind, I would argue, we are asking 
not whether it has an essence but whether it has a comparable ontological status to naturally existing 
biological kinds. That is, we are asking whether it has relatively crisp boundaries, is objectively real rather 
than merely reflecting classificatory conventions, and has a biological basis. Are mental disorders akin to 
biological species, with an equally solid, non-artifactual foundation in the natural world? In many or most 
cases, the answer will be a clear "no” However, the answer is obviously and uninterestingly "no" if we 
require a natural kind to have an essentialist basis that is implausible even for biological species. Almost no- 
one doubts that "carving nature at the joints" — even if it is an ugly metaphor — is a reasonable and feasible 
goal when it comes to biological taxonomy at the species level, even if these joints are not defined by 
essences. The question ought to be whether we can have the same confidence in the existence o f "natural" 
joints and objective discontinuities in the psychiatric domain. In short, I think Zachar deflects the real 
challenge of the natural kind view of mental disorders by joining it to the important but distinct issue of  
essentialism.' (Haslam, 2003:3)
Daniel Sulmasy discusses the  connection betw een natural k inds and diseases in his (2005) 
article, w hich is m ean t to espouse an A ristotelian position. For Sulmasy, natural kinds 
m ust be a ttended  by law-like principles and their m em bers m ust possess ‘dispositions’.68 
Diseases are always diseases o f a living natural kind bu t they  are no t them selves natural 
kinds because they  fail to fulfil a crucial criterion -  the dispositions of a natural kind 
should allow any one o f its m em bers ‘to flourish as the  kind o f th ing  th a t it is’.69 This 
criterion is unfolded as follows:
‘Natural kinds have dispositions. This much teleology must be granted. Uranium undergoes a characteristic
67 Haslam (2003:4) See also Tsou (2008) who adapts Boyd’s account to psychiatric kinds.
68 Sulmasy (2005: 491, 492)
69 Sulmasy (2005:492)
42
pattern o f radioactive decay. Various types o f stars have dispositional predicates. They develop and change 
over periods o f time that may seem long by human standards, but there is a pattern by which a star’s history 
must unfold temporally if it is to behave as the kind o f thing that it is. Dispositional predicates seem  
especially characteristic o f living natural kinds. In fact, Philippa Foot has written that the word ‘good’ is an 
attributive adjective, not a predicative adjective, and cannot be understood apart from an understanding of 
what kind o f thing something is. So, for instance, the word ‘good’, as used in the phrase, “good roots,” 
cannot be understood unless one knows that it is being attributed to a rosemary bush and not to a 
rhinoceros. Having deep roots would not be good for a rhinoceros. Natural kinds have natural tendencies. 
Much of the scientific enterprise consists of coming better to understand these natural tendencies. This 
teleology....does not imply the anthropomorphizing of things...[T]hat natural kinds have law-like principles 
that determine how they develop and flourish as the kinds of things that they are is simply a fact about the 
world as we encounter it.’ (Sulmasy, 2005: 492-493)
Since diseases fail to contribu te  to flourishing, they  are no t natural kinds b u t 
classifications ‘o f a certain  state of affairs th a t can occur in m em bers o f particular living 
natural k inds’. I no te  en passant th a t Sulmasy m entions several o ther aspects o f this 
construal o f diseases, the  asym ptom atic aspect being one of them .
‘There can be asymptomatic disease. But if a pattern of disturbance in the law-like biological principles that 
determine the characteristic development and typical history of a living natural kind is to be called a 
disease, at least some individuals with the disease must be inhibited from flourishing as the kinds of things 
that they are. For example, prostate cancer at age 80 may be “incidental” and never interfere with a man’s 
flourishing. But unless prostate cancer interfered with at least some men’s flourishing, it would not be 
called a disease.’ (Sulmasy, 2005: 497)
In his (2006) book dedicated  to psychiatric classification, Dominic Murphy argues th a t it 
does no t m atte r w hether (psychiatric) diseases are natural kinds or no t.7° M urphy notes 
first the  variety o f ways in which natural kinds have been construed and organises the 
accounts on  offer in four categories: sim ple essentialism s, nom ological kinds, refined 
essentialism  and ecum enism . Simple essentialism  is ‘the  view th a t w hat m akes a 
collection o f entities in to  a natural kind is som e m icrostructural essence th a t accounts for 
their o ther p roperties’.71 The nom ological view states th a t kinds participate in the  laws of 
nature; in  th is approach, since the laws o f na tu re  are ‘the  deepest, im m utable regularities 
th a t there  are’, the  involvem ent o f natural kinds in laws entails th a t they  should also be
70 Murphy (2006, 9.4, 9.5.5)
71 Murphy (2006, 9.5.1)
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regarded as ‘spatio tem porally  unrestric ted  and  im m utab le’.72 The ‘refined essentialism ’ is 
represen ted  by Boyd’s account, w hich preserves the  core o f sim ple essentialism  in th a t 
‘m icrostructu re  is one way to keep properties together’, b u t has the  additional insight th a t 
due to m echanism s, ‘clusters of properties m ay stick together hom eostatically, despite 
pertu rbations in the  env ironm ent’.73 Finally, ecum enism  is the  varian t of Boyd’s account 
developed by Griffiths, w hich identifies inductively useful, hom eostatic  clusters in o ther 
special sciences beside biology and stresses the  im portance o f external m echanism s.
M urphy allows h im self for a m om ent to be draw n in to  the  debate and  expresses his 
d iscon ten tm en t w ith  ecum enism . The m ain reason seem s to be that, by stressing the 
im portance o f external m echanism s, Griffiths deviates from  the refined essentialist line 
represented  by Boyd’s account.
‘Griffiths thinks that this liberalisation of the notion o f essence is justified by its resonance with Boyd’s ideas 
and by its continuity with earlier theories of natural kinds (1997, 189). The idea that the essence of 
something can be external to it was never part of the tradition of natural kinds, but it is not ruled out by the 
idea o f homeostatic mechanisms to which Boyd appeals. But if extrinsic forces are permitted to hold a kind 
together, then maybe chartered accountants are a natural kind, since they share properties in virtue o f a 
historical fact -  they passed the relevant exams. But now we start to wonder whether anything can be a 
natural kind’ (Murphy, 2006, 9.5.5)
The problem atic tension  betw een refined essentialism  and  ecum enism  appears to have 
deeper roots, dow n into the  preferences th a t each theo rist m ight have. Evidently, a 
natural question  arises -  why should we care?
Why should we care though? Why not break with tradition, do away with essences altogether, and embrace 
ecumenism? The great insight of ecumenism is the recognition of the many reasons for properties to cluster 
together, ranging from atomic structure to government declaration. So both refined essentialism and 
ecumenism are good concepts o f kindhood. My taste runs to saying that the former picks out natural kinds 
and the latter does not, although it does pick out useful kinds. But I do not have a knockout argument 
against all other positions. It is hard to see how to resolve the dispute over whether all kinds are natural, or
only ones with simple essences are but that there are also other kinds of kinds Whether or not we call
some or all o f these natural kinds does not seem terribly consequential. What is the significance of this for 
psychiatry?’ (Murphy, 2006, 9.5.5)
72 Murphy (2006, 9.5.2)
73 Murphy (2006, 9.5.4)
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Since different theorists  m ight have different opinions as to w hat natural kinds are, 
w hether diseases are na tu ra l kinds or no t is in fact a m oot point, as ‘m ental illnesses are 
kinds, even if they  are no t natu ral kinds. And w hether they  are seen as natural kinds ‘is 
largely a m atte r o f choice’.74 M urphy’s conclusion is th a t we should ju st look a t useful 
ways o f classifying diseases (for trea tm en t) and leave aside their natural kind status, since 
‘there  are b o th  natu ral kinds and o ther scientifically fruitful divisions in n a tu re ’.75
The views o f the  theorists  presented  in th is section are representative for how  natu ral 
kinds have been  discussed vis-a-vis the  m edical dom ain. Some of these views are 
in teresting  and  challenging. A nd yet, I tend  to th ink  th a t they reflect a problem atic 
relation to the  very issue o f w hat natural kinds are -  or, in o ther words, to the  realism  vs. 
nom inalism  d ispute concerning kinds -  sim ply because certain  assum ptions abou t kind 
realism  are taken  for gran ted  while o ther assum ptions are no t even m entioned . I will 
discuss th is realism  dilem m a in the next section, in w hich I will also state the  pa th  o f my 
subsequen t enquiry.
To anticipate, w hat I will try  to  do in the  next chapters is sim ply to  com plem ent the 
argum en ta tion  o f those theorists who claim th a t m edical kinds fit coherently  into a 
p icture o f natu ral kinds (especially ‘cluster’ kinds) by taking in to  account as m any criteria 
o f m em bership  as possible.
74 Murphy (2006, 9.5)
75 Murphy (2006, 9.5)
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§ 1 .4  R e a l ism  (a n d  N o m in a l is m ) a b o u t  K in d s
W hat is natural kind Realism and  how  can we define it? W hen  investigating the  sta tus of 
kinds o f diseases (or any o ther kinds in the  special sciences), the  issue o f kind Realism 
(and N om inalism ) becom es alm ost a m ethodological concern. The reason is th a t the 
discussions abou t the  ontology o f natural kinds can involve extrem ely difficult and  
variegated m etaphysical argum ents, w hich are m ostly set ou t against the  background of 
the  exact sciences. W hen  en tering  the relatively uncharted  territo ry  of the  special 
sciences then , there  is no t enough scope to discuss fastidiously enough abou t all the 
ram ifications of the  kind Realism debates. Accordingly, there  is a problem  as to how one 
should connect one’s enquiry into the special science kinds to the classical accounts of 
natu ral kinds.
There exist two extrem e strategies th a t a theorist o f the  special sciences could support, 
corresponding to two m ethodological ‘dangers’, as it were. O n the one hand, the  ‘danger’ 
w hen discussing a science as m edicine is simply to take up one account o f natu ral kinds 
or ano ther and  ‘tran sla te ’ the results in to  the respective special science, draw ing 
conclusions m uch too swiftly. This does happen  in m ost o f the  cases o f the  au thors 
discussed in the  previous section. O n the o ther hand, the  ‘danger’ is to  insist upon  the 
variety o f kind m em bership  criteria and adop t the position  th a t ‘natural lan d ’ is an 
indeterm inate  and useless notion, which one can em ploy in w hatever sense one wishes 
to .76
I do no t th ink  th a t e ither o f these extrem e positions is fruitful w hen dealing w ith the 
issue o f kind Realism. I will state here my reasons and th en  portray  the  ‘m iddle g round’ 
m ethodology I will take up in my enquiry. As far as the  first extrem e is concerned, a 
theo rist o f special sciences should no t ignore th a t there  are several options available for 
the  kind R ealism /N om inalism  dilem m a and th a t none o f them  has proven to be beyond 
(reasonable) criticism . A simple way to p resent some of these options in a un itary  way 
goes as follows.
76 Murphy (2006) adopts this position. For another example see Machery (2006) - who discusses the natural 
kinds of concepts and notes, as a pre-emptive defence of his preferred account, that ’the notion of natural 
kind, like the notion of heap, is vague’ (Machery, 2006: 448). See also Shain (1993: 291) for a similar stance.
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A very strong  option  is to take lands as real only insofar as substantive universals exist.77 
In th is respect, one could argue th a t the  entire  debate over kind Realism hinges on w hat 
ontological s ta tus we should assign to the pa tte rn s o f co-instan tia ted  properties we find 
in nature . If, ontologically (from the  po in t o f view of a classical substance-a ttribu te  
relation), the  co-instan tia tion  o f certain  properties by individuals does no t represent 
anyth ing  m ore th an  'the sum 1 of separate instan tia tions o f p roperties (taken singly) th en  
one can only adop t (som e form of) reductionist stance on kinds. If substantive universals 
exist, th en  the  phenom enon  of co-instan tia tion  calls for a separate m etaphysical category. 
O therw ise, all criteria underlying the various ways in w hich our classifications are non- 
arb itrary  will be related  to forms o f kind Nom inalism . For instance, denying criterion I 
(natural p roperties requirem ent) w ould am oun t to adopting  a strong nom inalist position, 
affirm ing criterion II (causal induction  requirem ent) w ould be an  allegiance to m oderate 
nom inalism , and, say, em bracing criterion Vib (N&S requirem ent) could be viewed as 
adopting  a w eak nom inalist stance.
This approach  m ight appear too radical and one m ight w ant to shift tow ards a less 
am bitious option. For instance, it is som ew hat plausible to regard the  position th a t 
a ttends criterion  Vib (N&S requirem ent) as realism  or weak realism .78 If the  patterns of 
properties instan tia ted  by particulars are clear cut (as opposed to being fuzzy), th en  one 
could argue th a t kinds do represent a separate category th a t delineates a special place in 
our ontology - and the  aesthetic, hierarchical arrangem ent o f chem ical elem ents th a t are 
separated  by gaps certainly invites th is line o f reasoning. Intuitively, kinds are some sort 
o f ‘en tities’ and  having non-fuzzy patterns, as opposed to fuzzy ones, seem s to go 
sufficiently far in th is (intuitive) direction. W e simply do no t need substantive universals 
for kind Realism, one could th en  claim.
However, in fact, one could find reasons to claim th a t each o f the  criteria outlined in §1.1 
is sufficient to delineate kind realism. One could accept for instance th a t w hen particulars 
instan tia te  several explanatory powerful properties, we have (from  the  po in t of view of a 
substance-attribu te  relation) a ‘sum ’ o f ‘separate’ instantiations, insofar as no substantive
77 It is for instance Lowe’s (2001) position. Lowe does not distinguish between variants o f nominalism, as I 
shall do in the following.
78 Ereshefsky (1992) (1998) for instance, holds that it is a realist position
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universal exists to  account from  the  above for the phenom enon  of co-instantiation. 
Nevertheless, one could po in t ou t th a t the  ‘sum ’ represents ontologically som ething m ore 
th an  its p arts’. As I have underlined  in §1.2, it has been poin ted  ou t th a t objects sharing a 
single (explanatory powerful) property  (e.g. charged bodies), do n o t seem  to form a 
natu ral kind. N ot just properties, b u t pa tte rns of properties are instan tia ted  and these 
p a tte rn s  (irrespective o f w hether they are fuzzy or not) should delineate a separate 
m etaphysical category. One could thus give up criterion Vib and instead o f necessary and 
sufficient conditions, simply ask th a t clusters be in place, em bracing criterion Via. 
‘Insofar as clusters o f properties exist, th en  kinds are real’, the  conclusion o f th is approach 
would sound.
O ne could go all the  way dow n and even take just criterion I as sufficient for kind 
realism .79 The po in t w ould be th a t there  is still an im portan t difference betw een 
classifications based on Cam bridge properties and the ones based on natural properties. 
In addition, it could be argued, unless individual substances are construed as a ‘bunch  of 
p roperties’, as m ost often the trope theorists hold, then  individuals instan tia ting  a 
p roperty  and  grouped on grounds of th is sim ilarity do appear to m ark ou t a separate form 
of being.
The variety o f these options is indeed striking and the discussion of which o f these 
options (or any o ther I have no t portrayed here) points tow ards Realism is a very 
com plicated m atter. However, tu rn ing  to the  o ther extrem e, I do no t th ink  th a t one 
should adop t the  position  th a t natural kinds represent a ‘dum m y’, indeterm inate  notion  
th a t everyone can use in w hatever sense one wishes. Indeed, som etim es the special 
science theorists po in t ou t th a t scientific, em pirical enquiry can dispense w ith the notion 
o f natural kind.80 This m ay be a correct po in t - perhaps for m edical research it does no t 
m atte r m uch w hether there  are natural kinds o f diseased organism s - b u t it does seem  to 
m iss the  target, sim ply because from the poin t of view of scientific practice only, m any 
curren t philosophical discussions m ay appear redundan t. From scientists’ po in t o f view, a
79 I have already mentioned (§1.2) that Dupr£ takes his own position as a ‘promiscuous realism’, because the 
properties involved in his most unusual classifications, are not gerrymandered. See Wilson (1996), Daly 
(1.996), Wilkerson (1998) for some samples of the feisty debate on whether this deserves the tag of realism.
80 This is Murphy’s (2006) stance, for instance.
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discussion such as w hether laws are m etaphysically necessary or not, for instance, m ay 
appear quite futile as well, since they could o f course m ake do w ith the  notion  o f physical 
necessity only. To give ano th er example, scientists arguably do n o t care m uch abou t (and 
the ir research is no t influenced by) the  dispute on w hether properties are universals, 
tropes or sets, and  the  exam ples could go on.81
Nonetheless, all talk  regarding the thorny  relationship betw een em pirical research and 
theoretical reasoning notw ithstanding, ‘natu ral k ind’ does represent an im portan t 
m etaphysical no tion  found a t the in tersection  of various discussions in  m etaphysics and 
in the  philosophy of science, w hich in ter alia can be used to address the  d istance betw een 
the exact sciences and the ‘im m ature’ ones. Therefore, discussing natural kinds is useful 
and an  investigation of their status in m edicine can be fruitful, if conducted  on the  right 
track.
As I said, in order to  avoid the  two extrem e positions, I will adopt a simple, ‘m iddle line’ 
m ethodology. O n the  ‘negative’ side, m y approach presupposes, for one thing, th a t I will 
avoid getting  involved in the  kind Realism debate an d /o r avoid trying to adjudicate 
betw een various particu lar accounts of natural kinds. For another, it entails th a t I will 
resist ‘projecting’ directly  the  conclusions of any particular natu ral kind account from  the 
exact sciences in to  the  realm  of the  pathological.
O n the  ‘positive’ side, m y approach will be to take each criterion associated w ith natural 
land  m em bership  and see w hether an ‘ontological gap’ betw een the  exact science lands 
and the  m edical lands opens up. More precisely, in chapter 3 I will com pare a ‘classical’ 
natural kind (nam ely gold) w ith a kind of disease (nam ely Graves’ Disease). The exact 
science kinds are the  ones considered to typify natural kinds and  I take it as 
uncontroversial that, irrespective of w hat resolution the Realism dilem m a over the  right 
m em bership criteria m ight have, if natural kinds exist, they should be found prim arily in 
the  exact sciences. Such a com parison should thus m ake clear certain  resem blances and 
differences betw een m edicine and the exact sciences th a t should m atte r decisively in 
establishing the  character o f disease kinds.
8* O f course, philosophical arguments could be brought in order to show the redundancy o f the natural kind 
notion. The most important one is advanced by Ian Hacking in his (2006) and (2007).
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My ‘m iddle line’ m ethodology will n o t be entirely  neutral, however, in the  sense in  which 
I will n o t sim ply use these criteria as m eans o f com parison w ithou t questioning their 
g rounding  in  the  intuitive backdrop of the  natural kind discourse. As I have explained, 
th is intuitive backdrop poses a great challenge to the  intelligibility o f m y enquiry and  its 
relation to the  kind m em bership  requirem ents needs to  be explored. I will explain how  in 
the  next subsection.
§1.5 Ca r v in g  n a t u r e  a t  its  jo in t s
Intuitively, natu ral kinds are supposed to  po in t tow ards classifications th a t are ‘profound’, 
‘u ltim ate’, ‘basic’, ’fundam enta l’ and reveal ‘w hat things are ’. O f all the  expressions o f 
these in tu itions, I shall take the  idea th a t natu ral kinds ‘carve na tu re  a t its jo in ts’ to  be 
representative.
Kind theorists  often appeal to th is phrase w hen they w ant to m ake clear th a t their 
preferred account o f na tu ra l lands is the  right one.82 Nevertheless, ‘w hat th ings are' and 
accordingly, w hat 'carving natu re  at its joints' am ounts to, is n o t univocal. As such, 
invoking th is assum ption  seem s prima facie  just a rhetorical device th a t com es to 
accom pany w hatever stance theorists adop t on the R ealism /N om inalism  dilem m a 
discussed in §1.4. T hat is, its purpose sim ply seem s to  add som e un-argum entative w eight 
to one’s claim s th a t certain  criteria of m em bership should be em ployed for delineating 
natural kinds.
This w ould be, however, too quick a dism issal o f th is assum ption  or set o f assum ptions. 
W e do have the  in tu ition  th a t natural lands pick ou t som ething ‘deep’, ‘profound’, 
‘fundam enta l’, etc. W hile argum ents based exclusively on in tu itions are weak, in tu itions 
as such cannot be a ltogether rejected and their im portance should not be neglected. In 
the  context o f my proposed com parison, the respective in tu itions tell us th a t Graves’ 
Disease, like all disease kinds, is a ‘superficial’ kind and  th a t com paring it w ith  the 
‘fundam enta l’ kind gold w ould be entirely  inappropriate . W hat we have here is a
82 See for instance Wilkerson (1995)
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challenge to  the  very intelligibility of the  p resen t enquiry. How could th is challenge be 
dealt w ith?
Again, I do n o t w ish to reject these intu itions. Being aware o f their rhetorical potential, I 
w ould ra ther ask - w hat direction(s) could they  be leading tow ards, w hen revealing w hat 
th ings a re ’ is a t stake? I will outline two alternatives as to w hat ‘carving natu re  a t its 
jo in ts’ po in ts to. Then I will in troduce a caveat I already announced  in the  In troduction  to 
th is thesis and I will explain how, in spite o f th is obstacle to intelligibility, my enquiry in 
the  next chapters is to be undertaken .
In contem porary  m etaphysics, there  is a divide - am ong the possible m etaphysical 
schem es th a t could be em ployed in order to substan tia te  the  abovem entioned in tuition(s) 
- betw een two basic approaches on how  revealing lands is disclosing ‘w hat th ings are’. In 
very sim ple term s, on one approach, being a m em ber o f a natural kind is crucial for the  
identity  o f any particu lar.83 O n the o ther approach, kind m em bership is no t taken  to be 
crucial for the  iden tity  o f particulars.84 Let me exemplify w ith two theorists who explicitly 
state  in their w ork how  they  take kinds to ‘carve natu re  a t its jo in ts’ from  this po in t of 
view, nam ely Brian Ellis in his w ork on laws o f nature  and David W iggins in his w ork on 
sortals.
Like all sortal theorists, W iggins takes sortal concepts to be associated w ith sem antic 
conditions o f ‘iden tity  and  individuation’ th a t ‘sort o u t’ w hich things fall under them  and 
w hich do not. In his approach, however, these sem antic conditions do no t only allow the 
users o f sortals to coun t th ings (an obvious consequence o f the  capacity to identify the 
objects falling under th em )85 b u t also, in the  case o f a certain  range o f sortals called 
‘u ltim ate’, to establish the  tru th  conditions of a posteriori (absolute) identity  statem ents. 
M ore specifically, for W iggins, sta tem ents such as ‘a is identical w ith  b ’ are true if and 
only if a and b fall under the  same ultim ate sortal f  and  they  have the sam e causal
83 Brody (1974,1981), Denkel (1996), Wiggins (1980); see also Bigelow (1999)
84 See Ellis (2001, 2002), Wilkerson (1995), Lowe (1989, 2006)
85 In the traditional sortals discussion, the semantic conditions of identity should allow us to recognize and 
count objects. They are associated with relative identity, that is, with objects' identity as objects o f a sort or 
another. See Geach (1962) and also Noonan (2006)
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history.86
W hat th is m eans on a m etaphysical level is that, should any object a cease to  fall under an 
u ltim ate  sortal f, it w ould cease to  exist. In o ther words, the  possession o f the  
characteristics th a t objects ‘o f a so rt’ share -  characteristics also involved in  the  sem antic 
conditions o f application for sortals - constitu tes m etaphysically a sine qua non condition 
for preserving the  iden tity  and existence o f the objects in question.
C onverted into the  kinds term inology, W iggins’s con ten tion  is th a t the  possession o f 
certain  p roperties th a t objects ‘o f a k ind’ share in virtue o f their m em bership  constitu tes 
m etaphysically a necessary condition for the  identity  and existence o f kind m em bers. 
W ere natu ral kind m em bers to lose their kind characteristics, they  w ould cease to exist. 
W iggins holds, for instance, that:
‘...the elucidation of the identity ‘a=b’ depends on the k ind  o f  th in g  that a and b are...Consolidating all this 
we have a threefold theory...a=b if and only if there exists a sortal concept f  such that (1) a and b belong to a 
kind which is the extension of f  (2) to say that x falls under f  -  or that x is an f  -  is to say what x is (in the 
sense Aristotle isolated) (3) a is the same f as b, or a coincides with b under f, i.e. coincides with b in the 
manner o f coincidence required for members of f  (Wiggins 1980: 48, italic original, bold added)
‘[A]n individual a ’s having ceased to exist at t is a matter of nothing identical with a belonging to the 
extension of the ultimate individuative k that is a’s kind’ - Wiggins 1980: 67, italics added)
Now, Brian Ellis exemplifies the o ther branch o f the  divide. Ellis also th inks th a t kinds 
‘carve natu re  a t its jo in ts’ and reveal ‘w hat things are '.87 In his rationale however, this role 
played by kinds has no th ing  to do w ith the individual identity  of kind m em bers. As I have 
explained in §1.2, in Ellis’ view, the  sim ilarities used to  dem arcate kinds are dispositional 
properties and  m icrostructures selected precisely (and only) because they  are explanatory 
powerful. In his approach, m em bership to a kind brings ‘w hat th ings are’ into the  light in 
the sense o f explaining the  behaviours th a t kind m em bers exhibit. Only properties and 
their causal in terconnectedness are in focus.
86 In other words, Wiggins adopts the view that semantically, sortals have associated ‘absolute’ and not only 
relative conditions of identity. I should emphasize that in the present section as well as in chapters 2 and 3, 
the term ‘identity’ is chiefly used to refer to absolute identity. Relative identity will only be brought into 
discussion in §3.6, in a clearly specified context.
87 e.g. Ellis (2000:335)
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Accordingly, the  (individual) identity  of kind m em bers is eluded from  the rationale 
underlying Ellis's affirm ation th a t ‘natural kinds carve natu re  a t its jo in ts’ (on his 
preferred  in te rp re ta tion  o f th a t phrase). Parenthetically, Ellis uses a t tim es the phrase 
‘iden tity  o f th ings’ indistinctly, in th a t it is no t clear w hether in his a rgum enta tion  is at 
w ork the  absolute iden tity  o f particular kind m em bers (qua particulars) or their relative 
iden tity  qua k ind m em bers; th is equivocation reverberates in som e of his o ther 
argum ents on kinds, w hich will be looked at in the  next chapter. An extended survey of 
his w ork is revelatory though -  for Ellis, kind m em bership  has no th ing  to do w ith  the 
absolute iden tity  o f kind m em bers, as the following quotes indicate.
‘The individual essence of a thing is the set of its characteristics in virtue of which it is the individual it 
is...The kind essence of a thing on the other hand, is the set of its characteristics in virtue of which it is a 
thing of the kind it is. O f these two conceptions of essence, the most important one...is the kind essence... 
(Ellis 2002:12)
Things behave as they do...not because of any external constraints that force them to, but because this is 
how they are intrinsically disposed to behave in the circumstances...I assume that the identities of thing of  
the most fundamental kinds are wholly dependent on how they are disposed to act. If protons, for example, 
are such fundamental things, then for anything to be a proton it must always be disposed to behave as 
protons...protons could not behave according to different laws without ceasing to be things of the kind they 
are' (Ellis 2002: 2-5)
I am reluctant to accept...that the individual essences of a thing belonging to a natural kind includes its 
kind essence. Nor do I think that I have to accept this thesis to provide a sound basis for scientific 
essentialism.’ (Ellis 2002: 238, italics original)
W e see that, on one approach, illustrated by W iggins, carving natu re  a t its jo in ts via the  
kinds schem e is in principle providing (a part of) the  conditions o f identity  for 
individuals. O n the  o ther approach, illustrated by Ellis, natu re  is just carved in a different 
sense. Each o f the two resulting ‘branches’ adm its various detailed  in terpretations, 
specifying additional m etaphysical characteristics th a t kinds are taken to have and 
consequently  articulating the ‘being’ of kind m em bers (i.e. ‘w hat they are’ in virtue of 
their m em bership). For Ellis for instance, as I have outlined in chap ter 1, natural kinds are 
characterised by ‘essential’ properties and  kind m em bers instan tia te  substantive 
universals arranged in a hierarchical structure. For W iggins, m em bers o f any natural kind
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share a certain  ‘principle o f activity’, w hich is ‘nom ologically g rounded’ in causally 
efficient p roperties discovered a posteriori.88
I canno t claim  th a t th is divide is the  very crucial one for elucidating the  crux o f in tu itions 
a ttend ing  the natu ra l kinds them e. In o ther words, I can accept th a t one m ay a ttem p t to 
tackle in a d ifferent way the substance o f the  in tu ition(s) in question .89 N onetheless, for 
m y purposes it is sufficient th a t undeniably, th is is an im portan t divide. In its light, my 
enquiry in the  next two chapters can be plausibly undertaken , in spite o f the  problem s of 
intelligibility I have portrayed in this section. The guiding rationale will be the following: 
natural kinds can be taken  to carve nature  a t its jo ints down to the  identity  of their 
m em bers or not. If identity  is indeed involved in circum scribing a ‘basic ontology', 
providing an  ‘u ltim ate  classification, revealing ’w hat th ings are’, etc., th en  there  is no way 
diseases could be natural kinds. In o ther words, there  is no way the  identity  o f an 
organism  could depend  on w hatever diseased tra its it m ay acquire. This is the  very caveat 
o f my enterprise, w hich I had m entioned in the In troduction.
However, if identity  is not involved, then  for every m etaphysical feature th a t is p resen t in 
the  case of the  gold kind, we could find a correspondent in the  case o f the Graves’ Disease 
kind. W hatever ‘essential’ properties are said to be possessed by the m em bers o f the  gold 
land, sim ilar ‘essential’ p roperties could be said to be possessed by the m em bers of the  
Graves’ Disease kind. If a substantive universal was said to be instan tia ted  by the gold 
land  m em bers, th en  I will claim th a t there is no reason why the Graves’ Disease kind 
m em bers should no t also instan tia te  a Graves’ Disease substantive universal, and so on.
I will follow the  la tte r side o f my rationale, in which identity  is no t explicitly involved, in 
chapter 3, by using the criteria o f m em bership as m eans of com parison betw een the 
Graves’ Disease kind and  the gold kind. Prior to that, however, som e of these criteria of 
m em bership (nam ely requirem ents VIb, VII and VIII) will be scrutin ized in chapter 2, as 
part of a m ore general, m etaphysical discussion of the identity-sense o f carving nature  at
88 Cf. Wiggins (1980 : 77-83 et passim). See also Weatherson (2002) for a discussion.
89 I could accept for instance that instantiating substantive universals or not is another important divide, as 
I think Lowe would claim (Lowe 2006). My divide, however, criss-crosses all the other differentiations, 
insofar as no major metaphysical aspect is neglected in my discussion. I do not ignore for instance that 
natural kind members could be said to instantiate substantive universals. Indeed, I shall discuss this aspect 
extensively in the next chapter. I am just trying in this section to deal with a set o f  intuitions.
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its joints. These th ree  requirem ents, I will argue, are related  to  the  identity  sense of 
carving nature, in th a t only if the  identity  of kind m em bers depends upon their 
m em bership , are these requirem ents justified. Thus, I will show th a t the  problem s of 
essences, substantive universals and  processes - i.e. the  specific m etaphysical problem s 
we are confronted w hen  questioning the justification o f these requirem ents -  are quite 
innocuous for the  existence o f m edical kinds, if the  identity  sense o f 'carving natu re  a t its 
jo in ts’ is n o t explicitly invoked .90
As to  the  very justification of this identity  sense o f ‘carving n a tu re ’, in tu rn , I will show 
th a t it faces huge epistem ological problem s, the  m ain reason being th a t the  notion  of 
iden tity  is prim itive.911 do n o t th ink  th a t these epistem ic difficulties can be overcom e and 
I will offer a t th e  end o f chapter 3 som e reasons for such scepticism . However, I will no t 
draw  a definite conclusion as to w hether th is iden tity  sense o f ‘carving natu re  a t its jo in ts’ 
is tenable  or not.
90 One consequence of this argument, in chapter 3, will be that to deny that the ontology of gold kind 
members is on the same metaphysical level with the ontology of Graves diseased organisms is to tacitly 
appeal to the individual identity of kind members.
91 In the sense in which about identity, as a primitive relation entities bear with themselves, nothing 
informative can be said. See (Lowe 2001:44-47), Oderberg (2007: n7) and Mackie (1994). I will not discuss 
which of these two senses of carving nature is correct, from a metaphysical point of view; see § 3.6
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C h a p t e r  2 Es s e n c e s , Su b s t a n t iv e  U n iv e r sa l s  a n d  p r o c e ss e s
In t r o d u c t io n
This chapter is dedicated  to  an  analysis o f th ree  criteria o f natural kind m em bership  - 
criteria  VIb, VII and  VIII (the N&S, non-overlapping and  non-phase requirem ents, 
respectively) -  vis-^-vis the identity  sense of carving natu re  at its joints. These criteria ask 
th a t (candidate) na tu ra l kind m em bers should have necessary and  sufficient conditions of 
m em bership  (criterion VIb), th a t no two natural kinds could share m em bers except w hen 
they  are in a species-genus hierarchy (criterion VII) and th a t these m em bers should no t 
instan tia te  the  kind specific-properties as part o f a process in w hich m ore fundam ental 
kinds are involved (criterion VIII). In o ther words, it is dem anded th a t the  ‘divisions in 
natu re ' corresponding to natural kinds should be clearly delineated (non-fuzzy), non- 
overlapping (except in a genus-species hierarchy) and non-phase (non-im plicated in 
transito ry  transform ations).92 W hat I w ant to argue is th a t th a t w ithou t invoking the 
d iachronic identity  of kind m em bers, these requirem ents are groundless and th a t 
theorists  appeal tacitly to the  identity-related sense o f carving natu re  w hen setting  them  
forth.
My starting  po in t in analysing criteria VIb and VII is the  existence o f determ ining  
properties and the ir pa tte rn s  -  the  m etaphysical backdrop that, as we have seen in §3.1, 
circum scribes the inductively rich kinds. Now, if we simply followed the patterns in 
w hich the  determ ining  properties are co-instantiated, we w ould find some 'divisions' th a t 
are fuzzy and criss-crossing, and o ther 'divisions' th a t are m ore clear-cut, as it were. W hy 
should we consider the  latter divisions ontologically higher th an  the  form er, in the 
pu rsu it for natural kinds? It is clear that, in order for the  N&S and non-overlapping 
requirem ents to be justified, natural kinds should represent som ething m ore than  groups
92 In the notation I have introduced in chapter 1, criterion VIb says that, for any individual a, member o f a 
kind K, the determining properties part o f the pattern [pi, p2,...,pn] should be necessary and sufficient for 
membership. Criterion VII requires that, were a to also be a member o f a different kind K*, then either K 
and K* are identical or they are situated in a species-genus hierarchy. Criterion VIII asks that the pattern 
[pi, p2,...,pn] should not represent a phase o f a more fundamental pattern possessed by a.
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of particulars sharing (patterns of) determining properties.
These requ irem ents could be justified, by in troducing  new  elem ents in the  m etaphysics of 
kinds, in two (m ore or less related) ways. One way appeals to 'essences' (and ‘essential’ 
p roperties) a ttached  to kinds (or possessed by kind m em bers). The o ther appeals to 
substantive universals said to be instan tia ted  by kind m em bers. I will argue, nonetheless, 
th a t w hat we end up with, w hen appealing to such m etaphysical elem ents, is a chicken 
and  egg dilem m a. The dilem m a goes as follows. W hen looking at the  patterns of 
determ in ing  properties, should we pick up - am ong the ‘candidate’ divisions in nature  
th a t could correspond to natural kinds - only the non-overlapping and non-fuzzy ones 
because natural kind m em bers are supposed to instan tia te  ‘essential’ properties an d /o r 
substantive universals? Or should natural kind m em bers instan tia te  ‘essential’ properties 
a n d /o r substantive universals because the  divisions in natu re  corresponding to natural 
lands are supposed to be non-overlapping and  non-fuzzy?
I w ant to indicate in §2.1 and §2.2 th a t there  is a vicious circle betw een, on the  one hand, 
characterising in  a certain  way the m etaphysical category o f natural kinds (and the 
divisions o f natu re  corresponding to them ) and, on the o ther hand, a ttribu ting  to natural 
land  m em bers -  w hich are already taken to (co-) instan tia te  (patterns of) determ ining  
properties, on a m inim al in terp re ta tion  - certain  other types of instan tia tion . T hat the 
properties form ing the  pa tte rn s in question are no t only determ ining  b u t also ‘essential’ 
(on a certain  construal o f the  essential) does no t avoid the  vicious circle, I will argue. 
Similarly, th a t the  properties form ing the patterns in question are no t only ‘determ in ing’ 
bu t their possession follows from  the  instan tia tion  o f a substantive universal, does no t 
break the  vicious circle. O f course, I will argue th a t the  vicious circle can be broken down 
only if the  identity-related  sense of carving nature  at its jo ints is appealed to.
My argum enta tion  in §2.1 and §2.2 is in tended  to cover bo th  criteria VIb and VII (N&S 
and non-overlapping requirem ents). Indeed, m y po in t is th a t bo th  of them  are justified 
only if the  identity  o f kind m em bers is appealed to. However, for the  ease of exposition, I 
will m ainly discuss the  N&S requirem ent and will come back to criterion VII w henever it 
is necessary to  po in t ou t th a t the  same trea tm en t applies to  it as well. To em phasize, 
everything th a t will have been said abou t criterion VIb is also perfectly relevant for the
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non-overlapping requirement.
In §2.3 I tu rn  to criterion VIII and the  problem  of the  phase/non-phase  distinction. I 
begin by accepting th a t intuitively, we have a certain  range o f kinds th a t appear to  be 
phase kinds, i.e. appear to  result from  picking up (patterns of) properties th a t are only 
in stan tia ted  by particu lars because they  are engaged in certain  (m ore or less transitory) 
processes. I ask, however, w hat is the  justification for the com m onsensical p h ase /n o n ­
phase d istinction  th a t underlies our usual dism issal of certain  kinds as phases o f m ore 
‘fundam en ta l’ kinds. I focus on w hat I consider the  best philosophical defence in the  
literature  o f th is com m onsensical phase/non-phase d istinction, nam ely Jonathan  Lowe’s, 
and  argue th a t it fails in its curren t form and  th a t its only hope is the  adoption  of the 
identity-sense of carving nature.
W hat is in teresting  abou t Lowe’s position is th a t the  diachronic conditions o f identity  for 
objects do play a role in defending the com m on-sense phase/non-phase  distinction. 
These conditions are not linked w ith (non-phase) kind m em bership, however, b u t w ith 
m ore general categorizations of objects (in m aterial, artefactual and  biological strata). 
Lowe claims, am ong others, th a t unless these conditions o f diachronic identity  are 
accepted, the  perspective of the  num ber of natural, non-phase kinds m ultiplying greatly 
above the  num ber of kinds com m only accepted (the so-called ‘H eraclitan’ th reat) an d /o r 
reducing greatly below the num ber of kinds com m only accepted (the so-called ‘Spinozan’ 
th rea t) w ould be un-escapable. My poin t will sim ply be to show th a t these H eraclitan 
and  Spinozan th rea ts  cannot be repelled by Lowe’s strategy.
O f course, I will no t w ant to suggest a t all th a t it is m eaningless to talk  abou t phase kinds. 
I simply w ant to say th a t insofar as criterion VIII is used to rule ou t special science kinds 
as phase kinds, th en  the  only chance to do so is by adopting the identity  sense o f carving 
natu re  a t its joints. T hat the  alternative o f having special science kinds as non-phase 
lands entails som e form  of ‘H eraclitanism ’ does no t represent in the  least a catastrophic 
perspective. Such a possibility should simply m ake us re-th ink  the  phase, non-phase 
distinction, in o ther term s th an  the com m onsensical ones.
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§ 2 . i  E sse n c e s  a n d  e s s e n t ia l  p r o p e r t ie s  -  T h e  lo c k e a n  s t r a t e g y
O ne way o f justifying w hy the  patterns o f determ ining properties should fulfil the  N&S 
(and the  non-overlapping) requirem ent(s) is to  claim th a t the  characteristic properties o f 
kinds are n o t only determ in ing  bu t also ‘essential’. In th is line o f justification, the  
necessary and  sufficient conditions for m em bership  should circum scribe 'essences' of 
natu ral kinds. Such 'essences' are evidently m issing in the  case o f fuzzy (and /o r 
overlapping) kinds, in w hich we only find patterns of determ ining  properties simpliciter.93
I will show  in § 2.1.1 that, for all the kinds th a t fulfil the  requirem ent(s) VIb and VII, the  
'essential' denom ination  attached  to their characterizing properties is only a ‘tag’. Just 
em ploying such a tag does not add anything to the  nature  o f the  properties in question 
(and hence to  the  natu re  o f the  divisions of nature  they  characterize). Such properties are 
ultim ately  determ in ing  properties. Hence, criteria VIb and VII are unjustified and  their 
only justification, I argue in § 2.1.1, is the  identity  sense o f carving nature.
I should stress th a t I do no t in tend  to question (or even en ter into the discussion of) 
w hether kind m em bers th a t do fulfil in the actual world certain  N&S conditions w ould 
also have to fulfil them  in all possible worlds. T hat debate concerns w hether, for example, 
the  division in natu re  th a t corresponds to the  (natural) kind gold is m etaphysically 
necessary circum scribed by a certain  (non-fuzzy) set of properties. W hat I ask in th is 
section is a different question: why should the  divisions of nature  (the groups of 
particulars w ith certain  sim ilarities) th a t correspond to natural kinds be so and so? In 
o ther words, my em ploym ent o f the ‘should ' m odal level here is in tended  to  question a 
certain  characterization  o f the m etaphysical category of natural lands.
93 e.g. Wilkerson (1995:61-88), Harre (1974) e.g. Wilkerson (1995:61-88), Harre (1974). Note that the N&S 
and/or the non-overlapping requirements do not entail the existence o f ‘essences’ and ‘essential’ properties. 
‘Essences’ could be brought in as a possible justification  o f these requirements, in a philosophical 
argumentation, and, as I have already mentioned, substantive universals represent a possible alternative 
justification. One could argue that, conversely, ‘essential’ properties do not entail these requirements, 
simply because ‘essential’ properties could be construed as being only necessary for membership (Bird, 
2009). At any rate, as I have mentioned in chapter 1, the very term ‘essential’ has an extremely complicated 
semantics in that there are at least four senses of it that are invoked in the natural kinds discussion. What I 
will try to show in the following is that, in a sense, there is a relation of de dicto entailment between (a 
certain construal of) essential properties and the N&S and non-overlapping requirements and that the de re­
de dicto slip hinges on an equivocation between certain senses o f the essential.
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W ere natural kinds tu rn  up not being characterized by criterion VIb, th is w ould be 
consistent, I believe, w ith  arguing th a t the  division o f natu re  corresponding to  gold is 
non-fuzzy in a m etaphysically necessary (or only physically necessary) way, if the 
argum en t em ployed causal explanations for why certain  properties are co-instan tia ted  in 
perfect clusters.
T hat is to  say, the  a rgum enta tion  th a t (the division o f na tu re  corresponding  to) gold is 
m etaphysically necessarily circum scribed by a certain  set o f properties, should no t 
(uncritically) use as assum ption(s) th a t
i) gold is a natural kind
ii) ii) all natural kinds fulfil the N&S requirement
iii) iii) any metaphysically possible world should possess the same structure o f natural kinds as the
actual world
iv) iv) in the actual world, gold is characterized by such and such properties 
in order to derive the  conclusion th a t
v) in any metaphysically possible word, gold fulfils the N&S requirement (and is characterized by such and 
such properties).94
Prem ise ii) needs to be argued in favour o f separately, and  n o t taken  for granted, 
irrespective o f what is the case w ith certain  divisions o f natu re  in  the  actual (or any 
possible) word.
§2.1.1 T h e  L o c k e a n  s t r a t e g y
W hat are the ‘essential’ properties th a t supposed to form  the  necessary and  sufficient 
conditions o f m em bership  for non-fuzzy kinds? W hen  discussing them , the  kind theorists 
em bracing the N&S requ irem ent appeal, ultim ately, to the  term s in w hich one w ould
94 Parenthetically, premise iii) is employed by authors like Ellis (see Ellis et. al. 1992, Ellis 2008:146) who are 
interested in the metaphysical necessity of natural laws, and is quite disputable. Without premise iii) the 
conclusion that can be derived, at best, is that in any physically possible word, gold fulfils the N&S 
requirement (and is characterized by such and such properties); see Lange (2004) for a critical stance.
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describe determ in ing  properties. T hat is, they are described as the  properties th a t explain 
(i.e. produce) observable behaviours.
It should  be said th a t the  rationale em ployed by the kind theorists  in question  belongs to 
a certain  Lockean trad ition . Just as Locke, w hom  they cite or m ention  explicitly, these 
theorists  insist upon  the  conventional natu re  o f the  classifications based on observable 
(secondary) properties. The claim is th a t the  observable properties are m ind-dependen t 
a n d /o r  relational and  thus (in my term inology) the  resulting kinds fail to fulfil criterion I. 
The observable properties (assim ilated m ore or less to Locke's secondary qualities) are 
con trasted  w ith the  m icro-structural properties (which are taken  to correspond to the 
Lockean prim ary qualities). The latter are adverted, on the one (rhetorical) hand, to be 
able to  show  'w hat th ings are' and to ‘carve nature  a t its jo in ts’, in virtue o f their causal 
roles. O n the  o ther hand, they are said to jointly form 'Real Essences' shared by all the 
m em bers o f natu ral k inds.95 The sense o f carving natu re  a t its jo ints involved in the  entire 
discussion is the  non-iden tity  related one.
Brian Ellis, one o f the  kind theorists presented  in chapter 1, follows th is rationale. Ellis 
looks in his expository passages a t chemical elem ents and  com pounds and com pares their 
m icro-structural properties w ith the superficial properties we can observe.96 The form er 
properties are to be preferred to the latter, argue Ellis, because the form er are intrinsic 
w hereas the  la tte r are relational (the m ost often cited example o f observable, relational 
property  being colour), and  also because the form er are a ttended  by causal powers, etc. in
95 O f course, as I have already mentioned, apart from the Lockean way, there is a different, semantic vein of 
argumentation for essences that is often appealed to. In this vein, the term 'gold' for instance, should pick 
out its reference in all possible worlds in which the reference exists. Since I am primarily looking at 
metaphysical arguments, this Kripkean vein will not be discussed here in any detail. This was one of the 
main assumptions of this thesis, as stated in the Introduction to this thesis. I will point out at the end of  
this subsection how a critique of the Kripkean strategy could directly spin off from the present 
argumentation. For a fully-fledged criticism of Kripke, see Lowe (2007a), Lowe (2008), Mellor (1977) Salmon 
(1979) and Salmon (1982). See also Mumford (2005, esp. pp. 426, 427) for an argument showing that, on 
scrutiny, the Kripke/Putnam strategy is not different at all from the Lockean strategy employed by Ellis et. 
ah
96 See Ellis (2008: 140, 2002: chapter 4). As I have discussed in §1.2, Ellis divides the micro-structural 
properties in two sorts: the causally efficient properties and the so-called structural properties, namely the 
properties underlying similarities in shape, spatio-temporal arrangement of various components, etc. How 
structural properties can be part o f necessary and sufficient conditions is a problem that cannot be solved 
by the Lockean strategy. In order to deal with it, Ellis appeals to substantive universals and I shall look at 
this alternative/complementary strategy in § 2.2.
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the  sense th a t they produce the la tte r.97 Crucially, Ellis adds, the  kinds characterised by 
such m icrostructural p roperties should be non-fuzzy.
'The intrinsic properties and structures of things are what make them what they are. They explain how  
things are disposed to behave, just in virtue of how they are constituted, and what the causal powers of 
their constituents are. But this is precisely what Lockean real essences are supposed to do. Therefore, the 
intrinsic properties and structures of things are their Lockean real essences. (Ellis, 2001:31, italics added)
However, one could poin t out, the fact th a t the  intrinsic properties and the structure  of 
th ings explain how  th ings are disposed to behave simply m akes those properties 
determ ining. O f course, the  tag of ‘essential’ or ‘being part of real essences’ can be 
stam ped upon them , b u t no th ing  in the  existence of determ ining  properties as such, 
justifies taking only those particulars th a t instan tia te  non-fuzzy, clear-cut pa tte rn s of 
such properties as natu ral kind m em bers. W hy th en  should we rule ou t fuzzy lands as 
candidate natural kinds? Ellis seem s to be aware o f th is aspect and continues:
It is important to understand that things could have Lockean real essences even if no natural kind 
existed...Therefore, for natural kinds to exist, it is not enough that things should have Lockean real 
essences. Things belonging to different natural kinds must have clearly distinct real essences. There cannot 
be any borderline cases between the real essences of different natural kinds because, if  there were, the 
distinctions between kinds would be superficial, as for example, the blue/green distinction is, having no basis 
in the underlying reality. For natural kinds to exist, there must be discreteness or discontinuity at the most 
fundamental level. If objectively different kinds of things exist in nature, the distinctions between them  
must be there in their intrinsic natures for us to discover.' (Ellis, 2001: 31, italics added)
Ellis no tes th a t we could have ‘real essences’ possessed by m em bers o f certain  kinds 
which are fuzzy (and overlapping) in the  sense th a t the  superficial properties and 
behaviours of such m em bers w ould be explained by their m icrostructures. It is just th a t 
the m icrostructures in question w ould not be exactly similar for all the  m em bers o f such 
kinds (and such m icrostructures w ould overlap).
However, we see th a t Ellis dism isses such kinds as un -natu ral and  arbitrary  w ith w hat 
appears to be a sleight o f hand. Ellis com pares the problem  of figuring out the  
m em bership o f individuals in borderline cases (cases in  w hich kinds overlap, or the
97 S e e  E l l i s  ( 2 0 0 1 : 3 1 )
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individuals in question  do no t seem  to share a sufficient part of a cluster characterising a 
fuzzy kind) w ith the problem  of deciding over the  m ind-dependency  of relational 
properties, like colour supposedly is.98 This does appear to be a sleight o f hand  because, if 
we searched for the  way the determ ining  properties agglutinate, the  distinctions betw een 
the  clusters o f properties we would find are no t ‘superficial’ and ‘w ith no basis in  the  
underly ing reality’. The regions of density  one could find in the  m ulti-d im ensional space 
o f (determ ining) properties for m edicine and special sciences in general, are no t arbitrary  
and  the  properties in question  are just as real as the  determ ining  properties to be found in 
chem istry. Only if one already accepts the N&S (and non-overlapping) requirem ent(s) 
does the  possible existence of borderline cases im ply th a t fuzzy (and overlapping) kinds 
are arbitrary.
Ellis was one of the au thors in troduced  in chapter 1 because his views are indeed 
representative for a very large num ber of kind theorists. O n the  issue of ‘essences’, Ellis 
does a t least appear to  recognise problem s th a t are not even considered by o ther kind 
theorists  adhering  to criterion VIb. The latter are happy to take up the  Lockean idiom  and 
claim  th a t na tu re  is surely carved at its jo in ts w hen we speak about ‘essences’. Since this 
strand  of argum en ta tion  has been hugely popular in the  natural kinds discussions, (so 
m uch th a t the  entire  debate seem ed to be reduced to w hether kinds have essences or 
not), it is w orth  looking a t two m ore illustrations o f it. Take for instance the 
argum entation  em ployed by W ilkerson in his (1995):
'...something is a member of a natural kind if and only if it has a real essence, that is, an intrinsic property or 
set o f properties that is both necessary and sufficient for its being a member of that kind. The word 'real' 
crept in, not just as a historical reminder of Locke's distinction between real and nominal essences, but as a 
philosophical reminder that we are here concerned with essences that are de re, not de dicto, essences that 
lie in the things themselves and not in our beliefs, thoughts, theories or remarks about them1 (Wilkerson, 
1995:109)
W hat are the  essential' properties, according to W ilkerson, and how  can their existence 
justify the  N&S requirem ent? Obviously, in order to  surpass the  chicken and egg dilem m a
98 Parenthetically, what Ellis ignores is that one could take colours as intrinsic properties if one makes the 
differentiation between the instantiation of a dispositional property and the manifestation o f the associated 
disposition; see Bird (2005) who discusses the respective differentiation.
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m entioned  in the  in troductory  part of th is chapter, tautological definitions o f essential 
p roperties should no t coun t as satisfactory for grounding  th is requirem ent. T hat is, 
defining the  essential p roperties as those properties th a t are possessed by all (and only) 
the  m em bers o f a kind should n o t be considered a convincing justification for why only 
som e of the  pa tte rns of de term ining  properties we find in nature, i. e. the  non-fuzzy ones, 
should  count as natural k in d s ."  Som ething else should ground such definitions. W hat 
could th is additional ingredien t be? W ilkerson writes:
'Now, if we are realists [about kinds] we are bound to consider how things are 'in nature' and to wonder 
whether the kinds distinguished in our theories are natural kinds. To use Plato's familiar analogy, we must 
wonder whether we are carving at the joints of nature [...] when we identify something as a member of a 
natural kind, we are in principle able to explain a wide range of its properties, including the apparently 
superficial properties. The real essence of such a thing not only determines its proper de re classification 
....but also directly explains many of its properties...It is precisely because gold has the atomic number 79 
that in normal atmospheric conditions is malleable, fusible, soft and heavy' (Wilkerson, 1995: 30, 55)
For W ilkerson then , the  essential properties are, evidently, the  properties shared by all 
and  only the  m em bers o f natural lands. They are also characterized as m icro-structural, 
in trinsic properties th a t show 'w hat things are' and (by) explain(ing) the  behaviour and 
properties o f kind m em bers. This is insufficient though.
If one pu ts aside the  rhetorical exclam ations concerning natu re  being finally cut a t its 
joints and the th ings having revealed a t last their 'being', there is no th ing  added to the 
nature  of those properties in W ilkerson's argum entation, aside from the features I 
previously discussed w ith  regard to the determ ining  properties.
'I suggest that, if we are to produce an interesting account of natural kinds, we should insist that members 
o f natural kinds, and the corresponding real essences, must lend themselves to scientific investigation...It is 
precisely because gold has a certain atomic number that it has certain characteristic properties (its being 
malleable, fusible, etc.)[...] greetings, nations and banknotes ...do not lend themselves to any sort of precise 
scientific investigation. By the same token, we should insist that natural kind predicates are inductively 
projectible, whereas other predicates are not. If I know that a lump of stuff is gold, or that the object in 
front of me is a narcissus, I am in a position to say what it is likely to do next, and what other things of the 
same kind are likely to do [...] since scientific generalization involves exploring the causal powers of things,
99 Wilkerson does appear to acknowledge that, without drawing any consequences though; see Wilkerson 
(1995: 31, 32)
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and since causal powers must be constituted or realized by intrinsic properties, the real essences o f natural 
kinds must be intrinsic rather relational properties. '(Wilkerson, 1995: 32-33, italics added)
The m ajority o f kind essentialists em ploy the sam e type o f argum ents. In these 
argum ents, on scrutiny, the  'essential' properties of lands are no th ing  m ore or less th an  
determ in ing  properties. Take also Harry's view on kinds, developed originally in his (1974) 
and  recently  re-espoused w ith m inor m odifications in his (2005). Harr£, just like Ellis, 
focuses on the example of chem ical classifications. H arre rem inds us in the very 
beginning w hat the  essential properties for kinds are supposed to  be.
“ESSENCES: A REMINDER 1. Properties o f kinds a. Proprium: properties found in or displayed by every 
instance of a kind. b. Essence: properties necessary for a being to be a member o f a kind c. Accident: 
properties found in some instances of a kind. Accidental properties displayed by some individuals in a 
group cannot be part o f the essence of the kind. [...] Essences are sets o f properties selected according to 
various criteria from the propria. In philosophical writings, ‘essences’ have four main features: i. They are 
immutable, the essence o f a kind cannot change, ii. They are indivisible, a subset o f the constituent defining 
properties o f an essences is not an essence, iii. They are necessary, unless a being displays the properties 
defining the essence it is not a member of the kind. iv. They are infinite, that is an indefinite number of 
actual beings may realize an essence” (Harre, 2005:10)
Nevertheless, no th ing  in th is generous exposition goes beyond the tautology th a t 
essential properties are those properties whose possession is necessary and sufficient for 
m em bership. A few passages later, the reader gets a dose o f Lockean distinctions and 
quotes, and is told th a t the 'essential' properties (of kinds) tell us 'w hat th ings are'.
“Though the concept o f ‘essence’ is as old as philosophy, the way that chemists think in terms of essences, 
though the word may never cross their lips, has its origins in the writings of John Locke (1690) and Robert 
Boyle (1666). Here is Locke’s famous exposition of the distinction between nominal and real essences.. . . its 
essence, which is nothing but that abstract idea to which the name is annexed, so that everything contained 
in that idea is essential to that sort. Whatever we use to distinguish substances into sorts ‘. . . I call by a 
peculiar name, the nominal essence to distinguish it from the real constitution of substances upon which 
depends this nominal essence and all the properties o f this sort, which . . . may be called the real essence’ 
(Locke, 1690: Bk 3, Ch 6, Sect 2)....The real essence of type or kind is the cluster of properties necessary and 
sufficient for a being to be an instance o f a type or a land” (Harr£, 2005:10-11, italics original)
As in W ilkerson's case, one could ask though - w hat are the  'essential' properties, beside 
the fact o f their possession being necessary and  sufficient for kind m em bership? W ell, it
tu rn s  ou t th a t they  are the  intrinsic, structural properties th a t can be indicated as 
causative factors for the  observable properties and  behaviour o f their bea re rs .100 I 
conclude th a t ‘Essential’ properties, construed in the  Lockean trad ition , cannot justify the  
N&S requirem ent. The Lockean strategy am ounts to circular reasoning th a t defines de 
dicto th e  divisions o f na tu re  corresponding to natural kinds as being non-fuzzy.101
As specified in the  In troduction  to th is thesis, I am  concerned here w ith  the  m etaphysical 
side o f the  discussion over (natural) kinds. To be sure, one can argue, from  a sem antic 
po in t o f view, th a t the  additional ‘ingred ien t’ needed in order set aside the  de dicto charge 
vis-^-vis the  essential properties is the  way our kind term s behave.102 As I have already 
m entioned , there  are convincing critiques o f this sem antics-based strategy in tended  to 
justify the  N&S requ irem ent bu t the  final part o f th is sub-section I w ould like to indicate 
very briefly my version o f the  critique.
O ne can s tart by defining kind term s simpliciter, as the  term s th a t refer collectively to 
particulars and are sim ply to be distinguished from  singular term s (which refer to single 
particulars). Kind term s, of course, could refer to particulars exhibiting various types of 
sim ilarities - th a t is, they  could refer to divisions of natu re  th a t are non-fuzzy (and non ­
overlapping) or to fuzzy and  overlapping ones. Now, my criticism  w ould be that, in nuce, 
the  sem antic strategy am ounts to categorising only the  kind term s referring to the  form er 
type of divisions as natural land term s. This is why.
The argum ent em ployed by Kripke et. al. has, in my idiom, roughly the  following form:
i) the kind term ‘gold’ pick up in all possible worlds the same division of nature
ii) in the actual world, the respective division of nature fulfils the N&S requirement and the necessary and 
sufficient conditions are represented by such and such properties
100 Harre, 2005:12
101 Several o f Locke’s commentators (Ayers 1991, Uzgalis 1988, Crane 2003) have underlined this point with 
regard to his argumentative intentions, as such. Mumford (2005) addresses a critique to Ellis's 'essentialism' 
that is very close to the argument I present in this section. For kinds to have essences, says Mumford, the 
conditions of membership should be necessary and sufficient and ‘...there should be something else, 
something else about the properties characteristic o f kinds that makes them 'essential1 (Mumford, 2005: 
424). Ellis misses the point in his (2005) reply when he re-states his point that basically, the essential 
properties are determining and nothing above (Ellis, 2005a: 465-7)
102 See Soames (2006) for instance
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iii) for the respective division o f nature to be the same, it should be characterised by the N&S requirement,
Hence,
iv) in all possible worlds, the kind term ‘gold' picks out the division of nature characterised by such and 
such properties.
In Kripke’s form ulation, prem ise i) says th a t the  kind term  ‘gold’ is rigid and  prem ise ii) 
says th a t the reference o f ‘gold’ is discovered in the  actual w orld by a posteriori scientific 
enquiry. Prem ise iii) says th a t in virtue of the  necessity of identity, term s th a t are co- 
extensional in the actual world are co-extensional in all possible worlds and  the 
conclusion iv) states th a t (metaphysically) necessarily, gold is w hatever m icrostructure  is 
discovered a posteriori scientific enquiry.103 This sem antic argum ent, if valid,104 could be 
used in  order to  infer som ething about the  m etaphysical category o f natu ral kinds only if 
the  following corollary was added:
a) ‘gold’ is a natural kind term
b) ‘gold’ refers to a division of nature that necessarily fulfils the N&S requirement; 
hence
c) necessarily, natural kinds fulfill the N&S requirement.
However, to  hold  th is corollary is to  categorise only  the  k ind term s th a t refer to the  non- 
fuzzy type o f divisions o f nature  as na tura l kind term s.105 A nd th is is just a linguistic 
form ulation o f the  rationale which, I have shown, is underp inn ing  the  m etaphysical 
a rgum ents o f the  theorists  adopting the Lockean strategy.
103 See Kripke (1980) and Soames (2006)
104 and there are serious reasons to think that it is not, Cf. Stewart (1990) for instance, but this aspect need 
not concern us here
105 To stress, this critique represents merely a re-formulation o f the general critique addressed to Kripke by 
various authors; see for instance Lowe's (2007) and (2008) discussion.
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§2.1 .2  E s s e n t i a l  p r o p e r t i e s  a n d  i d e n t i t y
I have argued in the  previous sub-section th a t ‘being essential’ is a sim ple tag em ployed in 
connection  w ith  certain  properties, in order to  m ake the  N&S requ irem ent acceptable. I 
have show n th a t the  supposed justification for th is requ irem ent is circular. N atural kinds, 
it is claim ed, could only be those th a t possess essential properties, w here essential 
p roperties are those part of necessary and sufficient conditions. W e have here two 
definitions th a t sustain  each o ther in w hat reveals itself as a stipulation abou t the 
m etaphysical category of natural kinds -  a definition abou t those kinds th a t are natural 
and  abou t the type o f properties characterising the natural kinds. The tag o f ‘essential’ 
a ttached  to the determ in ing  properties is unjustifiably linked w ith a label a ttached  to the 
category o f natu ral kinds, as it were.
To be sure, the  inform al way of speaking about ‘tags’ and ‘labels’ in th is context m ight no t 
be the  m ost happy choice. A m ore adequate analysis of the  problem  is to say th a t 
theorists  like Ellis, W ilkerson and H arre - who w ork in the  Lockean trad ition  and, I 
should add, em ploy (actively) a certain  sense o f carving nature  a t its jo in ts -  m ake use o f 
an equivocation betw een different m eanings of ‘the  essential’.
I have differentiated in chapter 1 betw een th ree m ain senses o f the  essential th a t should 
be neatly  d istinguished -  i) as explanatory powerful (on the epistem ic side) or causally 
efficient (on the m etaphysical side) ii) as part of N&S conditions and  iii) as con tribu ting  
to the  identity  o f kind m em bers.106 The equivocation a t issue involves in its argum entative 
ram ifications all th ree  senses o f the  essential. So far, I have described the back and forth 
betw een i) and ii), w hich am ounts to categorising properties th a t are (m inim ally and) 
adequately picked out by i) as falling (also) under the  heading of ii) and hence leads to a 
de dicto reasoning abou t the m etaphysical category of natural kinds. Let there  be a kind K 
characterised by the p a tte rn  of determ ining properties [p^ p2, ....pn] and an individual a
lo6Just to make matters worse, Ellis refers sometimes to the N&S requirement using roughly the phrase 
‘identity of kinds’ (See Ellis 2001:19, 52, 75, 246). However, for keeping decently clear a terminology that’s 
already entangled (in the literature and in my own discussion as well) I shall continue to refer to criterion 
VIb as the N&S requirement. Ellis's idiom for the N&S requirement is worth bearing in mind though because 
it is I believe connected with a certain tacit use of the identity-sense of carving nature at its joints, a use that 
I shall return to a bit later.
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th a t in stan tia tes all of [pb p 2, ....pn]. To employ the inference - if a lost, say, the  property  
p3, th en  it w ould n o t be any m ore a m em ber of the  kind I<, were K to be natural - am ounts 
to a de dicto decision (based on the sem antics o f the  ii) sense o f the  essential) abou t the 
natu re  o f the  m etaphysical category of natural k inds.107
However, the  equivocation a t w ork in  the  argum ents of Ellis et. a l involves the  iii) sense 
as well, m ainly because the  N&S requ irem ent could be justified only if the  iden tity  o f a 
depends on all o f the  [p1? p2, ....pn] properties. If it did depend, th en  a could no t lose p3and 
rem ain  a m em ber o f the  kind K, for the  simple reason th a t after the  change, we w ould 
have instead of a ano th e r individual. Hence, to explicitly invoke the ii) sense o f the  
essential and  claim  th a t kinds should have necessary and sufficient conditions o f 
m em bership  is also to equivocate betw een ii) and iii). In fact, th is last equivocation boils 
dow n to appealing tacitly to  the  identity  sense of carving natu re  a t its jo in ts and I will 
come back to th is aspect shortly. Prior to that, I should add a few rem arks abou t criterion 
VII.
I have said in the  beginning o f th is chapter th a t I will trea t criterion VIb and VII (N&S and 
non-overlapping requirem ents) together. M ost of the  tim e, criterion VII is advanced 
com plem entary  to criterion VIb in th a t it is assum ed th a t if som ething fulfils criterion 
VII, th en  it also fulfils VIb. In my view, they are (also) related  in the  sense th a t their only 
valid justification w ould have to appeal to the identity  o f their m em bers.
There are num erous criticism s th a t can be addressed to criterion VII. A m ongst them , one 
of the  sim plest and m ost effective m erely points out th a t the  exact sciences are rife w ith 
criss-crossing classifications - th ink  for instance of how elem ents in chem istry could be 
classified into m etals/non-m etals and so lid /liqu id /gaseous.108 However, we can also 
advance the  sam e type o f argum entation  I have em ployed vis-^-vis criterion VIb, w ith 
respect to the  presence of a certain  vicious circle.
107This is somewhat ironical, if  we recall that a basic ingredient o f the Lockean strategy is to contrast the 
‘real essences’ with the ‘nominal’ essences and emphasize that the latter are merely de dicto definitions that 
could at best be useful for recognizing natural kinds; see Wilkerson (1995) for instance.
Io8See Khalidi (1998: 40,41,50). Khalidi also notes in his (1993) discussion of kinds as carving nature that 
criteria VIb and VII are connected.
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Let there  be two kinds K and  K* characterised by the patterns [pi,p2,.—Pn] and [p2, p3....pn, 
p n+i] respectively, w hich overlapped (w ithout being in a hierarchy), in the  sense th a t an 
individual a in stan tia ting  [pi,p2,....pn, Pn+i] was a m em ber o f both . To argue th a t a t least 
one o f them  could no t be natural, is to stipulate som ething abou t the m etaphysical 
category o f natural kinds, insofar as the  properties involved are ju st determ ining  
p roperties.109 The non-overlapping requ irem ent would be justified, again, only if the 
identity  o f (natural) kind m em bers depended  upon their m em bership. Suppose th a t a lost 
the  p roperty  p n+iin a process characterised by spatio-tem poral continuity , continuity  of 
causal history, etc.110 From the poin t of view of its m em bership in  K, the  individual 
resulting  from  the process should be (numerically) identical w ith  a. From the  po in t of 
view of its m em bership  in K*, the  individual in question should be different from  a, since 
the  kind m em bership  (one of the  necessary conditions for identity  preservation) was 
lost.m W e w ould thus have a violation of the  tertium non datur principle.
W hat the  non-overlapping and N&S requirem ents can a t best achieve is to  avoid certain  
intuitive 'paradoxes' o f criss-crossing and fuzziness, by precluding the ‘essences’ o f kinds 
from  'm ixing up' or 'being chopped'. These ‘paradoxes’ are associated w ith a certain  
construal o f kinds as ‘en tities’112 and are also m ade possible by a tacit appeal to a certain  
set of assum ptions. Here again is Ellis, explaining why chlorine is a natural land, given 
th a t it fulfils the  two requirem ents.
109See for instance Ellis (200513:376, 20053:463,464, 466) in which Ellis just argues that natural kinds should 
be mind-dependent and that ‘on inspection, it is clear that the ways in which reality is divided are not 
mutually independent, but have a natural hierarchical structure’ (Ellis, 2005a: 466).
“°One could mention here any other conditions, beside natural kind membership (our present hypothesis), 
upon which various authors think that the numerical identity of individuals might depend. Ellis (2001: 239) 
mentions only causal and temporal history for instance. Lowe introduces beside spatio-temporal continuity 
certain criteria specific for three categories (material objects, artefacts and living beings) like the 
preservation o f matter, for material, inanimate objects; see Lowe (2001: 55, 56,174 -178). More on Lowe’s 
criteria of identity will be discussed in § 2.3
111 See also Mackie (1994: 323). I have framed this example to suit the views of someone who adhered both to 
criteria VIb and VII because usually the theorists who adhere to one also stick to the other. But the example 
could be adapted also for the case in which VII was upheld and VIb rejected, that is, the case in which K and 
K* were cluster kinds. In this alternative scenario, we could imagine a to lose not only pn+1but a sufficient 
part o f the pattern [pDPij.—Pn, pn+J such that it would not be any longer a member o f K* but it would still be 
a member o f I<.
112 The assumption that kinds are some sort of entities is mentioned in Bird and Tobin (2008), in direct 
connection with (what I have called) requirements VII and VIb. F°r an earlier reference, see for instance 
Donnellan’s discussion of Putnam’s essentialism in Donnellan (1973)
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‘What is true of the chemical kinds is not true of biological species. The existing species o f animals and 
plants are clusters o f morphologically similar organisms whose similarities are due to their genetically 
similar constitutions. Our species concepts are therefore generic cluster concepts. They are not, however, 
generic kinds that are categorically distinct from one another, as the generic chemical kinds are. The 
species “elephant” has a number o f sub-species, which are sub-clusters within the elephant cluster. These 
sub-species are distinct enough to be reliably distinguished morphologically, and sufficiently different 
genetically to be said to be different kinds of animals. However, if we broadened our vision to include all o f 
the ancestors of the current elephants in the world, we should find, I think, that the morphological clusters, 
and the genetic clusters that explain them, would shift about as we go back in time, and would eventually 
overlap. Therefore, neither the generic species nor any sub-species o f elephant is a natural kind in the same 
sense as the generic and specific chemical kinds are. Chlorine, for example, is a generic chemical kind, the 
species o f which include the various isotopes of chlorine. But there is no species of chlorine existing now or 
at any other time that could possibly be a species o f any element other than chlorine. Chlorine, the generic 
kind, has a fixed nature, and each species of chlorine has its own fixed nature. (Ellis 2008:140-1)
W hy do the  m ixing and chopping’ of ‘essences’ appear paradoxical?113 Because, I further 
wish to  claim, the  identity  o f kind m em bers is tacitly appealed to in fram ing such 
scenarios. Take the  classical example of the  cyclist and  the  m athem atic ian  paradox 
form ulated  by Q uine,114 which perfectly parallels the  intuitive image th a t Ellis appeals to. 
If we accept, says Quine, th a t m athem aticians are necessarily hum an  and  no t necessarily 
two legged, and cyclists are necessarily two legged and no t necessarily rational, it w ould 
follow th a t a person  who is bo th  cyclist and m athem atic ian  is and  is n o t necessarily 
rational, and is and  is no t necessarily biped. Q uine regards such ‘criss-crossing’ situations 
as paradoxical (which, in our context, parallel the paradox of ‘m ixing’ o f essences for 
kinds w hich fail the  non-overlapping requirem ent) and employs them  in order to reject 
the  no tion  o f ‘essence’ (and the associated notion  of necessity).
Ellis appeals, as we have seen, to sim ilar examples, which are also regarded as paradoxical 
(and in order to see th is m ore clearly, we need only th ink  o f ‘m athem atic ians’ or ‘cyclists’ 
as candidate kinds). However, Ellis prefers to retain  the notion  of essence, and dissolves
113 For clarification, in this particular context o f intuitive ‘paradoxes’ arising out of violations o f criteria VIb 
and V II, I employ the term ‘essence’ with regard to the construal of essential properties are causally 
efficacious properties -  the determining properties. On the other hand, what I ask is how could authors 
like Ellis et. a l  regard the ‘mixing’ of putative essences for candidate kinds (violations o f criterion V II) and 
the ‘chopping’ o f them (violations of criterion VIb), as paradoxical without simply reciting the respective 
criteria. There is an intuitive source for an apparent paradox, but what is it?
114 Quine (i960:199)
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th e  paradoxes by holding th a t essences cannot be m ixed or chopped up, th a t is, by 
adhering  to criteria VIb and  VII. Now, we get to the  heart o f the  m atte r w hen we observe 
th a t Q uine’s envisaged situation  is paradoxical indeed only if m odal sta tem ents such as 
‘m athem atic ians are necessarily rational’ for instance, are given a de re reading.115 T hat is 
to say, only if the  identity  o f persons who are m athem aticians depends on them  being 
rational and the  identity  o f the  persons w ho are cyclists depends o f them  being biped, a 
person w ho was bo th  m athem atician  and cyclist and w ent m ad or lost one leg would 
rem ain, and  w ould no t rem ain  identical w ith itself. O n a de dicto reading o f the  respective 
sta tem ent(s), no paradox arises. Any hum an being can be bo th  a cyclist and a 
m athem atician , just as, we could add, any particular can be m em ber o f two overlapping 
kinds.116
Q uine w ould reject th is analysis of his paradox, given his adherence to referential opacity 
in m odal contexts.117 Ellis could not invoke the sam e reason, given th a t m odal contexts are 
a t the  centre o f his overall argum entation. Ellis would have two options, in order to 
ground his assum ption  th a t the  chopping or mixing o f essences is paradoxical. The 
form er w ould be to  explicitly stick to the de re reading o f the  (first order quantified) 
sta tem ents espousing the  conditions of m em bership for kinds, and m ake the identity  of 
kinds m em bers dependen t upon  their m em berships. The second w ould be to m ain tain  
the  ‘de d icto’ reading, as it were - th a t is, quantify the  respective sta tem ents in a second- 
order way. The la tter move w ould transm ute the  violations o f the  tertium non datur 
principle from the  case o f individual kind m em bers w ith their num erical identity, to the 
case of kinds and the ir identity  (where kinds w ould be substantive universals or
115 See for instance Oderberg (2001: 28-34, esp. p. 32), Marcus (1993: 227).
u6 i.e. can possess the ‘essential-for-the identity-of-kinds’ properties of two different kinds. Recall that Ellis 
calls sometimes the ‘essential’ properties associated with the N&S and non-overlapping requirements as 
‘essential for the identity o f kinds’ or ‘essential for kinds'. As I said, this usage is important for me when it 
comes to discussing the tacit use o f a certain sense of carving nature at its joints.
117 See Hylton (2007: 353, 354), Teller (1975:233, 234). We shall return to the notion of relative identity in §3.6 




To stick to  the  la tte r op tion  w ould indeed m ean to acknow ledge th a t the  conditions o f 
(natural) land  m em bership  do no t have to be fulfilled by all and  only the m em bers o f a 
k ind (at least n o t a result a o f reduction  ad absurdum  argum ent, concerning the above 
paradoxes). To stick to the  form er option w ould be to  in troduce the  identity  o f kind 
m em bers in to  the equation. Ellis does neither. T hat is, n e ither the  identity  o f kind 
m em bers is taken  into account, nor the second order quantification is adopted, yet the 
N&S and non-overlapping requirem ents, as well as the  talk  abou t the  properties 
‘essential-for-the-identity-of-kinds’ are m aintained.
W hat th is m eans, I hold, is th a t the  identity  of kind m em bers is tacitly appealed to in 
fram ing the putative paradoxes of criss-crossing or fuzziness. O f course, the  examples 
regarded by Ellis as paradoxical have a certain  intuitive appeal, just like regarding kinds as 
‘en tities’, w hich brings us back to the related  po in t concerning the assum ption th a t 
natural kinds carve natu re  a t its joints.
W hen discussing earlier the  case o f Ellis et. a l vis-a-vis ‘essences’ and the disguised 
determ ining  properties, I have insisted on their use o f the  expression (and their claim 
that) ‘w hat th ings are ’ is revealed by such properties (also constitu ting  for them  necessary 
and sufficient conditions for m em bership). Now, notice th a t to construe in the  above- 
m entioned  identity-related  way the relation betw een land  m em bers and the kind 
properties they  instan tia te  is to adhere to the  identity  sense o f carving nature  a t its joints. 
W ilkerson, Ellis and Harre, however - as alm ost all the  theorists  holding th a t natural 
kinds have necessary and sufficient conditions of m em bership fulfilled by all and only 
their m em bers119 - explicitly adopt the non-identity  related sense o f carving natu re  a t its
u8 Indeed, a second order quantification concerning kinds simpliciter would presumably range over 
substantive universals. I shall move to substantive universals in the next sub-section where we shall see that 
they cannot ground requirements VII and VIb either. O f course, such quantification would be as it were ‘de 
dicto’, just in the sense in which the entities quantified over would not be particulars / particular 
substances.
119 One exception is Wiggins (2001). Some problems with the type of argumentation that Wiggins and others 
employ will be discussed in §3.6
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joints.120
I conclude th a t the ir argum enta tion  vis-^-vis essences uses tacitly  the  o ther sense of 
carving natu re  a t its joints. Only if th is (identity-related) sense was adopted, the  N&S and 
non-overlapping requ irem ents (criteria VIb and  VII) could be justifiably em ployed in the  
Lockean strategy to pick ou t kinds and  the overlapping and  fuzziness o f kinds w ould 
indeed produce paradoxes.121
In the  next section, I will look a t ano ther possible justification o f requirem ents VIb and 
VII, revolving around  substantive universals. Substantive universals could be invoked as 
the  necessary ‘de re’ ingredient needed in order to overcom e the de dicto reasoning o f the  
Lockean strategy. Notably, Jonathan Lowe -  the  philosopher who rein troduced 
substantive universals into the kinds discussion - does n o t hold th a t on the level of 
particulars, the  divisions o f nature standing for the  entities instan tia ting  these substantive 
universals should be non-fuzzy and w ell-delineated.122 However, Brian Ellis has appealed 
to such substantive universals as justifications for requirem ents VIb and VII, especially in 
order to  solve the  problem s th a t structural properties pose for his account of 
m etaphysically necessary laws.123
Could substantive universals fare any be tte r th an  the Lockean strategy in justifying the 
existence of necessary and sufficient conditions o f m em bership for any natural kind? I 
will argue th a t they could not, on th ree related scores. First, I will show - vis-^-vis the  very 
in troduction  o f substantive universals into our m etaphysics o f (natural) kinds - th a t Ellis’s 
specific argum enta tion  suffers from the same shortcom ings as the  general Lockean 
strategy, in th a t the  assum ption o f natural kinds as standing for non-fuzzy and n o n ­
overlapping divisions o f natu re  is simply taken for granted. Second, by com paring Ellis’s
120 Both Wilkerson and Ellis reject that the identity of kind members has to do with their kind membership. 
Harrd does not even discuss the issue of identity; see Wilkerson (1995) Ellis (1999: 67,68) (2001:239), Harre 
(2005)
121 This is not meant to deny that some natural kinds do actually have necessary and sufficient conditions o f  
membership (and possibly have these conditions of membership in all possible worlds). My point is that not 
all natural kinds need to have necessary and sufficient conditions of membership, on the non-identity sense 
of carving nature; that is to say, the N&S requirement is not justified for the natural kind category if the 
identity sense of carving nature is not adopted.
122 See Lowe (1989:153-154), Lowe (2006:13-17)
123 Ellis (2001), (2002), (2005), (2008)
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views w ith Lowe’s, I will show  th a t even if we accept the  existence o f substantive 
universals, specific details o f these universals’ m etaphysics m ake the N&S requirem ent 
very problem atic. M ore precisely, I will argue th a t Ellis fails to  explain, in his fram ew ork 
o f kinds, w hat Lowe’s relation o f ‘characterisation’ betw een substantive universals and 
non-substan tive universals am ounts to. Third, I will show th en  th a t Ellis does no t solve 
the  difficulty th a t the  perfect sam eness o f categorical structu res for kind m em bers poses 
for his account o f m etaphysically necessary laws.
§2.2 S u b s t a n t i v e  U n i v e r s a l s  a n d  r e q u i r e m e n t s  VIb a n d  VII
In the m etaphysics of natural kinds re-in troduced  into the  philosophical debate by 
Jonathan  Lowe, natural kind m em bership is no t prim arily determ ined  by the  possession 
by particulars o f certain  properties b u t by their instan tia tion  o f substantive universals. 
Only secondarily (in an ontological sense) do kind m em bers come to  possess kind 
properties, due to a certain  relation of characterisation holding betw een substantive and 
non-substantive universals. To use one of Lowe’s expository examples, a particular apple 
is a m em ber o f its kind prim arily because it instan tia tes the substantive universal apple. 
The particular in question  is red, round, solid, etc. as a kind m em ber just because the 
non-substantive universals redness, roundness, solidity, etc. ‘characterise’ the  substantive 
universal apple.
As m entioned  in §1.2, Lowe does no t hold th a t m em bers of a natural kind, viz. particulars 
instan tia ting  a certain  substantive universal, should also instan tia te  a com plete set of 
properties whose possession is necessary and sufficient for m em bership. Lowe’s approach 
to these kind properties is situated  at the level of possibility. In the particulars th a t are 
m em bers o f a natural kind, a certain  set of properties could be instan tiated . The m ore 
such properties are instan tiated , the  m ore kind m em bers come to resem ble the 
substantive universal (which is perfectly ‘characterised’ by the  substantive universals 
specific for the  kind in q u e s tio n ) .^  W e m ight have particular apples th a t are n o t perfectly 
round, particu lar ravens th a t are no t black, etc. even if the  substantive universal apple is
124 L o w e  ( 2 0 0 6 )
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characterised by all the  non-substantive universals corresponding to  the  qualities we 
associate w ith apples.
Brian Ellis’s recen t w ork on natu ral kinds acknowledges the  existence o f substantive 
universals and requires a t the  sam e tim e th a t the  divisions o f na tu re  corresponding to 
natural kinds on the level o f particulars be non-fuzzy. T hat is, Ellis w ants the  N&S 
requ irem ent to hold for natural kinds. O f course, th is is no t the  only difference betw een 
Ellis and Lowe’s views. Am ong others, Ellis also differs from  Lowe in the way of 
constru ing the  dispositional/categorical distinction. Broadly speaking, for Lowe the 
d istinction  is grounded  in our m ode of predication (such th a t all the  properties actually 
instan tia ted  by kind m em bers are categorical, as it were). For Ellis, the  properties th a t 
kind m em bers actually share are split into causally efficient properties and structural 
properties - the  la tte r underlying sim ilarities in shape, spatio-tem poral arrangem ents o f 
various com ponents, etc. Just as in Lowe’s case though, these properties, found on the 
level o f particulars, represen t tropes o f non-substantive universals. Their possession is 
due to the  in stan tia tion  of a substantive universal and, presum ably, to a certain  relation 
betw een the  respective substantive universal and the  non-substantive universal (a 
relation whose nature, as we will see, Ellis hardly discusses).
Interestingly, Ellis seem s to have adopted  substantive universals m ostly in order to 
explain the presence o f ‘identical’ structures on the level o f kind m em bers. T hat is, the  
m ain use o f adopting  them  is to  underp in  and justify the  N&S requ irem ent on the  level of 
structural properties. For instance, a substantive universal should underp in /explain  the 
fact th a t all the  m em bers o f the  m ethane kind p resen t the  sam e shape o f the CH4 
m olecule. In Ellis's term inology, infima species of substantive universals should have 
'freestanding' tropes, acting like a sort of spatio-tem poral 'skeleton' for the  tropes o f the 
power non-substantive universals tha t are characteristic for each natural kind.125 W ith  
respect to  the  causally efficient (determ ining) properties, the  role of m etaphysical 
underp inning  for the  perfect sim ilarities betw een kind m em bers is played by ‘essences’ 
and  ‘essential’ properties, along the pa th  of reasoning I have described as the  Lockean
125See Ellis (2001:73-75, 67-69)
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strategy.126
W e should note th a t there  are certain  questions to  be asked regarding the very 
plausibility o f accepting the  existence o f substantive universals. In Lowe’s schem e for 
instance, such universals should play the  role o f tru th -m akers for scientific laws, 
constitu te  grounds for co-instan tiation  inductive inferences abou t kind m em bers, 
respond to  the  th re a t of H eraclitanism  or Spinozism  about particulars etc .127 It has been 
argued, however, th a t we have m ore m etaphysically parsim onious ways of dealing w ith 
these issues.128 For Ellis, as I have already rem arked, the m ain reason for in troducing 
substantive universals is the need to justify the  N&S requirem ent for natural k inds.129 Two 
related  queries can th en  be raised about his position. First, why should natural kinds be 
substantive universals, especially in the context in which natural kinds are supposed to 
fulfil the  N&S requirem ent? And second, how could substantive universals w arran t the 
N&S requ irem ent a t the  level o f particulars?
The form er query concerns the very in troduction  of substantive universals into one’s 
m etaphysics. As we will see, it brings to light the sam e type o f a priori reasoning about 
natural kinds I have em phasized vis-a-vis Lockean ‘essences' and ‘essential’ properties.
The latter is related to and yet independen t from  the form er in th a t one could accept in 
principle the  existence of substantive universals and yet reject the fact th a t som ething 
like the N&S requ irem ent follows from their existence. I will look in tu rn  a t these two 
queries in §2.2.1 and §2.2.2 and then  will analyse in §2.2.3 the particu lar case o f structures 
and structural properties vis-^-vis this requirem ent.
u6The complementarity between the Lockean strategy and the substantive universals strategy can only be 
observed in his (2001) treatise. In Ellis’s (2002) book substantive universals are hardly mentioned.
127 Lowe (2006:135)
128 For one, the truth-makers of laws could simply be taken to be properties (Bird 2007). For another, the co­
instantiation aspect can be explained without inflating our ontology, by appealing to properties and causal 
mechanisms, either internal or external, which produce the stability or unity o f the determining properties 
at the level o f kind members (Boyd 1991, Bird 2007). Also, Heraclitanism or Spinozism can be refuted by 
interpreting the individuation of particulars in terms of spatio-temporal continuity, sameness of causal 
history, etc and/or by viewing kinds as participating in individuation without kinds being substantive 
universals; see Wiggins (2001), Wilson (1999), Hirsch(i982). More on Heraclitanism and Spinozism will be 
discussed in §2.3
129 Ellis also wants kinds to be the truth makers of laws but for various reasons (having ultimately to do with 
his distinction between categorical and dispositional), his kinds are not really the truth-makers of his laws -  
powers are; see Botterill (2005)
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§ 2.2.1 W hy  have  su bstantive  universals in  o u r  o n t o l o g y  o f  natural  k in d s?
This is how Ellis sets the  stage for the  in troduction  o f substantive universals:
'The m ost salient general feature o f  reality I seek to explain is its natural kind structure. There are hierarchies 
of objects o f increasingly complex kinds....The more complex structures are compounded of simpler 
structures, the more complex properties, o f simpler ones. W ithin each o f these hierarchies, we may detect 
various samenesses (exact resemblances)....These identities can best be explained by assuming that there are 
universals that have particular objects....or structures as their instances....These similarities can best be 
explained by assuming that there are hierarchies o f generic universals, the infimic species o f which are all 
specific universals with identical instances. An ontology in which the only property universals that are 
recognized as fundamental are non-structural ones does not seem to be up to the task of accounting for the 
complex structures that are to be found in nature' (Ellis, 2001: 67-68, italics added).
W e see that, for Ellis, the  explanandum  is the fact th a t natural kinds and natural kind 
m em bers satisfy the  N&S (and hierarchy) requirem ent(s) and  the explananans is the 
in troduction  of substantive universals (beside property  universals). His ‘m ethodology' 
thus raises doubts from  the  start. I am  no t referring here to his (general) adoption of an 
Inference to the  Best Explanation strategy for solving m etaphysical d isputes,130 bu t simply 
to the  way in w hich Ellis fram es the very phenom ena to be explained by the  in troduction  
of substantive universals. W hat raises doubts, m ore precisely, is th a t we seem  to have 
here precisely the a priori reasoning present in the  case o f Lockean ‘essences’. Ellis th inks 
we should seek to  explain the  perfect sim ilarities betw een (certain) natural kind m em bers 
by postulating substantive universals. Nevertheless, should we no t explain in the first 
instance why only the  divisions o f nature th a t p resent these perfect sim ilarities betw een 
the  involved individuals are to  be acknowledged as natural lands?
In different term s, the  dilem m a raised by Ellis’s use of Inference to the Best Explanation 
goes as follows. Are the  divisions in nature  corresponding to natural kinds non-fuzzy (and 
non-overlapping) because natural kind m em bers are said to instan tia te  substantive 
universals? O r should natural kind m em bers instan tia te  substantive universals because 
the divisions in  natu re  corresponding to natural kinds are non-fuzzy (and non­
I3°Mumford (2005) offers a critique of Ellis’s conclusions by focusing on his Inference to the Best 
Explanation strategy, and taking into account the entire metaphysical picture that Ellis draws in his 2001 
treatise.
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overlapping)? Ellis obviously th inks th a t the la tte r question is w orth  asking and  responds 
affirmatively. The non-fuzzy (and non-overlapping) structure  o f natural kinds represents, 
says Ellis, 'a m ost salient feature o f reality'. The form er question  is overlooked. This 
m eans th a t Ellis sets aside the possibility o f constru ing in any o ther way the divisions in 
natu re  corresponding to natural kinds. If one considered th is possibility, th en  the fact 
th a t the  natu ral kinds satisfy the N&S requirem ent should at least becom e less salient and 
accordingly, the need to in troduce substantive universals in our m etaphysics o f natural 
kinds w ould lose m uch of its urgency.
The sam e assum ptions are present in the  details o f Ellis’s (otherw ise rem arkably rich and 
carefully w orked out) m etaphysical foundation for natural sciences. Ellis w rites for 
instance:
'The instances of each infimic species of natural kinds [i.e. substantive universals] in the category of 
substances must be all essentially the same. For if they were not, then the species would have subspecies. 
They are therefore like classical universals (which have no sub-species) although, as we will see, they are 
not property universals either' (Ellis, 2001: 70)
O f course, i f  natural kinds should fulfil the N&S requirem ent, th en  every tim e the 
m em bers o f a putative kind are no t 'essentially the  same', we m ust suspect th a t the  kind 
in question  groups together, on arbitrary  grounds, m em bers of different o ther natural 
kinds. Hence, we m ust suspect th a t it does no t po in t to the  instan tia tion  of a specific 
substantive universal by the particulars in question. Nevertheless, in the  above passage, as 
in all the  o ther places in w hich the N&S requirem ent is discussed vis-a-vis substantive 
universals,131 Ellis seem s to claim th a t natural kinds as substantive universals should fulfil 
the  N&S requirem ent because, if they did not, they w ould no t be natural.
W e could easily argue in favour of rejecting the in troduction  of substantive universals 
into the  m etaphysics o f kinds, a t least if the reasons for in troducing them  are Ellis’s. The 
problem s faced by his argum entation  are no t reduced, however, to the general problem s 
of the  Lockean strategy. V indicating the N&S requirem ent also proves very problem atic if 
we consider some details o f the  ‘functional’ ontology o f substantive universals.
131 e.g. Ellis (2001: 52-54)
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§ 2.2.2 HOW CO ULD SUBSTANTIVE UNIVERSALS JUSTIFY TH E N&S REQ U IR EM ENT?
Suppose we accept for the  sake o f the  a rgum ent th a t substantive universals need to  be 
in troduced  in to  our m etaphysics o f kinds. After all, there  m ight be o ther reasons I have 
n o t reckoned w ith  th a t could com pel us to accept their existence. But how  precisely could 
the substantive universals justify the exact sim ilarities betw een m em bers of natural kinds 
(i.e. individuals instan tia ting  the same substantive universal)? W hat I w ant to indicate is 
th a t even if we accept their existence, there is no explanation on Ellis’s behalf for why the 
kind m em bers should instan tia te  all of the properties characteristic o f a natural kind.
It is im portan t here to recall th a t Lowe, the  m ain p roponen t o f substantive universals in 
contem porary  m etaphysics, does no t adop t the  N&S requirem ent. In Lowe's schem e we 
have relations o f ‘characterization’ betw een all the non-substantive universals of a kind, 
on the  one hand, and  the substantive universal representing th a t kind, on the other. 
These relations cannot be 'translated ' a t the level of particulars though. The la tter can 
instan tia te  all o f the  properties specific for a natural kind, b u t they  do no t have to .132
Ellis takes on the m ain  insight of Lowe's m etaphysics o f kinds and we have seen how 
Ellis’s argues in favour of accepting substantive universals in to  our ontology, as the  best 
explanation we have for the  fulfilm ent o f the  N&S requirem ent by kind m em bers. 
Nonetheless, Ellis does n o t examine at all how any substantive universal could possibly 
ground from a m etaphysical po in t o f view the presence of perfect sim ilarities betw een the 
particulars instan tia ting  it. All we have on his behalf are a series of declarative statem ents, 
o f the  form:
‘[the perfect similarities between kind members] can best be explained by assuming that there are 
hierarchies o f generic universals, the infimic species of which are all specific universals with identical 
instances.' (Ellis 2001: 67-68, italics added)
Surely, the  m ost direct way of searching for such a justification w ould be to  look a t the
132 For Lowe, this is in fact one of the advantages of introducing substantive universals; see Lowe 1989:153- 
154-
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relation o f ‘characterisation’ (to choose the nam e Lowe employs, for sim plicity’s sake) 
holding betw een substantive universals and the  non-substan tive ones. Ellis does no t 
discuss a t any po in t th is relation in his 2001 treatise (or, elsewhere for th a t m atter). W hat 
could possibly be the  relation o f 'characterization ' betw een, say, a substantive universal 
NK and th ree  non-substantive universals Px, P2, and P3, such th a t any individual 
instan tia ting  NK sh o u ld  also co-instantiate  the  corresponding properties p^ p2 and p3, in 
the  sense specified by the  N&S requirem ent?
It should be em phasized at th is po in t th a t the  explanation for w hy certain  determ ining 
properties are agglutinated  in perfect sim ilarities betw een m em bers o f kinds (thus 
describable  by necessary and  sufficient conditions o f m em bership) should no t appeal to 
causation. T hat is, the relation of ‘characterization’ should explain the perfect co­
instan tia tion  of (determ ining) properties in term s th a t do no t appeal to the  Boyd-like 
m odel o f divisions o f natu re  resulting from  the  clustering o f properties due to the  causal 
structu re  of the  world. Such a causal structure  m ight determ ine a perfect clustering of 
properties tan tam o u n t to perfect sim ilarities holding betw een particulars, bu t could no t 
explain how  the  N&S requirem ent holds for certain  kinds specifically  due to  their 
instan tia ting  a substantive universal.
O ne possibility w ould be to appeal to a part-w hole relation. In this case though, it would 
be very difficult to m ain tain  the ontological status o f substantive universals, as entities 
standing one level higher in the hierarchy of universals, over and above the n o n ­
substantive characterising k inds.133 This move w ould m ake NK a conjunctive, n o n ­
substantive universal, having as parts the universals Px, P2, and  P3 and its substantial role 
sta tus w ould be lost. Ellis w ould certainly reject th is possibility since he rejects 
conjunctive p roperties.134
A nother possibility w ould be som e sort of relation o f necessitation.135 Nevertheless, such 
relations o f necessitation betw een universals have a bad nam e. First, it is because they
133 Cf. Armstrong (1997)
134 Ellis (2001: 68, 91, 92, 96-7)
135 in Armstrong’s (1985) sense.
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seem  ad hoc in general.136 In our case, to say th a t such a relation holds betw een a 
substantive universal NK and the non-substantive universals P1( P2, and  P3 is no m ore than  
to posit th a t kinds should have necessary and sufficient conditions o f m em bership. 
Second, because it is unclear how  such a relation betw een universals is ‘tran sm itted ’ at 
the  level of particulars. 137 It m ight be th a t this ‘transm ission’ aspect gains some 
plausibility if the  corresponden t o f the  nom ic necessitation betw een universals a t the  
level o f particulars is taken  to be the im m anent necessity underlying the successions of 
p roperties.138 But in our case, we are no t talking about causation. The relation betw een 
the  properties p x, p 2 and p3 is one o f co-instantiation and th is is precisely w hat needs to be 
explained by the relation betw een NK and Pu P2, and P3.
Perhaps one could argue -  in analogy to a well-known rationale concerning the relation 
betw een non-substantive universals and causal pow ers139 -  th a t the  identity  of a 
substantive universal depends on its ‘association w ith’ a certain  set of non-substantive 
universals. The identity  should be dependen t the sense in which the  instan tia tion  o f a 
substantive universal NK by a particular a should bring abou t the  co-instan tia tion  by a of 
a set o f properties pu p2 and p3 (corresponding to non-substantive universals Px, P2, and 
P3).14°
But the  analogy could no t work, I think. In the  case o f the  association betw een powers 
and properties, the  argum ent is backed up by the Eleatic principle (nam ely the principle 
th a t no en tity  th a t does no t m ake a causal contribu tion  should be accepted in one’s 
ontology).141 It is also backed up by the serious sem antic and  epistem ological problem s of 
the  rival conception o f causation and property  individuation.142 However, in our case,
136 See Mumford (2004: 93) Lange (2000: 8)
137 This is the famous ‘problem of inference’ to the level o f particulars; see for discussion Handfied (2009: 
294), Cartwright and Alexandrova (2007: 796) Mumford (2004: 93)
I38C£ Armstrong (1997)
139Shoemaker (1998); see also Bird (2007:71) Armstrong (1985:161)
140 One could argue that the identity of a substantive universal depends on its characterizing non­
substantive universals, without this entailing anything about what properties kind members should 
instantiate. Indeed, this is what Lowe intimates (Lowe, 2006: 155, 169, 170, 173). This strand of 
argumentation would not be of much help for Ellis, since the N&S requirement concerns the level of 
particulars and their properties.
141 See Colyvan (1998) for a (critical) discussion.
141 Problems issuing from the possibility that the properties could associate different causal powers see Bird, 
2005)
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again, betw een p u p2 and  p3 (and w hatever o ther property  stands for the  instan tia tion  by a 
of NK) we do n o t have causation b u t co-instantiation and  no principle analogous to the  
Eleatic one is available vis-^-vis the individuation of substantive universals.
Now, in add ition  to using, on a general level, Inferences to the  Best Explanation in ways 
th a t in te rp re t in advance the category o f natural kinds, Ellis also employs a specific 
argum en ta tion  concerned w ith the  structural properties o f kind m em bers. This 
argum enta tion  is w orth  analysing because it constitu tes a very good illustration o f the 
tribu lations faced by the N&S requirem ent w hen the natu re  o f the  relation o f 
‘characterisation  is n o t clarified.
§ 2 .2 .3  St r u c t u r a l  p r o p e r t ie s  a n d  t h e  N & S r e q u ir e m e n t
My hypothesis is th a t in the  overall argum entation  th a t Ellis employs in his (2001), the  
relation o f ‘characterisation’ from  the  level o f universals is simply taken  as redundan t and 
unw orthy  o f fu rther consideration. For Ellis, the  standards im posed by the N&S 
requ irem ent on the  co-instan tia tion  o f properties, taken as causal powers, are simply to 
be justified by the  Lockean strategy. As for the perfect co-instan tiation  o f structural 
properties, Ellis appears to th ink  th a t it is sufficient to invoke the  relation of instantiation 
betw een particulars and substantive universals simpliciter, w ithout any need to examine 
the  relation betw een the  (structural) properties and the substantive universals via the 
non-substantive universals, as in Lowe’s case.143 W hat we can see in Ellis’s argum entation, 
w hen com paring it to Lowe’s, is a certain  change of perspective, as it were, which can be 
indicated in a simple, heuristic no tation  as follows.
For the  case of a structu re  S possessed by a particular a, w hat we observe w hen Lowe and 
Ellis’s views are com pared is a change of focus from  the  relation o f characterisation o f the 
substantive universal K by, say, non-substantive universals Px, P2 and P3, to the relation of
143 Lowe argues that structural properties such as shape are simply non-substantive universals (just like 
mass or charge), which characterize the kind, substantive universals. Lowe does not call the structural 
properties categorical, because he employs a different construal o f the categorical-dispositional distinction. 
See Lowe (2006:17,124-127)
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in stan tia tion  by a o f the  substantive universal K, simpliciter. In o ther words, instead of 
the struc tu re  S being possessed by a due to its instan tia tion  o f K, due to  the relation of 
characterisation  betw een Px P2) P3 and K and due to  the  structural properties p x, p 2, p3 
possessed by a representing  tropes of Px P2 and P3, Ellis simply invokes a ’s in stan tia tion  of 
K.
FIGURE 4 The switch of focus from the relation of characterisation of the substantive universal K by non­
substantive universals Pi, P2 and P3 (as it appears in Lowe), to the relation of instantiation by a o f the 




U niversal P x
Substantive 
universal FC
Individuals member o f  the kind PC, with the 
structure SIndividual a member o f  the kind FC, with
the structure S (possessing structural properties plr p2, 
Pi)
The structure S is possessed by a due to its 
instantiation of K, to the relation of  
characterisation between Pa P2 aiiclP3 and 
K and to the structural properties pt, p2, P3 
possessed by a (representing tropes of Pi 
P2 andP3) '
Tlie structure S is possessed by a due to 
its instantiation of K
*  re la tion  o f  characterisation 
**instantiation by a  o f  a su b stan tiv e  universal
The change of focus from  the  ‘characterisation’ relation to  the  relation of instan tia tion  of 
substantive universals simpliciter is realised by way of a series o f in terrela ted  argum ents.
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Ellis con tends th a t structural universals cannot be reduced to non-structu ral universals,144 
th a t the  in stan tia tion  o f structural universals presupposes its bearers possessing the same 
structu res,145 th a t the  instan tia tion  o f non-substantive universals does no t presuppose 
their bearers being the  sam e,146 and hence th a t the properties possessed by kind m em bers 
generaliter (i.e. their resem blances) cannot be satisfactorily grounded in non-substantive 
universals only.147
Substantive universals are thus (re-)in troduced by way o f ‘substantivising’ struc tu res,148 as 
it were, and two rem arks should obviously be m ade. O n the one hand, the  possibility of 
reducing structu res to structural non-substantive universals is no t considered.149 O n the 
o ther, again, the  m ain  reason for taking substantive universals as grounds for the  
structural resem blances betw een (natural) kind m em bers is th a t the  N&S requirem ent
144 See Ellis (2001: 68). Contra Bigelow and Pargetter (1990), Ellis argues that the universals standing for the 
atoms o f carbon and hydrogen, cannot account for the shape of the methane molecule, because ‘universals 
cannot be spatially arranged’.
145 ‘As soon as we speak about spatial arrangements o f objects, we are already invoking the language of 
structural universals, since different groups of objects can presumably be arranged in exactly the same way’ 
(Ellis 2001: 68-69)
^ ‘The instances o f property and relation kinds are tropes; those of substantive universals are objects or 
substances....The instances of any specific quantitative property are property instances; they are not the 
objects in which these instantiations may occur, because the objects in which such a specific universal is 
instantiated need not all be the same...Two grams o f water is not identical to two grams of 
alcohol....Therefore the instantiations of the classical universal in these two cases are not the samples, but 
the masses of the samples’ (Ellis 2001: 70, 71, italics original)
147 ...one might think of the property of being a hydrogen atom as a simple conjunctive universal (which is 
the simplest kind of structural universal). A thesis o f this kind is certainly plausible for the fundamental 
constituents o f matter, which presumably have no structure. But hydrogen atoms and the atoms and 
molecules of more complex substances all have structures, some of them quite complex. Yet their structures 
are no less essential to their identities as kinds’ (Ellis, 2001: 74, 75) One wonders though, i f ‘universals are 
not spatially locatable’ (p.75), how come substantive universals can fulfill for structures possessed by 
particulars the role that structural, non-substantive universals cannot. Ellis acknowledges in the final part 
of the respective section dedicated to substantive universals and structures that ‘tropes have the advantage 
of being spatially located, and relatable by primitive relations’. Campbell’s (1990) attempt to reduce 
structures to tropes is dismissed for the main reason that ‘it does nothing to explain the broad facts about 
the world alluded in the Basic Structural Hypothesis’ (Ellis 2001: 76), where the Basic Structural Hypothesis 
is the thesis that the world possesses the structure of natural kinds Ellis thinks it possesses (see Ellis 2001: 
22). No mention of Lowe’s work is made in the entire treatise.
148 See Ellis (2001: 73,75 et passim.) for the continuous vacillation between designating structures as the 
result o f the instantiation of substantive universals by particulars and stating on the other hand that objects 
or substances represent the instances o f substantive universals.
149 Even if structural properties are mentioned at one point: ‘a trope o f the structural property that all 
methane molecules have is the exemplification of the structure in any particular molecule.’ (Ellis 2001: 24, 
italics added). Compare with ‘substantive universals are always instantiated by objects or substances....and 
properties and relations are always instantiated by their tropes.’ (Ellis 2001: 73).
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should hold for th is (structural) level as well.
In o ther words, instead  of explaining how the  instan tia tion  o f a substantive universal, 
simpliciter, could justify the  presence o f ‘identical’ structures, Ellis is keen to stress only 
th a t the  o ther alternatives (on the level o f universals) canno t provide the  required  
justification. Ellis seem s th en  to conjecture that, since there  needs be som ething on the 
level o f universals following the instan tia tion  of which kind m em bers should possess the 
same structures, th a t som ething m ust be substantive universals. But surely, rejecting all 
o ther alternatives (for having the N&S requ irem ent justified for structures) does no t 
m ean th a t the alternative we are left w ith should not be explained on its own. Presenting 
structu res as ‘substantiv ised’ is helpful in a sense w ith the intuitive side, b u t it does not 
have m uch argum entative weight.
I conclude th a t substantive universals cannot justify the  N&S and non-overlapping 
requirem ents. The substantive universals strategy advocated by Ellis has the  same 
shortcom ings as the  Lockean strategy, and faces in  add ition  the  problem  th a t the  nature 
of the  relation betw een substantive and non-substantive universals is n o t clarified. Ellis 
does no t solve the  difficulty th a t structural properties pose for his account.
In the  next section, I will look at criterion VIII and its possible justifications.
§2.3 THE PROBLEM OF PROCESSES AND CRITERION VIII
In the  p resen t section, I tu rn  to criterion VIII and the problem  of justifying the 
com m onsense phase/non-phase distinction. Criterion VIII asks th a t natural kind 
m em bers should n o t instan tia te  their kind specific-properties as part o f a process in 
which m ore fundam ental kinds are involved. In o ther words, it is dem anded th a t those 
‘divisions in natu re ' corresponding to  natural kinds it be non-phase (i.e. non-im plicated
8 6
in  transitory  transform ations).150
Usually, kind theorists overlook th is criterion, as such, b u t w hen it is b rought into 
discussion, the  reason is nearly always to defend the com m onsense phase/non-phase 
distinction . This intuitive, com m onsense d istinction  leads us to  consider certain  kinds as 
depicting divisions o f objects, substances and hence being natural, non-phase kinds (and 
o f course, the  paradigm  here is represented by the kinds in the  exact sciences). These are 
opposed to the kinds th a t depict stages in processes undergone by objects, which should 
be considered non-natural, phase kinds (and the paradigm  here are certain  kinds in 
biology related to  developm ental transform ations).151
Since one com m on objection against diseases being natural kinds is th a t diseases 
represen t processes, th is criterion deserves separate a tten tion  and trea tm ent. Is it 
justified to rule ou t m edical kinds (and special science lands in general) as phase kinds? 
W hile a m ore detailed  discussion o f th is aspect will be undertaken  in  the  next chapter, I 
w ant to argue here, on a m ore general level, th a t w ithou t invoicing the identity  sense of 
carving nature, criterion VIII cannot be used to rule out special science kinds as phase 
kinds.152 I will focus here on w hat I consider the  best philosophical defence in the 
literature  o f the  com m onsensical phase/non-phase distinction, nam ely Jonathan  Lowe’s.
W hat is in teresting  abou t Lowe’s position is th a t the  diachronic conditions o f identity  for 
objects do play a role in defending the com m on-sense phase/non-phase distinction. 
These conditions are not linked w ith (non-phase) kind m em bership, however, bu t w ith 
m ore general categorizations of objects (in m aterial, artefactual and  biological strata). 
Lowe claims, am ong others, th a t unless these conditions o f diachronic identity  are 
accepted, the perspective o f the  num ber of natural, non-phase kinds m ultiplying greatly
150 In the notation I have introduced in chapter 1, criterion VIII says that, for any individual a, member of a 
kind K, the determining properties part of the pattern [p„ p2,...,pn] should not represent a phase o f a more 
fundamental pattern possessed by a.
151 Almost none of the medical kind (or more generally special science) kind theorists seriously approach 
this problem.
152 Certainly, most special science kinds appear intuitively as phase kinds. We should not only think about 
medical kinds but also economic kinds (discussed in Nelson 1990), biology kinds (discussed in Ereshefsky 
1992, 1998), psychological kinds (discussed in Cooper 2008) or even kinds o f concepts (discussed in 
Machery 2005)
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above the num ber of kinds com m only accepted (the so-called ‘H eraclitan’ th rea t) an d /o r 
reducing greatly below the num ber o f kinds com m only accepted (the so-called ‘Spinozan’ 
th rea t) w ould be un-escapable. My poin t will simply be to show th a t these H eraclitan 
and  Spinozan challenges cannot be repelled by Lowe’s strategy.
But w hat precisely is the  connection betw een the H eraclitan and Spinozan views and the 
discussion abou t kinds and their phases? The connection has to do w ith  the  transitions, 
processes or changes undergone by kind m em bers. Simply put, on the Spinozan view 
alm ost any transition  undergone by kind m em bers am oun t to  a phase kind change, even 
w hen it is n o t intuitively so. O n the H eraclitan view, in turn , alm ost no transition  
represents such a change -  they  are alm ost all non-phase, substantial kind changes. Let 
m e give some examples.
For instance, given the transition  undergone by an individual caterpillar tu rn ing  into an 
individual butterfly, the  H eraclitan view w ould be th a t we have a substantial kind change, 
such th a t the  individual in question changed m em bership from  one natural kind 
(caterpillar) to ano ther (butterfly).153 The Spinozan view w ould be in agreem ent, in this 
case, w ith  the  com m on in tu itions saying th a t a phase kind change is in place, such th a t 
the  individual in question did no t change its m em bership bu t rem ained all along part of 
the  butterfly  kind. Nonetheless, in o ther cases, the  Spinozan view would also be in 
conflict w ith com m on intuitions. For instance, for the transition  undergone by a sample 
of gold tu rn ing  in to  a sam ple of lead (in a supernova), the  Spinozan view would be th a t a 
phase kind change is in place as well, such th a t only one natural kind was involved (either 
gold or lead) w ith its phases.154
O n the  Spinozan side then , gold would be a phase of lead (just as caterpillars would be
153 The transition from caterpillars to butterflies is part o f a set o f stock examples employed for expository 
reasons in the literature on kinds and their phases, when the accent is placed on the metaphysical and not 
scientific side of the discussion.
1541 shall adopt in this section a few terminological adjustments, merely for expository reasons. Hence, I 
shall speak about (natural) ‘kinds’ and their ‘phases’, (instead o f ‘natural kinds’ and ‘phase kinds’). As 
‘particulars’ will be designated kind members (and not tropes or modes) - where kinds could be countable 
or mass kinds. Members o f countable kinds will be designated as ‘individuals’ and they will be the main 
focus of this section. However, everything I shall have to say here about countable kinds is readily 
applicable to mass kinds as well. It is for this reason that when discussing the absolute identity o f kind 
members, I do not mention their numerical identity but their diachronic conditions of identity.
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phases o f butterflies). Overall, the  num ber o f natural kinds is greatly reduced, because 
m ost (com m only accep ted)155 substantial kind changes are no t acknowledged, as such. O n 
the  H eraclitan side, to the contrary, butterflies and caterpillars w ould be bo th  natural 
kinds (just as gold and  lead w ould be two different natural kinds). Overall, the  num ber of 
kinds is greatly m ultiplied, because m ost (com m only accepted) phase kind changes are 
no t acknow ledged, as such.
Notably, the  abovem entioned kind changes - phase kind changes and substantial kind 
changes - should be differentiated from w hat we could call phase individual changes and 
substantial individual changes. The individual changes have to do w ith the diachronic 
iden tity  o f kind m em bers, qua individuals, and no t w ith their kind m em bership. In the  
case o f the  caterpillar-butterfly  transition  for instance, it is one th ing  to ask w hether the 
individual in question  changes its kind m em bership or not, and ano ther to ask w hether 
the  individual rem ains identical w ith itself or tu rn  into a different individual. The two 
questions are related bu t still different because, for example, it is n o t im possible to th ink  
th a t the  individual caterpillar could undertake a phase kind change while becom ing a 
different individual, th a t is, while undertak ing  a substantial individual change.156 
Similarly, no logical en tailm ent exists betw een substantial kind changes and  substantial 
individual changes -  a particular could swap natural kinds while its diachronic identity  is 
n o t affected.
To be sure, there  are variants of the Spinozist or H eraclitan strategy th a t could be 
d irected at individuals (with the purpose of showing th a t the num ber o f individuals is 
dram atically reduced or indefinitely m ultiplied, respectively). However, in a sim ilar vein, 
one can affirm th a t Spinozism /H eraclitanism  about lands does no t entail, nor is entailed 
by Spinozism /H eraclitanism  about individuals. For instance, a Spinozist ontology o f kinds 
in which the ir num ber is greatly reduced appears consistent w ith an orthodox ontology of 
individuals in w hich the  num ber of kind members is no t even under dispute. Think of a
155 Talk of commonly accepted natural kinds in this context is not incongruous with my description of the 
multi-faceted debate on kind Realism from chapter 1. In this section, by ‘commonly accepted kinds’ I simply 
refer to what most lay people prefer to call ‘substances’, which are sharply differentiated from ‘processes’ 
(and the ‘phase kinds’ that that could be circumscribed by looking at processes). Many scientists, especially 
the chemists, share the same linguistic intuitions directed at the exact science kinds.
156 See Geach's famous example o f the cat Tibbies apud Noonan (2006)
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Spinozist, counter-in tu itive scenario in which the only accepted kinds were, say, 
‘inorganic m atte r’ and  ‘organic m atte r’. Such a scenario seem s consistent w ith the 
existence o f all the  individuals we intuitively accept -  their individuation w ould depend, 
ju st as in the  m ore com m onsense situation in which we have m any o ther kinds delineated 
by the  natural sciences, on their spatio-tem poral locations and on their kind 
m em bership . It is just th a t they  w ould have only two options for kind m em bership.
As I said, Jonathan  Lowe has a ttem pted  to defend the com m onsense phase/non-phase  
distinction  from  the  H eraclitan and Spinozan challenges by way of draw ing - in an 
original and  elegant argum entative path , which involves substantive universals, laws and 
categories circum scribing individuals’ diachronic identity  -  a certain  dischotom y betw een 
substantial kind changes and phase kind changes.
I will p resen t in the  following Lowe’s solution (§2.3.1) and th en  will argue th a t it is 
unsatisfactory, m ainly because his construal o f w hat kind m em bership  is - the 
instan tia tion  o f substantive universals, simpliciter - cannot preclude the  "moves’ o f 
inflating or reducing the num ber of kinds in one’s ontology. A p roponen t o f the 
H eraclitan or a Spinozan views could speculate the  role th a t laws play in defining kind 
changes, while accepting the  broad lines of Lowe’s m etaphysics. I will p resent the  m ain 
parts o f th is law-based strategy (§2.3.2) and th en  will press on the consequences th a t this 
strategy has on the  coherence o f the  ontological picture th a t Lowe wishes to offer as a 
foundation for natural sciences (§ 2.3.3). In the final part o f this section I will indicate th a t 
viewing the diachronic identity  of kind m em bers as dependen t upon their kind 
m em bership could salvage Lowe’s position (§2.3.4).
To stress, my purpose is no t at all to suggest th a t it is m eaningless to talk  abou t phase 
kinds. I simply w ant to say th a t insofar as criterion VIII is used to rule out special science 
kinds as phase kinds, th en  the  only chance to  do so is by adopting the  identity  sense of 
carving na tu re  a t its joints. That the  alternative o f having special science kinds as n o n ­
phase kinds entails som e form of ‘H eraclitanism ’ does no t represen t in the  least a 
catastrophic perspective. Such a possibility should simply m ake us re-th ink  the  phase, 
non-phase d istinction, in term s different from the  com m onsensical ones.
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§ 2.3*1 Lo w e ’s stance
W ith in  the  construal o f kinds as substantive universals, Lowe draws the d istinction 
betw een substantial kind changes and phase land  changes by way of appealing to natural 
laws and  to  his ontological categories. N atural laws (which are taken to  govern the 
behaviour o f kind m em bers) correspond in Lowe’s schem e to relations o f 
‘characterisation’ o f substantive universals by non-substantive universals.157 Categories are 
in tu rn  broad divisions o f reality w ithin which the diachronic identity  o f particulars is 
confined.
For Lowe, laws and categories stand on the opposite sides o f (a certain  construal of) the  a 
priori/a posteriori dichotom y. W hereas knowing precisely w hat laws govern the behaviour 
o f kind m em bers depends upon em pirical inform ation, categories represent an a priori 
m atter, in the  sense th a t they are associated w ith the  m etaphysical reasoning th a t should 
provide a foundation  for the  natural sciences (and should reject ontologically 
unacceptable positions).158 Contra, ‘empirically m inded’ philosophers, Lowe argues th a t 
we should a priori accept three categories (the biological, the m aterial and the artefactual) 
as the  m ost general divisions of reality, which allow us to track down individuals th rough  
change/over tim e, by being specifically associated, each of them , w ith certain  diachronic 
conditions of identity.
The rationale is the following: as long as an individual retains its category, all the changes 
it undergoes represen t phase individual changes. Any trespassing of its category however 
(w hether physically or only m etaphysically possible) could only am oun t to a substantial 
individual change, associating the coming into existence of a different particu lar.159
157In Lowe’s sortal logic notation, for a particular a, a kind <{> and a non-substantive universal F, ‘a/c}/ 
represents a relation of instantiation of a substantive universal, laws have the form ‘<}>F’and the possession 
of the property F by the (kind member) a should be figured as ‘Fa/cp L (See Lowe 1982, Lowe 1989, ch. 8) The 
non-substantive universal F ‘characterises’ the kind (}> in such a way that the identity of c(> depends on it 
being characterised by F. (C f Lowe 2006, ch. 7 and 10, esp. pp. 155,169,170,173; see also Heil 2006, p. 7)
158 In addition, three different senses of the a priori (the Aristotelian, Kantian and the British empiricist one) 
are alluded to by Lowe in various places. In Lowe (1989) for instance, the British empiricist sense (on which 
a priori means innate) is touched upon at p. 13 and the Kantian and Aristotelian senses are mentioned as 
well on pp. 8,15.
159The diachronic conditions o f identity should be distinguished (in Lowe) from the sortal conditions of 
identity, the latter being conceptual criteria allowing us to identify and differentiate particulars as members 
of kinds; see Lowe 2001: 59
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Indeed, in arguing in favour o f the  existence o f categories, Lowe already tackles the  side 
o f the Spinozan and H eraclitan strategies concerning individuals, which is also an 
ontologically unacceptable position .160
Now, as I said, Lowe also employs categories and laws in order to face the ‘th rea t' of 
Spinozism  and  H eraclitianism  about kinds. Lowe argues, on the  one hand, th a t 
substantial individual changes also qualify as kind substantial changes.161 O n the o ther 
hand, for a change to represent a phase kind change, it should be the  case th a t the  laws 
th a t are characteristic o f the kind at hand  govern the transitions undergone by its kind 
m em bers:
‘A change to an individual substance S, of kind K, is a phase change for S just in case it is a change which 
things o f kind I< survive as a consequence of the natural laws of development for I<s’ (Lowe, 2001, p. 186)
W hile in the  case o f biological organism s we have the natural laws simpliciter, in the  case 
o f m aterial objects Lowe describes in addition  three conditions th a t the  phase changes 
m ust m eet -  they  should be reversible, gradual and reproducible.162 W e can infer th en  - 
bearing in m ind the m ore general definition o f kind changes reproduced above - th a t for 
m aterial objects we have a subset o f laws in which the m em bers o f kinds are involved 
w hen undergoing phase changes -  the  laws governing reversible, gradual and readily 
replicable transitions.
Lowe's (ra ther fragm entary) considerations abou t kind and individual changes, laws, 
categories, phases and substantial transform ations could be system atised as follows. For 
phase kind changes we have two conditions th a t are necessary and jointly sufficient, to 
wit, th a t the category kind m em bers belong to is preserved and th a t the  laws of the  kind
160 Lowe 2001: 86,187, Lowe 1989: 56-57 et. passim., Lowe 2009: 30
161 Lowe does not put much emphasis upon the difference between individual and kind changes. Lowe 
admits for instance that there are two types of substantial changes that particulars can undertake (2001:174- 
175). Nevertheless, in certain places in his argumentation it is not very clear which of the two types of 
substantial changes is discussed, i.e. kind-related or individual-related (see for instance his 2001:178, 179 et 
passim, 1989: 56-57). Accordingly, it is not very clear which of two possible sides of the Heraclitan and 
Spinozan strategy -  directed at kinds or individuals -  is criticised by Lowe and attempted to be refuted. 
Lowe appears at times to conclude that Heraclitanism about kinds can be rejected, using premises that 
could only refute Heraclitanism about individuals. It is in order to clarify possible misunderstandings o f this 
sort that I have introduced above a fourfold differentiation between types of changes -  with the risk of 
making my exposition harder to follow
12 Lowe 2001:176
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in question  govern the  transitions undergone its m em bers. The negation o f each 
condition  is in tu rn  sufficient for substantial kind changes. Substantial kind changes 
occur e ither w hen the  category kind m em bers initially belong to is no t m aintained or 
w hen  the  laws o f the kind at hand  do not govern the respective transform ations.163
Given the relation betw een categories and individual changes, we can re-phrase the  above 
conditions by saying th a t for phase kind changes, phase individual changes and  the 
bearing o f laws characterising the  kind in question are necessary and  jointly sufficient. 
For substan tia l kind changes on the  o ther hand, it is sufficient e ither th a t an  individual 
substan tia l change is in  place or th a t the  laws guiding the  m anifestations o f the  kind in 
question  do no t govern the  processes its (initial) m em bers come to  undertake.
163 O f course, in Lowe’s framework it makes perfect sense to speak about laws characterising kinds and allow 
at the same time that some o f the kind members could undergo transitions that are not governed by those 
laws. That is because, again, for Lowe laws represent relations between substantive and non-substantive 
universals, and the law statements are second order quantified. Indeed, the fact that his account offers a 
metaphysical explanation as to why exceptions to laws’ manifestation show up at the level o f particulars is 
taken by Lowe as an advantage of his construal of laws. Otherwise, Lowe argues, we have no way of 
rendering intelligible the ceteris paribus clauses that need to be introduced when analysing the behaviour of  
particulars in first order quantified statements; see Lowe (1989:153-154) and Lowe (2006:13-17)
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FIGURE  5 LOW E’S SCHEME
Changes undergone by an individual a - initially m em ber of a kind cj) -  which could become m em ber of a 
different kind cj>* or go through a phase of (}) depending of certain necessary and /o r sufficient conditions. The 
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T he w ay in  w h ich  Lowe u n d e rs ta n d s  k ind  changes, how ever, does n o t fulfil th e  p u rp o se  o f 
re sp o n d in g  th e  S p inozan  an d  H erac litan  challenges o f th e  co m m o n -sen se  p h a s e /n o n ­
p hase  d is tin c tio n . In th e  follow ing tw o-subsec tion , I will explain  w hy I th in k  th a t  Low e’s 
view is co n s is ten t w ith  an  H erac litan  or Spinozan  reality  o f k inds.
§  2 . 3 . 2  T h e  m a i n  s t r a t e g y
To recall, th e  cha llenges th a t th e  Spinozan  an d  H erac litan  view s pose  to  th e  
com m o n sen se  reality  o f  kinds  are th a t  m any  tran s itio n s  u n d erg o n e  by p articu la rs  a m o u n t 
to su b stan tia l k ind  changes, even w hen  th ey  are n o t in tu itively  so (on  th e  H erac litan  side) 
or th a t  m any  tran s itio n s  do n o t rep resen t changes o f k ind, even w h en  th ey  are in tu itively
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so (on the  Spinozan side).164 Thus, on the H eraclitan side, the num ber o f kinds in nature  
is m uch greater th an  the  one com m only accepted (in exact sciences a n d /o r by laypersons) 
w hereas on the  Spinozan side, the  num ber o f kinds is m uch sm aller th a t the  one 
com m only accepted.
Now, is Lowe's schem e up to th is task? My answer is - no. To resist, a p roponen t o f the  
H eraclitian or the  Spinozan view (henceforth a H eraclitan or a Spinozan, respectively) 
would concentrate on the part o f Lowe's argum entation  in which laws play a role in 
defining (substantial and  phase) changes. Her m ain strategy w ould be to question, th a t is 
to say, w hich non-substantive universals characterise w hich substantive universals, in a 
sense th a t will be clear shortly.
Let us look a t the  changes th a t are com m only regarded as phase kind changes. These 
changes are taken to revolve around a single land. Thus, the  m odification o f the  features 
any particu lar possesses does no t am oun t to the  swapping o f its natural kind m em bership 
for another, bu t to a kind phase, as in the tu rn ing  o f any particular sam ple o f w ater into 
ice or in the  transitions undergone by any particular caterpillar along its m atu ration  to a 
butterfly .165 The H eraclitan would w ant to say th a t no natural laws characteristic o f a 
purported ly  single kind a t work govern such processes and that, to the  contrary, we have 
at least one additional kind being instantiated , a land which is characterised by its own 
set of laws. Thus, the  H eraclitan would describe the com m only regarded phase kind 
changes as substantial kind changes.
Let us look now  at the changes th a t are com m only viewed as substantive kind changes. 
These changes are taken  to revolve around (at least) two kinds, such th a t the 
m odification o f the  features possessed by a particular am ounts to the swapping o f its kind 
m em bership for another, as in the transform ation o f any particular sam ple o f gold into
164 Lowe sometimes treats the concerns about individuals and kinds together. In his (2001) for instance, 
Lowe affirms that one of the advantages of adopting his kinds framework is that the Heraclitan view on 
individuals can thus rejected (p. 187) even if, it does appear to me, the argumentative role of rejecting it is 
played in his metaphysics by his three categories. See also Lowe’s (1989, pp. 56, 57 and 2009, p. 30) where 
kinds (and the sortal conditions of identity associated to kinds) are also invoked in an argumentation that 
effectively employs only categories (and the diachronic conditions of identity) and thus can only rebut 
Heraclitanism about individuals.
1651 shall keep up with the expository examples used by Lowe.
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lead for example. The Spinozan would w ant to say th a t no natural laws are trespassed and 
that, to the  contrary, the  transition  is governed by laws characteristic of the  initially 
instan tia ted  kind, such th a t the  putative kind th a t comes to be instan tia ted  is in fact a 
phase o f the  kind initially in stan tia ted .166 Thus, the com m only regarded substantial kind 
changes w ould be described by the Spinozan as substantial kind changes, by way of 
in terp re ting  (just as the  H eraclitan would do, save in an opposite sense), the  role th a t 
laws play in Lowe's very distinction betw een substantial and phase changes.
As I said, these strategies w ould boil down to questioning w hich substantive universals 
are characterised by which non-substantive universal. That is because, to  recall, laws 
involve for Lowe non-substantive universals characterising substantive universals. Let us 
take a change in which, say, a particular a initially possessing three properties Fj, F2 and 
F3, loses the property  Fx and acquires ano ther property  F4.l6?The question is - w hat 
substantive universal(s) w ould be instan tiated  by a, as a kind m em ber (before, during 
and) after the  change?
Consistently w ith  Lowe's basic account of substantial and phase changes, I claim, one 
could equally say that:
i) along the  transition , a instantiated  a single substantive universal cj) (characterised 
by the  non-substan tive universals Fx, F2, F3 and F4), such th a t the change was in fact a 
phase one,
or that:
ii) ii) two lands cj) and cj)* were involved in the  respective process, such th a t the  
particular a changed m em bership from a land  cj> characterised by the non-substantive 
universals Flf F2 and  F3 to a kind cj)* characterised by the  non-substantive universals F2, F3 
and F4.
In Lowe’s notation , the  transition  observed on the level o f particulars from
166 or, conversely, the initially instantiated kind could be seen as a phase o f the kind that comes to be 
instantiated.
167 Where, o f course, the properties F„ F2, F3 and F4 instantiated by a would in fact be, in Lowe’s 
metaphysics, modes of the respective non-substantive universals.
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Fxa/<J>(?)&F2a/4>(?)F3a/c}>(?) to F2a/<J>(?)&F3a/<|)(?)&F4a/<j)(?),168 m ight equally be said to  be 
governed by the law L: 0(l) (F1&F2&F3) -> <|)(l) (Fj&Fi&F^,169 or the law L*: (F!&F2&F3) -»
o (2) (F2&F3&F4).
If the  change undergone by a was com m only regarded as a phase kind change, the 
H eraclitan w ould claim th a t L* and no t L is the  law governing it. Hence, a necessary 
condition  for a phase kind changes o f the kind cj> would no t be fulfilled and a sufficient 
condition  for substantial kind change to cj)* w ould be satisfied since no laws o f the  form  of 
L govern the change.
If the  change undergone by a was com m only regarded as a substantial change, the  
Spinozan w ould claim th a t L is the law governing it. Hence none o f the  sufficient 
conditions for substantive kind change from  cj) to cj)* would be satisfied and  both  the 
necessary conditions for a phase change o f the  kind cj> would be fulfilled.
As Lowe him self adm its, the definitions of kinds and laws are dependen t in his 
m etaphysics.170 This does no t am ount to vicious circularity insofar as one is concerned 
w ith in terp re ting  law -statem ents as having kinds as tru th -m akers and takes laws as 
describing the  relation o f characterisation of substantive universals by non-substantive 
ones. Nevertheless, one can still discuss w hat and how m any kinds (substantive 
universals) exist ou t there.
To p u t it differently, one can accept Lowe’s argum ents th a t laws should be viewed as 
describing characterisation-relations on the level o f substantive universals (because 
otherw ise we have no m etaphysically unam biguous justification for the  nom ic necessity, 
the evaluation of counterfactual conditionals, the fact th a t laws could have exceptions, 
etc).171 N onetheless, there  is still space to discuss precisely what kinds are out there, as 
substantive universals characterised by non-substantive universals.
As we have seen, a t least in the  first instance, substantive universals can plausibly be
168 or, differendy put, the transition observed on the level of particulars from (F1StF2.StF3)a/4>(?) to 
(F2&F3&F4)a/(j>(?)
169 or, more generally, the law L: (F,&F2&F3&F4)
170 Lowe 1989:153, Lowe 2006:16,127-132,152-156
171 Lowe 1989:150-154, Lowe 2006: 26,132,133,147
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added to /re trac ted  from  our m etaphysical picture so as to m odify the num ber of 
com m only accepted kinds and challenge our intuitive judgem ents abou t phases and 
substantial changes. Various o ther argum ents Lowe adduces in  order to confer 
intelligibility to  his schem e could no t preclude, I believe, such a counter-in tu itive 
com bining o f substantive and  non-substantive universals. In o ther words, I will suggest, 
the  broad lines o f his m etaphysics could easily accom m odate a H eraclitan or Spinozan 
stance on the reality o f kinds.
§  2 .3 .3  C o u l d  H e r a c l i t a n  o r  S p i n o z a n  k i n d s  r e a l l y  b e  f i t t e d  i n t o  L o w e ’s
ONTOLOGY?
Lowe m ain tains th a t judging normality (that is, judging which non-substantive universals 
characterise w hich substantive universals, irrespective o f w hat properties are instan tia ted  
by particulars) is no t independen t of know ing laws172 (which, o f course, describe the 
relations o f characterisation betw een these two types of universals). But th is could not 
stop the  H eraclitan in talcing for instance white ravens as a non-phase kind, different from 
the com m only regarded raven kind (which has blackness am ong its central features, 
according to Lowe), and the change of any particular black raven into a w hite one (say, as 
a result o f irradiation) as a substantial kind change. W hat the H eraclitan w ould claim was 
th a t no natu ral laws concerning the com m on kind o f (black) ravens (which w ould be 
com m only taken as the  single non-phase kind a t w ork in such a change) are violated, 
since the  black ravens are no t supposed to be white. The non-substan tia l universal 
w hiteness, a H eraclitan w ould instead contend, characterises the  white raven kind.
O ne does no t have to  stick to examples of laws th a t have exceptions a t the  level of
172 Lowe 1989:153, Lowe 2006:16
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particulars.173 A H eraclitan w ould be happy to accept w hat Lowe says abou t experim ents, 
for instance. In experim ents, after checking th a t a sample belongs to  a certain  kind (i.e. 
th a t it possesses the  tropes o f the  non-substantive universals th a t are know n up to the 
m om ent o f the  experim ent to characterise the  kind in question), the  behaviour o f the 
sam ple is tried  in h itherto  untried  conditions. Thus, new  laws are derived, often in a 
single run of the  experim en t.174 Let us envisage, on behalf o f the  H eraclitan, an 
‘experim ent’ (say, for the  people in Jamaica in Locke’s tim es, to use the  expository 
example m entioned  by Lowe in his 2001) in which w ater was subject to  below o°C 
tem peratures. Now, the ‘discovered’ law that ice/w ater is solid could be taken by the 
H eraclitan  to  characterise the  kind ice. “W ater is no t supposed to be solid”, she w ould 
claim -  “only ice is, and ice represent a different natural kind from w ater”, the  H eraclitan 
reply w ould go.
O n the  o ther side, of course, the  Spinozan w ould no t agree w ith  the  Heraclitan, since her 
purpose would be to justify a decreased num ber o f kinds and  in terp re t as phase changes 
the transitions th a t are com m only regarded as substantial changes. To the contrary, the 
Spinozan w ould hold for instance th a t an atom  (or a m acroscopic chem ical sample) could 
possess 79 and  th en  82 pro tons as a m em ber of the  same kind, just as sam ples o f w ater (as 
m em bers o f the  same kind) could possess different states of aggregation. Having 79 
pro tons and  having 82 pro tons in nucleus would represent for the Spinozan different 
non-substantive universals characterising the same substantive universal, say gold, and 
no t two substantive universals, gold and lead, as it should norm ally be the case (if Lowe's 
m etaphysics o f kinds was to underp in  the com m only accepted kinds in the natural 
sciences). The transform ation  o f any sample of gold into a sample of (what is com m only 
taken as) lead w ould be governed in her rationale by the laws characterising the kind gold 
only and  hence bo th  the necessary and the sufficient conditions o f a substantial kind
173 I do not have the slightest issue here with Lowe’s metaphysical construal of laws according to which they 
have exceptions on the level o f particulars. Indeed, it seems to me that in the case of genuine co­
instantiation, the only way to justify the so-called ceteris paribus clauses that are attached to the first-order 
quantified generalisations frequently appealed to in science is to invoke substantive universals and kinds as 
truth-makers of laws (see Lowe 1989: 153, 154). I have just taken up the criticism addressed to Lowe that 
‘normality’ is hard to ascertain on the level of particulars (see e.g. Mumford 2000) - a criticism which is I 




change w ould n o t be satisfied.
To be sure, we have the  in tu ition  th a t gold and  lead, as elem ents are d istinct and  stable, 
and  thus should  be regarded as different kinds.173 Nevertheless, w ater and ice are also 
stable on their own, and, as Lowe says, the  difference in atom ic num ber is n o t enough for 
draw ing the  d istinction  betw een phase and non-phase.176 A ssum ing here the  role o f the 
Spinozan, I gladly agree.
In the  case o f m aterial objects, Lowe argues in favour o f o ther in tu itions th a t I have 
already referred to -  the  phase changes should be reversible, repeatable and gradual. In 
o ther words, the  laws specific for a m aterial kind (and w hat non-substantive universals 
characterise substantive universals) in its phases, should be picked out using certain  
o ther in tu itions we have about the  transitions they  govern on the level o f particulars. 
N onetheless, the  obvious reply would go, in tu itions can vary, and  a H eraclitan or 
Spinozan can have in tu itions o f their own, just as, to be sure, the  num erous proponen ts of 
an ever changing or everlasting reality in the  history of philosophy had. It seem s like 
Lowe w ould have no answ er if in the discussed example, a Spinozan replied th a t for her it 
is sufficient th a t the  gold-lead transm uta tion  is realised in bo th  senses in laboratory 
conditions and occurs naturally  and reversibly in supernovas?177
O ne final issue (of consistency) m ight be w orth m entioning here. To re tu rn  to our 
example, given the non-substantive universals Flf F2, F3 and F4 and two substantive 
universals (j> and <$>*, to ask which Fs characterise which cj)s is to question, in a sense, w hat 
‘individualises’ substantive universals. Lowe does allow exceptions for laws on the level o f 
particulars, w ith regard to w hat properties are instan tiated  by kind m em bers. O n the 
level o f universals though, the  non-substantive universals should characterise substantive 
universals as a m atte r o f m etaphysical necessity, as it were, in th a t the  identity  of 
substantive universals should depend on the non-substantive universals they are
175 Even if not all chemical elements are that stable. Unobtainium346 is an extreme example.
176 See Lowe 2001:178
177 Of course, a Spinozan or a Heraclitan could also dismiss the intuitions for regarding, on a 
commonsensical basis, that certain transitions are ‘development changes’ governed by ‘development laws’. 
Again, the Spinozan and the Heraclitan could have intuitions of their own.
100
characterised by, a t least in the  case o f fundam ental kinds.178
The argum entative p a tte rn  involved in Lowe’s reasoning for the level o f substantive 
universals (th a t is, in the  case o f kinds) is striking sim ilar to  the  argum entative pa tte rn  
em ployed by an ti-H um ean  proponents o f the  m etaphysical necessity o f natu ral laws (in 
the  case o f properties).179 The la tter theorists claim th a t (some or all of) the  n o n ­
substantive universals are individualised by the causal powers they  associate, in th a t the  
identity  o f non-substantive universals depends on the causal in teractions their instances 
can engage in.
Lowe criticises th is approach, m ainly on the ground th a t it involves a confusion betw een 
principles o f transw orld identity  and principles o f intraw orld iden tity .180 T hat is, it 
involves draw ing (unw arranted) conclusions from w hat is actually the  case to w hat is 
m etaphysically necessary the case, along the path  of Kripke’s a posteriori necessities.181 
Lowe claims therefore th a t the respective approach has two problem s. It has first a strong, 
m etaphysical problem  -  to suppose th a t the  identity  o f a non-substantive universal 
depends over its association w ith powers just seem s ‘highly dubious.'182 It also has a 
weaker, epistem ological difficulty in th a t one cannot be sure about which n o n ­
substantive universals are individuated by which powers.183
Now, referring strictly to  the  weaker, epistemic issue, my suspicion is th a t Lowe has a 
problem  of consistency here, because his m ain stance on how kinds are identified and 
‘singled o u t’ is sim ply th a t in nature we find certain  stable co-instantiations o f 
properties.184 This line however appears as highly susceptible to the  sam e type o f critique 
Lowe advances against the  anti-H um ean proponents o f nom ic m etaphysical necessity. It 
is actually th e  case th a t on the  level of particulars, properties are agglutinated  in certain
178 See Lowe 2006:155, 169, 170, 173. Lowe avoids the of terminology o f identity-dependence for substantive 
universals, preferring to say instead that (at least) some laws concerning natural kinds, when properly 
interpreted, emerge as metaphysically necessary (ibid. p. 155).
179 See for instance the arguments advanced by Shoemaker 1998, Ellis 2001, Bird 2005
180 Cf. Lowe 2006:150-152,164-165. Several other reasons are adduced against the metaphysical necessity of  
laws, as construed by the anti-Humean theorists. For instance, Lowe claims that universal physical 
constants could have been different (ibid. p. 151).
181 Ibid. p. 153
182 Ibid. p. 164-165
183 Ibid. p. 154
184 Ibid. p. 135.
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p atte rn s  th a t science inform s us about, one could reply. W hy is it w arran ted  to  draw  
conclusions, on such em pirical grounds, about which non-substantive universals 
characterise w hich substantive universals, w here the relation o f ‘characterisation’ involves 
the  la tte r’s identity?185
I do no t wish to question  here Lowe’s view of the nature  of the ‘characterisation’ relation. 
There m ight be independen t reasons why the respective relation needs to be construed in 
th is way, especially in order to differentiate it from  A rm strong’s relation o f 
necessitation.186 W hat I strongly suggest though is th a t w hen H eraclitanism  or Spinozism  
are reckoned with, Lowe’s considerations on laws, kind ‘individualisation’ and  em pirical 
research cannot coun t as m eans to resist these views. If to construe the  special science 
kinds as non-phase k inds is a form  of Heraclitanism , Lowe’s defence of the com m onsense 
phase/non-phase  d istinction  cannot count as a rejection.
As in the  discussion o f criteria VIb and VII, I w ant to bring into the p icture the  identity  
sense o f carving natu re  a t its joints. I will show  in the next section th a t only if the  
diachronic conditions of identity  for kind m em bers are taken to depend upon their kind 
m em bership, the  Spinozan and H eraclitan challenges could be responded and, in 
particular, criterion VIII could be used in order to rule out special science kinds as phase 
kinds.
§ 2 .3 .4  I d e n t i t y  a n d  t h e  p h a s e  n o n -p h a s e  d i s t i n c t i o n
If the  identity  sense o f carving nature  a t its jo ints was adopted, the H eraclitan and 
Spinozan challenges could be adequately responded. W ithin  Lowe's system , adopting th is 
identity  sense as a solution would m ean treating the com m only accepted natural kinds as
185 See especially Lowe 2006: 170, where Lowe rejects the view that the identity of a non—substantive 
universal might depend on its association with a substantive universal (using the example of electric 
charge). On the same page, Lowe intimates that kinds are ‘individualised’ by certain non-substantive 
universals they are characterised by (the example of electrons, positrons and unit charge). In plain words, 
for Lowe, to speak of the identity of non-substantive universals (either vis-i-vis their association to kinds, 
or their association to causal powers) is ill-founded, whereas talk of the identity o f kinds is justified. No 
reason for this unilateral treatment is provided.
Armstrong (1997)
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categories. T hat is because, given Lowe's construal of w hat a category is, th is move w ould 
inter alia entail th a t the  identity  of kind m em bers depended  on their kind m em bership  
(such th a t the  diachronic conditions o f identity  for any individual w ould have to include 
and m en tion  explicitly the  instan tia tion  of a substantive universal).
Recall th a t in one form ulation o f Lowe’s basic schem e on changes (which I have fram ed in 
§ 2.3.1). Individual phase changes and the bearing o f laws characterising a kind should be 
necessary and jointly sufficient for the  changes undergone by its m em bers being phase 
ones. O n the o ther hand, for substantial kind changes it should be sufficient e ither th a t 
an  individual substantial change is in place or th a t the laws governing the  m anifestations 
o f the  kind in question  do not have a bearing over the  respective processes undergone by 
its m em bers.
Now, if the  com m only accepted natural kinds were treated  as categories, no t only all 
individual substantial changes would qualify as kind substantial changes (as already is the 
case in Lowe's schem e) bu t also all substantial kind changes would be individual 
substantial changes. T hat is, individual substantial changes w ould be sufficient and 
necessary for kind substantial changes. This w ould elim inate from Lowe's schem e the  role 
th a t laws play in defining substantial kind changes and w ould stop the H eraclitan an d /o r 
the Spinozan from  seeing such changes where intuitively they are no t an d /o r overlooking 
them  w here they  intuitively they are in place.
The role played by laws in phase kind changes w ould have to be m aintained though, for 
the following reason. There are some changes undergone by particulars that, intuitively, 
are ne ither phase changes nor substantial kind changes -  like for instance in the  case of 
the  irradiation o f a raven th a t tu rn s  thus white. Lowe's construal o f laws coherently  allows 
such exceptions on the level o f particulars. This is in fact one o f the  great advantages of 
his account o f natural laws. Notice, however, th a t on his schem e of changes - which 
includes laws playing a role in the  definition o f both substantial and phase kind changes - 
the process in  question could not qualify as a phase change (since a raven turn ing  w hite 
would no t obey the law of 'developm ent' for the  kind o f raven). O n the  o ther hand, this 
process could qualify as a substantial change on the o ther hand. As we have seen, the
103
H eraclitan w ould gladly speculate th is latter aspect.187
A m ong others, the purpose o f viewing the com m only accepted kinds as categories w ould 
be to  stop the  H eraclitan  from  re-in terp reting  w hat substantial kind changes m ean. The 
purpose w ould also be to defend com m onsense in tu itions on the  phase/non-phase 
distinction. If the  role o f laws were rejected altogether from  draw ing th is p h ase /n o n ­
phase distinction, we w ould have to accept th a t since the  individual ravens plausibly 
rem ain  identical w ith them selves if they  tu rn  white, changes such as the  ones they suffer 
under irrad iation  represen t phases undergone by their kind. Yet, while processes such as 
irrad iation  saliently qualify as individual phase changes, our com m on in tu itions say th a t 
we should n o t have all the  individual phase changes entailing th a t kind phases are in 
place. To p u t it simply, w hat the  com m onsense regards as accidents should no t coun t as 
kind phases.
187 And, o f course, the Heraclitan who wanted to view medical kinds as non-phase, natural kinds would very 
gladly consider this possibility.
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FIGURE  6  COMMONLY ACCEPTED KINDS AS CATEGORIES
An individual a - initially m em ber of a kind cf> - could become m em ber of a different kind cj)*, could go through 
a phase of cj) or could com e to instantiate an accident vis-a-vis <f>, depending on certain necessary and/or 
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As I said, th e  m ain  u p sh o t o f ad o p tin g  th e  id en tity  sense o f  carving n a tu re  a t  its jo in ts  
w ould  be to  s top  th e  S p inozan  an d  th e  H eraclitan  from  co n stru in g  in  a p a rticu la r w ay th e  
co n d itio n s  for su b stan tia l k ind  changes. Contra  th e  Spinozan, one cou ld  argue th a t  any  
tran s itio n  u n d erg o n e  by  an  ind iv idual chang ing  its ch arac te ris tic s  so as to  sw ap tw o 
com m only  reg ard ed  k inds fulfils th e  necessary  an d  suffic ien t co n d itio n  for su b stan tia l 
k ind  change  (since it also rep resen ts  an  ind iv idual su b stan tia l change). Sim ilarly, contra  
th e  H erac litan , one cou ld  ho ld  th a t any  tran s itio n  th a t does n o t involve th e  sw apping  o f 
two com m o n ly  reg ard ed  k inds does n o t fulfil th e  necessary  an d  suffic ien t co n d itio n  for 
su b stan tia l k ind  change an d  hence it sim ply  rep resen ts  a k ind  ph ase  or a sim ple 
ind iv idual p h ase  (an  acciden t).
S trictly  re ferring  to  th e  H eraclitan  challenge, th e  m u ltip lica tio n  o f k inds w ould  also be 
lim ited  by th e  fact th a t  an  ind ividual could n o t s im u ltaneously  in s tan tia te  tw o n a tu ra l
i ° 5
kinds (tha t were no t in a species-genus hierarchy), since th is w ould violate the  tertium  
non datur law. This prohib ition  is plainly justified w hen it com es to categories -  no 
particular could sim ultaneously instan tiate  two different categories, and  Lowe argues very 
convincingly in favour of it for the statues/m aterials cases, in w hich we have different 
particulars w ith the sam e spatio-tem poral location.188 The prohibition  in question could 
easily be extended for natural kinds, if categories were m ore broadly viewed so as to 
enclose natural kinds.189
Should the two H eraclitan and Spinozan still w ant to modify the num ber o f kinds by 
excessively inflating or reducing it, they would have to look a t the  conditions of 
individuation for kind members and claim th a t on the level of particulars alm ost every 
change is a change in their diachronic (absolute) identity  (on the  H eraclitan side) or th a t 
alm ost no change is a change in the diachronic identity  o f individuals (on the Spinozan 
side). However, this w ould be a m uch m ore difficult enterprise, or, a t any rate, it would 
represen t a different discussion.
There are som e serious difficulties w ith taking such a view on the identity  bearing o f kind 
m em bership. Some o f the  m ost im portan t are the  general epistem ological problem s of the 
identity  sense of carving nature, which I will discuss in the next chapter. Parenthetically,
I should add th a t th a t the  view of the com m only accepted natural lands as categories 
would not suffer from  the  tribulations th a t Lowe im putes to  it, in some (again, ra ther 
fragm entary) rem arks he m akes on the putative difference betw een kind substantial 
changes and individual substantial changes.
Firstly, th is construal o f categories and the identity  of kind m em bers would n o t entail 
th a t every com m only regarded phase individual change was in fact a substantial 
individual change.190 I do no t see why it should even favour th is view (although it 
certainly does no t preclude it). Taking the com m only regarded natural kinds in science as 
having a bearing on identity  is som ething th a t should counter the  H eraclitan or the 
Spinozan who pursued  the easier (i.e. less implausible) side of their strategy, th a t is, who
188 See Lowe (1995) and also Oderberg (1996)
189 Which is just to say, of course, that on the identity sense o f carving nature, criterion VII could also be 
used to stop the multiplication of kinds
19°Contra Lowe 2001:187
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questioned the  com m only accepted kinds, and no t particulars. Should anyone w ant to 
argue in favour o f a H eraclitan or Spinozan reality on the level o f particulars, th a t kinds 
have an iden tity  bearing w ould not m atter, I th ink  (or it w ould constitu te  a h indrance), 
since the a rgum enta tion  would simply have to be pursued on a different level.
A t best, one could advance the following inference indicating the dangers o f seeing the 
instan tia tion  o f substantive universals as part o f diachronic conditions o f identity: i f  kinds 
have an iden tity  bearing, and i f  kinds are indefinitely m ultiplied (or reduced) then an 
ever-changing (or un-changing) reality of particulars will resu lt.191 Nevertheless, all hinges 
on the  accent w ith w hich th is conditional is employed reductio ad absurdum, and  for 
w hat purpose. O ne could use this conditional to argue that:
i) Kinds should no t have an identity  bearing because such and such consequences over 
the  reality o f particulars emerge,
or
ii) The num ber o f lands should no t be m ultiplied or constricted because such and such 
unacceptable consequences abou t the reality o f particulars emerge.
To be sure, Spinozism  or Heraclitianism  about particulars is m uch m ore unacceptable 
than  Spinozism  or H eraclitianism  about kinds. After all, m any respectable m etaphysical 
schem es in contem porary  m etaphysics do not have a central place for kinds (or do no t 
even acknowledge their existence) bu t pay full heed to the  existence o f particular
191 In fact, I am inclined to reject even this inference, simply because, as I have mentioned in the 
introduction to this section, it seems to me that Heraclitanism/Spinozism about kinds and 
Heraclitanism/Spinozism about particulars represent different aspects of these counter-intuitive strategies, 
and these aspects do not presuppose each other. Take for instance one strong Spinozan scenario on kinds I 
have mentioned in the beginning o f , according to which our ontology contains only one or, let us say, three 
kinds, corresponding to Lowe's three categories -  the biological, the artefactual and the material. This 
Spinozan view would be consistent I believe with a construal of kinds as substantive universals and would 
not have a fortiori consequences over the differentiations between particulars we commonly accept. All the 
non-substantive universals that in Lowe’s current scheme characterise various substantive universals in the 
biological, inorganic and artefactual realms would characterise (what we could call) the biological 
substantive universal, material substantive universal and artefactual substantive universal, respectively. All 
the particulars that in Lowe’s current scheme are members of various natural kinds would be members of 
these three kinds only. The differentiations between these particulars would be grounded, as they are 
grounded already in Lowe’s current approach, on certain category based diachronic conditions of identity 
(which, in this case, would coincide with the sortal conditions of identity).
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substances. All in all, there is no relation of entailment betw een viewing the kind 
m em bership  as having as bearing over the diachronic identity of kind m em bers and  all 
phase individual changes ending up being also substantial individual changes.
Second, on th is construal, categories would not be the m ost general forms o f being we 
could th in k  of. 93 However, th a t the material, biological and artefactual are the  m ost 
general categories we could envisage answers only one half of the question concerning 
their nu m b er -  w hy should not we have less than  three categories. It does n o t answ er w hy 
we should n o t have m ore.
Third, th is construal w ould keep open the possibility of kind swapping (like in the  case o f 
any organism  th a t dies) bu t it would not preserve the possibility o f an individual 
changing its kind while rem aining the same.194 This is just to say th a t it w ould no t adm it 
its logical negation. W hy would one w ant to preserve the possibility o f such changes 
betw een kinds o f num erically identical individuals? The only reason I can th ink  o f is the 
doctrine o f C hristian transubstantiation. But there are alternative ways to deal w ith th is 
issue th a t theologians have form ulated -  approaches with sidestep the m edieval 
A ristotelianism  and  in te rp re t in a different sense how Christ is 'present' or 'in place' in the  
bread and  wine o f the  Eucharist.195
Fourth, on  th is construal we would not be 'born' w ith the criteria of diachronic identity  o f 
objects and  we w ould som etim es rely on scientists to tell us w hat kinds are out th ere .196 
W ould th is m ean th a t categories are not any more a priori? I suppose th a t they w ould still 
be, if in a m inim al sense, to a ttribute to kinds identity bearing over their m em bers would 
not be som eth ing  th a t scientists could tell us about, or any 'empirical' inform ation could 
provide us, b u t w ould be the result of a metaphysical reasoning designed to reject certain
92 See for instance Armstrong (1997), Campbell (1990). As we know, even for Quine the preference to 
desert landscapes' stopped at the level of the first order quantification (destined to reduce all the other 
statements about ‘intensional’ entities); see Quine (1968)
93 As Lowe claims they should be; see Lowe (1989, ch. 7)- The same claim can be found in Wiggins (2001) 
with regard to the ‘ultimate sortals’, which correspond in Wiggins s system to Lowe s categories .
94 Whereas Lowe claims that this possibility should be preserved (without specifying any reason for this); 
Cf. Lowe (2001: 55,184), (1989:14)
195 Hemming (2000) is a brilliant example.
9 Pace Lowe 2001: 187, for instance, where it is claimed that categories should be somewhat innate (in 
connection with the British empiricist construal of the a priori).
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unacceptable positions. 97 The role of metaphysics, as underlying and providing a 
fram ew ork for the  natural sciences -  a role that Lowe insists upon in various places198 -  
would be unaltered .
O f course, these are details tha t concern the peculiar aspects of Lowe’s system  ra ther our 
general purpose in  th is chapter. However, Lowe’s argum ents are im portan t for the  
discussion o f criterion  VIII because they represent, as I have m entioned, the  best defence 
in the  litera tu re  o f the  comm onsense phase-non phase distinction. The general 
a rgum enta tion  I have adopted in this section against criterion VIII ruling out special 
science kinds as phase kinds will be com plem ented in the next chapter by a m ore 
contextualised analysis of medical lands. In fact, all the argum ents presented  in the  
p resent chap ter will be used as a general metaphysical background in chapter 3, w here 
the com parison  betw een gold and the Graves’ Disease kind will be undertaken. At the  end 
of chap ter 3 the  epistem ological difficulties of the identity sense of carving natu re  will 
also be p resen ted  and  the metaphysical considerations from the present chap ter on 
essences, substantive universals and processes will be rounded up w ith m y conclusions 
abou t m edical k inds in particular and natural kinds in general.
197 Nothing in the reasoning concerning categories entails that have them from birth or even that we should 
be able to know them in any direct way. Taking categories as innate comes dangerously close to 
evolutionary biology/psychology views, with all their tribulations, even if Lowe, in his philosophy o f mind, 
(distances him self from and) criticises the pre-eminence that these evolutionary approaches have come to 
have; see Lowe (2000). More generally, categories are highly susceptible to arbitrariness and subjectivism  
accusations, if we construe them either as innate or (even) as Kantian transcendentals. The minimal sense 
of g  priori associated with the metaphysical reasoning that should be employed in order to reject 
unacceptable positions (and provide a foundation for natural sciences, as Lowe wants its metaphysics to be) 
is consistent with scientific information being used in non-empirical metaphysical considerations.
98 See Lowe 2006:3-5 et passim.
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C h a p t e r  3 . G o l d  v s . t h e  G r a v e s ’ D is e a s e  k i n d
In t r o d u c t i o n
Are d iseases n a tu ra l k inds? I have no ted  in chap ter 1 that, since lan d s  in th e  exact 
sciences (are  ta k e n  to) typify na tu ra l kinds, a straigh tforw ard  w ay to  ad d ress  such  a 
q u es tio n  is to  co m p are  a k ind  o f disease w ith  an  exact science kind. Such a co m p ariso n  
shou ld  m ak e c lear ce rta in  resem blances and  differences betw een  m edicine an d  th e  exact 
sciences th a t  sh o u ld  m a tte r  decisively in establishing th e  charac te r o f k inds o f d iseases. In 
th e  p re se n t ch ap te r, I will com pare Graves’ Disease, tak en  as an  exam ple o f  a 
p a th o lo g ica l’ k in d  a n d  gold, as an  exam ple o f a ‘classical’ n a tu ra l kind. Before exp lain ing  
from  w h a t p o in t  o f  view  th is  task  will be undertaken , let m e first d raw  th e  b ack g ro u n d  
im age o f  th e  co m p ariso n .
Im agine w e have, o n  th e  one hand, a set o f various th in g s— say rings, coins, fram es, e tc .— 
th a t a re  yellow , fusib le, m alleable, soluble in aqua regia and  so on. O n th e  o th e r h an d , 
th in k  o f  a series o f  o rgan ism s th a t p resen t certain  biological fea tu res in  c o m m o n — 
ex o p h th a lm ia  ( th e  p ro tru s io n  o f one or bo th  eyes), m yxoedem a (a tib ial n o n -p ittin g  
oedem a), g o itre  (an  en la rg em en t o f the  thyroid  g land detec tab le  as a sw elling in  th e  
neck), a n d  d ec reased  w eight, accelerated  in testina l transit, tachycard ia , in to le ran ce  to 
heat, o steo p en ia , o steoporosis, proxim al m uscle w eakness, etc.
F IG U R E  7  G O L D  K IN D  M E M B E R S A N D  O R G A N ISM S SU FFE R IN G  FR O M  G RAVES’ D ISEA SE  (R E P R O D U C E D  
FR O M  W H E E T M A N , 2 0 0 0 )
no
Each of these two sets o f particulars has certain striking resem blances. The question  I am  
concerned w ith  can th en  be usefully re-form ulated as follows: if gold objects are part o f a 
natural kind, w hy should not organisms with the symptoms of Graves’ disease form  such 
a kind as well?
Do the  two kinds fulfil/fail the criteria of m em bership laid out in chapter 1 (and 
reproduced below), in such a way that an ontological gap betw een them  is salient?
FIGURE 8 The c riteria  o f m em bership in a natural kind NK for a particular a instantiating a pattern  [pi, p2, pn] of
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Take criterion  I, concerning natural properties. Both gold and the Graves’ Disease kind 
(henceforth GD kind) fulfil this requirem ent, or a t least, no ontological gap can be 
detected  a t its level. W ith  respect to gold, the resemblances betw een its m em bers do 
appear as genuine - they  are malleable, soluble in aqua regia, yellow, can be extended 
and shaped w ithou t cracking, dissolvable in a HC1/H N03 solution, able to reflect the  570- 
580 nm  spectrum  of the visible light, etc. These are not properties resulting from wiggling 
predicates b u t are pointing towards real similarities, behaviours, and dispositions, being 
m alleable, soluble in aqua regia, yellow, being extended and shaped w ithout cracking, 
dissolving in  a HC1/H N 03 solution, reflecting the 570-580 nm  spectrum  from  the visible 
light, etc, are n o t properties resulting from wiggling predicates bu t po in t tow ards real 
sim ilarities and  behaviours. W ith respect to the GD kind, the observable sim ilarities 
shared by its m em bers do appear as natural properties as well. Values are no t involved in 
ascertaining w hether an  organism  presents enlargem ent of the thyroid gland, p ro truded  
eyes, a non -p itting  oedem a of the tibial tissues etc. In the same vein, no gerrym andering 
of pred icates is p resen t in attributing to hum an organisms properties like exophtalm ia, 
goitre, m yxedem a, etc. T hat is, such organisms are not the focus of our discussion 
because a pred icate  like, say 'being hospitalized between 7 and 19 days in endocrinology 
clinics and  being either male or female' has them  in its extension. These organism s do 
p resent biological resem blances (even if they are, from a medical po in t o f view, 
superficial, in  the  sense in which medical research is trying to discover the  ‘p rofound’ 
causes o f such sym ptom s and signs).
A dm ittedly, one m ight invoke here the problem  of the theory-ladeness o f observation, or 
the fact th a t the  properties in question m ight be relational. But ever since the early logical 
em piricist program  of providing a purely observational vocabulary fell into disrepute, the 
fact th a t our theories m ight inform our observational term s is no longer considered to  be 
a serious p ro b le m .199 At any rate, if it is a problem  at all, it affects bo th  kinds under 
discussion. Furtherm ore, if the charge of sharing relational properties is raised against the  
GD kind, it can be equally raised against gold. Thus, either both kinds fulfil this
199 Cooper (2005: 81-86) has argued persuasively that these worries should be dismissed in the case of 
psychiatry and I take it that the same goes for the case of somatic medicine.
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requirem ent or no ontological gap can be justified at its level.200
In §31_§3-5 I WH1 take each of the rem aining criteria of m em bership in tu rn  and will argue 
tha t instead  o f an  ontological gap between the two kinds, we have a difference of degree. 
This applied enquiry  will follow the general metaphysical discussion from chapter 2 from  
two (in ter-connected) points of view. On the one hand, it will rely on the previous 
analyses o f essences, substantive universals and processes. On the o ther hand, it will 
assum e -  w ith  regard to the intuitive assum ption(s) tha t natural kinds provide a ‘basic 
o n to lo g y , fram e u ltim ate classifications’, tell us ‘what things are’ etc. - th a t gold carves 
nature a t its jo in ts in a sense tha t does not involve the identity of its m em bers. The other, 
identity -related  sense will be discussed in the final part of this chapter, in §3.6. Evidently, 
certain  references to the identity  of kind m em bers will be present th roughou t the  entire  
chapter, in connection  w ith my working assum ption that theorists appeal tacitly to  the  
identity  sense o f carving nature when setting forth certain requirem ents (and 
characterisations o f the  natural kind category) -  requirem ents th a t are otherw ise 
groundless.
§3.1 In d u c t i o n
Induction  has two variants -  a causal and a co-instantiation one. In the fram ew ork I have 
adopted, the  form er has to do w ith inferences about superficial properties while the  latter 
is expressed by inferences about determ ining properties.201 If successful inductions can be 
fram ed for the  m em bers of a certain kind, the kind in question is a m ore probable 
candidate for being natural. Most neutrally put, inductively rich kinds go one step further 
away from  being sim ply arbitrary collections of particulars and are m ore probable 
candidates for circum scribing 'divisions of nature' th a t correspond to natural kinds. I have 
called the  requirem ents th a t natural kinds should participate in these two types of
200 The same type of argument can be advanced for the microstructural similarities shared by the members 
of each kind.
The above distinction between causal and co-instantiation inferences does not exclude that, ultimately, 
causation might also be the metaphysical ground for co-instantiation. Indeed, I shall argue myself in favour 
of this possibility. These two types of inferences need to be distinguished however, because there are 
alternative metaphysical justifications for co-instantiation on offer (essences and substantive universals), 
see also §1.1.
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induction  criterion  II and  V, respectively. I shall argue in this section th a t bo th  gold and 
the GD kind satisfy them .
3.1.2 T h e  c a u s a l  i n d u c t i o n  r e q u i r e m e n t  ( c r i t e r i o n  II)
Let us first look a t criterion II -  the causal induction requirem ent. Criterion II says th a t a 
group o f particu lars - identified prima facie due to their instan tiation  o f certain  
‘superficial’ p roperties and behaviours [qlf q2, ...qn] - form a non-arbitrary kind K if they 
also possess certain  properties [pu p2, ...pn], which are ‘profound’ from a causal po in t of 
view, i.e. are a tten d ed  by causal powers, have roles in scientific explanation, prediction, 
etc.202 If th is is the  case, then  for any individual a, one could advance inferences abou t its 
‘superficial’ p roperties o f the form ‘W ere a to be a m em ber of K, a would, or probably 
would, in stan tia te  [qu q2, ...qn]’.
Gold fulfils th is requ irem ent w ith a vengeance. One of the reasons why grouping together 
the  objects th a t are m alleable, soluble in aqua regia, yellow, etc., is no t conventional, is 
th a t one can reasonably expect that the next observed sample of gold will be extended 
and shaped w ithou t cracking, will dissolve in a HC1/H N03 solution, will reflect the  570- 
580 nm  spectrum  from  the visible light, etc. Such causal inductive inferences can 
justifiably be fram ed because, besides these ‘superficial’ properties and behaviours, gold 
m em bers also share determ ining properties -  namely the m icro-structural properties 
characteristic o f the gold elem ent (and its metallic complex); the latter properties are 
causes for the  form er. That is, the superficial similarities of objects w ith such and such 
colour, solubility, etc. are indicative of natural kind relationship vis-i-vis criterion II 
because they  are doubled by ‘profound’ similarities at the level of the micro structural
202 Thus, from the point o f view of the natural kinds discussion, the causal induction requirement differs in 
extension from the natural property requirement. Of course, one could argue, in line with the Eleatic 
principle, that a property exists only insofar as it is attended by causal powers. However, the causal 
induction requirement is particularly concerned with the sort of properties science tries to discover - the 
determining properties. Even if, for instance, the superficial, perceptible properties o f water may also be 
attended by causal powers (and hence can act as causes) science is interested in the underlying, 
microstructural properties of water (which act as causes for its superficial, perceptible properties). This is 
not to say that determining properties need only be micro-structural, it is just to say that, even if all 
properties may act in some respect as causes (and hence be attended by causal powers) some of these 
causes are more important than others.
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properties o f the gold element.
There are, to be sure, num erous questions to be asked about the natu re  o f determ ining 
properties (i.e. the  individuation o f causes, the  ontological dependency o f causal powers, 
e tc ).203 However, these difficulties about the  exact characterisation of the causative 
relation betw een the determ ining  and the superficial aspects o f kind m em bers 
now ithstanding, the  sim ilarities present on the level o f m icro-structures do m ark out an 
im portan t d istance betw een u tterly  arbitrary collections o f individuals w ith different 
underlying properties and the kinds for w hom  causal inductions concerning superficial 
p roperties can be form ulated.
Now, one can affirm th a t the  same is the  case for the GD kind. The set of sym ptom s of 
Graves’ Disease are no t grouped together fortuitously, from the poin t o f view of criterion
II. T hat is, one o f the m ain reasons for why ‘classificatory strangeness’ is no t present w hen 
considering together the  organism s th a t possess the above-m entioned ‘superficial’ 
p roperties is precisely the  com m on causal ground underlying them .
Indeed, we have here a striking example of a conjunction of sym ptom s whose causal base 
has been  discovered by m odern m edicine and thus lies in sharp contrast w ith disease and 
disease kinds in the classification o f which causal arbitrariness was the rule. The history 
o f m edicine is rife w ith such examples - conditions in which various sym ptom s were 
grouped together for reasons tha t did not have anything to do w ith the sim ilarities 
p resen t on  the  level o f determ ining properties. In the  sixteenth century for instance, 
blindness, chancre and penile ‘rubbery tum ours’ (granulom a form ations) were considered 
syphilis sym ptom s and their emergence was a ttribu ted  to astrological influences 
punish ing  fornication. In antiquity, to take another example, convulsions, loss of 
consciousness and  vertebral muscle spasms were grouped together as com m on sym ptom s 
of a ‘divine’ disease affecting certain chosen people, a disease which should have allowed 
its sufferers to transcend  the sublunar realm  and en ter the realm  of essences.
As I said, GD is a different sort of disease, however, because determ ining ‘pathological’
2°3See Schaffer (2007) and Psillos (2002) for discussion. What I just want to stress is that my use here of
determining properties (as properties attended by causal powers) is neutral vis-^-vis the Humean/anti- 
Humean dispute, which will be looked at more closely in chapter 4.
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properties are also shared by kind m em bers. The diagnosis of Graves’ Disease is 
established by detecting  in the  blood certain  types of antibodies called TRAS (thyroid 
receptor antibodies) and  high levels of thyroxin (the thyroid horm one). These in tu rn  
represen t param eters indicating the presence of specific biological m icro-structural 
p roperties - e.g., increased perm eability of cells to sodium  and sugar, the presence of 
certain  steroid transcrip tion  factors in nucleus, increased Na+/K+ ATPase concentration in 
m em brane, an increase in the  num ber and size o f m itochondria, reduced expression of 
the  thyro trop in  p subun it and com m on a subunit (suppressed thyrotropin), increased 
expression o f HCN2 (hyperpolarization-activated cyclic nucleotide-gated catiion channel-
2), voltage gated potassium  channel and SERCA (sarco(endo)plasm ic reticulum  calcium- 
activated ATPase, responsible for increased heart rate and contractility), increased type 1 5’ 
deiodinase, increased LDL and VDRL receptor lipase (responsible for reduced to ta l and 
LDL cholesterol), increased osteocalcin, alkaline phosphatase, and urinary N -telopeptide 
(responsible for osteopenia, osteoporosis, and fractures), increased serum  creatine kinase 
(responsible for proxim al muscle weakness and easy fatigability), increased fatty acid 
oxidation and  sodium  potassium  ATPase (responsible for increased therm ogenesis and 
oxygen consum ption, perspiration and weight loss), etc.
These are determ in ing  properties because they are each in tu rn  involved as causes in 
different stages o f the  global process which underlies the  disease in question and whose 
‘ou tcom e’ is precisely the em ergence of the sym ptom s. Some of these determ ining 
properties are sum m arised below, in parallel to their effects.
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FIGURE  9  DETERM INING PRO PERTIES (re p ro d u c e d  fro m  B re n t 2008)
Table I, Manifestations o f Graves’ Disease.*
System Clinical Finding or Manifestation
Pitu itary  S u p p re sse d  thy ro trop in
C ard iac  In c reased  h e a rt ra te  an d  contractility
H e p a tic  Increased  peripheral Ta production; reduced
total an d  LDL cholestero l, lipoprotein(a)
Skeletal Inc reased  b o n e  tu rnover, o s teo p en ia ,
o s te o p o ro s is , an d  frac tu res
R eproductive
M ale Erectile dysfunction , red u ced  libido
F em ale  irregu lar m e n se s
M etabo lic  Increased  th e rm o g en e s is  and  oxygen
c o n su m p tio n
W h ite  Fat R educed fat m ass
M u scle  Proxim al-m uscie w eakness, easy fatigability
T hyroid Increased  thyroid secretion o f  T3 and  T4
Marker of Direct or Indirect Thyroid Hormone Action
R educed expression  o f  thyrotropin /8 su b u n it and  c o m m o n  
a  su b u n it
Increased  ex p ression  o f  HCN 2, vo ltage-gated  p o ta ss iu m  
ch an n e l {Kvl.5, Kv4.2, Kv4.3), a n d  SERCA; in creased  
tr-M H C  and  d ecreased  /3-MHC expression ; in c reased  
se ru m  atrial n a triu retic  p ep tid e
Increased  type 1 5 '-d e io d in ase , LDL an d  VLDL recep to r, 
lipase , SREBP-2, CYP7A, an d  CETP
Increased  o steoca lc in , a lkaline p h o sp h a ta se , an d  urinary 
N -te lopep tide
Increased sex h o rm o n e  globulin, reduced  free te s to s te ro n e
A ntagonism  o f  estro g en  action; im paired g o n ad o tro p in  
regulation
Increased  fatty acid ox idation  and  so d iu m —p o tass iu m  
ATPase
A ug m en ted  ad ren erg ic -m ed ia ted  lipoiysis
Increased  SERCA activity and  se ru m  c rea tin e  k inase
Increased type 1 and type 2 5 '-d e io d in ase  activity in thyroid
*  D ata  a re  from  M o to m u ra  an d  B rent,9 Brenta e t al.10 and  Klein an d  O ja m a a .11 CETP d e n o te s  ch o lestero l e s te r  tran s fe r  
p ro te in , CYP7A cho lestero l 7 cr-hydroxyiase, H CN 2 hyperpo larization-activated  cyclic nucleo tide-gated  ca tio n  channel 2, 
LDL low -density  lipopro te in , M HC m yosin heavy chain, SERCA sarcop lasm ic  reticulum  calcium -activated ATPase, SREBP- 
2 ste ro l regulatory e le m e n t-b in d in g  pro tein  2, T3 triiodo thyron ine , T* thyroxine, and  VLDL very-low -density lip o p ro te in .
Because the  GD kind presents such an underlying layer of determ ining properties, it can 
be involved in (causal) inductions in the same relevant sense as gold. T hat is to  say, 
c riterion  II canno t circum scribe an ontological gap a t this point. W e have instead a 
difference o f degree.
The difference in degree, in this particular context, refers to the certainty of the  respective
inductive inferences. One (gold) is arguably universal, whereas the o ther adm its 
exceptions (or, alternatively, can be read as probabilistic) w hen it com es to  the  organism s
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th a t are m em bers o f a GD kind.204 In the case o f gold, we can expect th a t the next 
observed m em ber o f th is kind will dissolve in aqua regia for instance, w hereas in the  case 
o f GD we can expect th a t the  next observed m em ber of th is kind is to have exophthalm ia 
w ith a certain  probability. Alternatively, we can expect th a t the respective organism  will 
have exophthalm ia only if a host o f certain  o ther conditions are in place.
However, such a difference in the  certainty of inferences does not am ount to the  two 
kinds being situated  on different ontological levels. Insofar as the  requirem ent to 
participate  in causal inductions is concerned, a kind is inductively rich if causal powers 
are a t w ork betw een the involved properties (i.e. the superficial and determ ining ones).205
Irrespective o f the disagreem ents as to w hat in terp reta tion  causal powers should receive 
and  the  exact na tu re  of determ ining properties, at this po in t we only need to stick to the  
(m inim al) fact th a t causation exists in m edicine. In o ther words, if in pathological 
organism s there  are non-accidental successions betw een events, inductions should be 
vindicated  and  criterion II is fulfilled (even if the  respective inferences are no t universal).
Take the  rela tion  betw een TRAs and exophthalm ia, a relation th a t is considered by all o f 
today’s m edical standards as causal. This relation has a know n m echanism ;206 it has been 
verified in experim ental conditions, both  in vivo and in vitro, and has been subject to
204More precisely, the respective inferences can be read as probabilistic (on the frequency-interpretation of 
probability), in which case the inductions simply express the chances of certain properties designated in the 
consequent to show up given the presence of other properties designated in the antecedent (and thus the 
respective inferences are metaphysically underlined by non-deterministic causation); see Forster (2004: 
21,54). The exceptions, on the other hand, can be taken as showing up due to the presence/absence of 
certain other factors that are not specified in the antecedents of inductive conditionals (and in this case, the 
'probably' locution present in the inductive statements would have an epistemic interpretation); see e.g. 
Fales (1990: 105). Alternatively, the other factors that might influence the conditions in which the 
antecedent o f the respective conditionals obtains might be indicated in an attached (ceteris paribus-like) 
clause; see for instance Cartwright (1999:90). In medical treatises (endocrinological ones included, of 
course) the correlations between causative factors and effects are sometimes expressed as frequencies 
simpliciter, but the addendum that certain other factors, currently unknown, might influence the strength 
of association is just as often met; see for instance Bahn et. al. (1998)
205 See Morris’s (2007) presentation of Hume’s inductive scepticism related to causal powers, Snyder’s 
(2006) discussion o f Whewell’s view on causal induction and Hacking's (2006) discussion of Mill's co­
instantiation induction, in contrast.
206 ‘Mechanism’ is used here in the simple/neutral sense of a series of factors spatio-temporally related, 
between which non-accidental relations are observed to obtain in experimental conditions, and which are 
correlated with statistical assessments from the level of populations.
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n u m ero u s  p o p u la tio n -lev e l a ssessm en ts .207 It is know n o f th is  re la tio n sh ip  th a t  due to a 
m o lecu la r m im icry  b e tw een  th e  TSH recep to r from  th e  level o f  thy ro id  m em b ran e  and  
ce rta in  p ro te in s  loca ted  in  th e  re tro -b u lb ar, p re -ad ipocy te  soft tissue, TRAs (the 
an tib o d ie s  d irec ted  m ain ly  ag a in st th e  T S H -recep to r o f  th e  th y ro id  m em b ran e )208 reach  
th e  o rb ita l m uscles an d  fib roblasts. H ere, th ey  induce  an  in flam m ato ry  in filtra te  
co m p o sed  m ain ly  o f  T -lym phocy tes an d  m acrophages. T he cy tokines p ro d u ced  by th e  
la tte r  s tim u la te  th e  sec re tio n  o f ce rta in  g lycosam inoglycans (m ainly  h y a lu ro n a te  an d  
ch o n d ro itin  su lfate) by th e  fibroblasts, w ith  hydroph ilic  consequences.
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207 See, e.g., [41] for in vitro laboratory assessments, [42] for animal testing evaluations, and [43] for 
epidemiological assessments.
208 TSH (thyroid stim ulating horm one) is a horm one secreted by the hypophyseal gland which controls the 
activity of the  thyroid gland. Normally, TSH reaches a certain receptor located on the thyroidian m em brane 
and enables a series o f intracellular reactions in the thyroidian follicles th a t culm inate in the synthesis of 
thyroxin (the main thyroid horm one) and triiodothyronine (thyroxine's active metabolite). W hen TSAs (the 
antibodies produced by lymphocytes as a result of perceiving' the TSH-thyroidian receptor as foreign, i.e., 
as an antigen) target the respective receptor, they enable the same set of intracellular reactions but in an 
exacerbated way. Informally put, this is the main reason for the emergence of Graves’ disease symptoms. 
Thyroid normally controls the base metabolism rate. In Graves’ disease, via the abovem entioned 
determ ining properties located at the microcellular level, the metabolic influences of thyroid are 
exacerbated, and hence the superficial manifestations (the symptoms) show up.
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The resulting oedem a, together w ith the presence as such of the  inflam m atory infiltrate, 
leads to the  p ro trusion  of the eyes and the associated signs of exophthalm ia—retrobulbar 
pain, pain on eye m ovem ent, eyelid erythem a, conjunctival injection, chemosis, swelling 
o f the  caruncle, and eyelid edema.
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FIGURE n  IMMUNE ASPECTS OF OPHTHALMOPATHY (reproduced from  W heetm an 2000)
To be sure, there are m issing gaps in the m echanism  leading to the em ergence of eye 
p rotrusion, and m edical researchers acknowledge th is.209 However, the  yet unknow n 
details notw ithstanding , by all of m edicine’s standards, the relation betw een TRAs and 
exophthalm ia is non-accidental, as I have said.210 That is why causal inferences can be 
fram ed for organism s w ith detected TRAs levels in blood vis-^-vis the  presence of 
exophthalm ia. It m ight be tha t these causal inferences, as all the other involving m em bers 
of the  GD kind, are no t one hundred percent sure, as in the case of gold.211 But they show 
th a t the GD kind fulfils criterion II, just like gold, w ithout any ontological gap.
209 See Wheetman (2000) for instance.
210 A more detailed discussion of causal relations in medicine will be undertaken in chapter 4.
211 Parenthetically, one could argue that the causal inductive inferences in which gold members are involved, 
as the inductive inferences across all sciences, are not universal. They always admit exceptions related to 
the presence or absence of certain other factors that enable or interfere with the manifestations of causal 
powers; see Cartwright 1989, 1998) and Lowe (1989) for a discussion directly framed in the (metaphysical) 
terms of causal powers.
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3 - 1.2  T h e  c o - i n s t a n t i a t i o n  i n d u c t i o n  r e q u i r e m e n t  ( c r i t e r i o n  V )212
Criterion V says that, besides allowing causal inductions, inductively rich kinds should 
also enable us to form ulate co-instan tiation  inferences. Such co-instantiation inferences, 
as discussed in chapter 1, are abou t the  very possession o f determ ining properties. They 
are thus different (at least in the  first instance) from the causal inferences revolving 
a round  criterion  II. W hereas the  la tte r are based on the  relation of causal dependence of 
superficial properties on the  determ ining  properties, the form er concern the co­
instantiation o f determ ining  properties them selves. In the no tation  I have adopted, 
criterion V says that, for any individual a, given a kind K characterised by a pattern  of 
determ in ing  properties [p„ p2, p3....pn], were a to be a m em ber of K, a would, or probably 
w ould, co-instantiate  [p1? p2, p3 ....pn].
In fact, w ithou t such co-instantiation inferences, the  aforem entioned use of kinds in 
causal inductions could no t be possible. Informally, the rationale can be pu t as follows: 
yes, w hen it com es to causal inductions, we can expect th a t the next observed particular, 
if m em ber of the  kind gold, will be malleable, for instance, given th a t this kind has the 
determ in ing  p roperty  of having the valence shell electrons delocalised. But why should 
we expect the  next m em ber of the kind gold to have the valence shell electrons 
delocalised? M ore generally, why should we expect th a t the future observed kind 
m em bers will p resen t the  same pattern  of determ ining properties? Co-instantiation 
inferences are needed in order for the causal inferences involving superficial properties to 
m ake sense.213
Again, gold fulfills th is requirem ent with a vengeance. The determ ining properties th a t 
characterise the gold elem ent and its metallic complexes are so tightly united tha t 
philosophers and lay people alike often and in various contexts use the locution ‘Z=79’ to 
refer to the  m icrostructure in question, even though the properties involved are m ore 
com plex th an  a predicate referring to any atom ic num ber may convey. The atom s
nz I shall come back to criteria III and IV later. The reason why criterion V is discussed beforehand is that it 
is connected with the theme of induction and it has important argumentative links with criterion II.
213 In other words, the inference 'Were a to be NK, a would, or probably would, instantiate [q„ q2,....qn] 
depends upon the inference 'Were a to be NK, a would, or probably would, instantiate [p„ p2,....pn]
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com posing gold sam ples have an electronegativity of 3.54 on the Pauling scale, an 
ionisation energy of 890.1 kj/m ol, a certain  d istribution of electrons in orbitals (including, 
as in all transitional elem ents, a partly filled d sub-shell (3d) th a t confers to it m ultiple 
oxidation states), 118 neu trons in the  stable state, and varying num bers in its 18 
radioactive states, n o t to  m ention  the  properties gold has in its m etallic form.
O f course, th a t gold has an atom ic num ber (Z) of 79 conveys a very im portan t property of 
gold atom s and  gold samples in general, and it has, in addition, a heuristic use in 
distinguishing the elem ent at hand from all the o ther elem ents. But indeed, besides 
p ro tons and  their num ber, the  determ ining properties present a t the  m icro-structural 
level in question  are m ore num erous. Now, why are the determ ining properties in gold's 
case th u s  united? And, m ore generally, w hat justifies, in the  end, the  co-instantiation 
inductions th a t can be form ulated for the kinds satisfying criterion V?
Three different answ ers could be offered to such an inquiry. One is causal (and 
m etaphysically quite uncom plicated) whereas the  o ther two are non-causal and in troduce 
in tricate  m etaphysical notions -  essences and substantive universals. One simply says 
th a t due to  the  causal structure  of the world, the determ ining properties are agglutinated 
in  certain  patterns, w hich adm it exceptions on the level of individuals. The other two say, 
in one way or another, th a t lands must instantiate  the  same pa tte rn  o f determ ining  
properties if they  are to be natural at all.
It is in teresting  to note first th a t the causal answer in fact transform s the co-instan tiation  
inferences in to  (m ore or less) causal inductions, thus bringing criterion V closer to 
criterion  II. The causal answer explains th a t an individual a, if m em ber o f a kind K, would, 
or probably  would, instan tiate  [px, p2, p3....pn] since a, as a m em ber of K, participates a t 
the  level o f its de term ining  properties in causal in teractions in w hich are involved various
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in ternal and  external m echanism s.214
These m echanism s could agglutinate [plf p2, p3....pn] perfectly, such th a t a would 
instan tia te  all o f the  properties in question, or (depending upon circum stances) 
im perfectly, such th a t exceptions could show up a t a s  level.
O n the  non-causal side, in contrast, the  o ther two answers imply th a t the co-instantiation 
inferences are strictly separated from the causal inductions th a t the previously discussed 
criterion was concerned w ith. These two answers hypothesize that, if m em ber of K, a 
should instan tia te  all o f the  properties o f the  pa tte rn  [plf p2, p3....pn], either because K has 
an  ‘essence’ and  [px, p 2,...,pn] are ‘essential’ properties,215 or because a instantiates a 
substantive universal K which, m etaphysically, imposes the instantiation of all of the [p^ 
P2, ...pn] by a .216
In the  p resen t (sub-)section I shall look prim arily at the first, causal option, which, as we 
shall see, is sufficient for the m odest purposes o f our com parison. I shall then  com m ent 
ra ther briefly on the  o ther two (non-causal) answers at the end of this section. I shall 
insist however upon the  significance of m etaphysical elem ents such as ‘essences’, 
‘essential p roperties’ and ‘substantive universals’ in the following sections (when 
analysing criteria Via and VIb).
The po in t I wish to  m ake regarding the co-instantiation induction requirem ent is tha t the  
first, causal option does justice to gold and GD. In both  cases, th a t is to say, we have a
214 ‘Mechanisms’ are cited here simply in order to designate those internal and external causal elements that 
are involved in the agglutination of determining properties. I should point out that there are specific 
problems with the metaphysics of causation that involves the notion of mechanism (see for instance 
Woodward 2008, Salmon 1998 and Cartwright 1999).We do not need to go into these issues at this point 
though. To invoke mechanisms, in this context, is simply to make more intuitive how the ‘causal structure 
of the world’ intervenes into the co-instantiation of the ‘profound’ properties o f kind members. 
Significantly, Boyd (1991, 1999), who introduced the causal story in the topic of natural kinds and the 
properties that characterise them, refers frequently to ‘causal mechanisms', without discussing in any detail 
the ontological niceties associated with mechanism causation. It is worth noting that generally Boyd is a 
non-Humean about causation (Boyd, 1995: 365-7).
215Cf. Ellis (2002) Wilkerson (1995) Harre (2005)
2l6See Ellis (2001) Note that not all kind theorists believe that substantive universals induce the co­
instantiation of all the properties of a characterising pattern on the level of particulars, as Ellis does. Lowe 
(2001) does not, even though he holds that on the level of universals, the patterns in question ‘characterise’ 
in integrum the substantive universals they correspond to; see Lowe (2006: 155, 169, 170, 173). See also Heil
(2006) for a critical discussion of Lowe’s position on (substantive or not) universals. I shall return frequently 
to Lowe's approach in the subsequent sections of this chapter.
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causal story th a t explains the  unity  o f the respective determ ining properties. In the case 
o f gold, the  story w ould appeal to a com bination o f classical elem ents o f quantum  
m echanics, for instance, the  nuclear and electrom agnetic forces, Pauli’s exclusion 
principle for quan tum  states, the  Fermi energy, etc. That the  determ ining properties of 
gold (including its num ber of protons) are co-instantiated  is arguably due to causal 
in teractions (such as the  in teractions governed by the colour forces holding gluons and 
quarks together and m ediated  by gluons them selves, the  interactions betw een nucleons 
governed by the  strong nuclear forces and m ediated by the exchange o f pions, the 
in teractions betw een p ro tons and electrons governed by Colum b’s force, etc).
Should any aspects o f th is picture appear as non-causal,217 the causal story o f the creation 
o f (chem ical) elem ents could also be invoked. Gold was one of the elem ents w ith an 
atom ic num ber greater th an  26 th a t was produced by the S process (slow-neutron- 
capture-process) in  stars some 100 m illion years after the  Big-Bang (when the First 
galaxies and  stars were created) and it continues to be thus produced in stars (either by 
the  S process, or the  R process o f rapid neu tron  capture in core-collapse supernovas).218
In the  case of the  GD kind, there is, on the one hand a mixed m echanism  in which 
external environm ental factors, such as smoking or iodine intake, and internal factors, 
such as various genetic predispositions, cause organism s to produce the above-m entioned 
TRAs— the antibodies directed against their own thyroids.219 O n the other hand, there are 
correlated  in ternal m echanism s in which the over-stim ulated thyroids produce excess 
am oun ts o f the ir horm ones, thereby augm enting the physiological effects, and finally 
creating a cluster o f the  above-m entioned pathological’ determ ining properties (which
217One could argue that there are determining properties o f gold that do not result from causal interactions 
simpliciter. For instance, the distribution of electrons in orbitals takes place according to Pauli’s exclusion 
principle which simply forbids that two identical fermions may simultaneously occupy the same quantum 
state. Pauli’s principle follows from the anti symmetry of the wavefunction(s) for fermions, which is 
commonly considered as being simply a principle of nature (see for instance, Fenyman 1966: section 4-4 and 
Pauli’s own rendition in his 1946:17). A causal interpretation o f Pauli’s principle could be formulated in the 
framework of relativistic quantum field theory in terms of relativistic local causality or in Bohmian 
mechanics; Cf. Bohm et al. (1955) and Cushing (1993). For a philosophical discussion see van Fraassen (1980: 
122-124), Lewis (1986: 222-223) and Salmon (1989:159-164).
218 See for example Wallerstein, G. et. al. (1997)
219 See Holm (2005), Rapoport et. al (1998), Jacobson (2007), Manji (2006)
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V a rio u s im m u n e  cells  (ly m p h o cy tes, 
d en d ritic  cells , m a cro p h a g es) initially  
c o m in g  fro m  extra-thyroidal sites  
(lym ph  n o d e s , b o n e  m arrow ) 
p r o d u ce  thyroid  stim u la tin g  
a n tib o d ies  (T R A s) that attack a 
certa in  rec ep to r  o f  th e  thyroidian  
m em b ra n e  (th e  thyrotrop in  
recep to r). T h e  o v erstim u la tio n  o f  
th is r ecep to r  p r o d u ce s  th e  
hyp ertrop h y  and  hyperplasia  o f  
thyroid ian  c e lls  fo llo w ed  by the  
e x c e ss iv e  p r o d u ctio n  o f  h o r m o n e s  
(thyroxine and  tr iiod otiron in e). T h e  
im m u n e  ce lls  sy n th e s iz e  a lso  v ar iou s  
cy to k in es  (su ch  as in terfero n  g, 
in terleu k in  1) w h ich  am plify  the  
in fla m m a to ry  a sso c ia ted  p r o c ess  and  
in d u ce  the e x p r ess io n  by the  
thyroidan  ce lls  o f  recep to rs (C D  5 4 , 
C D  4 0 ) and im m u n e  en h a n cin g  
m o le c u le s  (ITLA II).
FIGURE 12 A PART OF THE CAUSAL MECHANISM INDUCING THE PRODUCTION IN EXCESS OF THYROID’S HORMONES. 
(Reproduced from W heetm an 2000)
These ‘causal stories’ back up the use of co-instantiation inductions both  for gold and the 
GD kind. Again, there  are varying degrees of certainty regarding the ensuing inductions. 
In the gold case one can expect, say, tha t the next observed m em ber will have the shell 
electrons delocalised in its m etallic structure. In the case of the GD kind, one can expect, 
say, th a t the  next observed m em ber is to have, with a certain probability, m itochondria 
increased in num ber and size in a cells’ cytoplasm. Alternatively, one can expect th a t it 
will have such m itochondria only if a host of certain o ther conditions are in place.221
However, just as in the case of the causal inferences involved in criterion II, one can argue 
th a t th is difference in the  certainty of co-instantiation inferences concerning determ ining 
properties does no t m ark out an ontological gap betw een the two kinds, from the point o f
220 To recall, thyroid is the gland that controls the base metabolism rate and hyperthyroidism mainly 
exacerbates these metabolic effects.
221 See Brent (2008)
125
view o f criterion V.
The causal elem ents in the gold case produce a ‘perfect’ pa tte rn  o f determ ining 
properties. The causal elem ents in the  case of the GD kind allow exceptions in th a t kind 
m em bers instan tia ted  parts o f the  cluster in question. The difference in the certainty of 
inductions only has to do w ith the efficacy o f the  causal paths underlying the unity  of 
determ in ing  properties. It has to do, th a t is to say, w ith causation and its way of 
m anifestation, and no t w ith the ontological levels onto which the various kinds could be 
m apped. For co-instantiation inductions, it is sufficient th a t causation, as such, is in 
place. How efficacious m echanism s are in clustering properties is simply an issue th a t has 
no th ing  to  do w ith  criterion V and the m etaphysics of kinds.
Now, I have m entioned  in the beginning o f this sub-section th a t besides the  causal 
answ er to  the  un ity  o f determ ining properties, there are two alternative (and connected) 
solutions to the  question of how m em bers of a kind satisfy criterion V. They explain how 
kinds allow co-instan tiation  inductions by appealing to 'essences' and 'substantive 
universals'.222 These are two venerable m etaphysical notions, whose involvem ent in 
criteria VIb and  VII has been explored in c h a p te r .  I do no t th ink  th a t we should dwell 
upon  them , in the  context of criterion V (and II), for a very simple and yet convincing 
reason.
Insofar as criterion V (and II) is (are) concerned, essences and substantive universals can 
only play a redundan t role. In fact, appealing to them  is redundan t on two (related) 
scores th a t concern criterion II and the very existence of these m etaphysical elem ents, 
respectively. For one, calling upon ‘essential’ properties/essences of kinds, an d /o r the 
in stan tia tion  o f substantive universals, cannot shed any (further) light on the capacity of 
kinds to  participate  in inductions. Once it is established on causal grounds that, for any 
individual a, if it is a m em ber of the kind K then  a will, or probably will, co-instantiate the 
pa tte rn  o f properties [pu p 2,..., pn], further invoking the fact tha t a m ight also instan tia te  a 
substantive universal K (or tha t [pu p2,..., p n] are ‘essential’ properties) is no t any m ore 
inform ative abou t (the possibility of) the respective inference.
2 See for instance Lowe (2001), (1989) for an appeal to substantive universals in order to explain why the 
kind properties co-instantiate in the way they do.
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O f course, one m ight be in terested  in the certainty of the co-instantiation inductions, i.e. 
in w hether they  are universal or bear exceptions. Nevertheless, as I said, th is aspect does 
n o t concern  the  m etaphysics of (natural) kinds, from the poin t o f view of criterion V -  it 
can only indicate a difference of degree. W hether we have exceptions or no t does indeed 
m atte r for kinds insofar as criteria III, Via and VIb are concerned, and essences and 
substantive universals are actively involved in the discussion o f criterion VIb, as we shall 
see.
For another, if the  causal response I have discussed above is coherent, then  for reasons 
related  to  the  principle of parsimony, the argum ents in favour of the  very existence of 
substantive universals or ‘essences’ of kinds should invoke at a m etaphysical level 
something other th an  the need to justify induction for k inds.223 There should be 
som eth ing  else th a t w arrants inflating our ontology w ith substantive universals or 
alternatively, w ith  sets o f properties constitu ting ‘essences of kinds’ - w here the  ‘essential’ 
p roperties are defined (a b it mysteriously) as those properties th a t all and only the  
m em bers o f kinds instan tia te  and m ust instantiate.
2:13 Contra Lowe (2006: 135) who claims that substantive universals (and only they) could justify the co­
instantiation of properties for natural kind members
127
FIGURE 13 The co-instantiation of [p„ p2,......... pn] by a could be explained in  causal way
sim pliciter, or by bringing up the instantiation of a substantive universals. Once the causal 







foi, q* q J
* B etw een the  individual a and the substantive universal N K  there is a relation of instantiation, due to w hich  a 
possesses the pattern  [p1} p ,,. p n]
** Alternatively, the possession by a of [pl5 p 2, p n] m ight be  viewed as the result of the (efficient) causal
s tru c tu re  of the world (m echanism s, causal laws)
#** Between the ‘profound* and the ‘superficial’ properties [q„ q2 q n] there is a causally efficient relation.
I conclude th a t the  co-instantiation requirem ent cannot situate gold and the  GD kind on 
different ontological levels and that, more broadly, induction (be it o f a causal or co­
in stan tia tion  type) cannot reveal an ontological gap bu t a difference o f degree. In the  next 
section, the  two kinds will be scrutinized from the point of view of an equally im portan t 
criterion o f na tu ra l k ind m em bership -  involvement in laws.
128
§3 .2  T he  req uirem ent  o f  l a w - in vo lvem ent
A bolder developm ent o f the previously discussed requirem ent(s) says th a t natural kinds 
should be involved in (causal) laws of na tu re .224 It m ight be for instance th a t electrons are 
involved in induction  inferences of the type ‘if all electrons observed so far exhibited this 
or th a t behaviour tow ards protons, then  the next observed electron will, or will probably 
exhibit the  sam e behaviour’, or ‘if som ething is an electron, then  it will a ttrac t protons 
w ith  th is force’. However, one could poin t ou t tha t w hat is a t w ork here is a law in which 
the  electron kind is involved because charge is one of its characterising properties.
In o ther words, th is criterion says tha t the properties shared by kind m em bers should be 
n o t only natu ral and  explanatively powerful bu t also ‘nom ic’. In my notation, it says th a t 
for an  individual a—a m em ber of a (candidate) natural kind NK in virtue of being 
characterised by a pa tte rn  of superficial properties [qlf q2,..., qn] and a p a tte rn  of 
determ in ing  properties [plf p 2,..., pn]—the pattern  [plf p2,—, p n] instantiated  by a should be 
involved in laws th a t govern/describe either the causal interactions of a whose effects are 
[qu q2,-., qn] or the  in teractions of a w ith o ther individuals. Note th a t this requirem ent is 
d ifferent from  causal induction requirem ent, insofar as kinds could participate in causal 
inductions w ithou t being involved in laws, and there are serious reasons to  th ink  th is is 
the  case.
For instance, special sciences represent for m any scientific law theorists dom ains in which 
we do n o t have laws, a t least in the canonical sense th a t characterizes the  exact 
sciences.225 Yet, insofar as one does not advocate reductionism  (for instance o f the  
biological or psychological to the physical level), natural sciences cannot be understood  
as lacking causation, i.e. as being characterized by arbitrary, accidental processes. Hence, 
in such dom ains it should be meaningful to discuss explanatory powerful properties and 
causal inductions even if the existence of nomic properties, in the full-blooded sense, is 
an  undecided issue.226
224 Criterion put forth by Bird (1998), Collier (1996), Ellis (2001) Cooper (2005) and Mackery (2005) among 
others.
225 see Ellis (2001) and Carnap (1995).
226 See for instance Boyd (1991), who persuasively discusses causal induction and causation in biology while 
accepting that the type of laws found in physics have no correspondent in the biological realm.
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Now, the above form ulation is no t exactly appropriate, in the sense th a t it suggests a 
certain  in te rp re ta tion  o f w hat involvem ent in laws m eans for k inds.227 The respective 
in te rp re ta tion  is no t straightforw ard though, because of, broadly speaking, the various 
ways in w hich law sta tem ents can be framed. W hat I m ean to say is th a t the danger of 
circular reasoning exists here to a certain degree. That is why, inter alia, the difference 
betw een laws and law sta tem ents will have to be considered in our discussion.228 
Im portantly , the  issue o f w hat precisely laws represent is also involved here, as we shall 
see once the  two kinds are set in contrast from the poin t o f view of their nom ic 
relationships.
W hat laws are gold and  the GD kind involved in? One point th a t is obvious from the 
previous sections is th a t in the  case of the GD kind we have exceptions on the level o f the 
p roperties instan tia ted  by kind m em bers. Not all the superficial and determ ining 
p roperties o f th is kind are instantiated  by all organism s w ith Graves’ disease. W e have, 
th a t is, a cluster of properties possessed by the GD kind m em bers. In the case of gold, we 
do n o t have any exceptions because the various inductions th a t can be form ulated for its 
m em bers are universal.
This aspect is the cornerstone of our analysis from the point of view o f the  law- 
involvem ent requirem ent. A natural suggestion arises tha t the existence of exceptions 
betrays a difference in the  laws in which the respective lands are involved.229 Simply put, 
an  ontological gap could be seen to appear here -  we seemingly have laws th a t do not 
adm it exceptions in the  case of gold and laws tha t do adm it exceptions in the  case of the  
GD kind (for instance, the  law describing/governing the association betw een Graves’ 
Disease and  pre-tibial oedem a).
However, we have two in ter-related questions th a t need to be addressed a t this point: are
227 More precisely, it suggests that the truth-makers of laws are properties and that the main laws in which 
kinds are involved have a causal nature. Such an interpretation appears to set aside the fact that kinds 
might be the truth-makers of laws and that the laws in question might describe/govern co-instantiation 
relations between properties following from kinds’ possessing an essence and/or representing substantive 
universals.
228 I have purposely formulated the requirement in question in this form, in order to stress that on a 
minimal interpretation kinds are characterized patterns of properties (that is, at base kind members are 
simply individuals with similarities).
229 See for example Millikan (1999: 47, 48, 54, 55) and Nickel (2008:1,15,17)
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laws th a t adm it exceptions (ontologically) different from laws th a t do not adm it 
exceptions? and, as I have already anticipated, w hat precisely is the nature of the 
involvem ent of kinds in laws? Both questions are in need o f an answ er if the  criterion of 
law -involvem ent is to be reckoned with. In fact, the  form er question arguably depends on 
the  latter, in the following sense.
If the  involvem ent o f (natural) kinds in laws is roughly viewed as being m erely the  way in 
w hich laws are supposed to govern/describe causal in teractions in which kind m em bers 
participa te230 - th en  the  ontological discrepancy betw een laws th a t adm it exceptions and 
those th a t do n o t needs to be elucidated. O n the o ther hand, if the  involvem ent o f kinds 
in  laws is investigated m ore carefully so th a t the distinction betw een laws and law 
sta tem en ts (as well as the tru th-m akers of the latter) is heeded, then  it m ight be th a t the 
ontological difference betw een exception-less and exception-ridden laws does not have to 
be taken into account in our discussion.
In fact, I consider the  latter path  m ore proper and wish to follow it. That is, I in tend  to 
look m ore closely a t w hat involvem ent in laws is, in order to respond to the challenge 
posed by the causal induction  requirem ent. Beforehand, I should say, however, a few 
w ords abou t the  difference betw een exceptionless and exception-ridden laws, even if th is 
vein o f a rgum enta tion  is, I believe, m uch less fruitful.
The existence of exceptions in a certain realm  governed by a law could be viewed as 
resulting  from  th a t law being probabilistic or ceteris paribus. In o ther words, th a t the  
consequent o f a law (statem ent) is not satisfied in states of affairs in which its an teceden t 
obtains could be a ttribu ted  to ceteris paribus clauses not being fulfilled or to the 
probabilistic form  in w hich the consequent follows the an tecedent. Notably, the 
universally quantified form  of laws (statem ents) has been taken as canonical for the  way 
in w hich the  laws m anifest them selves and such laws have been typically advocated for 
the exact sciences.
Exception-ridden laws have been taken to characterise the  special sciences.231 In fact,
230 I take this as a translation of the equally rough dictum that ‘laws "characterise” kinds’; see for instance 
Collier (1996: 2), Nelson (1990:102) and Cooper (2005:46)
231 Cf. Psillos (2007: 38, 39,135,136)
131
sciences such as m edicine, sociology, economics, biology, etc. have taken on this 
denom ination  precisely due to the fact th a t their laws are supposed to adm it exceptions 
(and hence to be special) in contrast to the norm al’ laws of the exact sciences.232
This denom ination  of course carries a certain qualitative burden  (from an ontological 
po in t o f view) in the  sense th a t full-blown laws are supposed to be the ones from the 
exact sciences. It is exactly this burden  th a t seems to incline the ontological balance 
tow ards gold as being ‘m ore natu ra l’ th an  the GD kind.
Now, there  are possible m eans of dispensing w ith this ontological burden, m ainly by 
po in ting  ou t either th a t in the  exact sciences probabilistic laws are present (at the  level of 
quan tum  m echanics) or th a t the  ceteris paribus clauses are needed for all sciences, across 
all dom ains, in order for their m anifestations to show up on the level of particulars.233 The 
existence o f probabilistic laws in quantum  m echanics could then  be used in order to 
argue th a t if such laws show up at the m ost fundam ental level, their ontological status 
could no t be below the  status of universal laws. O n the o ther hand, the putative 
om nipresence of ceteris paribus clauses could arguably be employed to m odify the 
canonical form  in w hich laws have been traditionally construed.234
This vein o f argum entation  is no t very fruitful, however. Exploring it w ould have to 
d isentangle a host of very intricate issues. For instance, the probabilistic laws could 
actually be construed  as exceptionless, universal laws if, on the level o f their 
corresponding statem ents, the probabilistic clause is moved into the  consequent.235 O n 
the  o ther hand, the probabilistic form in which laws of the  special sciences (m edicine 
included) are som etim es expressed m ight not be genuine, law-like frequencies,236 bu t 
m ight represen t artefacts of the  statistical m eans o f analysing populations, reflecting our 
ignorance o f certain  o ther conditions tha t could transform  the law conditionals in 
question  into strict ones.237
232 See Fodor (1974) and Millikan (1999)
233 See for instance Mitchell (2000), Cartwright (1999) and also Lowe (1989)
234 See Mitchell (2000)
235 See Cartwright (1989:105). In fact, this is the classical form in which probabilistic laws are expressed (on a 
[relative] frequency interpretation of probability).
236 See Cartwright (1989:142,143)
237Cf. Hausman and Woodward (2004) apud Cartwright (2007b 1107)
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W ere such conditions to be discovered, they would prima facie qualify as ceteris paribus 
clauses. But such clauses engender o ther problem s of the ir own. For one, they (or at least 
som e o f them ) could also be incorporated  into the an tecedents of law -statem ents 
(an tecedents which w ould thus becom e very large) such th a t we end up having universal 
nom ic sta tem en ts.238 For another, these clauses are subject to substantial criticisms 
claim ing that, epistem ically and semantically, they are nonsensical.239
All in all, no m atter how  the notion  of law is stretched and tw isted, the  existence of 
exceptions still seem s to indicate for our com parison an im portan t difference in laws tha t 
is reflected (or originates in) the nature  of kinds. Take the case of ceteris paribus laws. 
N otw ithstanding  the  discussion over the intelligibility or unintelligibility o f ceteris 
paribus clauses, over how  they  could be inserted  into the antecedents o f laws, etc. one can 
still argue th a t since laws ‘characterise' kinds, the existence of exceptions in the 
m anifestation o f laws betrays a difference in kinds. In our specific circum stances, one 
could still hold th a t the  ceteris paribus conditions of the  laws governing the em ergence of 
ophthalm opathy, for instance, arise because the m em bers of the Graves’ Disease land  are 
n o t exactly similar. Since, in contrast, the m em bers of the  gold kind are exactly similar 
and  the  laws w hich ‘characterise’ them  do no t adm it exceptions, the two lands still appear 
to be situated  on different ontological levels, from the point of view of the law- 
involvem ent criterion.
W e have, however, ano ther vein of argum entation  a t our disposal, which is m ore 
powerful because it looks directly a t w hat the  involvem ent in laws m eans for kinds. In 
th is vein, the  difference betw een laws and law -statem ents, as well as the  tru th-m akers of 
the  latter, are crucial. These aspects could be employed in order to argue th a t the 
existence o f exceptions does not m atter w ith respect to the m etaphysics of kinds, a t least 
as far as criterion o f law involvem ent is concerned.
Let us take a (very) schem atic scenario in which a kind K is characterised, say, by the 
properties q u q2, q4 and p3, p 5, p7. The properties at hand are involved in causal
238See Cartwright (2002b)
239See Earman et. al (2002) and also Drewery (2001), Woodward (2002) for discussion. A reply to Earman et 
al.’s (critical) approach to ceteris paribus clauses can be found in Cartwright (2002b); Lange defends the 
meaningfulness of these clauses from a different perspective in Lange (2002)
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in teractions, and these causal in teractions are in tu rn  governed/described by laws. W hen 
it com es to the  involvem ent of K in the laws in question (i.e. w hen it comes to how laws 
characterise’ K), one could choose various nom ic sta tem ents th a t directly connect K with 
them . For instance, it m ight be said th a t it is a law fo r the members o f the kind K  to 
instan tia te  qj and q2, once they instan tiate  p 5. If the  determ ining properties are under 
focus, one m ight say th a t it is a law fo r the members o f the kind K  to instantiate  p 5, once 
they  are engaged w ith such and such external and in ternal m echanism s. If a, as a m em ber 
o f K, does no t instantiate , say, q2, or p 5; then, as I said, K can appear to be on an inferior 
ontological level in com parison to ano ther kind K* whose m em bers instantiate  all of its 
characterising properties, since the laws of K appear as ceteris paribus (or probabilistic) 
w hereas the  laws of K* are strict.
N onetheless, as I said, the  question w orth addressing is: irrespective o f how nom ic 
sta tem en ts are form ulated, can one really transfer the ontological consequences (if any) 
o f exceptions from  the  level of laws to the m etaphysical level o f lands? My conjecture is 
th a t they  cannot be transferred  if kinds are no t the tru th-m akers of these statem ents. In 
o ther words, if all there  is in the  involvem ent of kinds in laws is th a t certain law-like 
sta tem en ts can be p u t to use for various practical reasons,240 then  the existence of 
exceptions is ontologically innocuous for kinds.
My argum ent appeals in the  first instance to the causal picture fram ed in the previous 
section concerned w ith induction. W e have causal in teractions th a t result in the 
agglutination o f properties. Causal m echanism s, external and internal, produce the co­
instan tia tion  of determ ining  properties. The latter in tu rn  cause the em ergence of 
superficial properties. Now, adm ittedly, laws govern these causal in teractions.241 More 
precisely, the  efficacy of m echanism s is underlined by causal laws, such th a t w hether the 
determ in ing  properties are perfectly agglutinated (i.e. exceptionless vis-^-vis each land 
m em ber) or im perfectly agglutinated (i.e. leading to exceptions for some or all kind 
m em bers) is due to laws m anifesting them selves in different ways (or, we could adm it, to 
laws having a different nature). In turn, laws w ith potentially different natures similarly
240 Indeed, it could be argued that in scientific practice such law statements mentioning kinds are 
indispensable or at least very helpful - see the case of biology for instance.
241 If we leave aside positions such as Mumford's from his (2004) according to which laws are metaphysically 
redundant (in an anti-Humean framework of causation).
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underline the efficacy o f determining properties in producing the superficial properties.242
However, how  efficient m echanism s (and the determ ining properties) are in producing 
their effects is n o t significant for kinds from the point of view of induction. This simply 
represents a re-sta tem en t of the  po in t argued for in the  previous two sections. Similarly, I 
w an t to claim th a t insofar as laws are under focus, the  efficiency of the causal paths 
travelling from  m echanism s to determ ining properties and then  to superficial ones could 
m ark  ou t a significant difference only if kinds were directly responsible, from a 
m etaphysical po in t of view, for the efficiency in question.
To re tu rn  to a previous line o f argum entation, in w hat sense specifically could the ceteris 
paribus clauses a ttached  to  certain laws arise because the kind m em bers are no t exactly 
sim ilar? In th is in terrogation, the precise sense of ‘because’ needs to be clearly unveiled. 
Does it betray  the  m etaphysical ‘responsibility’ of kinds for the specific laws a t issue? If 
the  tru th -m akers of laws are no t kinds, then  w hat we have here is a perfect illustration (in 
th e  realm  of m etaphysical reasoning) of the fallacy th a t Reichenbach’s principle of 
com m on cause seeks to avoid (in the  realm  of causation).243
This principle says th a t for any correlation betw een two factors, one causes ano ther only 
if there  is n o t any o ther factor that, if considered, would screen off the initial correlation. 
By analogy, we always have ceteris paribus clauses attached  to law statem ents for kinds 
w hose m em bers are no t exactly similar, i.e. we always have a ‘correlation’ betw een kinds 
w hose m em bers are not exactly similar and ceteris paribus clauses a ttached  to law- 
sta tem ents. Nevertheless, th is ‘correlation’ should be m etaphysically significant on the 
level o f (natural) kinds only if kinds were the tru th-m akers of such law -statem ents. If 
lands do n o t play the respective role of tru th  makers, then  the m etaphysical ‘correlation’ 
betw een the  m em bers of a certain kind no t being perfectly similar on the one hand, and 
the  presence o f ceteris paribus clauses on the level o f law statem ents, on the  o ther hand, 
m ust sim ply be due to ano ther com m on m etaphysical ‘cause’ -  w hatever the  tru th -m aker
242 See Bird (2007)
243 For a discussion of Reichenbach’s principle, see Cartwright (1989)
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of the law-statements might be.244
To p u t it differently, my poin t is th a t metaphysically, the  level o f laws and the level of 
kinds are separate unless kinds are the tru th -m akers of law statem ents. The bearing of the 
ceteris paribus clauses-related or probabilistic exceptions on the nature  of the causal laws 
in question  can be transferred  to kinds and can thus am ount to an ontological difference 
only if lands are taken  to m ake law -statem ents true. This is just to say th a t the 
requ irem ent o f law involvem ent - where laws are a ttribu ted  some sort o f ‘canonical’ form 
and their m anifestations are deem ed to be exceptionless - is justified only if kinds are the 
tru th -m akers o f laws. O therw ise, the, nature o f laws is separated from the level of kinds.245
There is indeed an  alternative m etaphysical approach in which kinds do represent the  
tru th -m akers o f laws -  just in case one accepts ‘essences’ o f (natural) kinds an d /o r 
construes (natural) lands as substantive universals. This view is no t very orthodox in 
contem porary  philosophy of science, it should be said, and I have already argued th a t the 
need to  w arran t induction  cannot be a reason to introduce such elem ents into one’s 
m etaphysics o f kinds.246
I conclude th a t the  criterion of law involvem ent cannot indicate an ontological gap 
betw een the  two kinds under comparison.
244 Be it represented by brute regularities (a la Hume) or refined ones (a la Lewis 1986), generalisations 
invariant to manipulation and useful for prediction (a la Woodward 2002 or Mitchell 2000), capacities 
possessed by individuals (a la Cartwright 1989), single track potencies identified with properties (a la Bird 
2007), clusters of powers associated with properties (a la Mumford 2004), or whatnot. I need not delve into 
this issue here.
2451 would not want to commit myself to the stronger claim that the requirement of law involvement, as 
such, is unjustified. I we construe laws in a broad sense, as being capable of manifesting themselves with 
exceptions on the level o f particulars, then it might well be the case that all natural kinds are involved in 
laws. Take the particular discussion of clusters and kinds. As we will see in the next section, one can 
plausibly view clusters as the result of ‘the causal structure of the world’. But if kinds are construed as 
clusters and, further, causation is construed as arising due to the existence of laws, then it might well be 
that laws are involved with all cluster-kinds. Nevertheless, no problem should arise in this case for our 
comparison, vis-i-vis criterion IV. That is precisely because some clusters are perfectly ‘agglutinated’ while 
others are less perfectly ‘agglutinated’, due to the different levels of efficiency for causation. If laws are 
taken to underlie all causation phenomena, then laws should also be taken to admit exceptions on the level 
of particulars (for the special sciences domains).
246 See also Salmon (1982) and Mumford (2005) for a devastating critique of the essentialist approach to 
natural kinds, either in its Kripke/Putnam type (plain semantic form) or in the Ellis type (metaphysical 
form). Substantive universals are convincingly shown as redundant for the metaphysics o f laws in Bird
(2007)
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§3.3  T h e  cluster  req uirem ent  (criterion  VIa)
From  m y previous discussion about laws and induction, it is clear th a t the  existence of 
exceptions on the level o f properties instan tia ted  by kind m em bers is an im portan t aspect 
o f m y com parison, which needs to be considered w hen approaching alm ost all the criteria 
o f m em bership. There is however, a criterion explicitly concerned w ith the fact th a t the 
m em bers o f a land  m ight no t be exactly similar.
Criterion VIa (the cluster requirem ent) discusses w hat lim its the patterns o f determ ining 
properties should have and simply says, in the notation I have adopted, th a t the 
properties [p^ p2,...pn] characterising a (candidate) natural kind K should form a cluster 
as a result o f the  causal structure o f the world. N either all of [pu p2,...pn] nor any part of 
th em  need to  be bo th  necessary and sufficient for m em bership. All we need is to  follow 
the  pa tte rns in which the determ ining properties are co-instantiated. W e m ight find some 
'divisions' th a t are fuzzy (and criss-crossing), and o ther 'divisions' th a t are m ore finessed, 
as it were. They all fulfil the  cluster requirem ent though, insofar as the corresponding 
regions o f density  in the  logical space of the determ ining (and superficial, one could add) 
properties in which the  land m em bers can be localised, have a causal explanatory 
background.
It is obvious th a t bo th  gold and the GD kind fulfil criterion Via. In the  case of gold, we 
even have necessary and sufficient conditions for m em bership. In the case of the  GD kind 
(like in m any o ther diseases and disease kinds), we only have certain  necessary 
conditions.247 M ore precisely, we have on the one hand a condition for the  establishing of 
hyperthyroidism , nam ely low serum  levels of thyro tropin  and high levels o f free thyroxine 
a n d /o r  triiodothyronine(see figure below ),248 and on the o ther hand the condition th a t 
TRAS should be detected  in the  blood, which singles ou t Graves’ Disease am ong o ther
247 Other conditions with necessary (but not sufficient) conditions are for instance glomerulonephritis, 
hepatic cirrhosis, anemia and leukemia. See Lote (2000), Burgun e t  al. (2005).
248 In the earliest stages of Graves’disease, patients may have only increased secretion o f triiodothyronine. 
Cf W heetman (2000)
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hyperthyroidian  sta tes.249
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O ther diseases in som atic m edicine have sufficient bu t not necessary conditions and 
arguably, there  are also illnesses in which necessary and sufficient conditions are in
249 In practice, the examination establishing the existence of TRAs is not always performed because the 
presence of symptoms and signs like goiter and exophthalmia is taken as sufficient for diagnosis Cf 
Wheetman (2000). TRAs are considered worth investigating though in doubtful cases (along with an 
antibody directed against the thyroid peroxidase) with suggestive epidemiological background (for 
instance, for patients coming from iodine-excess areas) or for evaluative roles in treatment; see Davies 
(1998) for discussion.
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place.250 Insofar as the  clusters of determ ining properties for each disease are non ­
accidental however, i.e. are the  result of the  causal structure  of the world, criterion VIII is 
also satisfied for them . Indeed, w ith the exception o f idiopathic diseases, in which (at the 
very least) an  epistem ic obstacle is present, this can be affirmed for all life-threatening 
illnesses in som atic m edicine.251
W hat should be poin ted  ou t w ith respect to the  satisfaction by both  the gold kind and the 
GD kind o f the  cluster requirem ent is th a t they are thus integrated into the m etaphysical 
p icture o f hom eostatic  property  kinds (HPC) in troduced in the literature by Richard 
Boyd, especially w ith application to the  problem  of species in biology.252 My argum ents in 
the  previous sections draw ing upon the existence of causally efficient properties and 
causal explanations for the co-instantiation o f properties for both of the kinds under 
com parison owes also a deb t to Alexander Bird’s proposal vis-^-vis the extension o f the 
HPC m odel to the  kinds in the exact sciences.
‘Richard Boyd takes biological kinds, such as species, to be homeostatic property clusters. The idea is that 
certain sets o f properties tend to group themselves together. Thus, given all the biological properties there 
are, some combinations are found together in the same particular on many occasions whereas other 
combinations are found together never at all or rarely. The logical space of property combinations is not 
equally occupied by particulars. Some regions are highly populated whereas others are empty.... Thus it is 
the laws o f  biology and biological causes that explain the clustering of properties. The existence o f biological 
kinds has a natural explanation, ultimately in terms o f laws. The same may well be true o f natural kinds in 
general. W hen it comes to physical and chemical kinds, the laws may ensure that the clustering of 
properties is much more sharply defined.... The laws will explain why there are certain clusters; they will also 
explain the natures o f those clusters—the loose and vague clusters in biology, the partially precise clusters 
of chemistry and the perfectly precise clusters of particle physics... The laws of nature will explain why— 
necessarily—there are no members of chemical and microphysical kinds that lack certain properties, why of
250 Sufficient but not necessary conditions are met mostly in rheumatoid diseases such as lupus 
erythematosus systemic, rheumatoid arthritis, etc.
251 Idiopathic pathologies are those illnesses whose causes are unknown (or partly unknown) in 
contemporary medicine. In other words, they simply represent sets o f symptoms observed to co-occur, 
without a well-delineated causal base. Parenthetically, this does not mean though that the diseases in 
question are ‘rag-bag’ conditions (to use Cooper’s expression), since they can efficiently be treated. For 
example a considerable proportion of hypertension cases have an unknown basis and yet, the general anti­
hypertensive treatment is efficacious in these cases as well. See Kasper et. all (2008)
252 See Boyd (1991). Clusters, as such, have been introduced into the biological discussion by Dupr£, without 
the attending causal story (Dupre, 1981). This approach, which does not mention the causal aspects, limits 
much the appeal that clusters have in the kinds discussion. Some authors prefer Dupre's version rather than 
Boyd's one, though; see for instance Cooper (2005).
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necessity certain properties cluster together in a partially or fully precise manner.’ (Bird, 2007: 209-210, 
italics added)
The (m ore or less perfect) agglutination of properties as a result of various causal 
in teractions particulars are engaged in, bo th  in the  exact and special science(s), is a 
central feature o f Bird’s proposal. Bird takes the  causal in teractions to be underlined by 
laws and  laws in tu rn  are taken to express in an anti-H um ean vein the (metaphysically 
necessary) association o f causal powers to certain properties.253
Notably, since properties are then  the tru th-m akers o f law -statem ents (or o f nom ic 
subjunctive conditionals describing laws’ m anifestation), we can infer th a t the  problem s 
posed by criterion III (the law involvem ent requirem ent) do not show up in this m odel.
The loose and vague clusters of biology, suggests Bird, are to be explained by the 
biological laws th a t allow exceptions, w hereas the perfect clusters o f physics should 
em erge due to the  exceptionless physical laws. In Bird’s construal of laws as a 
m etaphysical category, natural kinds, substantive universals and any sort of kind essences 
do n o t play any significant role.254
O n a different note, it should be stressed th a t th a t alm ost all theorists of m edicine who 
claim  th a t m edicine (and the special sciences in general) possesses a structure of natural 
kinds, em brace the idea of ‘cluster kinds’ as a central feature of their views.255 1 have noted  
in chap ter 1 that, in a sense, my overall enquiry - which does no t take up a certain  
conception  o f w hat natural kinds are, bu t deals w ith various criteria of m em bership -  is 
sim ply m ean t to com plem ent the ‘classical’ argum entation o f these theorists in tending  to 
dem onstrate  th a t m edical kinds fit coherently into a picture of ‘cluster’ kinds.
W e have seen th a t the  GD kind, just like gold, fulfils criterion VIa. There are, however, 
two o ther criteria th a t m ake stronger dem ands about the lim its o f the  patterns of 
properties instan tia ted  by a (candidate) natural kind. I will look a t them  in the next
253 Bird (2005)
254 Even if, as we shall see in chapters 4, I consider the anti-Humean account of causation particularly 
suitable for medicine and medical explanations, I have tried in the part of the discussion directly 
concerning natural kinds to remain neutral vis-i-vis the Humean/anti-Humean variants o f causal 
framework.




§3.4 T h e  N&S a n d  n o n - o v e r la p p in g  r e q u ir e m e n ts  ( c r i t e r ia  VIb a n d  VII)
Two o ther im portan t criteria often called to pick out natural kinds are th a t their m em bers 
should have necessary and sufficient conditions o f m em bership (criterion VIb) and th a t 
different natural kinds should no t share m em bers except w hen they are in a species genus 
hierarchy (criterion VII). In o ther words, from the ‘divisions in nature ' corresponding to 
natu ral kinds it is often asked to be clearly delineated (non-fuzzy) and non-overlapping 
(except in a genus-species hierarchy).
In the  no tation  I have used so far, criterion VIb says that, for any individual a, m em ber of 
a kind K, the  determ ining  properties part of the  pattern  [p1? p2,...,pn] should be necessary 
and  sufficient for m em bership. Criterion VII requires that, were a to also be a m em ber of 
a d ifferent kind I<*, th en  either K and K* are identical, or they are situated in a species- 
genus hierarchy. How does our com parison fare w hen these two criteria are reckoned 
w ith?
In the  case of the  gold kind, since its m em bers possess as determ ining properties 
precisely the  characteristics of the gold chemical elem ent, it is the case th a t non-fuzziness 
and  non-overlapping are m et. That is, since the gold kind m em bers could no t possess 
only ‘a p a rt’ of the  determ ining properties found on the level of the  respective chem ical 
elem ent, it is the case th a t the gold kind m em bers fulfil the N&S requirem ent. In 
addition, given th a t there  is discreetness (non-overlapping) betw een the gold elem ent 
and  all the  o ther chemical elem ents, it is often argued th a t the gold kind m em bers could 
no t belong sim ultaneously to o ther kinds at the  same (hierarchical) level.256
In contrast, GD is an overlapping, fuzzy kind, both  at the level o f sym ptom s and, m ore
256 However, even if there is no overlapping on the level of chemical elements, as such, we have higher -  
level chemical kinds that could overlap; for instance, gold could be seen as part of a series o f criss-crossing 
kinds such as metal, transitional element, substances whose crystals are face-centered cubic lattices, etc. 
Theorists like Ellis for instance, who backs up the non-overlapping requirement, insist on the discreetness 
from the level o f chemical elements (Ellis 2001) and I shall assume, for the sake of the discussion, that gold 
does satisfy criterion VII.
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im portantly , a t the  level o f ‘pathological’ determ ining properties. For one thing, 
obviously, an  organism  possessing the characteristics of Graves’ Disease can 
sim ultaneously possess the  characteristics o f o ther diseases th a t are not in a species- 
genus relationship  w ith  Graves’ Disease. Hence, criterion VII is no t satisfied. For another, 
in order to be a m em ber o f the GD kind, an organism  just needs to present a part o f a 
cluster o f pathological determ ining properties.257 As detailed in the  previous section, we 
have som e necessary conditions for m em bership, nam ely the possession o f TRAS 
antibodies, low levels of thyrotropin  (TSH) and high levels of free thyroxine an d /o r 
triiodothyronine. No necessary and sufficient conditions are in place though.
I have form ulated  gold’s situation vis-a-vis criteria VIb and VII by saying th a t it is the case 
th a t the  respective kind (as m any other kinds in the  exact sciences) is a non-fuzzy, n o n ­
overlapping kind. I w anted to em phasize th a t the gold kind corresponds to a certain  type 
o f division o f nature, w ith certain characteristics. In chapter 2 I have argued, however, 
th a t kinds corresponding to ‘divisions of na tu re ’ th a t do not present these characteristics 
should  n o t be rejected as non-natural. That is because criteria VIb and VII can only be 
justified if the  identity  sense of carving nature is adopted .258W hat follows is that, in  the 
context o f the  non-identity  sense of carving nature, the N&S and non-overlapping 
requ irem ents do no t have to  be fulfilled by the GD land  and the fact th a t the  gold kind 
fulfils them  does not have any special ontological im portance.
To recall, b o th  the Lockean strategy and the argum entation  based on substantive 
universals cannot explain why the cluster lands - which stand for divisions o f nature  th a t 
can be w ell-delineated bu t can also be fuzzy and overlapping - should not be considered
257 See §3.1.2 in which some of the ‘pathological’ determining properties in question are summarised.
258 As regards criterion VIb, for any individual a, member of a kind K, that the determining properties part 
of the pattern [p„ p2,...,pn] should be necessary and sufficient for membership only if the identity o f a 
depends on all of the [p„ p2, ....pn] properties. If it did depend, then a could not lose p3 and still remain a 
member of the kind K, for the simple reason that after the change, we would have instead of a another 
individual. As regards the hierarchy requirement, again, it would be justified only if the identity o f (natural) 
kind members depended upon their membership. Let there be two kinds K and K* characterised by the 
patterns [plfpa,....p„] and [p2, p3....pn, Pn+J respectively, which overlapped (without being in a hierarchy), in 
the sense that an individual a instantiating [p„p2,.-.-Pn> pn+J was a member of both. Suppose that a lost the 
property pn+i in a process characterised by spatio-temporal continuity, continuity of causal history, etc. 
From the point of view of its membership in K, the individual resulting from the process should be 
(numerically) identical with 0. From the point of view of its membership in K*, the individual in question 
should be different from a, since the kind membership (one of the necessary conditions for identity 
preservation) was lost. We would thus have a violation of the tertium non datur principle.
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natural kinds. Take the  ‘essential’ properties involved in the Lockean strategy. The 
properties characterising cluster kinds are m icrostructural, explanatory powerful 
properties, just as the  properties characterising non-overlapping kinds w ith necessary and 
sufficient conditions o f m em bership are. W hat could be the difference betw een the 
form er type o f properties and the latter?
As far as the  no tion  o f the  essential is concerned, we have two options. Either there is no 
difference, if for a property  to be called essential is to be m icro-structural and explanatory 
powerful -  in w hich case cluster kinds should be acknowledged as natural as well -  or we 
have a difference, if for a property  to be called essential is to be part of necessary and 
sufficient conditions of land m em bership. Reckoning w ith this difference could no t force 
us, however, to exclude cluster kinds and the fuzzy, criss-crossing divisions of nature 
from  the  natural kinds category because it simply am ounts to affirming th a t some kinds 
(do no t overlap each o ther and) have necessary and sufficient conditions o f m em bership 
w hereas o thers have m ore loose conditions o f m em bership. To believe it am ounts to 
som eth ing  m ore is to decide de dicto th a t the fuzzy (and overlapping) divisions of nature 
are ontologically inferior to the non-fuzzy ones, i.e. to stipulate th a t the essential 
p roperties are necessary and sufficient for natural kind m em bership.
It m ight be th a t the  divisions th a t are non-fuzzy in the actual world are m etaphysically 
necessary so, i.e. are still non-fuzzy in all the  possible worlds, perhaps as the  result of 
causal in teractions th a t agglutinate properties w ith m ore than  physical necessity. 
N onetheless, th is aspect has to do with causation and other related issues - it does no t tell 
us anyth ing  abou t the  m etaphysical category of natural kind and the different sorts of 
divisions o f nature th a t should be acknowledged under its scope. The properties 
characteristic o f kinds th a t are called essential lack a certain additional de re ingredient. 
As Stephen M um ford puts it “there should be som ething else, som ething else abou t the 
properties characteristic o f kinds tha t makes them  essential’ [for natural lands].”259 This 
additional ‘de re’ ingredient, I have argued in chapter 2, cannot be represented  by 
substantive universals.
Take as an  example H a r r is  view on kinds, also discussed in chapter 2. Harr<§ defines
259 Mumford (2005: 424)
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essences and ‘essential’ properties as follows.
“ESSENCES: A REMINDER 1. Properties o f kinds a. Proprium: properties found in or displayed by every 
instance of a kind. b. Essence: properties necessary for a being to be a member of a kind c. Accident: 
properties found in some instances of a kind. Accidental properties displayed by some individuals in a 
group cannot be part o f the essence of the kind. [...] Essences are sets o f properties selected according to 
various criteria from the propria. In philosophical writings, ‘essences’ have four main features: i. They are 
immutable, the essence of a kind cannot change, ii. They are indivisible, a subset of the constituent defining 
properties o f an essences is not an essence, iii. They are necessary, unless a being displays the properties 
defining the essence it is not a member of the kind. iv. They are infinite, that is an indefinite number of 
actual beings may realize an essence.... The real essence of type or kind is the cluster of properties necessary 
and sufficient for a being to be an instance of a type or a kind” (Harr£, 2005:10, u)
But w hat are the  'essential' properties, beside the fact of their possession being necessary 
and  sufficient for kind m em bership? W ell, it tu rns out th a t they are the intrinsic, 
s tructural p roperties th a t can be indicated as causative factors for the observable 
properties and  behaviour o f their bearers. But th is is precisely the  definition of 
de term ining  properties we have dealt w ith in §1.2
“In practice, the properties comprising the real essence of a kind are often unobservables....Descriptions of 
the real essences of material stuffs are not ‘definitions’. They are theoretically derived hypotheses as to the 
constitutions or natures o f the beings in question. For example, that the hydrogen molecule is a diatomic 
structure o f atoms consisting of a single proton and an orbiting electron, is a hypothesis as to the real 
essence or true nature of the light, inflammable gas that is prepared by the use of certain procedures. While 
real essences are not revisable, statements about real essences as empirical hypotheses are revisable and 
have often been revised.” (Harre, 2005:12, italics added)
The properties of the  hydrogen molecule explain the nature of the light, inflam m able gas 
we observe. Similarly, one could easily add, the atom ic properties of the  gold elem ent and 
its m etallic com binations explain the behaviour and properties o f particulars th a t are 
yellow, m alleable, fusible, soluble in aqua regia, etc. And similarly, the  biological 
m icrostructural properties of the GD kind organisms explain their superficial properties 
and  behaviours.260
260 O f course, I must admit that the properties of gold explain almost everything that gold kind members 
exhibit, while the GD kind determining properties explain only a (small) part o f how human organisms 
behave and what these organisms instantiate ‘superficially’. It would be very easy to argue though that this 
does not mark out an ontological gap but indicates an (important) difference of degree.
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O f course, one could even argue that, if the  ‘essential’ properties possessed by the  
m em bers o f the gold kind are the ones th a t are causally efficacious for ‘superficial’ 
p roperties and behaviours, th en  both  gold and the  GD kind possess the  corresponding 
explanatory/causally efficient ‘essences’. But the bottom -line we are in terested in is th a t 
such ‘essential’ properties, construed in Lockean tradition, cannot justify the N&S and 
non-overlapping requirem ents.
§3 .5  T h e  n o n - p h a se  r e q u ir e m e n t  (c r it e r io n  V III)
Criterion VIII asks th a t the ‘divisions in nature ' corresponding to natural kinds should be 
non-phase (non-im plicated in transitory  transform ations). In the term inology I have 
em ployed so far, it says th a t the pattern  of determ ining properties [px, p2,...pn] o f a 
(candidate) natural kind K should not represent the phase of a m ore fundam ental pa ttern  
o f p roperties .261 W hen kinds are involved in processes th a t have to do w ith  their 
determ ining  properties, the  possibility th a t they  m ight tu rn  out to be phase kinds should 
always be considered.
The non-phase requirem ent has a straightforw ard im portance for the  case of pathological 
kinds, w hich are, of course, kinds of organisms and are also supposed to correspond to 
the  classifications in term s o f diseases th a t such organism s allow. To be sure, diseases 
involve num erous processes and, just to make m atters worse, pathological conditions can 
be in terp re ted  as being fundamentally processes. By focusing then  on organism s th a t 
p resen t certain  sym ptom s and using the static1 fram ework of natural kinds o f objects, one 
appears to  lose sight of the basic ‘transitory’ nature of diseases, as such. Pathological
261 This is admittedly a non-illuminating definition, since what a phase represents is not elucidated. Recall 
though that the terminology I have employed was meant to help the exposition while preserving the content 
of the claims usually made about the metaphysical category o f kinds in the literature. In the case of criterion 
VIII, the rather primitive role o f ‘phase’ in its formulation reflects the ambiguity present in the literature 
regarding the ontological delimitation of phases. In fact, it could be said that the ambiguity stems not from 
the lack o f a minimal indication of what a phase is, but from a plethora of characterisations of it that differ 
from author to author. Around this issue (i.e. the exact delineation of the phase/non-phase distinction) will 
actually revolve my argument in the present section.
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kinds o f organisms, that is to say, do appear as phase kinds.262
In the context o f our com parison, it could be claimed th a t Graves' Disease is a process or 
a sum  o f processes undergone by hum an organisms. These processes alter organism s 
from  having certain  dim ensions of eyes to an exophthalm ic state, from having a certain 
in testinal tran sit rhy thm  to an  accelerated one, from having a certain sugar and sodium  
cellular perm eability  to an increased one and so forth. The GD kind, it would seem, fails 
criterion  VIII. In contrast, gold seems to be ideally suited to the fram ew ork of natural 
lands o f objects. The gold kind does no t prima facie pick out an interm ediary stage in a 
process undergone by individuals and thus it does appear to fulfil the non-phase 
requirem ent.
Are natu ral kinds o f objects the  wrong ontological fram ew ork for Graves’ Disease? Or, in 
o ther words, is the  GD kind a phase kind? In chapter 2 I have approached criterion VIII 
from  a general m etaphysical position, arguing th a t the ‘H eraclitan’ challenge th a t the 
special science kinds pose over the com m on-sense phase/non-phase d istinction can be 
refu ted  only by adopting the identity  sense o f carving nature. In the present section, I will 
com plem ent the  respective line w ith a m ore focused and applied analysis for the  two 
lands under com parison. My response will no t involve a definitive answer to the  question 
w hether the  GD kind a phase kind. I shall rather be concerned, as in all the previous 
sections, w ith the  possible ontological gap betw een the GD kind and gold. The conclusion 
I shall try  to justify will be that, if GD is a phase kind, then  gold is a phase kind as well. 
Conversely, if gold is considered a non-phase kind, the GD kind should also be construed 
in th is way. The difference betw een the two kinds vis-&-vis criterion VIII, I will show, is in 
fact a difference o f degree. I will also come back to the proviso regarding the identity  of 
land  m em bers (and the identity sense of carving nature at its joints) will also be 
m ain tained  in this section, in a sense tha t will be m ade clear shortly.
Before approaching the m ain discussion, a brief clarification should be pu t in place. 
C riterion VIII has to do w ith the phase or non-phase nature of the patterns of determining 
properties, as such. Accordingly, the sort of processes th a t involve the superficial 
properties o f kind m em bers are not significant for the th rea t of representing a phase kind.
262 Of all the kind theorists discussing the medical kinds, none of them pays any serious attention to the 
phase threat or to the fact that diseases might fundamentally be processes.
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For a kind K characterised by the sets of properties [plf p2,...pn] and [q1} q2,...qn], w hat 
criterion VIII is concerned w ith is w hether the pattern  [plf p2,...pn] represents a phase in a 
process involving a m ore fundam ental pa ttern  of determ ining properties. The superficial 
p roperties [qu q2,...qn] and the processes leading from [px, p2,...pn] to [q1; q2,...qn] do not 
pose any th rea t from  this po in t o f view. These processes simply correspond to the causal 
in teractions th a t should occur in any (candidate) natural land characterised by 
determ ining  properties.263
This am ounts to saying that, w hen trying to dissipate the worry th a t diseases are 
fundam entally  processes and th a t natural kinds of objects represent the wrong 
m etaphysical fram ew ork for them , the sort o f changes th a t lead to the em ergence o f the 
superficial, sym ptom atic properties starting  from the determ ining 'pathological' ones, 
should no t be a taken  as a problem .264 W hat we should worry about (from the  po in t of 
view of the  phase/non-phase distinction) are the  processes due to which organism s come 
to possess or lose those determ ining properties as such.
For instance, in the  case of the GD kind we have on the one hand the process(es) due to 
w hich organism s w ith high levels of thyroxin come to suffer from weight loss and 
accelerated in testinal transit. O n the o ther hand, we have the process involved in 
organism s' acquiring these levels of thyroxin as such, i.e. the process due to which the 
TRAS are created and directed against (a certain receptor of) the  thyroidian m em brane, 
w ith  subsequent excitatory effects.
As regards the  form er type of (pathological) processes, my poin t is th a t acknowledging 
and  paying full heed to their existence is not a t odds at all w ith the hypothetical existence 
o f natural kinds o f (diseased) organisms. To the contrary, such kinds o f organism s could 
help explaining the processes at hand and integrate them  into a m ore com plete 
ontological picture. Just as in the exact sciences to every (natural kind of) process there 
should  in principle correspond a natural kind of objects (to use Ellis’s fram ework, for
263C / Ellis (2001:22,23,160,163)
264As it should be clear, I intend to argue that natural kinds of objects do not represent the wrong 
ontological framework for Graves’ Disease, in the context of our comparison. This is not to say that I thus 
exclude the possibility of coherently construing diseases as (natural kinds of) processes. The latter is simply 
a vein of argumentation I do not pursue.
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instance),265 there  does no t seem  to be any serious reason why in m edicine a natural kind 
of organism s should no t correspond in principle to every pathological process of this sort.
The rationale w ould be the  sam e -  given th a t pathological processes stem  from the 
existence o f causal in teractions in which certain determ ining properties are involved, the 
possession o f those determ ining properties can be used to circum scribe (candidate) 
natural kinds of pathological organisms. In our case, to the process th a t leads, say, from 
the  high level o f the  N a+/K+ ATPase to the em ergence of heat intolerance, there could very 
well correspond a (natural) kind o f organisms, GD, whose m em bers possess, inter alia, 
such levels of the ATPase. In a sim ilar fashion, in the case of gold, to the process th a t leads, 
say, from  having the  valence shell electrons delocalised to the  conduction of heat and 
electricity, there  corresponds a (candidate) natural kind, gold, which consists of 
individuals/sam ples, th a t possess, inter alia, such delocalised electrons in their m etallic 
structure.
It is the  la tte r type o f process however, the  one along which organism s acquire/lose the 
determ in ing  (pathological) properties themselves, which poses problem s from the point 
o f view of criterion VIII to the GD kind. In these types of m edical transitions, the 
corresponding kinds of objects (organisms) intuitively undergoing them  seem  to be 
characterised by other properties, m ore fundam ental than  the pathological ‘determ in ing’
266ones.
W hat is to be said abou t the seemingly inescapable ontological gap betw een the two 
kinds? I shall first reckon w ith a host of prelim inary reasons advanced in the  literature in 
order to draw  the line betw een phase and non-phase kinds. These reasons, I shall argue in 
§3.6.1, cannot show th a t gold satisfies criterion VIII in contrast to the  GD kind, because 
they  are either m etaphysical intuitions (and intuitions can always be disputed) or they 
can be adapted  to m ake the GD kind a non-phase one. Then I shall come back in §3.6.2 to
265Cf. Ellis (2001). At this point, Ellis introduces natural kinds of processes that correspond to the natural 
kinds o f objects, in the sense that the former spring from the (manifestations of) the causal powers that the 
latter are associated with.
266 The bearers o f these transitory events seem to be members of a more profoundly grounded kind, say, 
human organisms. We need not dwell upon what exactly this more profound kind of organism should be. 
What matters is that the pattern of determining properties of the GD kind appears like a phase in a transition 
undergone by organisms that present a more stable/fundamental pattern of determining properties.
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the  discussion o f the  two senses o f carving nature a t its jo ints and argue that, unless the 
iden tity  o f kind m em bers is taken into consideration, any further reasons adduced in 
o rder to situate the  two kinds on different ontological levels cannot fulfil their purpose. 
Just like in  chapter 2, I will discuss Jonathan Lowe’s views, from a different perspective 
though, m ore suitable for the applied purpose o f the present chapter.
§ 3 .5 .1  T r a n s m u t a t i o n  a n d  t h e  p h a s e / n o n - p h a s e  d i s t i n c t i o n
The starting  po in t of my analysis is represented by certain types of processes th a t gold 
can take p a rt in. Exceptionally, gold is involved in changes in which its sam ples acquire 
a n d /o r  lose their determ ining properties. Such a process is the transm uta tion  o f gold into 
lead, an  event during which the gold atom  acquires three protons. O ne of the  m ost 
im portan t determ ining  properties of the kind gold is thus modified. Accordingly, the  kind 
m em bers undergoing this transform ation actually change their m em bership from gold to 
lead.
T hat gold sam ples can suffer such processes does not represent, as such, a reason to  
qualify it as a phase kind. W hat is crucial however is to evaluate w hether their non-phase 
kind m em bership  (if any) rem ains the same, is changed or comes to be possessed. Let me 
recall a few conceptual distinctions I have introduced in chapter 2.
M em bers o f non-phase lands could be involved in principle in processes in w hich their 
determ in ing  properties are changed. It is just tha t these processes are supposed to be 
substantial ones, th a t is, processes along which the initial m em bership in the  respective 
non-phase kind is lost. They should be contrasted w ith the phase processes, th a t is, the 
processes m arking ou t the transitions undergone by a non-phase kind in w hich 
individuals are no t supposed to change their non-phase kind m em bership. More 
precisely, individuals should simply come to transitorily instantiate  a certain  p a tte rn  of 
p roperties that, as a fagon de parler, m ight be called a phase kind.267
267 For a discussion of the distinction between phase and substantial changes see Lowe (2001:182-184) and 
also Wilson (1999:16-20)
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So for instance the  changes undergone by a caterpillar tu rn ing  into a butterfly  are 
supposed to be phase changes during which the (non-phase) kind m em bership o f an 
organism  is no t changed. At most, the  pattern  o f properties characteristic of caterpillars 
(which differentiates them  from butterflies) m ight be said to  delineate a phase kind. The 
dying o f a butterfly, to  the  contrary, should qualify as a substantial change in which the 
m em bership  in the  initial non-phase kind is swapped for m em bership into a different 
non-phase kind.
FIGURE 15 PHASE AND SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES (the arrows indicate the  direction of the transitions undertaken  by kind 
m em bers - from  phase k inds to  non-phase kinds and vice-versa in th e  case of phase changes, or from  one non-phase k ind  to  
an o th er in  the  case o f substantial changes)
phase change *
P h a s e  k i n d
substantial change **
/Non-phase 
- ...........   \k in d  Iv2
* An individual a, m em ber o f the non-phase kind Kj which underwent a 
phase change would not swap its 11011-phase kind membership in IC1 but 
would transitorily instantiate the phase kind y
** An individual a m em ber o f the 11011-phase kind Ivj which underwent a 
substantial cha nge would swap its 11011-phase kind membership from  ICj to 
another 11011-phase kind Iv2
In fact, in such changes involving two different regna (biological and m aterial) a change 
in the  num erical identity  of the individuals bearing the processes at hand is arguably also 
involved. This detail though will become m ore relevant later. W hat we need to  hold on to 
at th is  stage is th a t only if the  gold-lead transm utation was a substantial change w ould 
gold straightforw ardly be a non-phase kind.
Now, we could usefully contrast the process of gold-lead transm utation  w ith the sort o f
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process by w hich hum an  organism s acquire/lose the determ ining properties o f Graves’ 
Disease. W e could take for instance the scenario by which the organism s already 
possessing those pathological determ ining features lose them , say, under treatm ent. 
D uring such a process (which we could call ‘the Graves process’), one o f the m ost 
im portan t determ ining  properties o f the GD kind is m odified such th a t the kind m em bers 
undergoing it actually change their kind m em bership (from GD to, say, 'healthy' 
organism s).268
O n the  one hand, we have, then, some hum an organisms in which the level of thyroxin in 
blood (initially dram atically high) decreases, due to a trea tm en t w ith propylthiouracil. 
This drug  inh ib its an enzyme called thyroperoxidase, which has a crucial role in the 
synthesis by thyroid o f its horm one(s). Once thyroperoxidase stops utilising H 202 to 
produce I+in the apical m em brane surface o f the thyroid follicle, the  residues o f tyrosine, 
an  am ino-acid presen t in the com position o f a dim eric protein  (thyroglobulin), cannot be 
used for the  assem bling of thyroxine. O n the o ther hand, we have some samples o f gold in 
w hich the num ber of pro tons in nuclei is m odified due to a-bom bardm ent in a particle 
accelerator or by leaving them  for a longer period of tim e in a nuclear reactor. By neu tron  
capture and  (3 decay a t a small neu tron  flux, the  gold atom s change into Hg, T1 and then  
Pb atom s.
Now, why claim th a t in the  case o f the Graves process we have a phase process - th a t is, a 
process due to which individuals move from a phase kind to another, (non-phase) k ind269 
- w hereas in the case of the gold-lead transm utation process, the transition  is supposed to 
entail a change th a t is m ore profound than  a phase one? In o ther words, why no t say th a t 
the  gold kind picks out a phase in the process leading to the lead kind? W e will look first 
a t four prelim inary m eans supposed to draw the phase/non-phase distinction, which
268 In the minimal sense of organisms whose survival is not threatened, by Graves’ Disease at least. We 
need not be preoccupied here with what the precise details of the kind instantiated after/before the 
organisms lose/acquire the determining properties o f the GD kind represents (or with the kind that is 
presumably instantiated all along the sickness time-period). It is sufficient to say that it looks like a more 
fundamental kind, in relation to which the GD kind appears as representing a phase.
269 In the quasi-majority of cases, the non-phase kind that appears saliently at the end of the phase had been 
instantiated all along the phase change -  see for instance the transformation of tadpoles into frogs. I do not 
wish to exclude the case in which, after a phase, the non-phase kind indeed comes to be instantiated.
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appear to indicate th a t gold is a non-phase kind, in contrast to the GD kind.270
It m ight be said first th a t gold is m uch m ore stable th an  the GD kind and th a t stability is 
a m ark  o f non-phase kinds distinguishing them  from the transitory  nature of phase 
kinds.271 A second (related) reason th a t m ight be invoked is tha t the  Graves process is 
qu ite  frequent and  easily replicable whereas gold-lead transm utation  is artificial and not 
reversible.272 A th ird  reason m ight be th a t gold, in contrast to the GD kind, is an ‘e ternal’ 
k ind .273 The chem ical elem ents, along w ith kinds of particles in fundam ental physics, one 
could claim, constitu te the  ‘blocks’ from which the universe is built, whereas diseases 
represen t the paradigm  of transitory, ephem eral phenom ena. A fourth reason th a t could 
be adduced  is th a t the  Graves process is subject to natural laws o f developm ent. Just as 
there  is a natural law (of developm ent) th a t dictates the transform ation of tadpoles into 
frogs - in o ther words, th a t establishes th a t tadpoles are a phase undertaken  by frogs - the  
Graves process is governed by the laws of developm ent (and regress) describing the 
in teractions betw een hum an  organism s and their environm ent. No such ‘developm ental’ 
laws are in place for the  gold-lead transm utation .274
Let us take all these reasons in turn. As regards the first one, it could simply be argued 
th a t stability is an epiphenom enon th a t does not even scratch the surface of the 
distinction  betw een phases and non-phases. Processes could happen faster or slower. W e 
m ight have pa tte rn s of properties th a t are instan tiated  for a very short tim e and yet seem
270 These means are to be found in among others, in Lowe (2001), Millikan (1999), Boyd (1999) Robinson 
(2004). They only represent an illustrative selection from the variegated reasons advanced in order to draw 
the phase/non-phase distinction, in the discussions concerning phase kinds as such, sortals or the concept 
of substance. Other examples of features advanced in order to shed light on the vein substances/non-phase 
kinds/substantial sortals are: being subjects of predication and bearers of properties, being the subjects of 
change, possessing unity in our spatio-temporal framework, being ontologically basic, being the crucial 
entities in a given system, etc.
271 See Lowe (2001:176) who claims that the phase changes should occur as effects of natural changes in the 
environment, and not due to drastic measures undertaken in laboratories. See also Robinson (2004) who 
approaches the phase/non-phase distinction as part o f the broader discussion over the concept of substance 
and who mentions stability as well.
272 Cf. Lowe (2001:174-189)
273 See Millikan (1999), Boyd (1999). The two authors discuss in their articles the differences between exact 
science kinds and special science kinds.
274 ‘A change to an individual substance S, of kind K, is a phase change for S just in case it is a change which 
things of kind I< survive as a consequence of the natural laws of development for Ks’ Lowe (2001:186). Note 
that Lowe has different phase-conditions for objects belonging to different categories (the material, 
artefactual and biological). I employ here a few of his conditions for illustrative purposes. The laws of 
development are mentioned by Wiggins as well, as means to trace out phases (and phase sortals); see 
Wiggins (2001:143).
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credible candidates for characterising non-phase kinds, as the case is for certain 
transitional chem ical elem ents. Indeed, a proper example is unobtanium  (Un346) whose 
atom s decay in 4.8 m icroseconds. Conversely, th a t processes take place very slowly is no 
guarantee th a t the  change they underlie is a non-phase one.
W ith  respect to the second reason, it could be pointed out th a t the  gold-lead 
tran sm u ta tion  can actually be reversed in laboratory conditions and it frequently takes 
place (in either direction, from lead to gold and from gold to lead) in supernovas. It is, 
after all, a natural process and the laboratory conditions in which it can be reproduced 
should no t m ake us consider it artificial in any way.
The response to the  th ird  motive would be m erely to say th a t gold is no t an ‘e ternal’ kind. 
The gold elem ent was created about 100 million years after the Big-Bang in the stellar 
nucleosynthesis, like all the elem ents whose atom ic num ber is greater than  th a t o f iron .275 
Indeed, it took abou t 100 million years for gold to be created, whereas for hum an 
organism s to em erge (and be capable o f bearing the traits of Graves’ Disease) some o ther 
13,7 billion years were necessary. But no m atter the tim e span th a t separates the 
em ergence o f the  two kinds, w hat we have here is a difference of degree, and no t an 
ontological difference.276
Finally, as regards the forth reason, a reply would be to em phasise th a t bo th  the 
tran sm u ta tion  and the Graves process are subject to laws. W hat happens in the  gold 
nucleus w hen it is bom barded with a particles, as well as w hat happens in an organism  
w hen the  enzym atic pathw ays tha t assemble the chemical com ponents o f thyroxine are 
d isrupted  by propylthiouracil, can be subject to counterfactual descriptions and  does not 
depend  on the  tim e and place in which the processes occur. That the laws describing the 
Graves process can be qualified as being laws o f ‘development’ whereas the  laws o f 
tran sm u ta tion  apparently  cannot, has only an intuitive (and hence very weak)
275 See for instance Wallerstein et. al. (1997).
276 Mitchell (2000) makes this point when comparing biological with physical laws, but the ‘created’ nature 
of gold is just as relevant for the kinds discussion.
153
importance.277
The set of m otives I have just invoked as potentially  able to pu t gold and the GD kind on 
different ontological levels is just a representative selection o f the  variegated reasons 
advanced in the  literature  in order to draw  the phase/non-phase distinction. All these 
reasons, however, could be similarly diagnosed - they are either m etaphysical in tu itions 
(and in tu itions can always be disputed) or they can be adapted to the  Graves process. In 
o ther words, they  cannot show an ontological discrepancy betw een the two kinds. W e 
seem  thus to have a choice - either the  GD kind is acknowledged on these grounds as a 
non-phase kind or we have to adm it th a t gold is a phase kind.
§  3 .5 .2  I d e n t i t y  a n d  p h a s e s
I will now  come back to the caveat regarding the carving nature a t its joints. The crucial 
justification for the  Graves process being a phase process, unlike the  transm uta tion  o f 
gold in to  lead, I shall argue, could only be th a t the identities of the organism s th a t lose 
the  determ ining  properties of the  GD kind are not influenced by this process, w hereas the  
identities of the  individuals m em bers of the  kind gold are indeed affected by the 
transm uta tion . As in chapter 2,1 will discuss Lowe’s stance on the issue of the p h ase /n o n ­
phase d istinction, from  a different perspective though.
Lowe describes in his (1998) four characteristics th a t processes undergone by kinds o f 
‘s tu ff  should possess in  order to qualify as phase ones. The example is the transition  from 
w ater to  ice.
‘(1) The change is readily replicable, as a natural effect o f an alteration in certain environmental conditions 
(2) the change is relatively gradual and continuous....(3) the change is naturally reversible...(4) during the 
change, no matter is lost or gained by the substance involved’ (Lowe, 1998:176)
Features (1M3) do not represent problem s for our com parison. Features (1) and (3)
277 And Lowe (the main proponent of the motive that the phase transformations are subject to laws) could 
not object that no laws are at work for the processes underwent by the GD kind members, since he rejects 
reductionism to the fizico-chemical level and admits himself that we could have laws with exceptions. See 
Lowe (1989:153,154).
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actually figured in the  set o f prelim inary reasons I have just discussed. Feature (2) 
represents a classical example of a condition framing, in an am biguous m anner, a 
m etaphysical in tu ition . W hat does it m ean for a change to be relatively or quite gradual 
and  continuous, one could ask? No clear response could be provided, of course, and w hat 
m akes m atters worse is th a t Lowe acknowledges parenthetically  th a t the ice-water change 
is d iscontinuous on a m icro-structural level.278
The fourth  feature is m uch m ore interesting however, because, in Lowe’s m etaphysical 
fram ew ork, it represents a criterion of identity. The preservation of m atte r’ is for Lowe a 
condition  th a t needs to be fulfilled by individuals from the category of ‘stu ff (non- 
biological, non-artefact m atter) in order to rem ain num erically the same across changes 
and  processes.279
For Lowe then, num erical identity  preservation is a necessary, yet no t sufficient 
condition, for a process undertaken  by an individual substance to be a phase one.28° 
Conversely, for a process undertaken  by an individual m em ber o f a certain natural kind to 
be a substantial one, the change of identity (i.e. its becom ing a different individual) 
represents a sufficient, yet no t necessary condition.
Now, if one denied, as I do, the relevance o f conditions (1M3) for the phase/non-phase 
d istinction  in the context of our com parison,281 it would follow th a t for a change to be a 
substantial one, the  alteration  of identity  was a necessary and sufficient condition. Let us 
look a t w hat Lowe has to say about the transm utation  betw een lead and gold.
‘Finally, consider the (hypothetical example of alchemic transmutation...if [alchemists] had succeeded, how  
should we have regarded the relation between a base metal, such as lead, and gold? Should we have
278 Lowe (2001:176)
279Lowe delineates three categories of ‘objects’, each of them associated with different conditions of identity 
(Lowe 1989: 8-15). As I mentioned in chapter 2, these conditions are such that they preclude any individual 
to trespass the limits o f a category and yet remain identical with itself (see the example of any dying 
organism or the statue/material discussion, approached in Lowe, 1995). Within a category, insofar as the 
corresponding conditions are fulfilled, individuals can undergo all sorts o f changes including changes o f  
their kind membership, while remaining identical with themselves. In other words, Lowe adheres to the 
non-identity sense of carving nature at its joints. This aspect will become relevant a bit later.
280 Lowe (2001:174,182)
2811 do not exclude that these conditions might be useful to draw the phase/non-phase distinction in 
general, or in other particular cases. What I am precisely interested in however, as regards these conditions 
and any other, is whether they can reveal an ontological discrepancy between the two kinds under 
comparison here, from the point o f view of criterion VIII.
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regarded them as really being the same metal, differing only in phase, as water differs from ice? I suggest we 
should have done so only if the process of transmutation had possessed features (1) to (4). Suppose however 
that the process had possessed all of these features, but that in addition, scientists had discovered (as they 
now have) that gold and lead are composed of atoms differing in their nuclear composition. Would that 
additional discovery have warranted a reversal o f the judgment that gold and lead are the same metal, 
differing only in phase? I think not. Thus I conclude that, as things actually are, what warrants the 
judgment that gold and lead are indeed different metals cannot just be the fact that there is no natural 
means o f transmuting gold into lead which possesses features (1) to (4). It is true that the fact that lead and 
gold differ in their atomic constitution - though only in conjunction with other facts about atoms -  explains 
why, as a matter o f natural law, no such natural process of transmutation can occur. But it still seems clear 
that this fact about their atomic constitutions is not by itself the sort o f consideration which should 
persuade us to regard gold and lead as stuffs of different kinds.’ (Lowe, 2001:177-8, italics original)
By Lowe’s own standards then, the  respective transm utation  could qualify as a phase 
change if conditions (1M4) were m et. O f course, Lowe does no t actually hold th a t the 
gold-lead (or lead-gold) transm utation  is a phase process. That is because, even if Lowe 
does no t claim  th a t any change in the identity  of the samples involved takes place,282 still, 
in his view, this process is no t readily replicable as a natural effect of an alteration  in 
certain  environm ental conditions, is not relatively gradual and continuous and is no t 
naturally  reversible.
If one denied, however, the relevance of features (1M3) for the  phase/non-phase 
distinction, it would emerge th a t if and only if the identity  of the involved sam ples was 
affected, the  process of transm utation  would qualify as a substantial, non-phase one. To 
p u t it differently, only if natural kinds were said to carve nature at its joints in the  identity  
sense, w ould the gold kind not qualify as a phase kind and would hence be ontologically 
different from  the GD kind (on the m em bership of which the identity  of organism s could 
no t possibly depend).
282 The claim is not made directly. Lowe just insists that individuals’ swapping of natural kinds, within a 
category, could take place without any change in their identity; see his discussion of substantial kind 
change and individual substantial change in Lowe (1998: 174,175,186). Since Lowe does not count the 
transformation of water into ice as attended by the losing of matter, presumably the gold-lead 
transmutation does not presuppose any loss o f matter as well in his view. Note parenthetically that the 
identity at stake in the gold-lead transmutation is not numerical identity (since we are talking about 
samples of kinds o f stuff), but diachronic identity in the broad sense, which is involved in our identifying of 
the same sample of a kind of stuff over time (see Lowe (1998:187)). Of course, my disclaimer concerning the 
absolute/relative identity distinction remains valid in this section as well — unless otherwise stated, any talk 
of identity (numerical or diachronic, more broadly) is about absolute and not relative identity.
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If the  non-identity  related  sense of carving nature a t its jo ints was adopted, no other 
m etaphysical elem ents or characteristics o f the  transm utation  process could be invoked, I 
claim, w ithou t finding a ‘correspondent’ in  the  case of the  Graves process. For instance, if 
w hat was invoked was that, in the  case of the  gold-lead transm utation, gold m em bers lose 
som e of the ir ‘essential’ properties,283 then, if the ‘essential’ properties are the ones 
construed  in the  trad ition  of the Lockean prim ary qualities, the same could be affirmed 
abou t the  Graves process. In o ther words, if such ‘essential’ properties were used as a 
criterion for draw ing the phase/non-phase distinction, it would follow th a t e ither both  
processes were phase processes or both  were non-phase ones.
At th is po in t I find m yself in com plete agreem ent with Lowe who rem arks in the  above 
cited passage th a t ‘...lead and gold differ in their atom ic constitution... th is fact about 
the ir atom ic constitu tions is no t by itself the  sort of consideration which should persuade 
us to regard gold and lead as stuffs of different kinds.’ Lowe is even m ore adam ant in 
o ther places:
‘Neither macroscopically observable phenomena, nor scientific information concerning the ‘internal 
constitutions' o f things, can resolve such issues for us in the absence of metaphysical guidance. Thus, even 
the fact, for instance, that the butterfly’s DNA is the same as the caterpillar’s cannot of itself show that the 
transformation of the latter into the former is not a change of substantial kind, any more than the fact that 
the atoms constituting lead and gold have different nuclear compositions of itself shows that the hoped-for 
alchemical transformation o f lead into gold would not be a phase change’. (Lowe, 1998:179)
O n a different note, if it was invoked th a t in the case of the gold transm utation , gold 
m em bers come to instan tiate  a different substantial universal,284 then  there would be no 
reason w hy the same could no t be said about the Graves process. The latter process would 
indeed involve a m ore frequent change in the instantiation of different substantive 
universals th an  is involved in the case of the gold-lead transm utation. However, I would 
suggest, th is ‘frequency’ aspect could not count as a motive not to accept such universals 
for the  two kinds standing in the beginning and end, respectively, o f the  Graves process. 
The rationale I w ant appeal to is the m erely the following: if O ckam ’s razor does no t 
function w hen substantive universals for the kinds gold and lead are postulated, there are




no reasons w hy it should function in the case o f biological kinds such as GD. Let me 
explain why I th ink  th is m ight well be the case.
I have m entioned  in §2.2.1 et passim  th a t it is a very contentious issue w hether such 
substantive universals should be accepted at all. All the roles they are supposed to play -  
like being the ground for co-instantiation inductions or being tru th -m akers for natural 
laws -  appear as redundan tly  filled in, because they can be fulfilled w ithin a non-inflated 
ontology based on properties only.285Now, if in spite of O ckham ’s razor, substantive 
universals are still accepted in one’s ontology of natural kinds, w hat restricts which kind 
m em bers should instan tiate  substantive universals and which not? At any rate, it could 
n o t be the N&S requirem ent, as I have shown w hen discussing Ellis’s work. Again, Lowe’s 
position  -  the  au tho r who m ost prom inently  adheres to the  view th a t natural kinds are 
based on substantive universals - needs to be discussed.
W e have seen that, unlike Ellis, Lowe does not accept the N&S requirem ent. Lowe thus 
sees the existence of substantive universal-based kinds as com patible w ith the members of 
those kinds sharing a fuzzy set of properties. Therefore, on his own grounds, a kind such 
as the  GD kind, which has cluster-like conditions o f m em bership, could in principle be 
associated to a substantive universal. Moreover, if we take into account all the  roles th a t 
substantive universals are supposed to play in the  m etaphysics of kinds, we can see th a t 
they  can be successfully fulfilled by the putative substantive universal of the GD kind I 
hypothesize here. This GD substantive universal would be the tru th -m aker o f the laws in 
w hich organism s w ith the characteristics of Graves’ Disease are involved. Such an 
universal w ould also explain why certain determ ining properties are co-instantiated by 
the  m em bers o f the  GD kind. It would also support the counterfactual scenarios in which 
the  organism s a t hand could be m eaningfully invoked and ultim ately, for the  exceptions 
on the  level of particulars th a t are comm only dealt w ith using ceteris paribus clauses 
a ttached  to  first-order quantified statem ents (in the literature on special science, in 
general, and  on m edicine as well).286
M ore plainly put, my suggestion is as follows. If the only criteria for a group o f individuals
285 See Heil (2006), Bird (2007)
286 Lowe’s exposition of the advantages of embracing substantive universals can be found for instance in 
Lowe (2006: 26,132,133,147)
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to  instan tia te  a substantive universal are th a t they co-instantiate a certain set of 
properties and are com m only engaged in nom ic behaviour (ceteris paribus or otherwise), 
and  also if the N&S and the non-overlapping requirem ent are rejected or show n to be 
unjustified ,287 th en  there  is no reason why substantive universals could no t actually be 
associated w ith a huge num ber of kinds, the GD kind included. Once O ckham ’s razor is 
stopped  from  functioning at the initial stage w hen the very existence o f substantive 
universals is in troduced  (vis-^-vis the lands in the exact sciences), it could not be brought 
to  function and lim it such a ‘m ultiplication’ of substantive universals (in the  special 
sciences dom ain, m edicine included).
W hat could stop this m ultiplication of substantive universals? To be sure, a m eans to stop 
it (the only one I can see in fact) is linking the instantiation of a substantive universal to 
the  identity  of the  respective kind m em bers.288
T hink  for instance about the m any different classifications and kinds th a t any single 
hu m an  organism  could be said to instantiate. Graves’ Disease is one of them , bu t we 
could also m ention  here, say, being a child, adolescent, elderly person, or, from the  range 
of diseases, suffering from Influenza pneum onia, peptic ulcer or g lom erulonephritis (to 
cite som e very com m on pathological conditions). All these classifications and  the  
a ttend ing  kinds of organism s smack of phases and phase lands, as it were. Their possible 
association w ith  substantive universals could be dismissed (and accordingly the 
phase/non-phase  distinction could be employed to rule them  out as natural lands, 
according to  criterion VIII) if we conceded tha t the identity of any particular organism  
m em ber o f a natural kind depends on its instantiation of the respective substantive 
universal.
O f course, w hat I am  referring to at this point is the non-overlapping requirem ent, in the 
context o f the  identity  sense of carving nature at its joints. All the above-m entioned kinds 
overlap each o ther -  no t all adolescents suffer from glom erulonephritis (even though 
some o f them  do) and not all elderly people suffer from peptic ulcer (even if some of them
287 As I have argued in chapter 2
288 Indeed, this was the construal of substantive universals in Aristotle and his medieval followers; see 
Gobbo (2000: 84), Dahl (1997: 233), Ayers (1991: 20). Oderberg is the only modern author who holds that 
kinds are substantive universals and claims explicitly that the phase/non-phase distinction should be drawn 
using the identity of kind members; see Oderberg (2007: 268), Oderberg (1996:150-152).
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do). If the  identity  o f any particular was m ade dependen t on its instan tia tion  o f a 
substantive universal, a t m ost one o f these kinds would have to be accepted and all the 
o ther putative substantive universals could be dismissed, on grounds o f the  tertium non 
datur law of identity .289
Lowe w ould no t accept this solution though. W e have already seen th a t in his construal 
o f kinds, an  individual could swap natural kinds even if its identity  rem ained unaltered. 
In o ther words, an individual could come to instantiate different substantive universals 
while rem aining num erically the same. For Lowe then, natural kind m em bership should 
no t have an iden tity  bearing on kind m em bers. Nevertheless, if this is the sense in w hich 
kinds carve natu re  a t its joints, then  the ontological difference betw een gold and the  GD 
kind arguably disappears, in the context of the  substantive universals discussion and  th a t 
o f criterion VIII as well.290
§3.6 A g a in , o n  c a r v i n g  n a t u r e  a t  i t s  j o i n t s  ( a n d  o n  c r i t e r i o n  IV)
O ne im portan t aspect o f my argum entation was set ou t in the discussion o f the carving 
natu re  a t its jo ints intuition(s) in §1.5. The guiding line I have adopted vis-^-vis the 
intu itive bu rden  surrounding the kinds them e was th a t we have two choices w hen 
adverting th a t natural kinds ‘show what things are’ or delineate ‘the fundam ental 
divisions o f n a tu re ’, etc. Either kinds are considered natural w hen the kind m em bership 
has a bearing on the identity  of its members, or kinds are considered natural, by 
em ploying all sorts of o ther reasons, irrespective of their bearing on the identity  of their 
m em bers.
The po in t I have tried to make in chapter 2 and the present chapter was th a t if the  non ­
identity  related sense o f carving nature at its joints was adopted, then  all argum ents and 
criteria for gold being a natural kind can also be applied for the case o f the GD kind.
289 See my discussion in §2.1.2 of the ‘paradoxes’ of criss-crossing.
290 Authors who believe that identity is crucial for drawing the phase/non-phase distinction, are Wilson 
(1999: 20) Hirsch(i982: 52-57) Wiggins (1980), Oderberg (2007). Not all of them see kinds as substantive 
universals. Some epistemic problems attending their position will be looked at in the next section.
O n the  o ther hand, if the identity  related sense o f carving nature  was chosen, then  an 
ontological difference betw een the GD kind and gold kind could arguably appear in the 
following sense. Given th a t the identity  o f the organisms could no t possibly depend upon 
their diseased tra its ,291 if the  identity  o f gold samples depended upon the m icrostructural 
characteristics of their kind, then  the two kinds under com parison would indeed be 
situated  on different ontological levels. This represents an extended form ulation o f the 
identity-proviso th a t I announced in Introduction to the present thesis. In th is section, I 
sim ply w ant to po in t to a host o f reasons due to which such a construal o f kind 
m em bership  is very difficult to justify, from an epistemological po in t of view.
It should be said th a t m ost kind theorists do not discuss the issue of the identity  of kind 
m em bers or prefer to adhere explicitly to (what I have called) the non-iden tity  sense of 
carving natu re  a t its joints. Nonetheless, some authors do claim th a t the  kind 
m em bership  does play a role in the identity  of kind m em bers.292 Their position faces 
som e serious epistem ic difficulties, as I have said, and I will explain in the  following why.
W e should  recall first of all that, aside from the entire issue of in tu itions regarding the 
category o f natural lands, to consider tha t kinds carve nature a t its joints in the  identity  
sense is to bring up criterion IV as a requirem ent th a t should be satisfied by any 
candidate natural kind. Criterion IV (the identity  requirem ent) states th a t for any 
individual a - m em ber of the  (candidate) natural kind K characterised by the determ ining 
p roperties [p lf p2, ...pn] - were a to stop instantiating them , a would tu rn  into a different 
individual b.
Then, we should  clearly distinguish between two aspects th a t could be addressed a t th is 
point. O n the  one hand, one could ask w hether it is intelligible to generally consider th a t 
such identity-influencing properties exist. On the other, one could look into why these 
properties should be the determining properties tha t characterise the com m only accepted 
kinds in the  exact sciences. The former enquiry concerns a m etaphysical issue th a t I will 
no t m uch refer to in this section. For my part, the existence of such properties should be
29T take this affirmation as uncontroversial.
292 Some o f the proponents of criterion IV are Wiggins (2001), Brody (1974), Denkel (1996), Elder (2007). The 
present section will synthesize a classic critique, to be found in an extended version in Mackie (1994) 3nd 
Sidelle (1992) for instance.
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acknow ledged. At any rate, I will simply accept here the m etaphysical thesis th a t the 
iden tity  o f individuals depends upon some the properties they instan tiate  (i.e. the  thesis 
th a t there  are no bare individuals).293 It is the  latter question, posing an epistemic 
challenge, which is the  subject o f this section.
Now, could we justifiably say th a t the kind properties play such an identity  role -  where 
the  kinds in question  are the ones com m only accepted in the exact sciences, in  virtue of 
certain  pa tte rns of properties? That is, why should the identity  o f a depend upon the 
properties [pi, p2,...pn] characterising its kind K? These are a t base determ ining 
properties and  we have seen th a t the com m only accepted kinds in the exact sciences - for 
w hich K stands here - satisfy in addition various other criteria. Indeed, it is precisely these 
determ in ing  properties -  constituting necessary and sufficient conditions (for delineating 
the  division o f natu re  corresponding to K), characterising K as intuitively a non-phase 
kind, putatively precluding individuals like a to sim ultaneously instantiate  any o ther kind 
I<* th a t was no t in a species/genus relationship with I< -  tha t should be proven to have an 
iden tity  influence over a. As I have tried to show in the previous section, in order for the 
N&S requ irem ent to be justifiably adopted, all of the [px, p2, ...pn] properties 
(circum scribing the  non-fuzzy division of nature corresponding to K) should have an 
identity-influence over a. The same could be said w ith respect to the non-overlapping 
requ irem en t and the non-phase requirem ent, even if, as I have rem arked, the latter two 
criteria  are no t logically connected with the form er.294
Yet, there  does seem  to be a distance between paying full heed to the sort of properties 
th a t science tells us about and drawing conclusions about the identity of kind m em bers, 
even if  the  kinds in question belong to the exact sciences. Paul Teller, from a rather 
neutral position, nicely expresses this difficulty.
....I call this the problem of co-variance or co-occurrence of properties: given just the assumption that two
293For discussion, see Chisholm (1967) Mackie (2006)
294 That is, we could admit that (candidate) natural kinds have a cluster of characterising determining 
properties and yet demand that no individual instantiated two clusters belonging to two different kinds 
which were not hierarchically positioned, or that the non-phase membership was lost if a certain 
proportion of a (candidate) natural kind cluster was lost by an individual, respectively. If this weaker, 
cluster alternative was adopted, a certain proportion of the (perfect) clusters of the divisions of nature in 
exact sciences would need to turn up not being identity-connected, in order for the hierarchy and non­
phase requirements to be ungrounded.
properties co-vary in their extension over the range of all possible worlds, it is quite consistent to assume 
that a thing has both of these properties in one possible world while that very same, numerically identical 
thing, has neither property in another possible world...the generalisations of contemporary science....do no 
more than specify co-occurrence of properties...atomic physics describes something called the 
transmutation of carbon into nitrogen....This generalisation can be glossed by saying that one existent, the 
carbon atom, ceases to exist and something else, a nitrogen atom, comes into existence; or by saying that a 
carbon atom changes into one atom o f hydrogen while retaining its numerical identity. (Teller, 1975: 238, 239, 
italics added)
It is exactly the  difference betw een being a determ ining property  and having a bearing 
over the  identity  of kind m em bers th a t is underlined by Teller.295 M odern science says 
no th ing  abou t the identity  of individuals and hence is consistent w ith the com m only 
accepted kinds not satisfying criterion IV (to use my terminology).
W e thus have a possible ontology, alluded to by Teller, which is w orth looking a t w hen 
discussing the epistem ic problem s of the identity  of carving nature a t its joints. W ere we 
to  draw  it in a bit m ore detail, we would not have to squabble w ith the em pirical 
inform ation th a t science provides us regarding generalisations about co-variance or 
successions of properties. W e would only have to accept th a t the identity  o f chem ical 
elem ents and chemical samples, for instance, does not depend on the respective atom ic 
num bers, th a t the identity  of electrons does not depend upon their charge, th a t the  
iden tity  o f pro tons does no t hinge on their having two down-quarlcs, and so on.
Recall th a t the  m etaphysical thesis according to which some properties possessed by 
individuals have an identity  influence is not under dispute here.296 Hence, the  identity  o f 
the  individuals involved in processes and transitions could adm ittedly depend over some 
of the ir determ ining  properties, but not on the ones com m only taken to characterise and 
singularise the  com m only accepted kind of the exact sciences.297 For instance, the identity  
o f gold sam ples could depend on the constituting atom s possessing, say, a t least 73
295 Even Ellis -  who, as we have seen, should be directly interested in construing the respective properties 
into an identity key - expresses the same perplexity as Teller’s. See Ellis (1999:67,68) (2001:239) (2002:12, 2- 
5> 238)
296 My discussion goes thus on the line set out by Mackie, in her (i994: 3U> 312> 332)
2971 have mentioned that the identity of the samples involved in the changes studied by the exact sciences 
might not depend on their determining properties (their composition to take up the classic idiom) but on 
some of their superficial properties. Lowe argues thus that it is at least conceivable to take the identity of 
water samples as depending over their perceptible characteristics (see Lowe 2007b).
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pro tons in their nucleus, having at least 2 electrons in the 5d sub-orbital and an  ionisation 
energy o f a t least 1.5 in the Pauli scale. A gold sample would not thus change its identity  
unless it stopped instan tiating  these properties -  which obviously do no t m atch the 
determ in ing  properties characterising the com m only accepted kind gold.
O ne m ight o f course w onder w hether we could still m aintain th a t the (candidate) natural 
kinds are the  ones th a t have identity  - influencing properties and m odify our fram ew ork 
o f kinds in the  exact sciences. To stick w ith our example, instead of gold being considered 
a (candidate) natural kind for instance,298 we could have as candidate the m uch broader 
kind w ith  a t least 73 protons in their nuclei, having at least 2 electrons in the  5d sub- 
orbital and  an ionisation energy of at least 1.5. Such a kind would have as m em bers, 
besides ‘gold’ samples, all the chemical samples th a t are com m only classified as 
Tantalum , Tungsten, Rhenium  and so on, going up from the elem ents w ith atom ic 
num ber 73 tow ards gold.
The possibility of m odifying our framework of kinds on this track (such th a t criterion IV 
was respected) does no t seem to have great prospects though. Once the distance betw een 
being a determ ining  property  and having an identity-influence is clearly m arked out, a 
m yriad o f o ther scenarios could be construed in order to build up such alternative kind 
fram ew orks. W hat could debar us from taking instead, as a (candidate) natural kind 
instan tia ted  by the gold samples, the division of nature whose m em bers have a t least 46 
p ro tons in the  nucleus and a relative atom ic mass is at least 106.42, or the division w ith 
the  first m olar ionisation energy at least 745.5 kj-m ol'1 and an atom ic radius of at least 128 
pm ?299
How broadly or narrowly should these kinds (which, evidently, do not look like the 
classical kinds accepted in present science/philosophy of science) be construed, in the 
pu rsu it o f respecting criterion IV, appears accordingly to be largely a m atter o f choice, 
due to  our epistem ic ignorance. In a quite broad scenario, we could only have three 
(candidate) natural kinds -  the material, the biological and the artefactual - if we 
accepted the  vision o f identity conditions tha t Lowe proposes for instance and we
298 As it is commonly construed in nowadays science, i.e. being circumscribed by the determining properties
described in § 3.1.2
2"See Mackie (1994:330, 331)
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dem anded  in addition  th a t (candidate) natural kinds had an identity  influence. In the 
b roadest possible scenario, we would only have one kind th a t the exact sciences are 
concerned w ith -  the  m aterial kind, to be opposed, by those who wish, to the im m aterial, 
intelligible one.
Note th a t th is possibility of broader kinds, envisaged in order to keep up w ith criterion 
IV, w ould no t entail any direct, m etaphysical consequences over how we construe 
individuals, or m ore precisely, the  separation betw een individuals. A world containing 
only one kind, or th ree kinds, as the one I have suggested above, would be consistent w ith 
having exactly the  sam e differentiations betw een individuals as the ones com m only 
acknowledged. It is ju st th a t these individuals would rem ain num erically the same across 
a larger num ber of changes. For example, in the scenario w ith only three kinds I have 
envisaged,300 any individual lead atom  if transm uted  into gold, would rem ain num erically 
the  same. Similarly, any individual gold atom , if transm uted into lead, would not change 
its identity, if all the  o ther conditions beside m aintenance of their material status (i.e. 
spatio-tem poral continuity, continuity of causal history, etc.) were also in place. Such 
a tom s w ould becom e different individuals only in the (counterfactual) scenario in which 
they  were no t m aterial any m ore but biological or artefactual.301
These scenarios w ith only one or three existing kinds are extreme ones and are b rought 
in to  the  discussion here for illustrative reasons only, following the argum entative line of 
our epistem ic ignorance about identity, which Teller alludes to. However, we need only 
bear in m ind th a t given the distance between being a determ ining property and having an 
iden tity  influence (and also, depending on w hether one accepts or no t criterion IV) we 
have two possible scenarios. Either the kinds com m only accepted in exact sciences 
cannot be justifiably said to fulfil criterion IV (and hence be natural)302 or alternatively, a 
m yriad o f o ther kinds fulfilling criterion IV could be envisaged (w ithout us having the 
epistem ic m eans o f adjudicating between alternative kind frameworks).
Yet, as I have said, some kind theorists who stick to the identity  sense o f carving nature
300 .... following Lowe’s proposal over the identity conditions for particulars. Obviously, Lowe would not 
agree that the view that out there we only have three kinds, since he does not embrace criterion IV.
301 Contra Lowe (2001:187) who claims that, in his terms, Spinozism about kinds entails Spinozism about 
individuals. For a more extended discussion of Lowe s views on this matter, see § 2.3.
302 Therefore, we could only accept them as natural in the non-identity sense of carving nature
165
and, a t least in their examples, cite as natural the  kinds com m only accepted in the exact 
sciences.303 They appear, th a t is to say, to consider the epistem ic problem  I have just 
described as solved or as no t even a problem . Their argum entation  proceeds over two 
d istinct (and yet related) lines.
They argue, on the  one hand, th a t if the characterising properties o f lands did not have an 
identity  bearing, then, on an epistem ic/conceptual level, we would no t be able to discern 
am ong the  individuals of our world. O n the o ther hand, they hold th a t we could not 
otherw ise m aintain, on a m etaphysical level, th a t the differences betw een individuals are 
in the  way they are. That is to say, we would either have to acknowledge our epistem ic 
and  conceptual ignorance in distinguishing individuals and /o r we would have to accept, 
as far as the  m etaphysical argum entation is concerned, a world in which the distinctions 
betw een individuals were blurred.304
I do n o t propose to discuss here in any detail their views, bu t only to indicate th a t the 
epistem ic dilem m a I have portrayed above cannot be very easily circum vented by such 
modus tollens - type argum entations. W hat I w ant to suggest, at a m inim um , is th a t the 
purported ly  unpalatable consequences of the  two lines of argum entation  do no t 
straightforw ardly follow from a denial of the  com m only accepted kinds satisfying 
criterion IV.
T hat is because, arguably, we are able to distinguish am ong individuals (individuals as 
m em bers of one land or another included) w ithout knowing which properties have an 
iden tity  influence. Prior to the identification of individuals and kinds is the identification 
o f p ro p ertie s .305 Once properties are pinned down, the differentiations betw een 
individuals should becom e salient. Even in the case of perfectly similar individuals from  a 
qualitative poin t of view, the spatio-tem poral coordinates should stop us from (w hat we
303 Wiggins for instance cites science and the laws of development discovered by scientific enquiry that 
should help us distinguish between kinds. Cf Wiggins (1980: 77-83 et passim); see also Weatherson (2002) 
for a discussion.
304 See for instance Oderberg (2007: 117-125, esp. pp. 123, 125), Hirsch (i997: 7-15)’ Lowe employs the same 
type of argumentation, not in order to defend criterion IV, but to justify his metaphysical categories, which, 
as I have noted in the previous section, are different from his natural kinds; see Lowe (1989. 57)> (2009.
30)
305 See Dupre (1993:80)
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could call) inappropriately applying the converse of Leibniz's law.3°6 Once properties are 
m anifest, kinds are also recognisable and, ipso facto, their m em bers are as well. A book is 
in the  first instance identifiable via its properties. By considering different parts o f these 
properties or even all o f them , various kinds th a t a book can be taken to be a m em ber of 
can th en  be grasped. Accordingly, the book in question can be viewed as a kind m em ber 
and  distinguished from other kind m em bers.
O n the  o ther hand, it is arguably a non-sequitur to infer that, were the kinds com m only 
accepted in the  exact sciences no t to satisfy criterion IV, we would have to accept a 
m odified reality of individuals. Take the scenario I have just discussed, in which we would 
only have three (natural) kinds w ith identity  bearing -  the  biological, the  m aterial and the 
artefactual. To repeat, this scenario seems perfectly consistent w ith having exactly the 
d istinctions betw een individuals in our ontology. No empirical inform ation th a t science 
provides us w ould need to be overlooked if we w anted all the chemical elem ents to be 
m em bers o f the  material natural kind. W e would have, in Teller's idiom, the same 
generalisations abou t co-varying properties.307 W hy should we have the distinctions 
betw een any two atom s blurred if these atom s would always rem ain identical w ith 
them selves as long as they rem ained m aterial (and are spatio-tem porally continuous, etc.) 
and  the  m aterial kind w ould be the only available one for them , as satisfying criterion IV?
It should be said th a t this entire discussion is fram ed in the literature in a ra ther 
idiosyncratic way, in th a t various other notions are introduced. Examples here w ould be 
sortals (where sortals could be concepts, term s or universals), principles of individuation 
(which could be epistem ic or metaphysical), relative and absolute identity, criteria of 
sortal, synchronic and diachronic identity, trans-w orld identification, conceptualist vs. 
realist vs. conceptual-realist frameworks, etc. However, on scrutiny, the core of the 
discussion is close to w hat I have just framed above, in adm ittedly simple term s. Let me 
give just one example -  W iggins's discussion of sortals in his (1967), (1980) and (2001).
306 See Black's famous example against the converse of Leibniz’s law -  the identity of indiscernables, 
discussed for instance in Noonan (2006). See also Grady (2007, section 2.1) who distinguishes, in the context 
of the so-called 'criteria of identity' construed in the cognitive/epistemic sense, between necessary and 
sufficient, and sufficient only criteria. The latter could be based on spatio-temporal coordinates only and 
could suffice for us to identify individuals.
3°7 Qj, jjjg same particulars, were we to speak about samples of stuff (non-countable kinds) and not 
individuals per se.
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W iggins is a defender o f w hat I have called criterion IV. His m ain line of argum entation 
proceeds as a reaction to Geach’s thesis on the sortal relativity of identity  statem ents. 
A ccording to Geach, sta tem ents such as ‘a is the same K as b’ do no t entail th a t a and b 
are the same individual in the sense suggested by absolute identity, i.e. do no t entail th a t 
‘a is a K and b is a K and a=b’.3°8 Geach’s sortal relativity thesis attends his m ore general 
claim  th a t the  notion  of absolute identity is no t intelligible -  roughly, th a t any a=b 
identification is relative to the  resources of a certain language L, such th a t in a different 
language L* a=b does no t hold any m ore (in the sense th a t a and b are no t any m ore 
indiscernable).3°9
U nderstandably, W iggins w ants to reject both  the thesis of relative identity  and the one 
on the  sortal relativity of identity statem ents. If both  the form er and the latter were 
correct, kinds could no t possibly be said to satisfy criterion IV. Interestingly, the latter 
does no t entail the  former, in th a t one could hold the sortal relativity and accept the  
existence o f absolute identity.310 W hat sortal relativity would say in this case is th a t two 
num erically d istinct individuals m ight represent the same kind m em ber.311 Accordingly, 
to  reject the  sortal relativity, while adm itting th a t absolute identity  exists, is simply to say 
th a t the  sam e kind m em ber m ust be one and the same individual. And, it does appear, 
from  the  assum ption th a t the same kind m em bers are the same individuals, there  does 
no t follow th a t the  identity  of individuals depends on the kind they instan tiate .312
Now, W iggins does acknowledge the separation betw een the two theses. His way of 
acknow ledging it however is to indicate tha t there is a difference betw een denying th a t “a 
is the  sam e K as b ” entails ”a=b” and denying th a t “a=b" entails th a t “a and b are o f the
308 That is, Geach denies that for any sortal term K, the expression ‘a is the same K  as b ’ will be satisfied by a 
pair <a,b>  only if the I-predicate of L is satisfied by <a,b>; see Noonan (1996) and also Geach (1962:152) 
apud Shoemaker (1970:532)
309 More precisely, the claim is that we cannot make sense of an I-predicate standing for an equivalence 
relation (a relation that was symmetric, transitive and reflexive and respected Lebniz s law) without 
relativising it to a certain language.
310 See Noonan (1996)
311 See Geach's famous example of the cat Tibbies, whose tail undergoes strange spatio-temporal changes, 
which is analysed for instance in Noonan (2006)
312 Cf Noonan (1981: 264)
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sam e kind IC.313 In other words, for W iggins, to affirm th a t absolute identity  exists is to 
say th a t som ething like criterion IV holds.
To be sure, one could poin t out th a t there are o ther ways of expressing absolute identity, 
via reflexivity and  Leibniz's law simpliciter for instance, w ithout bringing in sortals and 
kinds. A nd of course, as W iggins's critics are keen to underlie, even if we come to term s 
w ith  the  understand ing  of absolute identity  as involving sortals (which are the  conceptual 
coun terpart of kinds, in W iggins) we have no w arrant th a t the respective identity-bearing 
kinds can be know n or th a t they correspond in any way to the com m only accepted kinds 
in science.314 A nother interesting aspect is that, once sortals are invoked in connection to 
the  absolute identity  o f kind m em bers, the separation betw een the two theses I have 
m entioned  above becom es alm ost superfluous - the sortal relativity of identity  sta tem ents 
can be show n to be trivially false in a few steps th a t involve a sortal variant o f Leibniz's 
law.315
W iggins has certain  m eans of defense, which are complicated, interesting and provoking 
b u t do n o t alleviate the epistemic worries about sortals. Thus, W iggins brings up certain  
so-called principles of individuation tha t are m ainly related to our cognitive capacity to 
d iscrim inate betw een individuals w hen employing sortal concepts.316 The claim is th a t an 
individual falling under a certain principle of individuation could no t escape its bearing 
w ithou t ceasing to exist. To the charge of anthropom orphism ,317 W iggins responds by 
negating the  distinction betw een conceptualist and realist ontological stances and 
situating  h im self in a m iddle line. As a conceptual-realist, he a ttribu tes to our cognitive 
activities the  capacity to  single out the identity-related divisions of nature, com m enting 
in addition  th a t these divisions are m ind-independent and yet, they appear to us as they
3131 indicate here Wiggins's distinction between what he calls the thesis R (affirming the sortal relativity) 
and the thesis D (affirming that any absolute identity is to be elucidated by the employment of a sortal). See 
Wiggins (1980: 48-50) Wiggins (1967:1) and also Shoemaker (1970: 529,539), Noonan (1981: 260,261,264) for 
discussion
314 See Mackie (1994:330, 331)
315 The steps are the following i) a is the same K as b (Assumption) ii) a and b are both K* (Assumption) iii) if 
a and b are the same K, then they have all of the same properties (Leibniz' Law) iv) b is the same K* as b 
(Reflexivity) v) b has the property of being the same K* as b (from iv) vi) a has the property o f being the same 
K* as b (from iii and v) vii) a is the same K* as b (from vi) See Grady (2007: section 3.2) and Wiggins (1980: 
22) apud Noonan (1981: 262)
316 See Wiggins (1980, chapter 4) apud Mackie (i994: 321> 322)
3‘7See Lowe (2003: 818-820) and also Yablo (2003)
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do because our concepts are in the  way they are and no t otherwise. Objects, says W iggins, 
do no t single out them selves' -  they are the fish th a t do no t slip through the m esh tha t 
we cast.318 The m atters are com plicated by the fact th a t for W iggins one principle of 
individuation can be shared by different sortals and it is no t very clear which sortals share 
w hich principles.319
As I have said, it is no t my purpose here to explore in m ore detail the  niceties o f identity  
and  identity-influencing properties. In the context o f our com parison, w hether the  
determ ining  properties of the gold kind, as com m only recognized, have an identity  
bearing over gold samples, is an issue th a t I will rem ain neutral on. Overall, w hat I just 
w an ted  to  suggest was th a t w hether criterion IV and the identity-sense o f ‘carving natu re  
a t its jo in ts’ could be employed in order to deem  as natural the  com m only accepted kinds 
in the  exact sciences is a very com plicated affair.
§ 3 .7  F u r t h e r  rem ark s  o n  m e d ic a l  k in d s
My purpose in the  first th ree chapters of this thesis was to indicate, via a representative 
com parison, th a t as regards the life-threatening conditions in somatic pathology, there 
are no convincing reasons to affirm th a t m edicine lacks a determ inate structure o f natural 
kinds, in the  sense in which exact sciences can be said to possess such a structure.
The m ain  direction of the entire enquiry was laid out in the realism /nom inalism  
discussion of §1.4 .1 now wish to recapitulate my rationale, delineate the precise sphere o f 
m y conclusions and add some com m ents about the picture of natural kinds th a t can be 
inferred from  my discussion.
3l8Wiggins (2001:159) apud Lowe (2001:817)
319Mackie observes Wiggins's hesitations when it comes to the sortal 'animal' for instance and argues that 
the only characterisation of what a principle of individuation corresponds to on an ontological level 
(patterns o f activity and development) is insufficient to make sense o f which biological sortals share which 
principle of individuation; see Mackie (1994: 325> 32^)' Parenthetically, almost all o f Wiggins s 
commentators recognize the originality of his work but remark his convoluted style o f writing, see Lowe 
(2003: 816), Shoemaker (1970: 529) and Noonan (1981: 260)
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W hile rem aining agnostic abou t w hat natural kinds really are, one can safely assum e th a t 
natu ral kinds (if nature has indeed such a m etaphysical category) are to be found in the 
exact sciences. In this sense, gold can be construed as a classical natural kind. Using all 
criteria o f m em bership advanced in the literature, one can com pare then, from such an 
agnostic position, a m edical kind and a classical natural kind. There are various reasons 
w hy such a com parison m ight appear as unintelligible and one criterion of m em bership is 
deeply involved in the  intuitive obstacles th a t have to be dealt with. I have used criterion 
IV (the identity  requirem ent) in order to frame a basic divide betw een the various 
substan tia tions o f the intuitive assum ption th a t natural kinds carve nature a t its jo in ts’. 
The respective divide represented a guiding line for my analysis. The identity  of particular 
kind m em bers, I have further argued, has to do no t only w ith how one situates oneself 
against the claims th a t natural lands ‘show w hat things are’, delineate ‘the  fundam ental 
divisions o f na tu re ’, etc. It is also involved in the argum entations surrounding the  o ther 
criteria o f m em bership (VIb, VII and VIII, th a t is, N&S, non-overlapping and non-phase 
requirem ents, respectively) and how the two kinds under com parison fare w ith regard to 
them . My conclusion was th a t unless the identity-related sense of carving nature  a t its 
jo in ts is adopted  -  and serious epistemic difficulties stand in the way of this option -  no 
ontological gap can be proven betw een the two kinds.
Some further clarifications need to be added to this conclusion. I should stress first th a t 
the  use o f criterion IV in such a pivotal role in my analysis did not represent a deviation 
from  the  general line o f neutrality vis-i-vis the kind realism discussion th a t I have 
adop ted  - none of the two branches of ‘carving nature at its jo ints’ was given priority  in 
any way. A nother (related) qualification tha t should be em phasized is also concerned 
w ith the  intuitive burden  associated with natural kinds and especially w ith chemical 
elem ents. Irrespective of w hat argum ents could possibly be adduced, one still feels th a t 
gold and  all the chemical elem ents present features th a t situate them  above the level o f 
diseases. However, my conclusion was not tha t there is no difference a t all betw een the 
(m em bers of) GD land and the gold kind. Throughout this chapter, I have noted several 
differences betw een the m em bers of the two kinds in question. Let me recapitulate them .
The m em bers o f the  gold kind exhibit behaviours tha t are described by strict laws 
w hereas the  m em bers o f the GD kind are arguably governed by ceteris paribus laws. Even
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though  bo th  kinds are delineated by patterns o f co-instantiated determ ining properties, 
in the  case of the gold kind such properties explain alm ost all of the  causal in teractions in 
w hich its m em bers are involved, whereas in the  case of the  GD kind the pathological 
properties explain only a few of the  behaviours and superficial properties exhibited by the 
hum an  organism s. M oreover, the determ ining properties of gold are m uch m ore 'stable'. 
T hat is, th e ir unity, their co-instantiation in particulars is m uch harder to d isrupt than  
the  unity  o f the  determ ining  properties of the  GD kind. Issues concerning supervenience 
and  reductionism  betw een the biological and the physical, which I could no t discuss here, 
could also be b rought in to underlie differences betw een the m em bers o f the  two kinds.
N onetheless, all these differences - insofar as one looks specifically a t the  m etaphysical 
category o f (natural) kinds and not at the (related) categories of causation, laws, 
properties, universals, etc. -  represent differences of degree. They do no t am oun t to an 
ontological gap w hen the criteria of (natural) kind m em bership are carefully reckoned 
w ith.
My discussion o f the  criteria of m em bership was no t a simple application of the 
requirem ents involved. Along the analysis, I have discussed critically several criteria of 
m em bership  (nam ely criterion VTb, VII and VIII). More precisely, I have shown in chapter 
2 th a t if they are no t read in conjunction w ith criterion IV (and if criterion IV is shown 
n o t to be satisfied), they are groundless. No m atter w hat m etaphysical elem ents are 
invoked to back up these criteria (substantive universals, essences, laws) if the identity  o f 
k ind m em bers was no t brought in, then  they could only be involved in circular reasoning 
th a t w ould arbitrarily  characterise the category of natural kind.
A fter m y discussion, the  ontological dependency betw een the criteria of m em bership, 
w hich were prelim inarily presented in chapter 1, can now be reform ulated using the 
following diagram . In so far as my enquiry results in general conclusions abou t the 
character o f natural kinds, the below representation of the dependencies betw een 
various features a ttribu ted  to the metaphysical category of natural kinds would represent 
m y view on how  should any discussion about the divisions of nature be pursued.
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FIGURE 16 ONTOLOGICAL DEPENDENCIES BETWEEN CRITERIA OF NATURAL KIND MEMBERSHIP
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* The sort o f  properties characterizing a 
kind which fulfills criterion III would have 
to be at least natural (i.e. to satisfy criterion 
I) and at least determining properties (i.e. 
to satisfy criterion II). In other words, 
criterion III entails criteria II and I.
** The m ost plausible candidates for 
identity influencing properties are the 
properties involved in laws.
*** Only if  criterion IV was satisfied kinds 
could be attributed necessary and 
sufficient conditions o f  membership, 
would always be in a spcdcs-genus 
hierarchy if  overlapping and would be 
differentiated from their phases. In other 
words, satisfaction o f  cither criterion VIb, 
VII or VIII entails that criterion IV is also 
satisfied.
# That kinds participate in co-instantiation 
inductions means that they are 
characterised by natural properties.
## Co-instantiation inductions are 
dependent upon prior causal inductions.
### The existence o f  clusters resulting 
from ‘the causal structure’ o f  the world 
represent the metaphysical ground for co­
instantiation inductions. That is, 
satisfaction o f  criterion Via represent a 
sufficient condition for satisfaction o f  
criterion V.
My prim ary in terest is however in medical kinds, against the backdrop of the (already 
very rich) literature  on kinds in the exact sciences. I should thus finally state that, on the 
non-identity-rela ted  sense of ‘carving nature at its joints’, I adhere to (and hope to have 
argued intelligibly in favour of) a framework of natural kinds of diseases th a t suits, I 
believe, m edical research and practice. In medicine we do have determ ining properties 
th a t are explanatory powerful. They are to be found in clusters tha t are instantiated  by 
diseased organism s. The clusters can overlap each other and their lim its m ight be fuzzy, 
in the  m inim al sense in which for some somatic (life-threatening) illnesses there are no 
necessary and  sufficient conditions for diagnosis. In all the branches of somatic medicine, 
genetic classifications criss-cross with infectious, im m une or m orphopathologic schem es 
of arranging diseases and syndromes. Organisms can instantiate m ultiple diseases and the
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trea tm en t o f the  sym ptom s they exhibit is directed a t elim inating the determ ining 
properties th a t produce them .
To stress, th a t certain  criteria of natural kind m em bership are failed by disease kinds 
should no t worry us in the least. These criteria would have ontological significance only if 
they  were justified and I have shown th a t in their curren t form they are not. As to the  very 
role played by classifications in medicine, it is w orth adding that, for instance, the  fact 
th a t the  non-overlapping criterion is no t considered in organizing disease entities is 
ra ther fortunate. As I said, in medicine, classifications criss-cross each o ther depending 
on w hat de term ining  properties are under focus, be they genetical, im m unological, anato- 
pathological or im m unological. These classifications may coincide and gather under their 
heading  the  same groups of hum an organism  w ith the same symptom s; bu t they do not 
always do so and this can only contribute to the richness of explanatory hypotheses in use 
for explaining diseases.320
O ne aspect I w ould have liked to discuss more was the issue of 
reductionism /supervenience of causal powers. Since my m odel has a t its centre 
determ in ing  properties (as causally efficient properties) and these determ ining properties 
are clustered in individuals as a result of the causal structure of the world, causation is in 
a sense central to my approach. I have explained however in §3.1 and §3.2 why I believe 
th a t the  niceties o f the causation-discussions do not necessarily have to be brought in 
w hen discussing the  them e of natural kinds. One can define the determ ining pathological 
p roperties ra ther loosely, as those biological, m icrostructural properties th a t can act as 
causes for observable pathological properties and behaviours (the symptom s). The 
existence o f such properties can be inferred by a double negation, so to speak -  it is
320 For instance, immunology has quite a different classificatory system than antomo-pathology or 
infectious diseases. What happens in practice is that these classificatory systems, which obviously overlap 
each other, are used complementary in order to explain particular diseases, particular patients and their 
symptoms. Take the case of glomerulonephritis, for instance, which is categorised into several different 
pathological patterns vis-a-vis the level of inflammation in glomeruli, the immunoglobulin deposits present 
in the mesangial matrix or against the basal membrane, the presence of fibrin deposits (crescents) in the 
Bowman space, etc. (see Kasper et al 2008). Hence we have, as disease kinds, infectious glomerulonephritis 
(resulting from classifications on infectious causal grounds) membraneous glomerulonephritis (on immune 
grounds) crescentic glomerulonephritis (on morpho-pathological grounds), etc. These kinds criss-cross 
each other. Far from being a problem, the overlapping classifications corresponding to these kinds offer 
multiple explanatory hypotheses that concur in the diagnosis and treatment of any patient with fever, 
hematuria, proteinuria, nephronic or nephritic syndroms, etc.
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im possible th a t processes in m edicine happen by chance, accidentally. Hence, 
classifications th a t follow causally efficient bases shared by organism s are closer to being 
natural kinds th an  classifications based on o ther grounds (say, astrological influences, or 
belief in p lo tin ian  universals, as it was the case for syphilis or epilepsy). In fact Boyd, the 
m ain  p roponen t o f the  m odel I have (roughly) adopted, does not discuss in any detail 
causation a t any poin t of his argum entation about the hom eostatic clusters to be found in 
the  special sciences.
The issue o f reductionism /supervenience for causal powers would have deserved m ore 
a tten tio n  though, simply because, were the (biological and) medical causal powers 
reducible to the  causal powers of the physical and chemical level, the  ontological gap, 
w hich I have incessantly tried  to deny as holding betw een the two kinds under 
com parison, w ould be unavoidable. However, reductionism  is a m etaphysical thesis th a t 
is considered a t least controversial in the curren t philosophy of science and a to ken /token  
supervenience approach is consistent w ith the argum entation I have employed. T hat at 
m ost token /token  supervenience holds for the (biological and) medical causes vis-^-vis 
their underlying physical base was in fact one of the m ain assum ptions of this thesis th a t I 
have stated  from the In troduction .321
N onetheless, a certain  aspect of medical causation will be explored in the second part of 
the  p resen t thesis, in relation to the functional explanations th a t can be addressed to 
diseased organism s. More precisely, I will ask in chapter 4 how precisely the sym ptom s 
exhibited by the m em bers o f disease kinds should be in terpreted , w hen the 
H um ean/an ti-H um ean  dispute is reckoned w ith and the biological functions are no t 
(only) required  to  identify diseases, bu t (also) to explain them .
321 See Sober (1999) for a discussion of the bad prospects that type-type reductionism has as far as the 
biology/physics interface is concerned. See also Bird (2008) for a proposal on how emergentism could in 
fact be viewed as a tenable position in biology.
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C h a p t e r  4  F u n c t i o n a l  e x p l a n a t io n s
In t r o d u c t io n
The presen t chapter continues the previous investigation into m edical kinds in the 
direction  o f scientific explanations. Obviously, the  pragm atic reason why classifications 
abound  in sciences is th a t they sm ooth out the  way tow ards explaining the behaviour o f 
classified particulars. Simply put, pointing out the  kind m em bership o f a particular is at 
the  sam e tim e providing an explanation for th a t particular’s behaviour. For instance, in 
order to explain why a particular piece of yellow stuff conducts electricity and dissolves in 
a HCI/HNO3 solution, one can indicate th a t the respective piece o f stuff belongs to the 
kind gold (and gold typically conducts electricity and dissolves in aqua regia).
In general, natural kinds are associated w ith positive causal explanations. That is, the 
behaviour o f a particular is reckoned w ith by pointing out th a t the  properties 
characteristic o f its natural kind are responsible for it, in a positive way. That kind 
m em bership  can provide such positive causal explanations for the behaviours and 
properties displayed by various individuals is due to kinds being characterised by patterns 
o f determining properties. More precisely, we have some land specific, causal explanations 
because determ ining  properties, on a basic definition, represent positive causes -  their 
presence determ ines the em ergence and m aintenance of certain effects.
I have tried  to show in chapters 2 and 3 tha t one can speak about natural kinds in som atic 
m edicine w ith the same metaphysical confidence as one can talk about natural kinds in 
the  exact sciences. N atural kinds of diseases are to be found by tracing out the patterns of 
co-instan tia tion  of ‘pathological’ determ ining properties -  m icrostructural biological 
properties a ttended  by causal powers. On this account of medical kinds, w hat follows is 
that, ju st as in the  exact sciences, the m em bership of an organism  into a kind of disease 
constitu tes an  explanation for the pathological behaviours and properties exhibited by 
the  organism  in question.
To stick w ith  the case discussed in the previous chapter, a valid explanation of why a
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certain  organism  displays w eight loss, goitre, tachycardia, intolerance to heat and 
exophthalm ia is provided by indicating the m em bership of th a t organism  in the GD 
(Graves’ Disease) kind. The sym ptom s of such an organism  are explained by its kind 
m em bership  because the GD kind is characterised, on a fundam ental level, by a cluster of 
determ ining  properties such as increased glucose cellular absorption, high m em branar 
concen tration  of the Na+/K+ ATPase, increased seric level of thyroxin, etc., properties 
w hich cause the em ergence of those symptoms.
O ne can, o f course, seek further explanations as to why such determ ining properties are 
in place, and as I discussed in chapter 3 (in the context of co-instantiation induction), one 
should be able to indicate causal m echanism s, either internal or external, th a t produce 
the  co-instan tia tion  by an organism  of whatever determ ining properties are under 
scrutiny.
In m edicine (as in the  m edical philosophical literature)322 however, a large part of the
explanations in use do not take an overt causal form but are rather shaped in term s of
biological dys-functions (or failures to function). The absence of certain functional effects, 
in o ther words, is taken as responsible for the state of disordered organisms. The 
rationale for such an approach is that, since diseases are states in which biological 
functions fail, an explanation of why a particular organism  is diseased should reveal 
w hich function (of which items) precisely fails in tha t organism. To retu rn  to our 
example, an adequate explanation in this schem e for the state of a Graves’ diseased
organism  w ould be th a t its thyroid fails to fulfil its proper function.
This is a very broad way of speaking about the explanations founded on dys-functions and 
there  are of course num erous details, depending on the account of function adopted, 
w hich need to be taken into consideration. These details will be discussed later in this 
chapter. However, w hat is im portant to stress at this stage is that, on this construal of 
pathological explanations, the ‘W hy’ question tha t is being answered by pinning down 
failures of functions is intim ately connected with the disease/non-disease distinction. 
T hat is because such explanations seek to explain the diseased states o f organism s 
prim arily  in the  sense of revealing why these are not healthy states. Pointing out th a t a
322 See for instance Neander (1991)
certain  organism  has a dys-functional thyroid is primarily supposed to explain why th a t 
organism  is no t healthy, and not why it specifically has such and such symptom s.
O ne poin t I have underlined in the In troduction to this thesis was th a t the precise 
distinction  betw een disease and health  is beyond the scope o f the p resent thesis, which is 
focused solely on life-threatening conditions in somatic m edicine. Indeed, the  dilem m a of 
how  one can decide in borderline cases which condition is a disease and which no t does 
n o t influence a t all the legitimacy o f my enquiry in chapters 1-3 into the natural kinds of 
som atic m edicine. In a similar vein, w hat I w ant to em phasize at the  beginning o f this 
chapter is that, w hen it comes to functional explanations for som atic diseases construed 
as natural kinds, the disease/non-disease distinction is also of little in terest for the 
p resen t enquiry. Here I am  not concerned w ith the question of w hether some borderline 
conditions should be classified as diseases or not. Rather, by focusing on organism s whose 
survival is threatened , I w ant to consider how we can reconcile the (dys-)function based 
register of m edical explanations provided for their sym ptom s w ith the assum ption th a t 
diseases are natural kinds and tha t the behaviour of such ill organism s should be dealt 
w ith, on an  explanatory level, by indicating the positive causes characteristic o f (or 
identifiable through) their kind.
A m ong o ther reasons, it is necessary to treat functional explanations and kind-specific 
explanations together because the usual (dys)-function register provides incom plete 
explanatory answers. As I said, m ost theorists would hold tha t pointing out th a t a thyroid 
o f a particular organism  exhibiting such and such Graves’ Disease sym ptom s fails to 
function could in principle illuminate why that organism  is diseased, as opposed to being 
healthy.323 However, if the ‘W hy’-question is directed at the very presence of those 
sym ptom s - ‘W hy intolerance to heat, goitre, exophthalmia, and increased gastric transit?’
- indicating in response the failure to function properly of a thyroid can only give an 
incom plete answer. Adm ittedly, this answer am ounts to a sort o f  explanation for the 
sym ptom s a t hand, because the hum an organism works on grounds of fine-grained 
in terconnections betw een different biological item s and hence, the  failure to function 
properly  o f one of them  explains in a sense the disruption of the whole system.
323 There are though powerful reasons to think that functions could not draw rigorously the distinction 
between disease and health. See Cooper (2002) for a review of the problems that functions face in this 
regard.
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N evertheless, it represents a vague form of explanation, I shall argue, since it just appeals 
to negative causes of the phenom ena at hand.
Inform ally put, w hat is conveyed by such an  explanation is th a t ‘som ething has gone 
w rong w ith  the thyroid o f th a t organism ’. The ‘W hy’ interrogation rem ains though, in 
need o f a specific answer -  to keep up the inform al register, ‘yes, som ething has definitely 
gone w rong w ith th a t thyroid and the internal m echanism  of th a t organism  has been 
disrupted, bu t still, why goitre, exophthalm ia and increased transit, and not, say, 
shortness of breath , acrom engalia and oedemas?’
Such explanations based on failures to function cannot adequately explain the sym ptom s 
exhibited by a particular organism. W e need to say m ore than  ‘som ething has gone wrong 
w ith  the  biological item  X’ w hen we are dealing w ith an organism  exhibiting specific 
sym ptom s. W e can say som ething more, I will argue, if we make reference in our 
functional explanations to determ ining properties, which represent positive causes for the 
effects (sym ptom s) to be explained.324
The suggestion I will advance is that instead of (or com plem entary to) identifying the 
dys-functioning of biological items, we should (also) seek to identify in pathological 
contexts their functioning, per se. Kind specific explanations th a t refer to positive causes, 
I will argue, could be in terpreted  as functional explanations of diseases - in the 
paradoxical sense though in which symptoms and diseased states result from the proper 
functioning of biological item s and not their functioning failure.
In order to show this, I shall appeal to a particular account of function and shall pursue 
the  following rationale: to explain positively pathological sym ptom s is to reveal 
determ in ing  properties. The determ ining properties are micro structural characteristics of 
biological item s attended  by causal powers. For a biological item, to function is to
324 What I shall be focusing on in this chapter are explanations connected with the relation of efficient 
causality between determining properties and symptoms. An equally important form of explanation is that 
founded on the dependence relation holding between causal mechanisms (internal or external) and the 
presence of the determining properties themselves. Both sorts of explanation work on the same vein - they 
are grounded in the causal structure of the (biological) world. The conclusions I shall draw here with 
respect to the former type of explanation (based on the dependency between determining properties and 
symptoms) could easily be applied with respect to the latter type of explanation (based on the dependency 
between causal mechanisms and the determining properties themselves).
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produce certain  effects. If functions are construed as m anifestations o f causal powers, and 
the  sym ptom s are found to be am ongst the  m anifestations of those causal powers, then  
the  required  causally positive, kind specific explanations can be in terpreted  as being 
functional explanations -  explanations pointing out not the failure, b u t the  proper 
functioning of biological items.
In order to forge th is in terpretation, I shall appeal to an anti-H um ean construal o f causal 
powers. M ore precisely, I shall invoke Nancy Cartwright's construal of causation, which is 
particularly  suitable for the special sciences. I’ll argue th a t Cartw right’s capacities could 
provide the m etaphysical ground for the searched-for reconciliation betw een functional 
explanations and kind specific, causally positive explanations. If organism s are viewed as 
nomological machines, I shall argue, appealing to another im portan t notion in 
C artw right’s schem e, then  the functioning of biological item s could be invoked in order 
to  vindicate pathological’ explanations addressed to organism s in singular cases, th a t is, 
explanations connected w ith singular causal interactions involving diseases.325
The structu re  o f this chapter is as follows. In §4.11 shall briefly review the state o f the  a rt 
w ith  regard to the explanatory role of functions in biology and derivatively in m edicine. 
In §4.2 I shall discuss the notion of causal power and present its usefulness in 
explanations, following closely Nancy Cartwright’s critique of the H um ean account of 
causation. In §4.3 I shall present the problem s tha t function based explanations have in 
the  m edical realm  and how these problem s may be solved if the functioning in 
pathological conditions is construed as the m anifesting of capacities. The in terp reta tion  
o f organism s as nomological m achines will be discussed in §3.4, which will insist on the 
causal vein o f th is chapter, especially on the problem  of justifying singular causal claims.
325 As far as the methodology and scope of my enquiry is concerned. I should emphasize that my purpose in 
the present chapter is not to adjudicate between the Humean and anti-Humean options advanced in the 
literature or between the various accounts of biological functions on offer, but simply to connect the 
discussion over functional explanations in medicine with an area in the philosophy of science that has been 
neglected.
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§ 4 -i B iological  f u n c t io n s  a n d  their  role in  explan atio ns
W hat are biological (proper) functions? In w hat does the (proper) functioning o f item s 
consist? A prelim inary bu t simple and useful definition is th a t for biological items, 
functioning is producing effects, and the proper functioning of an item  is bringing forth a 
restricted  range of ‘special’ effects, out of the overall effects it could and does produce. 
The heart, to use a stock example, produces a m ultitude o f effects th a t could be 
considered functions: via closing and opening its valves, it produces acoustic-effects 
audible w ith the stethoscope; via endocrine-like atrial myocytes, it secrets the atrial 
natriu retic  horm one, via its rhythm ic contractions it propels blood into the arteries etc. 
O u t o f all these effects however, the propelling of blood is considered to be a ‘privileged’ 
effect, and producing it is construed as being the proper function of any heart.
W hy is that?  Because, the usual answer goes, to propel blood is normative and non­
accidental for hearts. Norm ativity and non-accidentalness are the two crucial criteria th a t 
the  'special' effects should satisfy in order to qualify as the effects produced in the  proper 
functioning of item s.326 They are comm only introduced in the literature using intuitive 
exam ples concerning artefacts. This is my own attem pt. Think of a clock throw n into a 
w indow  by, say, a naughty child who wants to annoy her neighbour. Even though one of 
the  actual effects produced by the clock in tha t situation is to break the glass, intuitively, 
th is represents an accidental effect. The clock’s non-accidental effect is, in contrast, the 
actual ro ta tion  of its moving hands in order to m easure time. Suppose th a t after the 
collision w ith  the window glass, its hands do not move any more. Even if the effect of 
m easuring tim e is not actually exhibited, its function still rem ains to indicate time, th a t 
is, to  produce the ro tation  of its hands. This is what, in a m odal register, it should do, 
w hat the  norm ativity  of its function am ounts to.
W hat such examples involving artefacts convey then  in an intuitive m anner is that, ou t of 
the  actual effects produced by an item, some are accidental and some are not. Moreover, 
ou t o f the  potential effects tha t could be produced by an item, some of them  are 
norm ative, w hereas others are not. Now, the intuitions attending the  functioning of
tJ-jg function literature, many other criteria are also discussed. Wouters (2005) for instance lists 30 
criteria. However, most of them are theory laden and depend in the end on the two crucial criteria I discuss 
above.
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artefacts apply also to a certain  extent to biological items. W e can grasp som ehow th a t a 
heart actually propelling blood is producing an effect th a t is non-accidental, in contrast 
to the  effect of actually producing noises audible w ith the stethoscope. O n the o ther 
hand, it is som ew hat intelligible th a t a m alform ed heart, which does not actually produce 
the  effect of propelling blood, still should produce it - th is is w hat the  norm ativity o f its 
function consists in.
The m ethod  of presenting the criteria of norm ativity and non-accidentalness by using 
exam ples of artefacts is useful (because it appeals to certain in tu itions th a t we have) and 
a t the  same tim e slightly m isleading (because the conten t of these in tu itions rem ains 
im plicit). W hat are, explicitly, the norm ativity and non-accidentalness of functions? How 
can we cash out the in tu ition  tha t some of the effects produced by an item  (natural or 
artificial) are special’?
The obvious th ing  to say would be tha t the proper functions address goals associated w ith 
the activity o f items. In the case of artefacts, the intuitive claim th a t they have ‘special’ 
effects should in principle be justified by the fact th a t artefacts are objects designed for a 
certain  purpose - clocks are designed for showing tim e and insofar as a clock rem ains the 
kind o f artefact th a t it is, its functioning should follow the goal in tended for it.
O ne could try  to find som ew hat similar justifications on the biological side. An age-old 
trad ition  sees biological items as being them selves ‘designed’ and their functioning is 
in terp re ted  as a proof of God's existence.327 There is an even older tradition, the  
A ristotelian one, according to which items have natures in which goals are 'ingrained', 
such th a t by functioning and producing specific goal-directed effects, item s actualize 
the ir nature  and hence are (or come to be) w hat they are.328 Nonetheless, the appeal to 
Creationism  or Aristotelianism  has lost its appeal nowadays, to say the least - creationism  
in biology faded away after Darwin, and Aristotelianism  was m ore or less expelled from 
science by the early m odern empiricists.329
Yet, functions continue to be used and invoked in biology both  by philosophers and
327 See Ariew (2007), Bigelow and Pargetter (i99o: 327> 32^)
328 See De Angelis (2003), Ariew (2002)
329 Some Aristotelians have survived nowadays though; see for instance Megone (1998). I shall come back to 
the issue of Aristotelianism in the final section of this thesis with some very brief remarks.
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scientists. In contem porary discussions, there are two m ain philosophical accounts of 
function th a t try  to preserve the in tu ition  of non accidentalness (and norm ativity, in the 
case o f one of them ) for the effects produced by biological items, while attem pting  to 
elim inate (or naturalise) goals.330 I shall call them  the W right and Cum m ins accounts and 
shall describe for each of them  how the 'special' effects are identified and w hat their 
(explanatory) connection to diseases is. For simplicity, I shall hence use henceforth the 
no tation  W -function and W -effects for the W right function and the W right special 
effects, and  C-function and C-effects for the Cum m ins function and the Cum m ins special 
effects, respectively.
The W right account, originally introduced in W right (1973), adopts the prem ise th a t 
biological item s have goals, bu t tries to naturalize them , th a t is, tries to justify the  non- 
accidentalness and norm ativity of the functional activity of item s only in term s of 
efficient causality, w ithout appealing to Creationism, Aristotelian natures or any other 
reference to final causes. In this account, the non-accidental character of proper functions 
is viewed as intim ately connected w ith the very presence of item s in organisms. Biological 
item s, po in t ou t the  proponents of this account, were selected in the process o f evolution 
because o f  producing certain effects - the W -effects.331 These effects enhanced the chances 
o f organism s’ survival and consequently, the genetic bases of the item s producing them  
was stabilised at the  level of populations. Thus, since item s are present in organism s 
because o f  producing the W -effects, it is inferred, to produce these W  effects is n o n ­
accidental. Item s have the goal of producing these effects, a goal th a t is revealed by the 
(causally efficient) process of natural selection.
Hence, in the  W right line, tha t hearts actually propel blood is a non-accidental effect -  an 
effect following a goal -  in the sense tha t hearts exist in the organism s because of 
producing th is W  effect. Normativity is also adopted. Hearts should produce the W  - 
effects due to which they were selected. A genetically m alform ed heart should propel
330 I follow here Godfrey-Smith (1993) who distinguishes between two 'families' of function accounts.
331 Often, proponents of this account speak of the recent past (Godfrey-Smith, 1994), in order to avoid the 
situations in which there was a stark evolutionary change in the effects delivered by an item. There are 
temporal variants of the Wright line in which it is not the past evolution, but the present (Kitcher, 1993) or 
the future (Bigelow and Pargetter, 1990) ones that are invoked in connection to the presence of an item. 
More precisely, when a function attribution has as temporal context the present, the Wright effects should 
be responsible for the maintenance of current items; when the future is invoked, the Wright effects o f an 
item should determine (or increase the chances of) its Jiiture maintenance.
blood, even if it is no t capable of actually doing it, since the (selection related) goal of 
producing the W -effects is ‘a ttached’ to it in every circum stance in which it is a heart a t 
all.332
Take the heart, for instance. Biologists need and have a category that ranges across species, but hearts are 
morphologically diverse across different species. Some hearts have a single pump with one auricle, some a 
single pump with two auricles, some have a ventricle partly partitioned, and some, like us, have the two 
separate ventricles. Hearts are also morphologically diverse within a species, because o f pathological 
deviations from the norm, due to disease, injury or deformity. They are all, however, organs fo r  pum ping  
blood. Not that all instances of hearts are able to pump blood. Some are too disabled. However, they are all 
supposed  to pump blood; by which I mean that pumping blood is what they were selected for—it is their 
proper function'. (Neander 1991: 467, italics original, underlines added)
O n a critical note, the  m ain problem  of this argum entation is the move from the prem ise 
th a t ‘hearts exist a t all because of producing certain W  effects’ to the conclusion th a t 
’hearts exist for the purpose of producing certain W -effects’. Is this move legitim ate (given 
th a t the  causality involved in evolution is strictly efficient causality)? It has been argued 
th a t it is no t and th a t goals are not naturalised but elim inated by this ‘evolutionary’ 
strategy.333 If goals are elim inated however, then  viewing the W -effects as ‘special’ effects 
o f biological item s appears arbitrary, and characterising them  as non-accidental and 
norm ative rem ains just a facon de parler.334
Now, w hat do the W -functions explain? In biology, since the W -effects cause the 
stabilization of the  genetic bases of their producing items, the W  functions explain why 
(biological) item s are present in organisms. In medicine, the scope o f the explanatory 
usefulness of the W -functions is grounded in the alleged norm ativity of the  W  effects. 
M ore precisely, the  presence of the W  effects is used as a m eans to define the healthy 
states o f organisms. Accordingly, the W right dys-functions are taken to explain why
332 For the past-focused variants of the Wright line, items m ust deliver the effect for which the item was 
selected. For the present-focused variants, they m ust determine the effects for which the item is currently 
maintained. Finally for the future-focused variants, the normative effects are those that will maintain that 
item.
333 Sometimes, the premise that ‘hearts exist at all because of producing certain W effects’ is presented as 
being in fact synonymous to the desired statement that hearts exist at all fo r  the purpose  of producing 
certain W^-effects’. But these two statements are obviously not equivalent, the critics o f the Wright account 
claim. They could be equivalent only if the premise of divine creation or (or that of Aristotelian natures) 
was also introduced and acknowledged in the overall rationale. See for instance Schaffner (1993)
334 See Juengst (1983:132-135), Sandler and Agich (1995).
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certain states o f organisms are not healthy.
Although a particular kidney might fail to filter blood, kidneys typically manage to perform their proper 
function, and so they standardly contribute to the fitness of organisms of the type [...] However, biological 
norms cannot be reduced to statistical norms, as we can see by noting that dysfunction can become 
widespread within a population through epidemics or major environmental disorders. A statistical 
definition of biological norms implies that when a trait standardly fails to perform its function, its function 
ceases to be its function [...] It is the function o f kidneys (both normal and abnormal) to filter wastes from  
blood because that is what kidneys did in ancestral organisms that caused them to be favoured by natural 
selection and this remains true even if  renal failures become universal’ (Neander, 1991:182,183, italics added)
Now, let us move on to the o ther m ain approach to functions and ‘special’ effects. The 
Cum m ins account (1975), aims to move the focus of the discussion from the evolutionary 
process to the  curren t organisation of organs and systems in organism s and to elim inate 
altogether goals from our construal of functions.335 As a consequence, it rejects the  claim 
th a t the  functional effects of an item  could be norm ative (in the W right sense or on any 
o ther in terpreta tion). However, it still preserves the claim that the functional effects are 
non-accidental, in a m uch looser sense though, to wit, in the sense th a t the functional 
effects explain some capacity of a relevant complex biological system in which the item s 
producing  them  are in tegrated .336
A relevant complex system, according to the Cum m ins account, is characterised by series 
o f fine-grained interactions between different item s w ith a specific spatio-tem poral 
a rrangem ent, each item  perform ing a specific task tha t contributes to the m aintenance of 
certain  capacities. The effects actually produced by items, which are relevant for the 
capacities of systems, are categorised as C-effects and producing them  is deem ed to be 
the  C-function o f the item s in question. Since the C-effects o f an item  cause (in part) the 
capacity of the system th a t contains them , they explain its capacity and accordingly, are 
taken  to be non-accidental.
335 Variants o f this account are the life-chances approach (Canfield, 1964) and the survival and reproduction 
approach (Boorse, 1977) apud Wouters (1999)
336 See Cummins (1975), Craver (2001) and also Bigelow and Pargetter (1990: 326). Cummins presents his 
account as an application of an Inference to the Best Explanation strategy for biological systems. On a 
different note, Cummins also views the functioning of biological items as being the manifesting of 
dispositions associated to them. In fact, that the effects produced by items should be manifestations of 
dispositions is just another restriction imposed by Cummins in order to select his non-accidental C-effects.
I shall return later to this dispositional aspect of his account in §4.3-
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To propel blood is a C-function of the heart in the Cum m ins line because the heart is part 
o f a com plex system, the circulatory system, in which it contributes to the overall capacity 
to deliver oxygen, elim inate wastes, etc. This role depends on the spatial configuration of 
the  heart in the circulatory system. It also depends on the tim ing of its contractions and 
the  correlation w ith the different tasks o f the o ther item s in the system (e.g. the sensing 
o f blood pressure and 02/C02 concentration realized by the receptors from the aortic 
notch, the  secreting of rennin  by the renal interstitial tissue in response to N a+ variations 
in the  renal afferent arterioles, etc). Given th a t w ithin such a system the propelling o f the 
blood causes (in part) the overall capacity to deliver oxygen and elim inate wastes, th is C- 
effect o f the  heart explains why the circulatory system is able to exercise its capacities and 
therefore is non-accidental.
No goal is m entioned  in such a ‘Cum m ins analysis’ of the effects of an item  produced 
w ith in  a complex system, and hence the norm ativity aspect of functions can be safely pu t 
aside. If in  a circulatory system a heart ceases to deliver its C-effects, such th a t the  overall 
capacity can no longer be m aintained, this simply means, in the Cum m ins schem e, th a t 
the  heart in question loses its C-function - since the circulatory system does no t m aintain  
anym ore its capacity, there is nothing left to explain.
This ra ther loose connection betw een the non-accidentalness of biological effects and the 
explanatory role they play, together with the rejection of any form of teleology, 
naturalised  or not, allows the Cummins theorist to pick out the C-effects of an item  in a 
variety o f system s th a t just have to satisfy the requirem ent of complexity. W ithin  the 
sam e organism , the  heart can be seen as part of the circulatory system (in virtue o f its 
beating), as part of the renal-excretory system (in virtue of its secretion of atrial 
naturiU retic horm one) or even as part of a global system constituted by the whole 
organism . Moreover, the systems under scrutiny do not have to be localised in singular 
organism s. One can, for instance, perform  a ‘Cummins analysis of the  role of heart (as a 
type-organ) in the  circulatory system at the level of a certain population and attribu te  to 
the  h eart C typical effects, which are non-accidental (i.e. explanatory-for Cum m ins) 
relative to  organism s from the population in question.
W hat is particularly  interesting about the Cummins functions is tha t they could in fact be
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identified in system s w ith pathological capacities, part of pathological organism s. In life- 
th rea ten ing  states of organisms, biological item s are still organised in systems and their 
activities still com plem ent each other and contribute to overall capacities. It is just tha t 
these capacities do not ensure the m aintenance and survival of organisms, bu t work 
actively tow ards their demise. In an organism  suffering from Graves’ Disease, w ithin the 
fram ew ork of the  Cum m ins account, one can justifiably a ttribu te  to the thyroid a C- 
function corresponding to the C-effects th a t a ‘Cum m ins analysis’ of the  endocrine system 
reveals -  the  increase of the num ber and size of m itochondria, the heightened cellular 
absorp tion  of glucose and Na+, etc. -  since these are effects th a t contribute to the 
pathological capacity of the endocrine system to increase the m etabolism  rate, produce 
in to lerance to heat, decrease in weight, etc.
W hat th is m eans, w hen it comes to explanations of diseases, is th a t the diseased states of 
organism s can be paradoxically explained by the C -  functioning of biological items. This 
explanatory use is possible at all precisely because in the Cum m ins account, the claim of 
norm ativity  is dropped. Diseases are not identified w ith states in which we find C dys­
functions of items. For a Cummins theorist, the life th reaten ing  conditions deserve a 
‘C um m ins analysis’ a ttribu ting  C-effects (and thus C-functions) to items, just as m uch as 
any o ther states in which, say, the survival of organisms is actively m aintained. W hen an 
organism  becom es Graves’ diseased, its thyroid simply loses its initial C-effects and starts 
delivering o ther C-effects. Since these new effects contribute to a newly acquired capacity 
o f the  endocrine system, one can infer tha t the thyroid has a new C-function explaining 
the  diseased state of th a t organism. In states in which the W right theorist could only see 
W righ t dys-functions and violations of the norm ativity of the W -effects, the Cum m ins 
theo rist can identify the presence of C-effects and hence a ttribu te  to item s C-functions 
th a t have explanatory usefulness.
'On this view, "Wright functions" and "Cummins functions" are both effects which are distinguished by 
their explanatory importance. The difference is in the type of explanation. So if it is claimed, for instance, 
that the function of the myelin sheaths round some brain cells is to make possible the efficient conduction 
of signals over long distances, it may not be obvious which explanatory project is involved. This may be 
intended as an explanation of why the myelin is there, or it could be part of an explanation o f how the brain 
manages to perform certain complex tasks. Sometimes the same assignment of functions will be made from 
both perspectives, but this does not mean the questions are the same....[Take] the case of the contribution
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made by some particular mutant DNA sequence in the development of a tumor. Because the DNA sequence 
goes wrong in some particular way, the cancer as a whole has certain properties....On the view I have 
presented, we have to say that this is a case where components of the system have both Wright functions 
and Cummins functions, and some of the Cummins functions — those determined by our explanatory 
interest in the cancer — are opposed to the Wright functions. The Wright functions of this stretch of DNA 
have to do (we suppose) with regulating cell division in a particular way, which keeps the number of cells of 
this type at a certain level. When the mutation produces a tumor, and this tumor becomes the subject o f a 
certain sort o f investigation, the Cummins function of this bit o f DNA, relative to that investigation, is a 
Wright malfunction.' (Godfrey-Smith, 1993: 7,15-16)
Obviously, since the claim of norm ativity is dropped as regards the C-effects, the 
Cum m ins theorist cannot a ttem pt to explain diseased states (in the sense o f indicating 
w hy they  are not healthy) by using the C-functions of item s and claiming th a t item s 
should perform  them . This strategy, which is associated w ith the W right account, is 
rejected. In fact, as I said, in the ‘pure’ Cummins account, the distinction betw een health  
and  disease does no t m atter.
Nevertheless, some theorists whose position is close to the general Cum m ins line try  to 
respond to the challenge posed by the W right side -  to wit, the  challenge th a t a 
com pletely adequate account of function should help us in distinguishing betw een health  
and  disease. Their a ttem pt to explain diseases, as non-healthy states, appeal to the  C 
typical effects delivered by item s at the level of certain populations.337 M ore precisely, 
diseased conditions are supposed to be explained by the lack of the  C-typical effects 
‘norm ally’ produced by biological items. In order to avoid the 'charge' of norm ativity, the 
lack o f these C-effects in non-healthy organisms is not in terpreted  as a consequence of 
dys-fim ctions (which would imply that the items involved in diseases still possess, on a 
m odal level, their Cum m ins function) but simply as the absence of the C-typical function 
(in one or m ore biological items). However, this a ttem pt has been severely criticised. The 
reason is that, in order to pick out diseases using the absence of the C-typical effects, one 
needs to  assum e th a t the presence of these effects is conducive to healthy states, and 
there  is hardly any way to justify non-circularly why a certain population is being chosen 
for delineating the searched-for C typical effects and not another.33
337 See for instance McNally (2000:309-314) Walsh (2008)
338 See Walsh (2008: 354), Wakefield (1992), (2001)
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These are some of the  m ost im portan t features of the curren t accounts of function 
em ployed in the philosophical literature. I have left out m any details of the curren t 
debates. The m ain features I have canvassed are sufficient though for the purpose o f this 
chapter, which is to enquire into the explanatory relevance of functions for diseases.
I shall investigate th is explanatory relevance in §4.3, using the case study o f a particular 
pathological condition, and I shall indicate there some of the  problem s th a t the  function- 
approach has w hen detailed ’pathological’ explanations are required for diseases and their 
particular instances.
These problem s, as I have anticipated in the  introductory  part o f the  p resent chapter, 
have to do w ith the distinction betw een positive and negative causes and certain  features 
o f the  m etaphysics of causation. That is why, before discussing the particular pathological 
condition  I have m entioned, I shall take a short detour and introduce in the next section 
the  H um ean an ti-H um ean debate and also Cartw right’s species of anti-H um eanism , w ith 
a focus on her views about singular causation.
§ 4 .2  C a u s a l  p o w e r s  a n d  e x p l a n a t io n s
'To explain is to reveal causes'. This m otto, nowadays widely accepted, was prom oted 
insistently  a few decades ago by Salmon and the other proponents of the so-called 'causal 
m odel' o f explanation, in order to emphasize their departure from the Hem pelian model. 
W hat is nevertheless true is that ‘to search for causes' was also indirectly H em pel’s 
purpose, in those cases in which the laws included in the explanans were w hat he called 
’laws o f succession'. It is just that the causes hunted  down by Hem pel were H um ean 
causes.339 Salmon just proposed a different m ethod to hun t them  down - instead of non ­
accidental regularities posited beyond and above cases of singular causal interactions, he 
insisted on the  relevance of m echanism s and transm issions of marks revealed by looking 
directly a t the  singular cases. His causes were anti-H um ean from this point o f view and 
w hat the  confrontation ' between the two models of explanation arguably conveys is that,
339 Hempel (1966: 53). This was also Lewis’s stance; see Lewis (1986: 214-241). For discussion see (Psillos, 2002: 
219), Cartwright (2002a: 5), Bigelow and Pargetter (1990 ' 320_323)> Salmon (1998- 69)
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if explanations indeed require p inning down causes, the latter task  depends crucially on 
the  m etaphysics o f causation one adheres to.
In th is section, I shall draw  first the  general lines of the H um ean and an ti-H um ean 
approaches to causation and th en  shall p resent in m ore detail a variant o f the  an ti- 
H um ean construal of causes developed by Nancy Cartwright, insisting upon  her views on 
singular causation. W hat I shall suggest in the  final part of th is chapter is th a t non- 
H um ean accounts o f causation - and in particular, the  way Nancy Cartw right develops 
and  in terp re ts  it - solves some of the problem s associated w ith the function-based 
explanations of diseases.
§ 4 .2 .1  T h e  H u m e a n  v s . a n t i - H u m e a n  d is p u t e
Suppose we have a singular causal in teraction - in circum stances C, betw een two 
individuals a and b possessing the properties A and B, respectively - in w hich A a 
represents the  cause and Bb (or more precisely, the  instantiation o f B by b) represents the  
effect. How would H um eans and anti-H um eans view this singular interaction? There are 
significant differences am ong the philosophers who stand in (either of) the two sides of 
the  debate, b u t the general lines of their positions could be portrayed as follows, as a 
pream ble to C artw rights specific views.
For an anti-H um ean, we have in this case a causal interaction because there  is an 
im m anen t necessity (a m odal ‘force’ or a causal ‘pow er’) holding betw een the two 
individuals involved and their properties - A a, as a cause, indeed brings forth B b as an 
effect.340 T hat an im m anent necessity holds in this singular interaction is due to A being a 
modal property  - i.e. a property whose instantiation is significant no t only from the point 
o f view of w hat actually is the case, bu t also from the point of view of possibila. There are 
several ways to spell ou t in w hat sense A is a property responsible for the m odal force of 
th is in teraction.
O n a sem antic level, A could be taken to be the tru th-m aker of a subjunctive conditional
340 See for instance Ellis (2000:329-330, 348-349).
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w ith the  approxim ate form: ‘had a exhibited A (in the right circum stances C), b would 
have exhibited the property  B’.341 O n a m etaphysical level, property A can be said to be 
associated w ith the potency (or power) P,342 in th a t its instan tiation  brings in a range o f 
possible causal interactions for its bearers. More precisely, due to its association w ith P, 
its instan tia tion  delineates a m odal range of causal behaviours - in th is case, the  possible 
p roducing o f B -  th a t actually take place w hen the right conditions or circum stances C 
(the presence o f stimuli, the absence of interferences, antidotes, etc.) are in place. Simply 
put, due to the  association betw een A and P, A a can in teract w ith particulars instan tia ting  
B. If the  righ t circum stances C are present, it does actually interact.
Singular causal interactions are taken thus to spring from the potencies associated to 
m odal p roperties .343 An im portant consequence of this view is th a t any sorts of 
regularities involving the properties a t hand represent just general system atizations o f the
341 One obvious connection here is with the counterfactual analysis o f dispositions. For some anti-Humeans, 
dispositions are indeed modal properties, or features of modal properties, in the sense in which dispositional 
subjunctive conditionals are not just a way to set out what having a disposition represents, but to underlie the 
range o f  possible causal interactions in which the bearers of dispositions can engage in, due to their 
properties, as such (Bird, 1998: 233). These counterfactuals are made true by the dispositional properties at 
hand and not by some sort o f regularity (Mumford, 1998: 87-91). What I have designated above as 
‘circumstances C  are reckoned with, in the counterfactual analysis, by way of mentioning (beside 
disposition- and manifestation-properties) also stimulus properties and by specifying either that the analysis 
holds in ‘ideal conditions’ (Mumford, 1998: 87-91) in which finks and antidotes should be absent (Bird, 2007: 
60) or in a certain range of situations that can be indexically circumscribed and referred to (Bird, 1998: 234).
342 Different authors employ different terms in order to designate the causal powers and underlie certain 
aspects o f them. ‘Potency’ is a term used by Bird in his (2007), which I think captures nicely the modal level 
of the properties in question. Cartwright’s preferred term is ‘capacity’ (Cartwright, 1999). Other 
terminologies include propensity, tendency, etc.
343 I should note that what specifically are the characteristics of modal properties, as opposed to non-modal 
ones, is a rather unsettled issue, which has to do with the related, problematic distinction between 
dispositional and categorical properties (the latter distinction having been often cashed out in terms of the 
relational/intrinsic dichotomy, or unobservable/observable, or non-measurable/measurable, etc.) and 
ultimately, with the very Humean/anti-Humean dispute - see Schaffer 2008.' 4 snd Ellis 2000: 329- I have 
assumed above the simplest approach according to which the actual instantiation of a modal property says 
something about the real of possibilia. For Bird, this merely means that modal properties (or potencies, in 
his terminology) make true certain subjunctive conditionals, Cf. Bird (2005. 43^ )- Molnar, to take 
another example, it means modal properties (powers, in his idiom) bear the mark of intentionality — they 
have a direction to particular manifestations, even when they are not exercised, as such; Cf. Molnar (2003) 
apud Psillos (2007:139).
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singular causal in teractions resulting from capacities’ m anifestations.344 M etaphysically, 
th is m eans th a t the  regularity betw een As and Bs can only be dependen t on the potency P 
associated to A. Semantically, it m eans th a t the  property  A is the tru th -m aker n o t only of 
a specific subjunctive conditional, bu t also of a universally quantified m aterial conditional 
th a t expresses the  regularities in question betw een As and Bs (see below fig. 17).
Figure 17 Features o f the anti-Humean stance 
-
A  is the metaphysical ground for A a causes B b’
That A  is associated with the potency P grounds any singular causal interaction 
in which B comes to be instantiated
P cond. C
A  a —  -— > (A a ► Bb)
The counterfactual analysis - the subjunctive conditional's truth maker is the 
modal property A.
P cond. C
A  —  — > (x )(A x -> B x )
Regularities spring the stable manifestation o f  potencies, when the right 
circumstances C are present.
If we can talk  about a general expression of the interdependence betw een causation, 
p roperties and pow ers/potencies, tha t general expression would have, m ost basically, the
344 The direction of ontological dependency is thus from the ‘bottom’ level' (singular causal interactions) to 
the ‘top’ (regularities exhibited by particulars bearing the relevant properties). It is for this reason that Ellis 
characterises his anti-Humeanism as a ‘bottom-up sort of theory, rather than top-down, [which] depends 
on taking a realist, non-reductionist, view of causal powers, capacities and propensities’ (Ellis, 2000: 330). 
Ellis retains however the ‘top’ level of laws, just as Bird for instance. Their position amounts to what Wilson 
calls ‘general’ (as opposed to ‘singularist’) anti-Humeanism (Cf. Wilson 2005), position criticised by 
Mumford (2004)
345 For a proof, see (Bird 2005:441-2). The reference to the conditions C (figured somewhat ponderous 
above) indicates that the regularities obtain only when the presence of stimuli, the absence o f interferences, 
antidotes, etc. are in place. Note that the notation I have used is just meant to have a heuristic purpose. In a 
more fastidious notation, the conditions C could be reckoned with, firstly, by attaching a ceteris paribus 
clause in front of the quantified statement (Bird 2004: 268-9), secondly, by adding a sort o f clause to its 
antecedent, as when finks, antidotes and stimuli-properties are mentioned (Bird 2007:60) or only stimuli- 
properties (Bird 2005:441-2) and thirdly, by adding a clause in its consequent (Ellis, 2000: 345)- Note also 
that when and if conditions C are referred to, the least preferred solution is to bring in the ceteris paribus 
clause because, in the related context of scientific laws, the cp statements at hand would not be universal 
and would stand, evidently, for laws that admit exceptions; see Schrenk (2007)
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form  of a sim ple causal law w ith the form ‘As (can) cause Bs’ - w here a m ore precise 
descrip tion o f the  path  leading from the association betw een A and P (Ap in my notation) 
to  a general form ulation of a causal law would have to incorporate m ore com plicated 
elem ents about the  m etaphysics of properties and the nature of their association to 
potencies/pow ers.346
Now, on the opposite, H um ean side, we have no m odal properties and no im m anent 
necessity holds betw een a and b - a does not per se produce, in virtue o f  its possession of 
A, the  instan tia tion  of B by b. That we have, nevertheless, a singular causal in teraction 
betw een the two individuals is due to a higher level regularity holding betw een As and 
Bs.347 This regularity should be universal (in tha t it should hold no m atter w here and 
w hen the  individuals instantiating A or B exist) and crucially, should be non-accidental 
(in th a t it is supposed to 'back up' counterfactuals th a t involve individuals instan tia ting  A 
or B).348
T hat is, in virtue o f its non-accidentalness, the regularity betw een As and Bs should 
constitu te  the  tru th  m aker of the abovem entioned subjunctive conditional - ‘had a 
exhibited A (in the right circumstances C), b would have exhibited the property  B’349 - 
w here th is tru th-m aking  relation would be just a way to express the ontological 
dependency o f the singular causal relation betw een a and b on the regularity itself.
A ssum ing th a t the respective subjunctive conditional was true, the 'm oderate' H um ean 
can allow th a t A be a ttended  by the potency P, bu t only in a loose ontological sense. Since
346 In Ellis and Bird’s cases, this more sophisticated ‘general’ expression is underlined by a metaphysics of 
universals whose identity is linked with their associated powers/potencies. Laws are portrayed using first 
order quantified, universal statements (just as the Humean laws are expressed); see Ellis (2000:345-46), Bird 
(2005:441-2)
347 See for instance Armstrong&Heathcote (1991: 63-64) where this view is nicely summarised, and also Nagel 
(1961) Suppres (1970), Papineau (1991) for a more extensive exposition.
348 For Hempel, just like for Nagel and Mackie, these non-accidental regularities are the scientific laws, where 
no definite indication is given as to why the laws in question back up counterfactuals; see for instance 
Hempel (1966) and also van Fraassen (1980) for a critique. For Lewis, the non-accidental regularities are the 
axioms o f a deductive system which organizes all facts with the ideal combination of strength (scope of 
application) and simplicity (coherence of axiomatixation); Cf. Lewis (1986)
349 See Armstrong and Heathcote (1991: 63-64) Cartwright (i999: H4) Bird (2005: 440). The conditions C are 
not usually mentioned in the classical Humean analysis and they represent in fact a great problem for the 
Humean strategy. One of Cartwright main arguments against this strategy, as we shall see, is that in nature 
we find no universal regularities and that the respective conditions C can be reckoned with only in an anti- 
Humean framework. See however Papineau (1991) where a response to Cartwright s contention vis-a-vis the 
conditions C is framed in Humean terms.
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the  tru th -m aker o f th a t conditional is the regularity betw een As and Bs, w hat a H um ean 
can at m ost perm it w ith regard to the m odal register of A is th a t it has its potency(ies) 
'bestow ed upon ' it by the regularity (ies) it is engaged in.35°
Figure 18 Features of the Humean stance
The regularity between As and Bs is the metaphysical ground for Aa 
causes Bb’
That between As and Bs there is a constant conjunction grounds any s in gular causal 
interaction in which B comes to be instantiated.
(x)(Ax—>Bx) entails (Aa □—* Bb)
Regularities are the truth-makers o f subjunctive conditionals.
p
(x)(Ax—>Bx) entails A
Potencies are 'bestowed upon' properties by the non-accidental regularities they are 
engaged in.
The thesis th a t properties could be attended  by potencies only conditional on non ­
accidental regularities is evidently consistent w ith (and even required by) an approach to 
the ir na tu re  from a non-m odal point of view only. A and B are occurent properties, i.e. 
p roperties whose actual instantiation in singular situations, as such, does n o t provide any 
'inference ticket' to a certain range of possible causal interactions.
The inference ticket to the realm  of possibilia is only provided by the regularity betw een 
As and  Bs - although properties rem ain occurent, even w hen they are considered in the 
contex t of regularities, their non-accidental conjunction is som ehow able to account for 
the  m odal features of the world.351 Put differently, As represent causes for Bs, only because
350 See Lewis (1986:223), Hirsch(i997: 62-64)
351 Hence the Humean Supervenience thesis espoused by Lewis - all the modal features o f the world 
supervene on the non-modal ones; see Lewis, i986:ix. Ellis 2000:329 gives a general characterisation of this 
stance on the modal features of the world, which is not limited to Lewis’s views. There are classical criticisms 
o f this position — see for instance D. Armstrong and A. Heathcote (1991)) van Fraassen (1989) - that underlie a 
central difficulty of the Humean program: if regularities are to dissolve any modal feature of the world, why 
certain regularities are non-accidental cannot be justified in non-modal terms only.
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As and Bs are part of a regularity, w ith some special features. W hat we could call as the 
‘causal law’ th a t As cause Bs, is grounded on the regular association of the  respective 
properties.
Two diagram s, representing w hat I take to be the m ain traits o f the  two opposing 
m etaphysical schem es of causation, are presented below, in figure 19. These diagram s are 
simplifying and  yet heuristic, I think, given the enorm ous literature surrounding this 
debate  and the  m odest purpose of this chapter - to connect the  problem  of functional 
explanations in m edicine with the discussions concerning the m etaphysics of causation in 
the  philosophy of science. The basic form of these diagram s will be reproduced several 
tim es in  th is section, w ith m odified elem ents in its ‘nodes’, depending upon  the context 
o f the  discussion.
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Figure 19 The H um ean (left) vs. anti-H um ean (right) rationale on the relation  b etw een  regularities, 
capacities, causal laws, general and singular causal claim s. The connecting lin es indicate on to logica l, 
ep istem ic and sem antic dep en dencies.
Regularities 
[As followed by Bs]
Causal laws (and general causal 
claims)
[As (can) cause Bs]
[&(As->Bx)]
\ Iy \ *# 
\
_ _ _ _ A — .






Singular causal interactions 
[A*? produces BJ>] 
[A?~->Bi?]
* Regularities [As follow ed by Bs] ground general causal 
claims [As (can) cause Bs] and (thus) ground singular 
causal interactions [A<? produces B b]. T he causal laws 
corresponding to the general causal claims are 
formulated using universally quantified statements [(x) 
(Ax->Bx)].
** Regularities [As follow ed by Bs] ground potency 
attributions [A]T] and (thus) ground counterfactual 
scenarios [Aa n -> B b]. Potencies (or powers) are 
‘bestowed upon’ properties by regularities.
*** The regularities in the top box are the brute, basic 
regularities, out o f  the systematisation o f  which Lewis 
for instance derives his Best System theorems — the 
Humean laws, as non-accidental regularities. Only a part 




Causal laws (and general causal






[As follow ed by Bs] 
[(s)(A x->Bs)]
MSingular caosalinteractions ] ■ 
[Aa produces Bbj 
[Ai? □~>B ]^
* Potencies associated to properties [A1)] ground general causal 
claims [As (can) cause Bs] and (thus) ground singular causal 
interactions [Aa produces B/;]. The causal laws corresponding to 
the general causal claims m ight as well be formulated using  
universally quantified statements [(x)(Ax->Bx)]. T hese statements 
might also contain a clause referring to the conditions C in which  
the manifestations o f  capacities obtain. M ost often, the respective  
clause is added in such a way that the statements remain universal 
and the corresponding laws strict.
** Potencies associated to properties [A15] ground regularities [As 
follow ed by Bs] and (thus) ground, as a facon de parler, 
counterfactual scenarios [Aa n->B £]. N ote  that the regularities in 
question might be the brute, basic regularities o f  the naive 
Hum ean or the sophisticated regularities a la Lewis [(x)(Ax->Bx)]. 
A t any rate, these regularities are taken to ‘spring from ’ the 
systematic manifestation o f  capacities.
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So, on the  an ti-H um ean side we have im m anent necessity, potencies a ttending  m odal 
properties w hich are m anifested in actual singular causal in teractions and  regularities 
w hich represent simple system atizations of the singular cases of interactions. The ‘causal 
laws’ express in a ‘general’ way the nature o f the association betw een properties and 
potencies. O n the H um ean side we have non-accidental regularities which bestow  
potencies upon occurent properties and ground ‘causal laws’. The regularities in question 
are supervenient on all the  actual cases of singular causal interaction.
Having set the background of the  general H um ean/anti-H um ean dispute, we can now 
tu rn  to  the  variant o f anti-H um eanism  developed by Nancy Cartwright, which, as I have 
m entioned , is particularly suitable for the  m edical sciences and  the  singular causal 
in teractions taking place in diseased organisms.
§ 4 .2 .2  C a r t w r i g h t ’s  c a p a c i t i e s
It should be said th a t there are m any sim ilarities betw een Cartw right's views and  the 
general an ti-H um ean program , perhaps m ore th an  Cartw right herself acknowledges. For 
instance, Cartw right accepts (and was actually one of the  very first proponents of) the  
an ti-H um ean  account of regularities according to which they 'spring' from  the  ‘potencies’ 
(her preferred term  being ‘capacities’) associated w ith properties. Regularities ju st 
system atize singular causation cases tha t take place w hen capacities m anifest them selves 
in certain  circum stances, argues Cartwright.352 There are, however, some differences in 
approach (or a t least some differences of accent) and some of them  will be im portan t for 
the  m edical cases I shall be looking at in the next sections.353
352 See for instance Cartwright (2007a: 8). Menzies also proposed that capacities could be taken as truth- 
makers of counterfactuals (see Menzies 2002), a move rejected by Cartwright, however, for un-specified 
reasons (Cartwright, 2002c). In her (2007a) such a counterfactual-based feature is I think adopted tacitly 
though - see (2007a: 24-5) and the discussed difference between the exercise and the manifestation o f a 
capacity.
353 It should be noted that Cartwright is not always clear about the precise metaphysics that underlies her 
account o f causation; for instance the bearers of capacities are sometimes considered to be properties, other 
times natural kinds or systems; see Drewery (2001) and Paul (2002) who note this lack of clarity. My 
employment of the category of property in the above presentation of her views is in a sense just a way of 
cutting the Gordian knot.
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O ne poin t of difference is th a t capacities can be exacerbated or diminished by specific 
stim uli, specific ‘causal contexts’, and th is aspect will be crucial for my analysis o f m edical 
causes in §4.4.354 A nother difference is th a t the  regularities th a t can be derived from 
capacities are no t spatio-tem porally unrestric ted355 - these regularities may only obtain  in 
specific conditions. The latter is a particularly  im portan t aspect of Cartw right’s 
argum entation  because, inter alia, it extends the scope of the capacities-rationale to the 
special sciences, where the lack o f universal regularities is notorious.
In the  m ainstream  anti-H um ean in terpretation, the resulting regularities are usually 
expressed as (first order) universally quantified statem ents, which have a t m ost a clause 
in troduced  in the  an tecedent or consequent of the  respective m aterial conditionals, in 
order to  indicate a set of circum stances C influencing the m anifesting of capacities (the 
presence o f proper stim uli, the absence o f interfering factors, antidotes, etc). For 
Cartw right however, capacities give rise to local regularities, circum scribed precisely to 
those sites in which the clause delineating the circum stances or context C is satisfied. In 
o ther words, Cartw right prefers to keep in the  an tecedent of the respective conditionals 
only the  (bearers o f the) capacities and in the consequent only the (bearers o f the) 
m anifestations, while all the other features enabling the m anifesting of capacities are 
exiled in  the  quantification area. In the notation  I have used in the previous section, in 
C artw right’s view the a ttribu tion  of capacities or potencies to properties can be used to 
derive only local regularities in th a t Ap entails (for all x in the circum stances C) (Ax—>Bx).
The settings in which the conditions C are present are called ‘nom ological m achines’. The 
la tter are certain  'arrangem ents' of factors th a t enable the full m anifestation of potencies 
by ‘shielding’ them  and their bearing individuals from any interference. Experim ental se t­
ups provide the  classic examples for such nomological m achines. Now, Cartw right 
stresses th a t there is an obvious distance betw een w hat happens in the contexts 
resem bling the  ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ o f nom ological m achines. ‘Inside’ a nom ological 
m achine, the  capacities are enabled to m anifest such th a t the behaviour of their bearers 
can be expressed in the  form of regularities - any individual possessing A in teracts w ith 
individuals possessing B. Thus, the regularity betw een As and Bs, does correspond to how
354 Cartwright (1989) (1995:154)
355 Cartwright (1999: 25-2.7,148)
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the  individuals possessing the properties in question actually behave, i.e. to w hat happens 
on an  occurent level.
‘Outside of nom ological m achines, the  capacities are still present, b u t stim uli are 
m odified, interferences show up, etc. and the behaviour of the  capacities’ bearers cannot 
(justifiably) be described in the  form of regularities. That is to say, w hen the ‘shielding’ 
disappears, the  sta tem ent describing the regularity betw een As and Bs just stands for in 
abstracto correlations betw een properties w ith no direct connection w ith how  the 
individuals which instantiate  the properties in question actually behave.356 W hat the  
presence, as such, of capacities guarantees to  us are (just) ‘causal laws’ o f the  form  ‘As 
have the  capacity C’ ‘As can produce Bs' ‘As tend to produce Bs’, etc.357 These are, one could 
say, spatio-tem porally  unrestricted, universal claims, bu t on a modal level -  they  po in t to 
possible causal behaviours. In other words, they are not regularity-like claims abou t w hat 
actually is the  case. As for w hat actually happens in an ‘outside’ context - depending on 
the  stim uli/in terferences in a particular situation, the m anifestations of a capacity can be 
exacerbated, dim inished or elim inated.358
So, the  distance betw een the ‘inside’ of nom ological m achines and the ‘outside’ is the 
d istance betw een two different sorts of causal contexts, which m atter for our general and 
singular causal claims. W hen we deal with causal contexts tha t are ‘inside’ - th a t is, causal 
contexts in  which we have a specific ‘shielding’, stim uli and a certain arrangem ent of 
causal factors -the regularities constitute an inference ticket about what, on an actual-ist 
level, takes place in singular causal interactions. W hen we deal with a causal context th a t 
can be described as ‘outside’ a nomological m achine, we know that capacities are still 
p resen t,359 b u t th is only offers us an inference ticket as to what, on a modal level, could 
take place in singular causal interactions. W e need in addition local inform ation, 
inform ation abou t stimuli, on how they change, w hat interferences show up, etc, in order
356 Cartwright (1999: 65-66,71,139-143)
357 Cartwright (1999: 59, 66,138) (1989:142-145,154)
35® ‘[capacities-claims]i. are claims about what systems with the cited features...can cause 2. the effect 
described may not occur but only 'contribute in some appropriate way to the actual outcome in any given 
case 3. the effect or even the successful 'contribution will only occur ceteris paribus...[the} prescriptions for 
filling in the ceteris paribus clauses...involve a whole range of categories from the ontology of capacities that 
are abhorrent to the Humean: triggering, shielding, enhancing, interfering and the like’ (Cartwright, 1995:
154)-
359 Cartwright, (2002b: 3-4)
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to infer what type o f manifestations are actually  present.360
‘[there are] three levels of causal claims important in scientific explanation, prediction and application: 
singular claims, causal laws and ascriptions of capacities. Capacities claims, I said, summarize a range of 
outcomes a subject can cause. Causal laws are more specific: They describe, usually probabilistically, what 
causal relations actually obtain in a specified kind of situation. Causal laws have thus the advantage over 
capacity claims that they can be used in a mechanical way for making predictions and also that they can be 
established by induction. But in both cases this is true only as long as the target situation and the situation to 
which the laws are relativized are the same. Their strengths are thus the flip side o f their weaknesses. They 
describe what really does happen when the situation is so and so. And they are proper laws: they describe 
what would happen, were the situation like that. But by their very nature they do not describe what would 
[actually] happen were the situation different’ (Cartwright 1995:154, italics added)361
The relation betw een ‘inference tickets’, capacities and contexts th a t resem ble the ‘inside’ 
or the  ‘outside’ o f a nom ological m achine can be usefully figured as follows.
occcurent
inference ticketsmodalinieteaee
tickets ‘outside’, /ora/knowledge of stimuli and 




Causal laws -‘inside’ and ‘outside’ 
(As can produce Bs)
Regularities -‘inside’
(for all x in the cp conditions) (Ax->Bx)
Figure 20 Capacities and 
inference tickets
'Inside ’ nomological machines: Ac 
entails (for all x in the cp 
conditions) (Ax->Bx), where the 
ceteris paribus clause indicates the 
‘inside’ o f  nomological machines. [C 
1999:139-143]
‘Outside’ nomological machines we 
have (As can produce Bs), or (As tend 
to produce Bs) or (As have the capacity 
to  produce Bs) [C, 1989:142-145]
The regularities o f nomological 
machines — inference tickets, on an 
actual-ist, occurent level, for what 
happens in causal contexts 
resembling the ‘inside’ o f  
nomological machine.
360 See Cartwright (2005: 2) and the discussion o f ‘background knowledge.
361 The ‘causal laws’ that Cartwright refers to in this quoted passage are the regularities from the ‘inside’ of 
nomological machines. In a more recent paper (Cartwright, 2005) as ‘causal laws are designated the 
‘capacity claims’ of the form ‘As can cause Bs and I shall primarily refer to this more recent use in the main 
text. See also Cartwright (2002a: 12-16), (2007a: 58)
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Now, th a t there  are no universal regularities is in fact the  m ain argum ent employed by 
Cartw right against the  H um ean schem e. Cartw right com plains th a t the H um ean ignores 
th is possible change in the  causal context and thus fails to distinguish between, as it were, 
the  ‘in ternal validity' of our general causal claims and their ‘external validity’.362
Problem s concerning the  vindication of singular causal claims evidently ensue for 
H um eans. Since they take their regularities as universal, they construe the ‘causal laws' 
g rounded in them  as having unrestricted  scope and thus capable of vindicating any 
singular causal claim. However, bo th  in the  case of determ inistic and probabilistic 
correlations, insists again Cartwright, we have no reason to th ink  th a t the corresponding 
causal claims form ulated by the H um ean will be universal. They have a scope lim ited to 
the  context in which they were assessed, and this applies both to the  exact and special 
sciences, irrespective of the m ethod used to ascertain causal claims - in laboratory 
settings or a t a population level.363
The general causal claim that, w ithout exception, As produce Bs in the context C (or As 
produce Bs w ith such and such probabilities in the causal context C) could no t be taken 
universally, in the  form th a t As produce Bs simpliciter, across all causal contexts (or th a t As 
produce Bs w ith such and such probability, over any causal context, over any population, 
etc).364 Hence, for any putative causal in teraction located in a causal context different 
from  the  one in which regularities were ascertained, w hat causes w hat cannot be 
ascertained by the H um ean ‘causal laws’.
An illustrative ‘case-study’ is Cartw right’s discussion o f N ew ton’s second law. This law can 
be read in a H um ean key as expressing a regularity. In order for this law to be applied, 
tested , used in inference, etc., says Cartwright, one needs certain bridge principles, th a t
362 Cartwright (2007b: 220)
363 When discussing exceptionless, deterministic regularities (which are usually referred to in connection 
with ‘experimental settings’), Cartwright has in mind both the regularities o f classical physics for instance, 
and at the same time the regularities established on a microstructural level in the special sciences - see 
Cartwright (1999). When discussion about the probabilistic regularities, Cartwright usually refers to the 
population-level assessments from the special sciences; see Cartwright (1989).
364 Cartwright (1989:142) (1999: 24-27) (2007a: 58)
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are in fact provided by the special force laws.365 Adm ittedly, the special force laws allow 
the  application N ew tons second law as a regularity, bu t a t the  same tim e restrict its 
scope. They bring in an explicit clause specifying the quantities a t work, b u t also a tacit 
clause forbidding any o ther sort o f influence to be exercised over the experim ental 
se tting /con tex t in w hich the regularity is tested .366
Consider Newton’s second law, F = ma. What does it say? Many...take it to describe a strict regularity. I 
think that it does so only conditionally. The claim we are entitled to believe from the vast evidence in its 
favor is this: if  nothing that affects the motion operates that cannot be represented as a force, then....The 
bridge principles match some theoretical concepts with concepts ‘antecedently understood’. In the case of 
Newtonian mechanics the primary bridge principles are the special force laws. These license a particular 
theoretical description -  e.g. ‘... is subject to a force F = GMm/r2 or ‘... is subject to a force F = eoqiq2/r2 -  
given a description in the vocabulary of masses, distances, times and charges- e.g. ‘... is a mass m located at 
distance r from a mass M, or ‘... is a charge qi located at distance r from charge q2’. Bridge principles provide 
strong constraints. The theoretical descriptions -  in our example the individual force functions from the 
special force laws -  are allowed only if  the corresponding descriptions in ‘antecedently understood’ terms 
are satisfied. (For example, “The force on a mass of size m is GMm/r2 if and only if m is  a distance r from a 
body of mass M”.)...It is because of the issue of evidence that I urge that the bridge principles of these
theories are so strongly constraining  Can all causes of motion be correctly described using just the
descriptions that appear in the bridge principles o f Newtonian mechanics? To all appearances, not. We 
have millions of examples of motions that we do not know how to describe in this way....We have 
succeeded in applying Newton’s second law to a vast, vast number o f cases -  but always o f the same kinds: 
the ones that appear in our bridge principles. (Cartwright 2007a: 36-37)
The two sorts of clauses, the  tacit and the explicit one, am ount in fact, says Cartwright, to 
a restric tion  of the  scope of the regularity th a t the  respective ’bridge principles’ are 
supposed to ‘transla te’. This is salient if we look a t a singular causal situation -  for 
instance a banknote dropped from the steeple of a cathedral, in a context in which, beside 
gravitational attraction , other forces are also a t work. As Giere explains, there are no
365 Even if Cartwright does not put it in this way, the special force laws could be read as ‘causal laws’ that 
can be derived from the regularity of Newton’s second law. This reading is in a sense inadequate, since a 
Humean would want to view the special force laws as expressing regularities (and derived causal claims) just 
as much as he or she would want Newton’s second law to express regularities. But what the special force 
laws bring about are more ‘shaped’ regularities, that introduce specific contexts, specific properties, etc. I 
would suggest this reading for the purpose of symmetry with the case of probabilistic regularities, where 
from frequencies are derived ‘causal laws’. In addition, this reading would make more intelligible the two 
diagrams introduced in figure 20, which are, admittedly, more suitable for special sciences.
366 Evidently, Cartwright underlies at this point what the two clauses are in fact meant to delineate -  namely 
nomological machines, ‘inside’ of which capacities are enabled to manifest themselves and thus ‘spawn’ 
regularities; see Cartwright (1999: 50).
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specific m odels suiting the drifting o f such a banknote. In o ther words, once the tacit 
clause precluding the existence of interferences is violated in a particular context, the 
general causal claim represented by N ew ton’s law cannot satisfactorily deal w ith certain  
singular causal interactions.
‘Imagine dropping a banknote from the top of St. Stephen's Cathedral (in Vienna) and watching it drift 
down to a spot in the square below. Within the context of classical (non-relativistic, non-quantum) physics, 
one might suppose that, in principle, the motions of the banknote could be fully accounted for in terms of 
Newtonian forces. This supposition Cartwright...rejects. She calls adherence to such a supposition 
(scientific) fundamentalism. Fundamentalism, in this context, amounts to generalizing the dominant 
science of the day to cover literally everything. Cartwright insists that there is no justification for this wild 
extrapolation from such well-known cases as dropping a cannon ball from the Leaning Tower of Pisa. In the 
case of the banknote, the effects of air-resistance and random gusts of wind are comparable to those of 
gravity. There are no specific models in mechanics, or in hydrodynamics, that fit this case. The falling 
cannon ball, by contrast, is an example of what Cartwright calls a nomological machine’ (Giere, 2000: 527)
A falling cannon ball has a m otion ‘governed’ by the regularity o f N ew ton’s second law 
because its (natural) context is similar to th a t of a nomological m achine - except the  
ea rth ’s a ttraction , all o ther causal influences are negligible. The cannon ball is in a sense 
‘inside’ a natural nom ological machine. W hat happens ‘outside’ w ith a banknote? To say 
th a t it is still subject to the same (non-accidental, ‘governing’) regularity is a m atter of 
faith, or fundam entalism , stresses Cartwright, in a rather picaresque w ay.367
Now, Cartw right m akes the same point w ith regard to the population level, im perfect 
regularities ou t o f which the H um ean w ants to extract probabilistic ‘causal laws’ - the 
causal laws in question could not have universal bearing. The im perfect regularities from 
the  population  level result in one way or another from an application o f Reichenbach’s 
principle - any correlation indicates causation, unless there is ano ther cause th a t ‘screens
367 Cartwright (1999: 27). The analysis of the microstructural assessments performed in laboratory 
conditions proceeds over the same path as the analysis of Newton’s second law. Whereas in the case of 
Newton’s second law we have a natural nomological machine, the laboratory conditions set out artificial 
nomological machines, which have the same advantages and tribulations as the natural ones; see 
Cartwright (1999: 60). Importantly, Cartwright warns against the semantics of mechanism , a notion that 
seems directly linked to microstructural assessments but whose use could be misleading, because its 
meaning possesses a definite anti-Humean register. Mechanisms are, after all, shielded settings. The 
Humean proponent might make use inappropriately of this notion and Cartwright is keen to point out that, 
if Humean mechanisms amount to (further) microstructural regularities, then the problems issuing from 
the variability o f causal contexts remain the same; Cf Cartwright (i999:13&~139> 143)-
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off the  correlation. To keep w ith our simple notation, any im perfect regularity betw een A 
and  B in a given population  - po in ted  out by an increase in probability (Pr (B/A) > Pr 
(B/-iA)) - underlies a probabilistic causal law, unless, by taking into account any factor F 
from  the  population  in question, the  regularity d isappears .368 In o ther words, 
Reichenbach’s principle says th a t As cause Bs, if the presence of any (other causes) Fs of Bs 
m akes no difference to the  rise in probability - Pr (B/A.F) > Pr (B/1A.F).369
The H um ean needs however to read Reichenbach’s principle in a reductionist way. The 
regularities grounding the probabilistic causal relation betw een A and B - which are not 
screened off by the o ther cause C p resent in a test populations - should constitu te a 
probabilistic pa tte rn  in which should play a part no t only A and B, b u t also F itself. F is 
the  factor whose presence, even if no t m aking a difference to the  probabilistic 
dependence betw een As and Bs, plays the role o f a background, or causal context in the 
final expression o f the rise o f probability [Pr (B/A.F) > Pr (B/-A..F)].
If a H um ean is to stick to his principles (i.e. to the view of properties as occurent and to 
the  dissolving o f causation into regularities), claims Cartwright, th en  the probabilistic 
p a tte rn  betw een As and Bs established in a test population could no t be projected a t the  
level o f ano ther population in which we would have a different background/context. For a 
different population in which the present factors were A, B and F*, we would have no 
reason to  expect an increase in the probability of B given A (irrespective of w hether we 
conditioned on F* or not). That is, a H um ean who stuck to his principles would have to 
subm it th a t the ‘causal laws’ th a t As cause Bs could not be simply deem ed universal. It 
holds in the  test population T, given a certain causal background in T - who knows w hat 
m ight happen  elsewhere, in a different population?
This is for instance Cartw right’s argum entation against the Geiger/Suppes approach to 
probabilities, presented in her (1989) -  the volume in which she actually in troduced the 
no tion  o f capacity. According to the Suppes approach, the rise in probability th a t should
368 I shall be using ‘A’, ‘B’ (and ‘F’) as standing either for a property or a causal factor (the causal factor that 
instantiates the property in question) depending on the context of the discussion.
369 This principle is to be found in all population-level techniques of ‘hunting down’ causes. In the causal 
path modelling, it is expressed in the condition that the error terms of the recursive equations are 
independent, in Bayesian nets by the Markov condition, in the Geiger causality by the condition that 
populations should be stratified such that all the other causes of the effect in question should be present or 
absent; see Cartwright (1989), (2007b)
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ground the  probabilistic ‘causal law’ linking A and B in a test population, should be 
partial conditional’ - i.e. established by ‘stratifying’ the population under study in 
‘hom ogenous’ subpopulations, i.e. in subpopulations in which all the  o ther causes of B 
were either presen t or absent. Hence, for a test population T in which all the o ther factors 
connected  to the  effect B were {Fj,..., Ft}, in order to conclude th a t A is a cause o f B, it 
should be the  case that: Pr T (B//A+/-F1+/-F2....+/-Ft)> P rT (B//~A+/-F1+/-F2....+/-Ft).
The la tter expression o f probabilistic dependencies is called ‘the CC form ula’ for a test 
population  T.37° Im portantly, the form ula has a stronger, universal corollary saying th a t 
beside the  test population T, in any o ther population I - stratified w ith respect to all the  
o ther causes o f B {F^.-.Fj} - we should expect th a t Pr r (B //A +/-F j+ /-F2....+/-Fi)> Pr t  
(B //~A +/-F!+ /-F2....+/-Fi). Cartwright argues th a t the  H um ean cannot justify precisely this 
universal form  of the  CC principle, requiring the  probabilistic causal claims established in 
a population  T to hold in all the o ther populations.
If A is viewed in an occurent m anner -  i.e. reductively taken as a part of some regularities, 
and  no t as a cause, per se -  then  the change of background w hen moving from the  test 
population  T to ano ther population I, makes the H um ean regularities in T irrelevant for
370 There are two possible interpretations of the CC formula. One position, the moderate one, is that the CC 
formula amounts to a methodology to track down causes in test populations, which has no bearing on the 
basic Humean metaphysical point - even though 'all the other causes’ need to be introduced in the 
methodology because of our epistemic limitations, ‘if we knew all the statistical associations [imperfect 
regularities] in the universe, there could not, in addition to these, be further facts that we had somewhat 
failed to mention [in our methodology of tracking down causes]’ (Cartwright, Dupr6 1988: 522). Contra this 
moderate Humean position, Cartwright argues that the causal claims established in a population do not (or 
cannot justifiably be said to) have universal bearing. I present in the main text this argument. The other 
Humean (radical) position is that the CC principle does amount to a reduction of causation to probabilities 
since ’all the other causes’ that need to be conditioned on in the process of ‘stratifying’ a test population, 
can simply be picked out in a reductive way as the factors that are probabilistically related to the effect in 
question. Cartwright argues in her (1988) and (1989) that this radical position is untenable and the 
criticisms are reiterated in her comments against the assumptions of the Bayesian nets techniques, in 
Carwright (1999). In short, Cartwright’s point is that, for probabilistic causes, we might have correlations 
between factors, which are not screened off by anything and which yet do not underlie causal relations. 
Given a probabilistic common cause producing an effect and a side effect via a certain pattern o f ‘firing’, the 
effect and the side effect could still be correlated, even after reckoning with the common cause and 
calculating the partial conditional probability. That is to say, not all probabilities dependencies indicate 
causal relations (see Cartwright’s comments against the Markov condition used in Bayesian nets, in her 
1999:107-111). On the other hand, probabilistic independencies do not entail that no causal relations are in 
place; that is, not all causal relations manifest as probabilistic dependencies (against the Faithfulness 
condition in Bayesian nets techniques; see her 1999- A factor (cause) might produce an effect via
two pathways, an enhancing and a preventative one, such that the overall influence of one over the other is 
cancelled and appears invisible in the statistical evaluation. The case discussed by Cartwright in her (1989) 
is Hesslow’s birth control pills, with their dual effects on thrombosis.
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causal inference.
The [CC] formula says that C causes E if and only if E is greater with C than without C in every 
homogenous background ...why expect any pattern o f probability relations from one background to 
another, let alone the totally uniform pattern implied by the universal quantifier?,..what is supposed to 
follow from one increase in probability of E on C in one of the specially related populations (test 
populations)?...what follows is that, in those special test situations, it can be regularly relied on that some 
Cs will produce Es...The point I want to make about this argument is that it justifies a very local kind of 
causal claim: if in a given test population we see the increase in probability that we are looking for, that 
guarantees that Cs cause Es there in that population. But it does not tell us any more’ (Cartwright 1989:142- 
145, italics original, underline added)
O f course, Cartw right is keen to poin t ou t th a t m aking causal inferences across different 
backgrounds/contex ts requires giving up the occurent construal o f properties/factors and 
in troducing  capacities.371 That we can expect As to cause Bs no t only in T bu t in all 
populations w here all the  o ther causes are conditioned on, implies th a t As have the 
capacity to produce Bs, and this gives us a m odal inference ticket from T to all the  o ther 
populations.
This sort of argum entation  is also presented by Cartw right against the  o ther m ethods of 
ascertain ing  probabilities a t the level of populations.372 The purpose is the  sam e - to  show  
th a t the  (H um ean) causal laws can only have a narrow, non-universal scope - again, given 
th a t As and  Bs in a population, one cannot exclude th a t in another population As have no 
influence upon  Bs, or m ight even prevent Bs. The appealed to examples are also 
variegated. For instance, skill loss during unem ploym ent might not perpetuate  high levels
371 Cf. Cartwright (1989:142-145). Notably, the moderate Humean could retort here that ‘capacities’ could be 
introduced just for methodological reasons, because of our epistemic limitation. That is, the Humean could 
claim that, if we knew all the regularities in the universe, ‘capacities’, the alleged immanent necessity 
attending them and the modal inference ticket across different contexts would dissolve into 'a kind o f meta­
pattern, a kind of recurring structure in first order patterns of association' (Papineau 1991: 409). See also 
Morrison (1995) and Psillos (2008) for a critique of the same type, which tries to ‘dissolve’ capacities into 
regularities and see the dependence on the ‘causal context’ of causal manifestations as just more grist to the 
Humean mill’ (Papineau, 1991: 409).
372 The whole argumentation concerning probabilistic causes (and the need to introduce capacities) can be 
applied for deterministic causes, and Cartwright does provide such an application, using the recursive 
equations o f causal path analysis. Instead of enhanced probabilities we have enhancements o f the strength 
of effects, evaluated by the coefficients of right-sided ‘exogenous’ variables, when all the other causes are 
being ‘fixed’. See Cartwright (1989), and also Irzic (1992) for a critical discussion. The Bayesian nets are 
criticised in Cartwright’s (1999) and (2007b).
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of unem ploym ent in spite of the  m axim izing utility causal law’,373 or, to take a different 
situation, in spite of the well docum ented  ‘causal law’ th a t sm oking causes lung cancer, 
one cannot exclude th a t there  m ight be a population in which sm oking w ould prevent 
th is cancer.374 The latter is obviously an  example from the m edical sphere.
W hen  discussing cases of singular causation in which the lack of universality for the 
causal laws shows its consequences, it also happens th a t Cartw right appeals to examples 
connected  w ith  the m edical realm.
“The more usual way to use probabilities to treat singe cases is in a two-step process. We use the 
probabilities to establish generic causal claims, then -  like Donald Davidson -  we insist that all admissible 
singular claims fall under a generic law. So i) if we take increase in probability as a necessary condition for a 
generic causal truth, “C’s cause E’s” and ii) we take as a necessary condition for “this C caused this E ’ that it 
be generically true that C’s cause Es, then we would have as a result that increase in probability o f E on C is 
a necessary condition for the related singular causal claim. I have already explained why I do not accept the 
first step. I am also suspicious of the second, whether or not we accept the first. I particularly worry about 
the second in medical and psychiatric settings.... Let us begin anecdotally. I offer Emily a regime of diet to 
lose weight. She says, “That kind of crash diet never works”. I reply, “It works for me”. And I do so with good 
reason. I am fairly careful about these matters. I have tried this diet frequently. It always works. I know 
about the possibility of spontaneous weight loss and about the placebo effect, about long-term vs short 
term outcomes etc. and I have evidence these are not a problem. Now there may be some description, D, of 
me that fixes in a law-like way the efficacy of this diet for people who satisfy D. In that case we would have a 
reference class, picked out in a non question-begging way, in which P(weight loss/diet) > P(weight loss/no 
diet). But there may not be such a description. There may simply be individual variation. To insist that 
there is always such a description is to let a big -  and insecure -  metaphysical assumption guide our 
methodology. That I think is a wrong thing to do.” (Cartwright (2005), italics original, underlines added)
There m ight be then  individual variation of the  causal contexts, which is m anifest in the  
particu lar cases o f individual organisms, such th a t the  general ‘causal laws’ are incapable 
o f v indicating singular causal claims. This brings us close to the next part o f th is section, 
in th a t there  is a straightforw ard application of Cartw right’s criticism  of the  H um ean 
approach  on causation (and her urging for the in troduction of capacities) to m edical cases 
and  the  problem  of m edical diagnoses.
Before m oving on to the  m edical side of the  discussion, a final note should be added, w ith
373 Cartwright (2007a: 73)
374 Cartwright &Dupre (1988: 526-27)
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respect to our prospects o f hun ting  down singular in teractions and the epistem ology of 
causation th a t Cartw right employs. It m ight appear, given her critique o f H um ean 
regularities and even her own fram ew ork o f capacities -  which provides, as we have seen, 
two sorts o f inference tickets, an occurent and a m odal one -  th a t our prospects of 
advancing w arran ted  singular causal claims are ra ther bleak. The H um ean ‘causal laws’ 
have a lim ited scope. Likewise, the occurent inference ticket offered by capacities is 
reduced to certain  special contexts. For any in teractions th a t occur in ‘outside’ contexts, 
we only have left the m odal inference ticket, which does not say m uch about w hat 
actually happens, or should be expected to happen, in singular situations. Aspirins can 
bring relief to headaches, inverted populations of m olecules can produce lasing, positively 
charged particles can a ttrac t negatively charged ones, etc. These are m odal claims, which 
are consisten t w ith different m anifestations showing up on an occurent level, if the 
variation in the  causal context is great enough, and which could even stir questions about 
the  existence and individualisation of capacities.375
The picture is no t th a t bleak however. The fram ew ork provided by capacities has a 
‘constructive’ part, precisely because the ‘causal context’ can som etim es by identified or 
controlled. This has two consequences. First, regularities can be created. Controlling a 
certain  causal context ensures th a t the m anifestation of a single capacity o f a causal factor 
happens regularly. As I said at the beginning o f th is section, Cartw right calls such 
arrangem ents in w hich ‘ideal’ causal contexts exist ‘nom ological m achines’ and in general, 
identifies them  w ith the  highly contrived settings of laboratories. For all the  singular 
situations in which the causal context of a nom ological m achine is present, we can 
univocally identify the  causal role (the manifested capacity) of a certain factor and predict 
the  actual outcom e of the  associated capacity.
Second, in singular situations in which no regularities are a t hand, given th a t we know 
th a t the  capacity is there  and tends to m anifest, we can identify the causal context th a t 
influences its m anifestation. The rationale here is ra ther different from the one used in 
the  case o f nom ological m achines. W hereas in the case of nom ological m achines, where 
regularities have to be created, one has to preserve the triggering factors (if triggering 
factors are needed) and elim inate all interferences, in the singular cases where
375 Cartwright raises herself some of these questions in Cartwright and Dupr£ (1988).
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regularities are absen t one has to assum e the existence o f capacities and try to identify all 
triggering factors and interferences. This allows one to determ ine w hether the  effect is 
caused or not, and if caused, w hether in a dim inished or enhanced way.
These two consequences of controlling and identifying ‘the causal context’ are 
in terrelated . The first consequence, simply put, allows us to track down capacities. Even 
if, on  a metaphysical level, capacities do no t depend on regularities (as all anti-H um eans 
agree), the  regularities of the  nom ological m achines represent the  right starting  point, 
from  an epistemic po in t of view, to identify capacities and their m anifestations. The 
second consequence allows us to use knowledge of capacities in th a t we can detect the 
m anifestations of these capacities, outside nom ological m achines, if we also have 
contextual, inform ation o f w hether interferences act as exacerbating, dim inishing or 
‘an tido te-like’ stim uli.376
These consequences will play an im portan t role in the  following section, where I shall 
assum e Cartw right’s fram ew ork and shall try  to apply it to the  issue o f pathological 
functional explanations, by way of asking w hat capacities could be involved in diseases. 
For now  though, let us tu rn  to the application in m edical cases o f Cartw right’s criticism  of 
H um eanism .
§ 4 .2 .3  Ca r t w r i g h t 's  r a t i o n a l e  a p p l ie d  t o  m e d i c a l  c a u s e s
In the  m edical cases, we have two classical ways of ascertaining causation -  the  
epidem iological study of frequencies a t a population-level and the physiopathological 
assessm ents in laboratories a t a m icrostructural level.
These assessm ents are used to infer ‘causal laws' or general causal claims. The latter are 
e ither probabilistic (e.g. smoking causes cancer w ith such and such probabilities) or 
determ inistic, exceptionless (e.g. aspirin ingestion over 5g/d induces an inflam m atory
376 See Cartwright’s discussion o f ‘background knowledge in her (2005:2) and the comments in her (1999) on 
the information needed to built up experimental settings. The respective information ‘is not itself a report o f  
any regular association — neither a real regular association (one that occurs) nor a counterfactual 
association (one that might occur)’ (Cartwright i999: *43) ■ See a s^o her discussion of rules of thumb in 
Cartwright (20073:62-64)
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response in  the  renal in terstitial tissues), depending on the sort of evidence draw n upon. 
Usually, the epidem iological evidence is a basis for probabilistic causal laws whereas the 
exceptionless ones com e from laboratory, m icrostructural assessm ents.377 O f course, we 
have in addition  m edical diagnoses (e.g. this case of pulm onary cancer was caused by 
smoking, or, this case o f renal failure was caused by aspirin intoxication) which use the 
general ‘causal laws’ to draw  singular causal conclusions about particular organisms.
Precisely how ‘causal laws' are inferred from  the evidence is a different discussion to 
w hich I shall re tu rn  in §4.4. W hat is im portan t to note a t this po in t is th a t the m edical 
literature  on causation is largely agnostic abou t the H um ean/anti-H um ean dispute. In 
o ther words, insofar as the  explicit m edical discourse is concerned, the H um ean is free to 
read it in a reductionist way - as am ounting  to causal claims th a t have regularities as their 
tru th  m akers.378
Now, there  is a natural extension of Cartw right’s anti-H um ean critique to the m edical 
realm , as the  realm  of a special science. Cartw right m ainly analyses case studies from 
physics and econom ics bu t also gives some examples from epidemiology, which enable us 
to  see why the  H um ean m ight be wrong w hen failing to lim it h is/her causal claims, given 
the variation in the causal contexts th a t occur in m edical situations.
For instance, as I have m entioned  in the previous chapter, Cartw right holds th a t in spite 
o f the  ‘causal law’ holding th a t smoking causes cancer w ith such and such probability, we 
m ight have a population  in which smoking was in fact beneficial for the  lungs.379 Not 
m any examples are given for m icrostructural assessm ents,380 bu t I take it that, since 
‘anything can cause anything else’,381 we cannot exclude for instance th a t the  antibodies
377 This is not always true however, in that on the one hand the epidemiological results might be 
interpreted as incomplete data for what are otherwise exceptionless causal laws whereas, on the other, the 
results o f many laboratory assessments are framed in probabilistic terms
378 It is indeed what Williamson and Russo do in their (2007) paper. They analyse, among others, the 
Bradford Hill criteria for assessing evidence of medical causation and conclude that Williamson's account of 
epistemic causality -  a neo-Humean account -  does justice to what the medical claims amount to. No 
reference to the other, anti-Humean side of the debate appears in Williamson and Russo’s paper.
379 Cartwright and Dupre(i988: 526-527) Cartwright (2007a: 58,65)
38oCartwright criticises in her (1999) the fact that huge financial resources are allotted to the breast cancer 
research investigating its genetic bases, while much less (financial) attention is paid to the research into the 
causal influence of the endogenous oestrogen levels on breast cancer, simply because 'the genetic 
programme is our best shot right now at a theory of everything1 (Cf Cartwright, 1999:17).
381 Cartwright (1999: 72)
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th a t are generally held to  block the neuro-m uscular junction  in m yasthenia gravis 
actually im prove the neurom uscular synapses and the m uscular m ovem ents.382
FIGURE 21 CARTWRIGHT’S RATIONALE APPLIED IN MEDICINE
P opulation  level regularities 
ijejride^
Probabilistic ‘causal law s’
M icrostructural assessm ents  
^jjtixot^)tionk^isjtej^ularities^)^
D eterm in istic  ‘causal law s’
Singular causal interactions 
(m edical diagnoses)
Contra H um ean general causal claims — both the probabilistic ‘laws’ o f  
epidem iology and the exceptionless ‘causal laws’ o f  physiopathology hold only  
for the context in w hich they were ascertained - these ‘causal laws’ do not have 
universal bearing [C 2007:58]
Contra H um ean singular causal claims - neither the probabilistic ‘causal laws’ nor 
the determ inistic assessm ent o f  laboratories can vindicate singular causal claims 
about interactions occurring in different causal contexts
Evidently, problem s of ascertaining singular causation (i.e. the  difficulties concerning 
m edical diagnoses) should follow for the  H um ean from the problem s involving the 
general causal claims. Recall Cartw right’s simple example o f a diet:
382 In the case of the microstructural assessments we might have two sources of ‘causal context’ variation. 
One would be the different sets of causal factors showing up from one context to another, as different 
‘backgrounds’ for the cause and effect under study -  it is a sort of variation that these assessments share 
with the probabilistic, population level evidence. The other source would be the difference between the 
laboratory settings and the real life organisms. The medical laboratory conditions operate, o f course, on 
grounds of a ‘shielding’ that eliminates (what an anti-Humean would call) a whole range of causal factors, 
interferences and stimuli. This latter sources of variation could evidently be invoked when questioning not 
only the Humean approach to medical ‘causal laws’ but also the move from ‘causal laws’ to singular causal 
claims. I shall return to this issue in §4.4
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“ [In] the more usual way...we insist that all admissible singular claims fall under a generic law...we take as a 
necessary condition for “this C caused this E” that it be generically true that C's cause Fs... Now there may 
be some description, D, of me that fixes in a law-like way the efficacy of this diet for people who satisfy D. In 
that case we would have a reference class, picked out in a non question-begging way, in which P(weight 
loss/diet) > jP(weight loss/no diet). But there may not be such a description. There may simply be individual 
variation. To insist that there is always such a description is to let a big -  and insecure -  metaphysical 
assumption guide our methodology. That I think is a wrong thing to do.” (Cartwright 2005, italics original, 
underlines added)
The ‘individual variation’ th a t Cartw right alludes to is an extrem e case of the difference in 
the  causal context th a t her custom ary argum entation  against the  H um ean strategy m akes 
so m uch use of. The upshot of applying Cartw right’s rationale to m edical cases is th a t the  
‘causal laws’ in m edicine are no t universal and  one can doubt their use in vindicating 
singular causal claims. Given the presence in a particular organism  of an etiological factor 
- probabilistically correlated (by whatever epidem iological m eans) to a certain  set of 
sym ptom s, or identified (by whatever m icrostructural assessm ents) as part o f a 
m echanism  held responsible for the respective set o f sym ptom s - one cannot justifiably 
infer th a t the  factor produced tha t set of pathological properties instan tia ted  by the 
particular organism  in question.
In the  next section, I shall p resent some of the problem s th a t (dys)function based 
explanations have in dealing w ith the pathological realm. Discussing these problem s is 
necessary because it will allow us to form ulate two in terrelated  questions -  w hat 
capacities are a t w ork in m edicine and w hat functions are a t work in the positive 
functional explanations -  which I shall try  to answer by looking a t w hat 
d ispositions/capacities m ight be m anifested in the  functioning of items, in the case of 
diseased organisms.
§ 4 .3  Fu n c t io n s  a n d  c a pa c ities
This section will revolve around an  example o f a particular pathological case. I shall use 
th is example in §4.3.1 to outline the m ain problem  th a t I take the dys-functional (or the 
failure-to-function) explanations to have, w hen it comes to singular organism s and their
213
sym ptom s - a problem  th a t has to do w ith the  distinction betw een positive and negative 
causes. Full-blown explanations, I shall argue, need to refer to positive causes, and 
function-based explanations can do th is only if the failure part is dropped, as it were. That 
is to say, full explanations of pathological occurrences m ust cite the  functioning  (as 
opposed to the  dys-functioning) of biological items.
Part o f the  aim  of th is section is to identify the sort of functioning th a t could be in place 
in pathological contexts. I shall th en  connect this line of enquiry w ith  the issue of 
vindication o f singular causal claims in m edical circum stances (outlined in §4.2.3) and 
shall suggest in §4.3.2 th a t a plausible answer consists in viewing the functioning of item s 
in diseases as the m anifesting of an ti-H um ean capacities.
§ 4 .3 .1  P r o b l e m s  o f  (d y s - )  f u n c t i o n a l  e x p l a n a t i o n s
The example I am  going to discuss is purposefully fram ed in the idiom  of the  case-studies 
th a t are frequently presented  in the m edical literature:
A 45 year old m an is adm itted  in the  em ergency un it w ith com plaints o f shortness o f 
b rea th  on exertion, dizziness and palpitations. O n observation, the patien t exhibits 
rhythm ic nodding of the head, alternating constriction and dilation o f pupils, blanching 
and  flushing of the  forehead, quick filling and collapse of carotid arteries. The physical 
exam ination reveals tachycardia, wide pulse, left and down-ward deviation o f the  apexian 
shock and  a descrescendo, early diastolic m urm ur in the axillary point. The paraclinic 
tests show on EKG ventricular hypertrophy, and systolic blood regurgitation in the  left 
ventricle on cardiac ecography.
The blanching and  flushing of the forehead, tachycardia, nodding of the head in tim e 
w ith  the  heartbeat, shortness of breath  on exertion, dizziness, alternating constriction & 
d ila ta tion  of pupils etc., are all sym ptom s (and signs) o f a valvular cardiac disease called 
aortic insufficiency (for simplicity, I shall henceforth simply call these sym ptom s and
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signs ‘Aol sym ptom s’).383 The diagnosis of this disease is established using, inter alia, EKG 
and eco-cardiographic tests and its basic trea tm en t consists in the m edical adm inistration 
of vasodilators and the surgical replacem ent of the aortic valve.
W hat function-based explanations could one provide for the sym ptom s the patien t in 
question  exhibits and how com prehensive could they be? Before addressing this question, 
I need to briefly present the standard  m edical textbook explanation of physio-pathology 
of aortic insufficiency (Aol).
Physiologically, the activity of the heart consists in a lternating  contractions and 
relaxations (systoles and diastoles), due to which the oxygenated blood com ing from the 
pulm onary veins enters the systemic circulation and C02 loaded blood is redirected via 
the  pulm onary arteries to the lungs. The circulation of blood through the heart in these 
specific directions depends crucially on a system of valves, which ensure th a t the 
oxygenated blood does no t mix with the C02-loaded blood, th a t the contractions are used 
only for pum ping blood in the arteries, etc.
Figure 22 Ventricular diastole (left) 
and systole (right)
As far as the systemic circulation is 
concerned, in a diastole the aortic valve 
(connecting the left ventricle with the 
aorta) is closed and the mitral valve 
(connecting the left atrium with the left 
ventricle) is open. The blood is then 
allowed to flow down from the left 
atrium to the left ventricle. In a systole 
the mitral valve closes down while the 
aortic valve is opened, and the blood is 
ejected into the aorta following the 
ventricular contraction.
383 It should be stated that these are symptoms and signs of two conditions that are treated separately in the 
medical literature: aortic insufficiency and cardiac insufficiency. The former is taken as a valvular cardiac 
disease, as such, whereas the latter is discussed as a condition that emerges when almost all cardiac diseases 
progress towards their more critical stages. In other words, cardiac insufficiency can be taken as an 
advanced stage of aortic insufficiency (with the note that not only the aortic insufficiency undergoes this 
phase); see Arnold (2008)
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In a systole, the  heart propels into the aorta 100-125011 oxygenated blood from the left 
ventricle (representing 60-65% ° f  its volume) through the aortic valve. In the  beginning 
o f the  diastole, w hen the  left ventricle relaxes and the in tra-ventricular pressure 
decreases, the aortic valve closes due to the  high pressure in the aorta. A lm ost 
sim ultaneously, the  m itral valve is opened and the blood com ing from the lungs flows 
dow n into the ventricle. The filling of the  left ventricle raises the  pressure inside it. 
Consequently, a t the  end of the  diastole the  m itral valve is ‘pushed’ upw ards and closed, 
while the  aortic valve is opened w hen a new systolic contraction begins.
In aortic insufficiency (Aol henceforth), the aortic valve closes dow n incom pletely a t the  
end o f the  systole, such th a t some of the  blood ejected in the systole leaks back into the 
left ventricle. In the  diastole, the left ventricle thus receives bo th  the regurgitated blood 
from  the  aorta  and the  blood flowing down from the left atrium . Hence, in the  systole a 
greater volum e of blood is pushed through the aortic valve, creating an increased systolic 
pressure in  the  aorta th a t decreases abruptly  in the  diastole along w ith the regurgitation. 
It is th is difference betw een the systolic and diastolic pressure in the  aorta th a t is 
responsible for the  blanching and flushing of forehead, the wide pulse, the  rhytm ic 
nodding  o f the  head in tim e w ith the heartbeat and the quick filling and collapse o f the 
carotid  arteries.384
The decreased ‘n e t’ outflow of blood (at the cerebral level) is responsible for dizziness and 
also for the  activation of certain baro-receptors from the aortic no tch  due to which an 
increase in  the  tone of the  sym pathic nervous system and hence tachycardia occur. At the 
renal level, the  decreased vascularisation activates a chain o f horm ones (rennin, 
angiotensin, aldosterone -  the  RAA system) th a t produce vascular constriction, the 
re ten tio n  o f Na and  w ater and, to a certain degree, the hypertrophy o f the  ventricular 
walls.
384 See Tanser (2007)
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FIGURE 2 3  AORTIC LEAKAGE (reproduced from Adam Health Encyclopaedia)
.Weakened 
aortic valve
Failure of the aortic valve to 
close tightly causes back flow 





Because the aortic valve closes down 
incompletely at the end o f  the systole, in the 
beginning o f  the diastole when the intra- 
ventricular pressure is low, a part o f  the blood 
ejected into the aorta flows back into the left 
ventricle. As a net result then, after a complete 
cardiac cycle, the blood from the left ventricle is 
ejected ‘incompletely’ into the aorta.
The decreased ‘net’ outflow o f  blood acts, infer 
alia, upon the sympathetic nervous system 
(producing tachycardia) and the RAA system 
(producing Na and water retention).
In the  m ore advanced phases of the disease, (when Aol progresses towards the so-called 
cardiac insufficiency phase), the left ventricle becom es thicker and its volum e increases, 
in order to cope w ith the increase in the volume of blood received in diastole; th a t is why 
we have a left and down-ward deviation of the apexian shock. The dilatation and 
hypertrophy of the left ventricle makes it relax less during the diastole and thus its 
diastolic pressure is heightened. W hen the diastolic pressure in the left ventricle reaches 
a certain  level, it is ‘transm itted ’ backwards to the left atrium , the pulm onary veins and 
fu rther on to the pulm onary capillaries in which the air exchange is perform ed. That is 
how  the  shortness of breath  occurs -  the increased pressure in the pulm onary capillaries 
produces the extravagation of plasma proteins into the alveolar space, pulm onary 
com pliance is then  reduced and the pressure of 0 2 in the exchange capillaries drops.385
The above represents w hat m ight be called the general physiopathological schem e of Aol,
385 This happens in the advanced stages, in which pulmonary oedema occurs - one of the classic 
manifestations of cardiac insufficiency; see Arnold (2008).
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described in very broad term s. Some further details will be adduced later. In this 
subsection I shall no t discuss the status of the  ‘causal laws’ th a t figure in this ‘textbook’ 
schem e b u t ra ther use it as a m inim al backdrop to express w hat I see as the m ain problem  
o f the c/ys-functional explanations.
W hat could explanations in term s of failures of functions tell us in th is particular case? 
Evidently, depending on which account of function one adheres to, one could yield in th is 
case e ither Cum m ins-type or W right-type explanations. Let us look a t the heart as one 
exam ple o f a biological item .386
The W right explanation would be th a t the  heart of this particular organism  does not 
produce its W -effects. The W -effects, rem em ber, are those which during a certain  period 
in evolutionary history increased the chances of their organism  surviving and due to 
w hich the  h ea rt’s genetic basis was stabilized and m aintained at the  level o f populations.. 
Even though t th is heart in this diseased organism  does do some pum ping, the  usual W - 
effects are m anifested in a dim inished way. Therefore, they do not qualify as the  W  effects 
o f the  heart - the  genuine W  effects are indeed the effects o f the heart exercised upon 
blood circulation bu t only w hen they are within a certain range. Had the heart usually 
pushed  blood w ith less than  50% ejection rate into the aorta and produced shortness of 
b rea th  on exertion, for instance, it would have had m uch lower chances of being selected 
as a biological item  in the way th a t it currently is.387 Since the genuine W -effects are 
m issing th en  in the organism  of this person, his heart is dys-functional and this failure to 
function explains the  disease and its symptoms.
The Cum m ins explanation would be based on the typical C-function - the function of the 
heart to  produce the C-effects statistically determ ined in a population relevant for th a t 
individual organism , let the effects in question be called Ci-typical effects, for reasons 
th a t will be clear very swiftly. These Qr typical effects circum scribed by statistics,388 
construed  as its contribution to the capacity of the circulatory system to d istribute
386 The following discussion could easily be applied to all the other items items implicated in the disease of 
the particular organism under scrutiny.
387 See for instance Neander (1991), Nesse and Williams (1999) and Wakefield (2001). See also Sadler and 
Agich (1995) for a critical discussion, in the context of psychiatry, which focuses mostly on the disease/non - 
disease distinction and not on functional explanations, as such.
3®® e.g. cardiac output 70-75011, ejection rate 60-65%) cardiac index 2.6 - 4^  L/min m , pressure in the 
ventricle in the mid-diastolic period 5-7 mmHg, etc.
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oxygenated blood and elim inate w astes,389 are not delivered in th is patient. His heart 
sim ply lacks the typical Q  function identified in the general population. W e have th en  a 
failure o f a C rfunction  and pointing out this failure constitu tes an explanation o f his 
disease and sym ptom s.390
These two types of function-based explanations indicating the failure o f the  heart to 
deliver the  W  and Q  typical effects, respectively, are som ehow  illum inating. Insofar as the 
no tion  o f explanation is connected w ith understanding,391 they  do throw  some light on the 
patien t's  state. Nonetheless, they do no t constitu te full-blooded explanations, in the  sense 
m entioned  in the previous section in which to genuinely explain a phenom enon is to 
p inpo in t the  causes whose effect it is.
In order to see th is m ore clearly, let us recall some features of the  basic explanatory role 
o f functions, espoused in §4.1. In biology, the W -function of a token item  T in a particular 
organism  is taken to explain the selection of the item  T, since tokens o f the  sim ilar type- 
item  produced the respective W -effects at a certain evolutionary poin t in the  history of 
the  lineage, which th a t particular organism  is part of. O n the o ther hand, the  typical C r 
function o f an  item  T belonging to a certain organism  is taken to explain the capacity o f a 
com plex system  (in a certain  population) in which its typical Q  effects play a role. 
A dm ittedly, these are in principle full-blooded explanations, since they explain certain  
aspects o f organisms, by reference to their causes. The W  or Q  typical effects produced by 
item s are taken  in tu rn  to act as causes producing the stabilisation in a certain  population 
o f the  item s’ genetic bases (in the  case of the W  effects) and the em ploym ent of a certain 
com plex capacity o f a biological system (in the case of the Q  typical effects).
W hen  it comes to pathological situations though, w hat we see is th a t in the  con ten t of 
explanations, the place of functions is taken by failures to function (as explanatory
389 I shall continue to employ Cummins’s term of ‘capacities’ with regard to the behaviours exhibited by 
biological systems (explained by the Cummins functions) even though Cartwright uses the same term with 
respect to her anti-Humean powers. The particular sense in which this term is employed in the main text 
will always be clear from the context.
390 See Juengst (1983: 131, 132). Juengst discusses the functional explanations that can be provided using 
Boorse’s account of function, which, as I have mentioned in §4-i> could be plausibly classified as a type of 
Cummins account.
391 Indeed, one of the ways that Hempel for instance tried to make sense of the notion of explanation was by 
connecting it with the psychological notion of understanding. See Hempel (1966)
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elem ents for the  pathological aspects - sym ptom s) and the place o f the  W  effects and  Q  
typical effects is taken by the lack of the  W  and Q-typical effects, respectively. T hat is, the 
absence o f certain  causal factors is supposed to explain certain pathological aspects.
Now, it is true th a t in an extended account of causality, the absence o f causal factors can 
be construed as a causal influence in its own way.392 Nevertheless, such explanations 
founded on failures to function do no t respond com pletely to the  'W hy' question 
addressed to diseases, simply because the pathological elem ents o f organism s do have 
positive causes on their own, beside the negative ones.
o Item T —> W-effects — >the maintenance of T
o Item T — ? lack of W-effects— ? pathological aspects
o Item T — > Cr typical effect — >the complex capacity o f the system S in which T is part of
0 Item T — ? lack of C,-typical effects ? pathological aspects
1 do no t w ish to  suggest th a t the failure-to-function explanations are trivial. I suppose 
th a t a p a rt o f the  contribution to understanding th a t these explanations seem  to convey 
stem s from the fact that, as discussed in §4.1, the Q-typical and the W  functions have 
been  presented  as capable of identifying diseases, via their failures. W hether they can do 
so is a long discussion. However, even adm itting  th a t the lack o f the  W  or Q-typical 
effects could help one identify and explain a certain state as non-healthy, I th ink  th a t 
there  is still a distance betw een understanding th a t an organism  suffers from a disease, 
and  specifically explaining the symptom s it exhibits.
In our ‘case-study’, we can perhaps understand  th a t the person’s organism  is diseased. 
Yet, we do no t have a straightforw ard answer as to why there is dizziness, shortness of 
breath , rhythm ic head nodding, etc. O f course, conceding th a t the lack of a causal factor 
is still a type o f causal contribution, one can point out th a t in tha t person's organism, a 
certain  disequilibrium  has shown up. After all, both  the W  and typical-Q  effects of his 
heart are supposed to be part of a fine-tuned series of in terconnections th a t are disrupted 
w hen these effects are no t present. This is w hat function theorists like N eander are
392 Even though there is no consensus on this matter; see Beebee (2001)
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referring to, w hen adverting th a t in m edicine the absence o f the  'healthy' effects o f item s 
(the W -effects, according to Neander) explains w hat happens to organism s in 
pathological cases.
This sort o f rationale does no t get us very far from the general issue o f identifying diseases 
though. Yes, a certain equilibrium  is broken down, one could retort, bu t again, why does 
th is organism  exhibit blanching and flushing o f forehead, a lternating  constriction and 
d ila ta tion  of pupils, etc. and not, say, wheezing, jo in t pains or H ippocratic fingers? In the 
end, w hat such explanations form ulated in term s o f failures of functions could tell us in 
th is particular case is that, to pu t it informally ‘The heart of this organism  does no t w ork 
well’. Is it sufficient?
The explanations revolving around failures of function (either W  dys-functions or losses 
of Q  typical function) constitute incom plete explanations of diseases. Again, I do no t wish 
to  suggest th a t they should be rejected. Nonetheless, it seems evident th a t a 
com plem entary  project, would also give explanations in term s of positive causes. Only in 
th is way one could explain precisely the em ergence of sym ptom s, in w hat sense the 
survival o f an  organism  is threatened, how the survival chances can be restored (by 
trea tm en t), etc.393
In fact th is is the direction of the ‘pathological’ explanations employed in som atic m edical 
practice. The ‘textbook’ physiopathological rendition of Aol I have briefly fram ed a t the 
beginning o f th is section appeals to positive causes.394 This aspect is w orth noting w hen 
looking fov function-based  explanations for the simple reason th a t the  physiopathological, 
textbook-stance on Aol can in  fact be viewed as a ‘Cum m ins analysis’ o f the  C-fim ctions
393 See Juengst (1983:131,132).
394 It should be submitted that the terms ‘dysfunction’ and ‘failure to function’ are often met in the medical 
textbooks, in order to indicate the lack of certain effects. But the overall balance is overwhelmingly turned 
towards the positive causes side.
possessed by item s in such a pathological circulatory system .395
I have poin ted  out in §4.1 th a t the appeal to the Q  typical functions is an additional, 
‘external' elem ent o f the  Cum m ins account of function, brought into discussion in order 
to  respond to  the W right-ean challenge th a t an appropriate account of function should be 
able to identify diseases. These typical Q  effects are supposed to be the 'healthy ones, i.e. 
are supposed to be selected from a 'healthy' population (and parenthetically, huge 
problem s a ttend  this way of discrim inating betw een health  and disease).
However, it is by no m eans obligatorily for the  'pure' Cum m ins account of functions to 
refer to the  typical Q-effects in 'healthy' populations. The basic idea o f this account is 
sim ply that, in order to a ttribu te  functions to biological items, one needs to  locate 
com plex biological systems and perform  the so-called ‘Cum m ins analyses'. To perform  a 
‘C um m ins analysis' is decom pose the systems in question into elem ents, trace out the 
overall effects produced by each one of them  and m ake sense of the contribution th a t the 
item s m ake to  the complex capacities exhibited by the overall system.
W hether these systems are pathological or no t (on any o ther criteria), appears thus to be 
extraneous to the  scope of a ‘pure’ Cummins account. Insofar as organism s w ith life- 
th rea ten ing  conditions have systems possessing certain features of complexity, one can 
a ttrib u te  C-effects (and hence C-functions) to the biological item s participating in them , 
relative to the  capacities exhibited by the systems under focus). Let us call these 
Cum m ins pathological effects the typical C2 effects.
As I said, the  C2 effects in question, resulting from the Cum m ins functioning  of biological
395 There are in fact two interpretations of where the Cummins functions and Cummins effects are to be 
found. First, they can be taken to correspond, in general, to the analyses of the current non-evolutionary 
theory and/or second, to the study of mechanisms. See Craver (2001) for the latter interpretation and 
Amudson and Lauder (1994) for the former interpretation (in which, in fact the Cummins analyses are also 
said to describe the practice of evolutionary biology). The identification of a sort o f Cummins functions and 
Cummins effects as being at play in the medical research spins off from the former interpretation -  if what 
Cummins and his followers describe suits very well the biological practice, then it should also suit the 
medical practice. This proposal concerning the medical scope of Cummins functions, paradoxically, is often 
brought to the table by proponents of the Wright account (see for instance Godfrey-Smith 1993:15-16) who 
are less preoccupied, however, with the explanatory project dedicated to medicine than they are with 
making the point that the Cummins functions could not be the proper functions. Since the Cummins 
functions can be identified in medicine, they argue, and the ‘proper’ functions should be able to ‘identify’ 
the pathological and make the distinction between disease and health, the Cummins functions could not be 
the searched-for proper functions.
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item s as well as the  influence of these C2 effects over systems (and ultim ately, over entire 
organism s), could be taken to be the ones discovered by curren t m edicine. That is to say, 
w hat general laboratory assessm ents, clinical trials, epidem iological studies, etc. are doing 
could in fact be viewed as am ounting  to ‘Cum m ins analyses’ which determ ine such C2 
effects (and C2 functions) w hich can be employed to provide full blown function-based 
explanations of diseases.396
The C2 effects o f the  heart appealed to in these explanations should be the hypertrophy 
and  dilation o f the left ventricle, the rising of the  nervous sym pathetic tone, the  
p roduction  of atrial natriuretic  peptide etc. The C2 effects o f (certain types of cells, i.e. the  
juxtaglom erular cells, from) kidneys should be the synthesis of rennin  and the subsequent 
p roduction  o f angiotensin II. The C2 effects of the aortic no tch  baro-receptors and the  
sym pathetic nervous system should be tachycardia (and certain  m odifications in the  
granula densa cells). The C2 effects of the suprarenal glands should be the secreting of 
a ldosterone (and subsequently the Na and w ater reten tion  and the hypertrophy and 
subendocardial fibrosis), e tc .397
To be sure, in our im aginary ‘case-study’, this sort of Cum m ins explanations based on the 
C2 functioning  seem s indeed to be in a be tter position th an  the 'failure to  function' 
approaches, w hen it comes to explaining the sym ptom s and pathological behaviours 
exhibited by the  particular organism  in question. These sym ptom s can be seen as 
resulting  from  the pathological capacities exhibited by its circulatory system, w hereas the 
various C2 effects o f heart and the o ther im plicated biological item s could be taken as 
responsible for how the particular circulatory system at hand behaves.
o Item T -> C2 typical effects -> pathological aspects (symptoms)
There are two im portan t caveats th a t need to be stressed though. The Cum m ins analyses 
-  w hich, I hypothesized, are to be identified in m edical research, w hen general 
physiopathological schem es are circum scribed — could only have as results typical C2 
effects, taken  as contributing in general to the  capacities of circulatory systems of a
396 See Geoffrey-Smith (2003)
397 See Tanser (2007), Arnold (2008). More details will be provided in §4-4
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certain  type (say, Aol circulatory systems). O n the other hand, the fram ework o f the 
Cum m ins functions, even if m uch m ore liberal than  th a t o f the  W right functions, has 
certain  restrictions th a t are no t often m entioned  by the function theorists, bu t m atter to 
our discussion.
Correspondingly, we have two (related) worries, which can be roughly expressed as 
follows: how do we know th a t the heart and all the  o ther im plicated biological item s 
produce in th is particular organism  the C2 effects a ttribu ted  to them  by m edical research 
and  th a t these C2 effects act as causes for sym ptom s? And, on the o ther hand, do these 
m edical C2 effects indeed constitu te m anifestations of Cum mins functions?
In §4.3.2 I shall try  to unfold these worries and provide some answers to them .
§4 .3 .2  F u n c t io n in g  a s  t h e  m a n if e s t in g  o f  c a p a c it ie s
In principle, em ploying a sort of Cum m ins functions, related to w hat I have called the C2 
effects, should provide full-blooded explanations for the  state of the  organism  of our case- 
study. This use of the Cum m ins functions, prim a facie, does seem to be perm itted  by the 
general fram ew ork of this account. In diseased organism s we still have systems w ith a 
com plex organisation and item s th a t contribute to their behaviour. Since the activity of 
these system s is life-threatening and ultim ately produces sym ptom s of diseases, the  C2 
effects resulting from  the  ‘Cum m ins analyses’ perform ed in the m edical research and the 
C2 functioning seem  strong candidates for being part o f full blown functional 
explanations. N onetheless, there  are two (interconnected) worries abou t the  very 
possibility o f th is sort o f ‘pathological’ functions and their use in explanations for singular
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organism s.398
The first w orry goes back to the  basics o f the Cum m ins account of functions. For 
Cum m ins, as I have m entioned  in §4.1, function ascriptions are supposed to be in fact 
a ttribu tions o f dispositions, in the  sense th a t the  Cum m ins effects o f item s should be 
manifestations of dispositions possessed by the  item s in question.
Something may be capable of pumping even though it does not function as a pump (ever) and even though 
pumping is not its function. On the other hand, if something functions as a pump in a system s or if the 
function o f something in a system s is to pump, then it must be capable of pumping in s. Thus, function- 
ascribing statements imply disposition statements; to attribute a function to something is, in part, to 
attribute a disposition to it. If the function of x in s to <E>, then x has a disposition to <t> in s. (Cummins, 1975: 
757-8)
The dispositions of the  item s perform ing C-functions, however, are ultim ately to be 
grounded  in regularities. Cum m ins thus adheres to a H um ean way of dealing w ith 
dispositions and  causation. T hat is to say, in order to justify a (singular) causal claim of 
the  sort - the  item  T of a such and such organism, in the  presence o f certain precipitating 
factors or stim uli, produced such and such Cum m ins effects (which in tu rn  contribu ted  to 
the  their com plex systems in a so and so way) - one should bring in regularities holding 
betw een item s such as T, their C-effects and finally, the  behaviours of systems. By going 
deeply enough, the  regularities in question should tu rn  out to belong, says Cum m ins, to 
the  realm  of pure physiology’.
'To attribute a disposition d to an object a is to assert that the behavior of a is subject to (exhibits or would 
exhibit) a certain law-like regularity: to say a has d is to say that a would manifest d (shatter, dissolve) were 
any of a certain range of events to occur (a is put in water, a is struck sharply). The regularity associated
398 As I said, this use in medicine of the Cummins functions was suggested by several theorists, for instance, 
by Godfrey-Smith in his (1993: 15,16). Godfrey Smith (like many theorists discussing the Cummins 
functions) does not pay any attention to a crucial aspect of the Cummins account. To take another example, 
Craver, who devotes in his (2001) a considerable effort to defending Cummins’s account against charges of 
triviality and showing precisely what type of systems (with what features of complexity) are related to the 
non-accidental Cummins effects, does not mention at all Cummins’s dispositions; see Craver (2001). In the 
functions literature, Bigelow&Pargetter provide a very interesting propensity account of functions, which 
revolves around dispositions possessed by biological items; see Bigelow&Pargetter (i99o: 332> 333)- Their 
account however, as I have specified in §4.1, is a future-based variant of the Wright account. Interestingly, 
Bigelow and Pargetter are Humeans about causation and their (1990) is aimed at defending a Humean 
metaphysics. No specifics about causation are discussed however in the section dedicated to biological 
functions.
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with a disposition - call it the dispositional regularity - is a regularity that is special to the behavior of a 
certain kind of object and obtains in virtue of some special fact(s) about that kind of object...by analyzing a 
disposition d of a into a number of other dispositions d, . . . dn, had by a or components of a such that 
programmed manifestation of the dj results in or amounts to a manifestation of d [...] The biologically 
significant capacities o f an entire organism are explained by analyzing the organism into a number of 
"systems" - the circulatory system, the digestive system, the nervous system, etc., - each of which has its 
characteristic capacities. These capacities are in turn analyzed into capacities of component organs and 
structures. Ideally, this strategy is pressed until pure physiology takes over, i.e., until the analyzing capacities 
are amenable to the subsumption strategy [i.e. until the analysing capacities are simple enough and can be 
reduced to regularities]’ (Cummins, 1975: 758, 760-1, italics added)
Now, w hat w ould follow in the m edical cases w ould be that, in order to ground the 
adverted  C2 effects (to be found in the physiopathological schemes), we should have some 
sort o f dispositions, such th a t the C2 functioning consisted in the m anifesting of these 
dispositions. W hat could these C2 dispositions be?
O ne im m ediate option is to stick to the term s o f Cum m ins’s original account, according 
to  w hich (function-related) dispositions are connected w ith the level o f pure physiology. 
N evertheless, adopting this view has an untenable consequence. Given th a t the 
d ispositions in question  should be reduced to regularities o f physiology, it would simply 
follow th a t the  physiopathological C2 effects were identical w ith the physiological ones -  
b o th  types o f effects being ‘dissolved’ in the same physiological regularities.
I have underlined  several tim es in the present thesis th a t I shall no t discuss the details of 
the  d istinction  betw een health  and disease (relying instead upon a broader distinction 
betw een those conditions th a t are life-threatening and those th a t are not). Yet, the 
conclusion th a t w hatever causal interactions are in m edicine, they are identical w ith the 
causal in teractions from healthy organisms seem s far-fetched,399 even for my rather 
agnostic position on the (m uch discussed) precise distinction betw een health  and disease.
A nother op tion  is to modify Cum m ins’s original account and hypothesize that, even 
though  we have ‘pathological’ dispositions present in the  C2 functioning, those
399 To mention only the evident (contrastive) consequences, irrespective of the exact statistical life 
expectancy o f a (human) organism with no aortic insufficiency, it is in any case higher than the expectancy 
o f an organism with Aol reaching the stage IV NYHA of cardiac insufficiency (the latter being 1 year in 50 % 
o f the cases; see Arnold 2008)
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‘pathological’ dispositions are different from the  physiological ones in th a t the form er are 
to be ‘dissolved’ in the  regularities o f the diseases.
Yet, th is alternative does no t seem  satisfactory either. O n the o ther hand, w hat would 
follow w ould be a m ultiplication of dispositions -  for each disease an item  is engaged in, 
it w ould have to possess a different disposition. O n the o ther hand, we should ask, w hat 
sort o f regularities of physiopathology could be the ones in which the ‘pathological’ 
d ispositions are to  be dissolved? This brings us to the second worry.
The second worry is th a t in m edicine we m ight not have the sort of regularities th a t 
w ould found general causal claims capable to vindicate singular causal interactions. To 
consider again our single case study, m entioning the C2 pathological effects (to be found 
in  the  ‘Cum m ins analysis’ perform ed in the m edical research) should am oun t to an 
explanation o f the  individual’s state and the attend ing  symptom s. T hat there is indeed a 
C2 functioning of these item s in this singular case is to be vindicated, in the H um ean line 
th a t Cum m ins adopts, by m entioning dispositions and ultim ately general regularities.
In o ther words, adopting the explicit idiom  of causation,400 the singular causal claim 
regarding the role of the  C2 effects in this particular organism  should be vindicated by the 
‘causal laws’ of physiopathology, where these causal laws are to be understood in a 
H um ean vein, as derived from regularities. Informally put, we should know th a t the C2 
effects are there, in th a t singular organism, (produced by the respective item s and 
producing  in tu rn  the m anifestations from the level o f systems) because we should have 
the  ‘causal laws’ of the  general physiopathological schem e of Aol.
4°°The two strategies that for Cummins are to be used in the ‘Cummins functional analysis’ - the 
subsumption strategy and the decomposition strategy (Cummins 1975) - were formulated in the 70’s, using 
the neo-Humean idiom of dispositions, regularities, explanations, etc. which was supposed to make 
causation talk unnecessary. But arguably, what are at work in the case of the Cummins functions simpliciter 
are general causal claims, just like in the case of the C2 functions are at work the general ‘causal laws’ o f 
medicine. In the case of Cummins function attributions to particular organisms, there are involved singular 
causal claims (supposed to be justified, for the Humean, by the general causal claims). In the context o f our 
discussion, the explanations citing these functions addressed to singular organisms are in fact singular 
causal claims (which are supposed to be vindicated by the general ‘causal laws of physiopathology).
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FIGURE 24 THE HUMEAN STANCE ON THE C2 FUNCTIONING AND THE ATTENDING CAUSAL CLAIMS
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A n a n ti-H u m e an  could  m ake th e  case th o u g h  th a t th e  ‘causal laws’ th a t  u n d erlie  any  
g eneral physiopatho log ical schem e in som atic  m edicine are n o t un iversal an d  could  n o t 
v in d ica te  s ingu lar causal claim s.4011 have fram ed in §4.2 th e  ra tiona le  developed  by 
C artw rig h t ag a in st H u m ean  causes an d  th e  w ay th is  ra tiona le  m ig h t be tak en  to  apply  to 
th e  m edica l causes. In  m edicine, as everyw here else, one could  ad o p t C artw righ t’s fam ous 
m o tto  - no  causes in, no  causes o u t402 -  ad m ittin g  th a t  capacities shou ld  be reckoned  w ith  
in  o u r g eneral an d  singu lar causal inferences.
401 The rationale would be the same as the one I framed in 4.2..3 - it would cite the variation in the causal 
contexts given for instance different arrays of causal factors showing up from one population to another, 
the difference between laboratory setting and the real-life organisms, etc. The series o f ‘questions’ that the 
anti-Humean could throw at the Humean strategy and ‘causal laws’ are also of the same type - does the 
decreased cardiac output produce the increased tonus of the sympathetic system and hence tachycardia? 
Well, we could have a population in which the sympathetic tonus is decreased by the lowered cardiac 
output. Does the increased pressure in pulmonary capillaries, given the rates o f filtration, reabsorbtion and 
lymph flow, produce the extravasation of proteins in the alveoli? Well, we might have a singular organism 
in which the congestion of the pulmonary capillaries helps the alveoli remain intact.
402 Cartwright (1989: 39)
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I have asked thus  in the  previous section w hat capacities should be ‘in troduced’ in our 
m edical reasoning. I w ould like now to connect this question, which has specifically to do 
w ith the  causation ‘vein’ o f th is chapter, w ith the questions surrounding the o ther ‘vein’ 
of function-based explanations.
Recall th a t w hen it comes to hun ting  down causes, according to Cartwright, the  m ain way 
in w hich we can find out abou t capacities and their m anifestations appeals to the  so- 
called nom ological m achines -  settings in which interferences are shielded, proper 
stim uli are presen t (and hence the m anifesting of capacities is regulated).
Some nom ological m achines are m an-m ade (e.g. lab eq u ip m en t),403 while o ther 
nom ological m achines are natural (e.g. the solar system )404. W hat is com m on to them  all 
is th a t ‘inside’ them  can be found ‘local’ regularities, out o f which we learn about the 
capacities’ m anifestations. In a very special sense then, the  m etaphysical path  o f the 
H um ean is the epistem ic part o f the an ti-H um ean.405
Once capacities are thus ‘localised’, th en  w ith further knowledge o f (abnorm al) stim uli 
and  interferences, we can draw  causal inferences concerning singular in teractions from 
the  ‘ou tside’. The question regarding w hat sort of capacities are a t work in m edicine 
should be th en  translated  as: w hat m edicine-related nom ological m achines do we have? 
Before a ttem pting  a response, let me sum  up the two worries th a t I have fram ed in 
relation to the  C2 functional explanations.
The first one stem s from the way Cum m ins construes the dispositions in the m anifesting 
o f w hich the Cum m ins functioning consists - these dispositions are said to be dissolved
403 ....and their laborious construction requires singular causal ‘information’- knowledge of stimuli, 
interferences, etc. which needs much experience but is in the end, says Cartwright (following Ascombe at 
this point) acquired because we can perceive natural necessity; see Cartwright (2002b)
404 In the solar system, the interferences represented by all the other causal influences different from the 
gravitational one are naturally negligible; see Cartwright (1999).
405 Whereas the Humean looks for regularities to reduce and ground ontologically the modal features of 
causation - recall capacities/powers are to be viewed as ‘bestowed upon’ by a certain type of constant 
conjunction - the anti-Humean looks for regularities in order to know about capacities. This is indeed a very 
special sense of ‘path parallelism’ -  for the anti-Humean, the regularities from the ‘inside’ are local and not 
universal regularities. Moreover, when nomological machines are of the man-made type, singular causal 
information about stimuli, interferences, etc. is essential in constructing them. In other words, that in a 
special sense the metaphysical path of the Humean is the epistemic one for the anti-Humean does not 
trivialise at all the Humean/anti-Humean distinction.
229
into the  regularities o f ‘pu re ’ physiology. W ere the C2 effects and the C2 functioning 
dissolved into those pure physiology regularities however, it would follow th a t there was 
virtually no difference betw een w hat causally happens in ill and healthy organisms. That 
is, the  causal in teractions in physiology and physiopathology w ould tu rn  out to be 
identical. O n the o ther hand, were the C2 effects taken to be dissolved into w hatever 
regularities we m ight have in m edicine, the  dispositions each biological item  has would 
be indefinitely m ultiplied, in accord w ith the potentially lim itless num ber of diseases they 
could be im plicated into.
The very a ttem p t to dissolve the C2 dispositions in question in to  the regularities of 
m edicine is connected w ith the second worry, form ulated from an an ti-H um ean 
standpo in t - regularities cannot ‘dissolve’ dispositions and bear out the  a ttending  causal 
claims. In an  explicit causal form ulation, the singular causal claims regarding the C2 
functioning and the causal in teractions a t w ork betw een the C2 effects, item s and systems, 
in the  case o f a singular organism, cannot be vindicated using the general ‘causal laws’ o f 
physiopathology, where these ‘laws’ are H um ean, regularity based ones.
In line w ith  the  m otto  ‘no causes in, no causes o u t’, one can view the C2 effects as 
m anifestations of an ti-H um ean capacities.406 O ut o f such capacities, ‘inside’ special 
contex ts/settings, regularities spring, allowing us to learn about capacities’ 
m anifestations. W ith  knowledge of capacities (and stim uli, interferences, etc.) one can 
form ulate causal inferences about the singular in teractions from ‘outside’. But w hat could 
be the  capacities at w ork in m edicine?
My suggestion goes along the following lines: the  capacities in m edicine are physiological 
ones and the C2 functioning results w hen these capacities are m ade m anifest in
406 I should emphasize, o f course, that the second worry is formulated in the backdrop o f Nancy 
Cartwright’s criticism of the universality of the Humean ‘causal laws’. Cartwright advocates the considering 
of capacities in our causal reasoning but her rationale is far from being a panacea: there are problems 
attending the anti-Humean program in general and her (particular) approach as well (see for instance 
Psillos 2008). I think though that at least the possibility of applying Cartwright’s rationale in favour of 
capacities to medicine (in the context o f the broader problems that functional explanations for diseases 
face) is worth investigating. As I stated from the very introduction of this chapter, my purpose is not to 
‘make a point’ and adjudicate between the Humean and the anti-Humean options advanced in the 
literature, or between the various accounts of function on offer, but simply to connect the discussions over 
functional explanations in medicine with an area in the philosophy of science that has been neglected; see 
also §4.4.
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conditions where there  are abnorm al stim uli, interferences, etc. This requires ‘healthy 
organism s (in the m inim al sense o f organism s in which the survival is actively 
m aintained) to correspond to ‘nom ological m achines’. That is ‘healthy’ organism s should 
represen t settings in which there  is a perfect coordination betw een different internal 
com ponents, such th a t the  ‘righ t’ set of stim uli are present, interferences are screened off, 
etc., and the capacities o f biological item s are exercised optimally.
In healthy organisms, like in any nom ological m achine, regularities show up. A part of 
C um m ins’s original insight is thus preserved, because these are precisely the regularities 
th a t Cum m ins refers to w hen saying th a t his H um ean dispositions are m etaphysically 
dissolved into regularities a t the level o f ‘pu re ’ physiology. In the schem e I propose 
though, the  capacities of biological item s are just ‘hun ted  dow n’ a t th is level. In o ther 
words, the  regularities in ‘pure physiology’ are just the  epistem ic platform  for further 
causal inferences concerning different causal contexts.
Diseased organism s are ones in which item s preserve their capacities, bu t the causal 
context changes in th a t the  sheltering disappears and there are either interferences or 
exacerbating stim uli. In these circum stances, the  capacities possessed by the biological 
item s m anifest waywardly -  they  are either exacerbated, dim inished, unaltered  or 
elim inated. Thus, the regularities from the nom ological m achine (‘inside’ healthy 
organism s) cannot justifiably be projected ‘outside’ (at the level of diseased organism s).407 
But the  causal claims in singular cases can be vindicated, notw ithstanding this change in 
causal context, by holding th a t capacities are still a t work, and observing w hat sort of
407 Recall that the crucial point o f determining the capacities inside nomological machines is that 
regularities (resulting from their systematic manifestations) cannot be justifiably projected ‘outside’ 
nomological machines (and indeed this is the entire significance of Cartwright’s insistence on modal 
inference tickets, which are different from the occurent ones). In the backdrop of our discussion, it seems 
evident that the regularities of physiology cannot be projected to the level of the pathological. This does not 
entail however that ‘outside’ there are no regularities - there might be, or there might not be (and 
Cartwright offers examples that cover both possibilities -  think of the cathedral banknote situation vs. the 
example of charges in a specially framed magnetic field, both offered in her 1999: 27, 60). Indeed, in the 
medical realm there are certain diseases (especially the chronic ones) that exhibit a somewhat regular 
behaviour. In my scheme, this regular pathological behaviour occurs in an ‘outside’ context in which the 
abnormal stimuli and interferences, being present long enough and affecting the physiological capacities in 
a certain sense, produce regular manifestations. Thus, the causal laws of medicine should be taken to 
emerge out of such pathological regularities (construed as an epistemic and not metaphysical source). 
Insofar as causes per se are concerned, however, my primary interest is in singular causation in medical 
contexts. I shall not insist upon the general causal claims and their interpretation.
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FIGURE 25 CAPACITIES IN MEDICINE
T his fram ew ork  resolves th e  p rob lem s o f th e  C um m ins patho log ical exp lanations. O n  th e  
on e  h an d , I co n cu r w ith  C um m ins, a t  w ork  in  th e  C2 fun c tio n in g  o f item s, are 
d ispositions, or capacities, in tim ate ly  co n n ec ted  w ith  th e  regu larities o f  p u re ’ physiology. 
H ow ever, un like C um m ins, I hold  th a t these  are an ti-H u m ean  capacities -  capacities 
w h ich  d ep en d  on  th e  regu larities o f  ‘p u re ’ physiology on  an  ep istem ic  an d  n o t 
m etaphysica l level an d  w hich  are a t w ork  both  in h ea lth y  and  pa tho log ical co n d itio n s 
(w hen  th e  regu larities  o f  physiology d isappear). To cite th e  C2 fun c tio n s o f item s is to
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provide full-blooded explanations o f diseases, insofar as the  various stim uli and 
interferences affecting the exercise o f their capacities are also m entioned (for the 
particular instances o f diseases we are in terested  in). In an explicit causal form ulation, 
these physiological capacities could vindicate (general as well as) singular causal claims in 
m edicine.
There are several m otives for th inking this proposal is plausible. The m ost im portan t of 
them  is th a t capacities appear to be used in a tacit way in m edical practice and research. I 
th ink  th is m ight be the case for the sim ple reason th a t physiopathology, in the  broad 
sense o f the  term , is based on physiology. A great m any of the physiopathological 
‘tex tbook’ schem es for somatic diseases th a t we have are grounded on the possibilities 
delineated  by the general claims of physiology, m odified in accord w ith the abnorm al 
stim uli w hich can exacerbate or dim inish the physiological m anifestations of biological 
item s. In o ther words, w hat m edicine describes as actually happening in the diseased 
organism s could be said to rest on the range of causal in teractions delineated by 
physiology - on the possibilities o f physiology. The basic view o f m edicine as a sort o f 
‘developm ent’ o f physiology was famously advanced by Canguilhem  in his (1966). 408
I shall try  to  exemplify how this interplay betw een physiology and  physiopathology, 
betw een the  possibilities of physiology and the actual in teractions of pathology, is a t w ork 
in the  following section, which will insist on the causal side of my rationale concerning 
pathological explanations.
§ 4 .4  Ca p a c it ie s  in  m e d ic in e
The presen t section is oriented tow ards the causal vein o f my argum entation  on 
pathological explanations. I shall look here a t an example o f a biological structure that, as 
we shall see, is closely connected w ith our ‘case-study’ -  the  rennin-angiotensin- 
aldosterone system (RAAS henceforth), which has a particularly im portan t behaviour in 
cardiac diseases. In §4.4.1, I shall use this example in order to describe the interplay 
betw een physiology and physiopathology I have m entioned in the previous section, in
408 Even if Canguilhem was not concerned with the causation aspects I deal with in the present thesis.
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connection w ith my hypothesis th a t organism s as nom ological m achines could do justice 
to  the search for positive causes o f diseases. Then, in §4.4.2, I shall re tu rn  to our ‘case 
study’ and indicate how  physiological capacities can be used to vindicate singular causal 
claims abou t pathological organisms.
§ 4 .4 .1  W H A T  ACTUALLY HAPPENS AND WHAT COULD HAPPEN
The rennin-angiotensin-aldosterone system  consists of specific enzym atic/horm onal 
pathw ays involving various organs (kidneys, the  liver and the suprarenal glands) and 
could be viewed as part of the type of biological nom ological m achine I have 
hypothesized in the previous section - a biological setting which is d isrupted in  the 
cardiac diseases in a certain  way, such th a t the  causal roles of biological item s are 
interfered with.
All cardiac diseases have as an ultim ate stage a state called cardiac insufficiency and the 
RAAS plays a pivotal causal role in this pathological stage. The role in question, however, 
is arguably governed by the physiology of the RAAS. I shall describe in the following the 
m ain  features o f this physiology and then  shall try to point ou t the  links w ith cardiac 
insufficiency in general and aortic insufficiency in particular.
A t the  level o f 'pure physiology', the RAAS acts upon the volume of circulating blood and 
the  system ic vascular resistance in response to different environm ental and in ternal 
variations, due to a series of horm ones and enzym es - am ongst which the m ost im portan t 
are rennin, angiotension II and aldosterone.
Rennin is an  enzyme produced by the so called juxtaglom erular granular cells, located in 
the  wall o f the  afferent arterioles (the arterioles th a t bring blood for filtration in kidneys’ 
glom erules). Its synthesis is stim ulated by three factors: the  decrease in the  w all-tension 
o f the  afferent arterioles in question, the stim ulation of sym pathetic nerve endings 
located at glom erular level and the decrease in the  concentration of NaCl in the tubular 
filtrate (the latter being sensed by ano ther group of cells pertaining to kidney’s nephrons
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cells that synthesize 
rennin are located 
in the wall o f  the 
afferent arterioles. 
These cells have 
sympathetic 
innervation and are 
also sensible to the 
variations o f  NaCl 
concentration in 
the distal tubuli, 
sensed by another 
group o f  cells called 
macula dema.
The result o f ren in ’s enzym atic activity is angiotensin II - a powerful vasoconstrictor tha t 
also stim ulates the cardiac hypertrophy. A ngiotensin II acts in tu rn  on the adrenal cortex 
to release aldosterone, a horm one which a t the renal level induces Na and w ater 
reten tion .
409 See Lote (2000)
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Renin breaks down a pre-hormonal 
chemical compound produced by the 
liver (angiotensinogen) enabling thus 
the release o f  angiotensin II, a powerful 
constrictor o f  vascular somatic muscles. 
Angiotensin II stimulates in turn die 
release by the suprarenal glands o f  
aldosterone, whose main action is the 
increasing o f  Na and water 
reabsorbtion in kidneys’ nephrons.
Angiotensin II has however many other 
important effects. It facilitates the 
norepinephrine release from the 
sympathetic nerve endings (thus 
contributing to the increase o f  the 
sympathetic tone), stimulates the release 
o f vasopressin (a pituitary hormone 
which increases the fluid retention in 
the kidneys) and the thirst centres in the 
brain, etc.
FIGURE 27 THE RENIN ENZYMATIC PATHWAY
O ne of the  basic activators of the RAAS is the decrease of cardiac output. That is because 
a decreased cardiac ou tpu t is associated w ith a drop in the wall tension of the afferent 
arterioles (due to the poor blood irrigation at the level of kidneys), a low NaCl 
concen tration  in the tubular filtrate (due to active reabsorbtion of NaCl whenever the 
renal irrigation is low) and an increased tone of the sym pathetic system (due to the 
activated baroreceptors from the aortic notch).
The decrease in cardiac ou tpu t is followed then  - via rennin, angiotensin II and 
aldosterone’s activity - by w ater and Na reten tion  (which restores the circulating blood 
volum e), vasoconstriction (which m aintains blood pressure), further stim ulation o f the 
sym pathetic system (which, inter alia, increases the heart’ contractility), activation of the 
th irs t centres in the brain (which com plem ents aldosterone’s effects), etc.
Informally put, w hen the blood delivered by the heart is lower in volume than  usual (in 
various m ore or less transitory  circum stances -  dehydration, bradycardia, low Na intake, 
blood loss), the RAAS acts and restores the perfusion of tissues by contracting blood 
vessels, increasing the circulating blood/plasm a volum e and increasing heart’s 
contractility. As soon as the cardiac ou tpu t is restored, the RAAS is dow n-regulated.
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FIGURE 28 THE HEART AND THE RAAS
At the level o f 'pure physiology' the RAAS (the 
rennin-angiotensin-aldosterone system) acts in te r  
a lia  upon the circulating blood volume and the 
systemic vascular resistance.
There are three main direct stimuli that initiate 
the enzymatic/hormonal pathways at the level of 
kidneys — a drop in the wall tension of the vessels 
that bring blood for filtration in the kidney’s 
glomerules, a low NaCl concentration in the 
tubular liquid that results from filtration and an 
increased tone of the sympathetic nervous system 
in its renal ramifications.
When the blood delivered by the heart is lower 
than usual, the RAAS acts and restores the 
perfusion of tissues by increasing the systemic 
vascular resistance, heightening the re-absorbtion 
o f Na and water in the distal tubuli and raising the 
heart’s contractility. As soon as the cardiac output 
is restored, the RAAS is down-regulated
Now, in all heart diseases, w hen they reach the stage o f cardiac insufficiency, the cardiac 
o u tp u t decreases. It is no t a transitory  decrease however - the heart simply cannot deliver 
in to  the  circulatory system  sufficient blood. Take the case o f aortic insufficiency - the  
disease th a t our ‘case-study is concerned with. As I have stated in §4.3.1, this disease 
results from  a d isruption of the  aortic valve th a t allows for the  ejected blood to leak back 
in to  the  left ventricle. In the advanced stages, the  aortic leaking produces a decrease in 
the  cardiac o u tpu t th a t cannot be com pensated and the RAAS is accordingly stim ulated. 
However, no m atter w hat the RAAS does, the  cardiac ou tpu t (beyond the level o f the 







drop in the 
wall tension
RAAS
Put differently, as an  u ltim ate  result of the  ‘interference' represented by the modified 
geom etry of the aortic valve, the  RAAS is excessively stim ulated and this has unw anted 
consequences -  the  vessels are excessively constricted and we get hypertension (HTN), 
the  blood volum e is excessively increased and we get in terstitial oedemas, etc. Relatedly, 
the  heart undergoes hypertrophy, d ilatation and subendocardial fibrosis. Thus, the 
in tracardiac pressure is increased and then  transm itted  to the lungs. That is how patien ts 
w ith cardiac problem s end up in em ergency room s w ith acute pulm onary oedema, to pu t 
it th is way.410
Now, one could have an an ti-H um ean reading of this chain of pathological causal 
in teractions, and  by using the term s ‘interference’ and ‘stim uli’, I have already (m ore or 
less tacitly) adopted  this reading. Im portantly, the  ‘active’ term inology I have used is in 
fact no t far away a t all from the one used in m edical textbooks.411
But explicitly, w hat one could claim is th a t the pivotal causal in teractions th a t take place 
in Aol cases are the  ones delineated by physiology. W e have first a range o f causal 
in teractions in which biological item s can engage in. W e have then  interferences (in this 
case, the  d isruption of the  aortic valve) th a t produce abnorm al stim uli, which in  tu rn  
exacerbate the  m anifestations of the biological capacities a t hand.
410 See Arnold (2008)
4U See Tanser (2007), Arnold (2008), Sharpe and Swedgerg (1999)
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FIGURE 29 AOI AND THE RAAS
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The pure ' physiology description of the in teractions betw een the heart, rennin, 
angiotensin  II and aldosterone tells us about the capacities th a t the item s in question 
have. From the ‘inside’ of a nomological m achine, in which the m anifestations of their 
capacities are regulated by the right stim uli and interferences are warded off, we learn a 
sum  of m odal behaviours, as it were. The heart can produce the lowering of pressure in 
the  afferent arterioles, the increase in the sym pathetic tone, the drop in the NaCl 
concentration  at the renal tubular level, etc., rennin  can produce angiotensin II, 
angiotensin  II can produce vascular constriction, activate the th irst centres, induce the 
hypertrophy of the myocardial cells, etc., aldosterone can produce the reten tion  of Na 
and w ater, etc.
Knowing w hat the heart and the RAAS can do perm its one to make sense of the causal 
in teractions th a t actually take place w hen interferences show up. W hen, in Aol cases, 
inside o f the  nom ological m achine constituted, inter alia, by the heart and the RAAS, a 
m ajor interference shows up in th a t the  aortic valve is disrupted, the stim uli triggering
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the  m anifestations of the  capacities a t hand  are modified. W hat actually happens 
afterw ards?
W hat actually happens is directly linked w ith w hat can happen. Let me state again the 
fam iliar pathways. Because of the aortic regurgitation, the ‘n e t’ result of the ventricular 
contractions is low -  a part of the blood ejected into the aorta leaks back into the left 
ventricle and the cardiac ou tpu t is thus decreased. The tension in the  wall o f the afferent 
arterio les is lowered, the baroreceptors from the aortic notch stim ulate the sym pathetic 
nerve endings from the glom erular level and the concentration o f NaCl from the tubular 
filtrate drops. In order to ‘restore’ the adequate cardiac ou tpu t then, the activated RAAS 
prom otes vascular vasoconstriction, reten tion  of Na and water, stim ulation of the  th irst 
centres, further activation of the sym pathetic system, etc.
Renin-angiotensin-aldosterone system
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W hat actually happens in 
A ol cases Hes within the 
scope o f (causal) 
possibility revealed by 
the nomological 
machine described in 
physiology. That the 
RAAS is actually 
stimulated in A ol cases 
is due to the exercise o f 
one o f the heart's 
capacities; that the N a 
and water are actually 
reabsorbed, blood 
vessels are actually 
constricted, etc. is due to 
the exercise o f the 
capacities o f the RAAS 
and its components.
FIGURE  30 WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENS AND WHAT COULD HAPPEN
To repeat, all these represent causal interactions tha t can coherently be viewed as
spaw ning from the capacities of the ‘pure physiology description. It is just th a t the
stim uli and thus the m anifestations of these capacities are exacerbated by the interference
specific for Aol. First, the stim uli received by rennin, angiotensin II and aldosterone are
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excessive. T hat is because, even though the  heart m ay deliver blood through the aortic 
valve a t an  optim um  rate, the  RAAS is continuously stim ulated - informally put, the RAAS 
is triggered as i f  the  left ventricle did no t push enough blood through  the aortic valve in 
systoles.412 Had the interference not been p resent (i.e. had the aortic valve not been 
disrupted) the  RAAS would have been ‘inform ed’ th a t the ejected blood through the 
aortic valve by the  left ventricle, as such, was otherw ise sufficient for the  organism ’s 
hom eostasis and (some of) its actions w ould have been dow n-regulated. Since the 
interference is p resent however, the  RAAS acts in order to restore the  blood circulating 
volum e and h eart’s contractility.
Afterwards, the  effects of (the overly exercised) capacities of RAAS act in tu rn  as excessive 
triggers for the  h ea rt’s own capacities. RAAS produces an increase in the  vascular 
resistance, the  so-called ‘after-load’ of the heart is accordingly heightened and this 
stim ulates the  m yocardial capacity for hypertrophy and dilation. This m yocardial capacity 
is also directly triggered by angiotensin II.413
In the  u lterior phases, all the o ther characteristics o f Aol show up in a row - the  high 
ventricular pressure in diastole, the  early closing of the  m itral valve, the increased 
pressure in the  pulm onary capillaries, the extravasation of proteins in the  pulm onary 
alveoles, fu rther feed-back positive activation of the  RAAS (when the cardiac ou tpu t 
th rough  the aortic valve in systole becom es indeed decreased, in the final stages o f Aol), 
etc.
Now, th is sort o f an ti-H um ean reading th a t can be given to a huge num ber o f diseases, 
am ongst the life-threatening conditions in som atic m edicine. Indeed, except cancers 
perhaps, alm ost all diseases have at least one part of their m echanism  involving
412 In point of fact, this is a variant of Aol - the variant in which the displacement of the aortic valve is large 
enough to bring about quickly the cardiac insufficiency stage, in the context in which the volume of blood 
ejected through the aortic valve may (still) be unaffected. Of course, there are variants o f Aol in which the 
displacement is smaller and thus the evolution of the disease takes longer. In such cases, by the time Aol 
reaches the stage of cardiac insufficiency (in which the role o f the RAAS takes central stage) the volume of 
blood as such ejected through the aortic valve is also diminished. But in these variants as well, no matter 
the stage of the disease, the stimulation of the RAAS worsens the condition by bringing about hypertension 
for instance. That is why medicines such as ACIs (angiotensin convertase inhibitors) - drugs that block a 
crucial pathway of the RAAS - are administered in aortic insufficiency; see Sharpe and Swedgerg (1999)
9 Angiotensin II induces among others the secretion of growth factors from the cardiac fibroblasts and 
endothelial cells. See Willenheimer et. al (1999)
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dim inishing an d /o r exacerbation o f the  causal relations from physiology. Graves’ Disease 
is o f course, ano ther illustrative exam ple.414 Assum ing th a t capacities are thus present in 
the  m edical realm , w hat is their involvem ent in m edical diagnoses? T hat is, how could 
they  justify causal claims abou t singular causal in teractions taking place in particular 
organism s?
§ 4 .4 .2  Ca p a c i t i e s  a n d  s i n g u l a r  c a u s a l  c l a i m s  f o r  d is e a s e s
I have argued th a t the  physiopathological ‘textbook’ rendition  of the  role o f the  RAAS in 
aortic insufficiency is based on physiology, in the  sense in which w hat actually happens in 
Aol (and in som atic diseases in general) could be said to rest on the range o f causal 
in teractions delineated by physiology, on the possibilities o f physiology. Arguably, w hat 
we have in th is interplay betw een the general causal claims of m edicine (or its ‘causal 
laws’) and the  general causal claims of physiology, are physiological capacities and certain  
‘aborm al’ interferences and stim uli th a t exacerbate or dim inish the m anifestations of 
these capacities.415
This is a sort o f (anti-H um ean) rationale th a t can ground singular causal claims
414 Other salient examples that could readily be cited are peptic ulcer, Cushing syndrome, diabetes mellitus, 
glomerulonephritis, cardiomiopathy. As I have noted in the previous section, Canguilhem has actually 
provided a metaphysics of medicine which, even if not discussing explicitly the causation aspects I am 
concerned with in the present chapter, is grounded on the idea that the pathological emerges from an 
exacerbation or diminishing of the physiological; see Canguilhem (1991). As for the case of cancers 
mentioned above, it does appear that that they could not be readily assimilated to my scheme, simply 
because the morphological transformations they presuppose are often so dramatic that the link to the 
physiological background is lost (see for instance the case of Burkitt's lymphoma). Notably though, there 
are some cancers in which metaplasia simply presupposes that a type o f tissue, in its pathological 
behaviour, assumes the physiological background of another type of tissue. For example, the small cell lung 
cancer induces high levels of cortisol in the blood by way of secreting a hormone called ACTH, which is 
physiologically secreted by the pituitary gland -  see Chabner&Thomson (2008) and their discussion of 
paraneoplastic syndromes.
415 That this anti-Humean reading can be viewed as delineating a sum of ‘causal laws’ for diseases is due to 
the fact that the ‘context o f diseases, even if situated ‘outside’ vis-a-vis the nomological machines of 
physiology, exhibit nevertheless a degree of regularity. When the nomological machines of physiology are 
disrupted and interferences, abnormal stimuli, etc. show up, the biological capacities do not manifest 
completely waywardly. In a sense, organisms with chronic illnesses themselves can be viewed as a sort of 
nomological machines that enable us to know about stimuli and interferences, and their influence on the 
manifesting of capacities. The full-blown nomological machines should however be taken to be the 
physiological ones, at least for reasons related to the principle of parsimony; see also the discussion of the 
worry concerning the multiplication of capacities, in §4.3.2
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concerning organism s w ith the sym ptom s of Aol. Indeed, I shall try to show th a t it is a 
rationale th a t is also tacitly presen t in the som atic m edical practice and research w hen it 
com es to m edical diagnoses, i.e. w hen it com es to causal conclusions about particular 
instances of diseases.
Let us m ake a bit m ore vivid the hypothetical scenario around which a part of this 
chap ter has revolved. Envisage the patien t o f our ‘case-study’ w ith the sheer sym ptom s 
and signs of Aol (shortness of breath  on exertion, dizziness, rhythm ic nodding of head, 
quick filling and collapse of carotid arteries, etc.) entering into an em ergency yard. The 
m edics perform  the m ost im portan t paraclinical test, the eco-cardiography, which shows 
inter alia the leaking of blood from the aorta.
/T ran seso p h ag ea l 
ecographies o f  
A o l hearts, 
ca tch ing  the  aortic 
regurg itan t jet, the  
h y p ertrophy  and  
d ilatation  o f  
ven tricu lar walls, 
the h igh 
ven tricu lar 
diastolic pressure, 
etc.
Usually, th is is enough to pu t a diagnosis. O f course, if the patien t is really in a critical 
state, further tests are perform ed - the pressure in the pulm onary capillaries is 
ascertained using an intra-atrial catheter, an EKG is used to check (am ong o ther things) 
the  ventricular hypertrophy, a urinary test assesses (am ong other things) natriuria, etc. 
The question we need to consider is -  would all these tests be enough for a Hum ean? 
W ould they  be enough for the Hum ean to infer that, in this particular instance, the 
m odified geom etry of the aortic valve has enabled the chain of in teractions whose 
outcom e are the  sym ptom s and of his overall condition?
F IG U R E  31 C A R D IA C  E C O G R A P H Y  (R E P R O D U C E D  F R O M  JANELLE, 2 0 0 3 )
The Cartw right-inspired critique that I have presented in §4.2.2 and §4.2.3 would be that,
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from  a H um ean po in t of view, all these tests show nothing. Insofar as a H um ean is 
concerned, a p roponen t of Cartw right w ould say, we m ight have there a case o f accidental 
succession of one factor (the putative effect or set of effects) following spatio-tem porally 
ano ther factor (the putative cause or set o f causes), irrespective o f w hether we discuss 
here abou t the heart or any o ther im plicated item. These tests assess a case involving 
singular in teractions and the m edics draw  conclusions about the particular organism  at 
hand. A H um ean needs however (universal) regularities.
W e have the general ‘causal laws’ of the  physiopathological schemes, which, in practice, 
guide the  m edics in inferring w hat actually takes place in th a t singular organism  and 
w hich are based on endless population level assessm ents and m icrostructural laboratory 
research. But ultim ately, if no regularities of the sort dem anded by the H um ean can be 
found or justified, then  the m edics’ conclusion rests in the end on m ore or less tacit anti- 
H um ean grounds. And indeed, one could argue th a t the  regularities dem anded by the 
H um ean are missing, in th a t in the case of this pa tien t we m ay have a different causal 
context.
For one thing, there  m ight be in place a com bination of causal factors and stim uli th a t 
does no t resem ble any of the  causal contexts in which the general physiopathological 
schem e was established.416 Suppose th a t the patien t of our ‘case-study’ suffers no t only 
from  aortic insufficiency (Aol) bu t also from diabetes m ellitus II, Cushing’s syndrom e, 
am iloidosis and  has a m odification o f the  aldosterone synthetase gene enabling an 
excessive aldosterone synthesis (familial prim ary hyperaldosteronism  form 1).
The factors th a t are p resent in these conditions can also act on the same sites th a t the 
factors o f Aol are said to act -  diabetes m ellitus influences the sym pathetic tom e and the 
NaCl concentration  in the tubular filtrate, amiloidosis produces cardiac hypertrophy, 
Cushing's syndrom e produces hypertension, the  faamilial prim ary hyperaldosteronism  
has as consequence, o f course, increased aldosterone synthesis. 417 The precise 
com bination o f the causal factors present in these conditions m ight no t have been
416 Of course, what I try to frame above is what could count, for this imaginary patient, as a variation in the 
causal context that would mark the difference between the ‘internal validity’ and the ‘external validity' o f  
our causal claims discussed by Cartwright; see Cartwright (2007:61) and also §4.2.2
417 See Kasper et. al (2008)
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studied in any sort of laboratory research o r/and  population level assessm ents. If the 
background constitu ted  by th is array o f factors was not explicitly present though, then  
any im perfect regularities established (by w hatever m eans) a t a population level and the 
a ttend ing  H um ean probabilistic general causal claims - just as any exceptionless 
regularities (established by w hatever m eans) at a m icrostructural level and the a ttending  
H um ean determ inistic causal claims - cannot rule out the  possibility th a t the d isruption 
of the  aortic valve was no t actually a preventative for the sym ptom s th a t subsequently 
em erged.
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FIGURE 32 A CAUSAL CONTEXT CONSTITUTED OF A BACKGROUND WITH A DIFFERENT ARRAY OF CAUSAL 
FACTORS.
One does no t need to resort though to such generous com binations of diseases (and 
causal factors) to argue th a t this patien t may not behave as others have. O ne could poin t 
ou t th a t the  causal context of this patien t is unique only by m entioning, on the one hand, 
th a t in the  population level studies the participants are random ised. O n the o ther hand, 
one could m ention  th a t there are differences betw een any m ore or less shielded 
laboratory settings researching the m icrostructural aspects and real-life hum an organism s 
- in the ‘sheltered’ conditions of laboratories, causal influences th a t show up in real-life
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s itu a t io n s  are e l im in a te d . 418
E ach o f  the ‘causal law s’ o f  the  
A o l schem e cou ld  be questioned  
w ith  regard to  its sco p e  over  
individual organism s, even  by 
appealing to ‘trivial’ differences  
constitu ting  a ‘d ifferent’ causal 
context.
T h e  interactions inside the RA A S  
(e.g. the o n es con n ection  
angiotensin  II w ith  aldostrone, at 
the level o f  the suprarenal glands) 
have n o t been  figured here but can  
be questioned  just as well.
FIGURE 33 WHAT CAUSES WHAT?
On an extreme note, one could even point to ‘trivial’ differences that could undermine 
the causal inferences of the Humean from the general ‘causal laws’ to the singular causal 
interaction at hand. One could question, for instance, the ‘causal law’ having as relata the 
low cardiac output and the drop in the wall tension of the renal arterioles by indicating 
that the particular organism at hand has, say, the left renal artery spinning off the aorta in 
the thoracic region.419 To take another example, one could question that, in this 
organism, the RAAS produces cardiac hypertrophy by pointing out that the liver (the 
organ producing angiotensinogen - the peptide precursor of angiotensin II) has two lobes 
instead of three,420 etc.
Of course, these are trivial differences, even for a lay eye, not to mention a medic or 
biologist. Nonetheless, we should ask, from what point of view are they trivial? Why do 
not the number of lobes of the liver or the branching position of the renal artery (when it
418 E xam ples here cou ld  be th e  m icrobiological stu d ies sim pliciter  that iso la te  system s, organs, tissu es, cells  
-  d ow n  to  th e  level o f  cellular com p o n en ts . A n im al ex p erim en tation  could  also be adduced; see  
C artw right’s d iscu ssio n  o f  laboratory con d itio n s and G alilean idea lisation  in her (1989; 185-188, 227, 228). 
R an dom isation  in m ed ica l trials is d iscussed  in Cartwright (20073:58-68).
419 T his is a variant described  in Fernet et. al (1987)
42°The third b e in g  th e  so  called  R iedel’s lobe - an inferior projection  o f  th e  right lob e  on  th e  right o f  th e  
gallb ladder; Cf. Gillard (1998)
246
Aol (disruption o f  
the aortic valve)low  
cardiac output
drop in the low  N aC l sympathetic








com es to producing o f renn in  or the em ergence o f cardiac hypertrophy) count as 
interferences, or as having a causal influence o f w hatever sort?
For the  an ti-H um ean (who knows physiology!), the answer is (relatively) simple: because 
all these differences have no th ing  to do w ith the exercise of capacities.421 For a H um ean 
who stuck to the  principle th a t causation talk  can ultim ately be grounded in regularities, 
the  answ er should be som ething like th is422 - because in the  Best System th a t w ould 
organise all the  facts o f hum an pathology in the  entire history w ith the best balance 
betw een sim plicity and strength, its theorem s w ould/should  no t m ention the num ber of 
lobes o f the liver or the branching position of the  renal artery. Alternatively, the  answer 
w ould invoke the fact th a t a Laplacian dem on - who knew everything th a t occurred along 
the  entire history (past and present) - w ould not count any liver lobes or any aorta 
bifurcating position in inferring (for the  case of an Aol organism  reaching the 
insufficiency stage), from the decrease of cardiac output, all the consequences m entioned 
in the  general physiopathological schem e of Aol.
In the ir decisions, the  m edics however do no t consult any Laplacian dem on or appeal to 
any best system s organising the facts o f the  entire history in a such and such a way. This 
is, if you like, a methodological point and no t a metaphysical one.423 It m ight well be the 
case that, in  the  end, the  H um ean m etaphysical position is just as coherent as the an ti- 
H um ean one -‘the  spoils to the  victor' as David Lewis used to say424 - and a further 
discussion o f th is d ispute is beyond the scope o f th is chapter. But w hen looking a t the 
actual practice o f m edicine, the  d istinction m ade by m edics betw een w hat is trivial and 
w hat is no t helps one in in terpreting  the conclusions draw n in m edical research and 
diagnoses as tacitly involving an anti-H um ean stance.
It has often been argued th a t physicists act in their experim ents ignoring the H um ean
421 On this Humean reading, knowing physiology is knowing about the physiological capacities and what 
stimulates (or interferes) with their manifestations. This knowledge is translated into the medical research 
and practice. Arguably, medics possess a knowledge of stimuli and interferences that is not limited to the 
textbook information but is also accumulated in practice and can be used to differentiate between 
particular cases and particular patients. The latter experience is important because it cannot be codified in 
general rules o f thumb. It is not a ‘catcher’, to use one of Cartwright’s suggestive expressions (Cartwright 
2007a: 62-64), which could provide us deductively the causes at work in individual cases.
422 See for instance Papineau (1991: 409), Russo and Williamson (2007:13) Schrenk (2008)
423 See Carwright’s reply to Lipton’s comments on ‘The Dappled World’ in Cartwright (2000°: 271-279)
424 Lewis (1995)
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w orries on causation.425 W hat I w anted to suggest in the  last part of th is chapter was tha t 
the  same is the  case in m edicine. Any treatise of physiopathology dwells on the causal 
in teractions o f a physiology treatise - the  huge m ajority o f the actual-s described in 
physiopathology rest on the  ca n s  of physiology and knowledge of interferences and 
stim uli. In the  same vein, physicians and  m edical researchers, w hen m oving from the 
level of laboratories and population level assessm ents to the one of particular organisms, 
w ork using an ti-H um ean assum ptions. They assum e a range of causal in teractions which 
item s can engage in, and adjudicate which o f the  potential effects (and to w hat degree, 
how  intensely) shows up in singular cases, using contextual knowledge of the  particular 
stim uli p resen t in each case.426
§ 4 .5  C o n c l u d i n g  r e m a r k s  o n  f u n c t i o n a l  e x p l a n a t i o n s
I have outlined here an approach to functional explanations th a t is in accord w ith the 
account o f natural kinds o f diseases developed in chapters 1-3. Let me recall very briefly 
the  rationale th a t represented the starting  poin t for the  present chapter. Since kinds of 
diseases are circum scribed by determ ining properties (biological properties a ttended  by 
causal powers) and to explain is to pin down causes, it seem s to follow th a t the 
explanations for diseased organism s should be searched for a t the level of the 
determ ining  properties characterising their kind. That is to say, the causal powers 
a ttend ing  these properties should explain the in teractions of biological item s and the 
em erging m anifestations (symptoms) exhibited by the organism s under focuses. O n the
425 For instance Lowe (1989) and Armstrong (1997) have drawn such a conclusion with regard to the crucial 
(non-repeatable) experiments in physics. Cartwright has made a similar point when discussing the Stanford 
gravitational experiment in her (1989) and (1999).
426 In the philosophical literature there are no systematic treatments of the role of anti-Humean powers in 
medical causation. In fact, there are very few papers that treat specifically medical causes and mention the 
Humean/anti-Humean distinction (excepting here the frequent, dilettante attempts o f epidemiologists to 
refer to natural necessity; see for instance Lipton and 0degaard (2005). Moreover, most if not all of them  
adopt a Humean view of medical interactions (e.g. Whitbeck, 1977, Marcum, 2008). Very recently for 
instance, Williamson and Russo have applied in their (2007) a neo-Humean account (i.e. the epistemic 
account) to medicine, concluding that ‘an epistemic account of causality is required to capture the full 
complexity o f [medical] causal evidence’ Russo and Williamson (2007:13, italics added). No mention of the 
other, anti-Humean side of the debate was made in their paper though. In this context, framing an anti- 
Humean response or alternative - even if in a sketchy manner, as I did - might represent a worthy 
enterprise.
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other hand, functions seem ingly represent an inextricable part of biology and medicine, 
w hich any philosophical approach to explanations needs to reckon with. How can one 
deal w ith the functional explanations of diseases then?
I have tried  to provide an answer, on the one hand by m anoeuvring the pair of 
distinctions function /function  failure and positive/negative causes, and on the o ther hand 
by in terp re ting  the functioning o f biological item s as the m anifesting o f capacities. In the 
following, I wish to add a few rem arks about some particular parts o f my argum entation, 
and  also a conjecture.
In the  final part o f th is chapter, a specific assum ption I have adopted  was th a t in the 
realm  of the  pathological, the H um ean cannot find the appropriate sort of regularities in 
order to justify the  general causal claims advanced in m edicine. The respective claims, I 
have shown, could be vindicated in the  fram ew ork o f biological capacities - capacities 
revealed a t the  level of ‘pure physiology’ and in the  exercise of w hich the functioning of 
item s consists. The level of ‘pure physiology’ was taken to be one at which the exercise of 
these capacities (and the  functioning of item s) is regulated by the right stim uli and all the 
interferences are w arded off.
Now, claiming that, by the rigorous H um ean standards, the sort of regularities th a t are 
found in m edicine cannot ground general (as well as singular) causal claims, evidently, 
does no t entail th a t the m edical dom ain is a realm  o f chaos, in which no regularities 
w hatsoever m ay be found (using th is tim e ‘regularities’ in a broad sense).427 Had diseases 
no t exhibited some sort of patterns, had no t sym ptom s grouped them selves in 
syndrom es, etc. m edical science would no t have been even conceivable. M edicine has its 
sort o f regularity and stability, and has a p lethora of causal claims th a t are successfully 
used in trea tm en ts  and further research. It is simply that, one could argue, the  stability 
found in m edicine is no t sufficient to ground a H um ean in terp reta tion  of these causal 
claims. There is always a possible variation in the  causal context. The fact th a t in spite of 
th is variation, the ‘causal laws' found in the  physiopathological schem es w ork and are 
fruitfully used in research and treatm ents simply underlines a po in t I have tried to make 
clear in § 4.4.2 -  tacitly, m edics employ anti-H um ean assum ptions.
427 Recall that, according to Cartwright, not even physics and chemistry exhibit the sort o f regularities that 
would fit the Humean stance on causation; see §4.2.1 and Cartwright (1999).
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S o m e  f i n a l  r e m a r k s
I have m entioned  in chapter 1 th a t natural kinds are the m odern heirs o f w hat the 
scholastic philosophy, by taking up a m ainly A ristotelian (but also Platonic) scheme, 
construed as Ideas in God’s m ind. From  this po in t of view, th a t diseases could be natural 
kinds appears alm ost as a blasphem y. W hen creating the w orld God could no t have 
considered th a t diseases need to have a place am ong the  substances constitu ting  the 
reality, as it were. Indeed, it was the A ristotelian concept of substance th a t was involved 
in  scholastics’ endeavour to reconcile the Greek ideal o f an eternal universe w ith God’s 
om nipotence by in troducing the paradigm atic Ideas as in term ediating the Creation. 
Diseases are im perfections, distortions of (substantive and non-substantive) universals’ 
instan tia tion  in the  sublunar realm, a medieval w ould have said.428 In Locke’s (already 
anachronistic) term s, one could say th a t diseases are dependen t entities, m odes, and 
im plicitly suggesting th a t they qualify am ong the substances is a 'category m istake’.
O n th is side of the discussion, a proper answer from the defender of diseases as natural 
kinds w ould have to consider the  history of philosophy and the way in which, from the 
seventeenth  century  onwards, the concept o f substance has begun to lose its original 
significance.429 1 could no t have tried to tackle such problem s in the present thesis, which 
was strictly concerned w ith an analysis of the m edical realm  vis-^-vis natural kinds and 
functional explanations, w ith the conceptual m eans and strategies o f the  contem porary 
philosophy of science. In my argum ent th a t diseases are natural kinds I tried, however, to 
consider as m uch as I could this ‘blasphem ous’ category m istake. I did this by offering a 
lo t o f space for discussion to the  in tu ition  o f carving nature (and its curren t expressions 
and  possible substantiations) and also to the phase/non-non  phase distinctions, in the 
m ultiple ways in which it seems to th rea ten  the placing of diseased organism s into the 
category o f natural kinds o f objects.
In fact, m y argum ent in chapter 2 th a t certain natural kind requirem ents are no t justified 
could have been m ore simply expressed by m erely em phasizing th a t criterion IV plays a 
crucial role in the  evaluation of several o ther criteria. I chose instead to integrate the
428 See Nandler (1998) Klima (2008), Funkenstein (1989)
429 See Lagerlund (2009)
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argum entative vein concerning the diachronic identity  of kind m em bers w ithin the 
in terrogation  over the  intuitive burden  th a t attends contem porary  discourses about 
natural kinds. I th en  offered a divide as to w hat these in tu itions could possibly m ean (if 
we distance ourselves from  the initial A ristotelian/Platonic/m edieval context and look at 
p resent-day m etaphysics o f science). Indeed, my point could be reform ulated by saying 
that, if one would w ant to prove th a t there  we have a category m istake in viewing diseases 
as natural kinds (w ithout appealing to God’s ideas or w hatnot), one would have to bite 
the  bullet and assum e explicitly the identity  sense of carving nature a t its joints. Similarly, 
if one w ould w ant to show th a t diseases are fundam entally processes and the ‘static’ 
fram ew ork of natural kinds of objects is entirely out of place, one w ould have to find 
entirely  new ways of draw ing the phase/non-phase distinction.
W ith  th is identity  caveat, I have shown th a t betw een (life-threatening) conditions in 
som atic m edicine and  the exact science kinds we do no t have an  ontological gap b u t a 
difference of degree. Further on, I have shown th a t we could provide adequate functional 
for diseased organism s construed as natural kind m em bers, by way of appealing to 
C artw right’s no tion  of capacity. It should be said th a t Cartw right situates her capacities as 
m odern  heirs of A ristotelian natures.430 Given that, of course, the  very notion o f function 
is A ristotelian, I could say th a t one additional reason why the enquiry in the first and 
second part o f my thesis is unitary  is th a t it am ounts in a sense to a (tentative) re- 
conceptualising of traditional Aristotelian categories and giving them  new uses.
Leaving the history of philosophy aside, Cartw right is also an im portan t au tho r for the 
first part of my thesis because my claim th a t no ontological gap separates disease kinds 
and  exact science kinds is in the trail of the  ‘dappled’ picture of the world th a t Cartw right 
argues in favour of, in her a ttem pt to reject the  hierarchical view of sciences.431 W hile 
being very sym pathetic towards and actually adm iring her views, however, I have not 
adop ted  (and did no t need to adopt) in my discussion of natu ral lands her starting  points 
and  argum entative aims. Cartw right m ainly discusses causation, seem s to  adop t an 
‘em ergen tist’ view of special science properties and is a staunch an ti-H um ean 432 O n my
430 See Cartwright (1989:187-200,1999: 77-104)
431 See Cartwright (1999)
432 See her reply to Peter Menzies’s suggestions, in the Philosophical Book’s issue dedicated to her work; 
Cartwright (2002c) and Lipton (2002)
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p art I have only assum ed supervenience for m edical properties and the an ti-H um ean 
stance was cautiously adopted, as an conceptual hypothesis th a t could add to the 
plausibility of functional explanations for disease kind m em bers. This cautiousness has its 
roots, of course, in the  lim ited scope of th is thesis, bu t no t only.
To appeal to a ra ther exotic illustrative treatise in the  present context, in the In troduction 
to  his ‘Liberalism’,433 John Gray, a defender of th is political doctrine, stated  th a t he 
w anted  to offer an exposition of liberalism  th a t could be useful bo th  for its friends and 
enem ies. Gray’s respective depiction of bo th  the strengths and weaknesses of a position is 
an  impressive example o f fairness in argum entation, which I have tried to follow, on a 
m ore m odest level. Thus, som eone who w anted to preserve the classical (medieval) 
connota tion  of substance could actually use the first chapters o f th is thesis in order to 
deny the existence of natural kinds in m edicine, simply by following the identity  caveat I 
have fo rm ula ted .434 The epistem ological difficulties I have portrayed to the identity  sense 
o f carving nature  seem  to me extrem ely serious bu t the  underlying m etaphysics is 
coheren t and o f course, I could not exclude th a t these trem endously  intricate difficulties 
could be overcome. This does not m ean th a t my conclusion is w eakened. If these 
difficulties are not overcome, again, diseases are natural kinds.
The sam e is the  case for m y application of Cartw right’s an ti-H um ean schem e in order to 
m ake sense of functional explanations for disease kinds m em bers. Cartw right often uses 
argum ents th a t have to do w ith the epistem ology and practical m ethodology of science in 
order to advance m etaphysical claims about the nature of causality.435 However, I have 
m entioned  from  the  beginning of chapter 4 th a t my purpose is no t (and could not 
possibly be) to adjudicate betw een H um eanism  and anti-H um eanism  in general, and 
even less to po in t ou t w hat nature the causality governing the m edical realm  has. W hat I 
have tried to do was to show th a t i f  we’re trying to m ake sense o f functional explanations 
for diseased organism s construed as m em bers of natural kinds, th en  Cartw right’s schem e 
is a suitable working hypothesis. This hypothesis suits the  special sciences, is coherent
433 Gray (1995)
434 In point of fact, my caveat regarding the identity of kind members is closely connected with Aristotle’s 
view of the relation between primary and secondary substances See Gobbo (2000:84), Dahl (1997:233)’ Ayers 
(1991:20)
435 For criticism, see for instance Psillos (2008), Papineau (1991).
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w ith practical judgm ent o f m edics the m edical practice and offers a background our 
in tu itions th a t som ething has gone w rong’ (and is exacerbated an d /o r dim inished) in 
diseased organism s.436
However, any argum ent as to w hat causality in m edicine is, w ould have to take into 
account no t (only) the  m ethodology of m edicine and our conceptual hypotheses on 
various levels (as for instance in relation to  the  natural kind level). Such an argum ent 
w ould also have to consider the intricate m etaphysical dilem m as th a t concern the nature 
o f properties, their association w ith causal powers, the  identity  o f these causal powers, 
etc .437 In this sense, again, the general description of the  m etaphysical positions involved 
in the  H um ean/an ti-H um ean  dispute from §4.2 as well as the  clarification of C artw right’s 
position  from § 4.3, could be used by one in order to argue th a t actually, H um eanism  only 
suits the  m edical science. But again, such an argum ent would have to tackle the intricate 
m etaphysical dilem m as I have m entioned. O therwise, anti-H um eanism  rem ains a 
powerful hypothesis for causality in m edicine.
W ord count: 98, 639 (bibliography included)
436 Given that, as I have stated in the end of § 4.4.2, in the philosophical literature there are no systematic 
treatments of the role o f anti-Humean powers in medical causation, I thought that looking at how  
Carwright’s views suit medicine is also worthy enterprise.
437 See Williamson and Russo (2007) who discuss the causes in medicine but do not say what the truth- 
makers o f their causal claims are.
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